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 Disassembling the Trust Machine 
Three cuts on the pol i t ical matter of blockchain 
Jaya Klara Brekke 
 
Abstract: 
Blockchain technology is, in part, a proposal to resolve ‘the political’ through technical means: 
decentralised networks to solve the problem of authority; cryptography to coordinate and 
secure the network; and game theory and incentive design to solve network behaviour. This 
PhD thesis draws on theoretical work by Karen Barad (2007) and Jacques Rancière 
(Rancière, 2010) to ask the question of what matters politically in blockchain technology – 
both in the sense of matter as becoming material of a new mediation of the political, but also 
mattering in the sense of being of political importance to engineers, developers and 
communities forming around blockchain as a potential. Rather than treating blockchain as 
coherent thing to be either celebrated or criticised, this thesis proposes and attempts to draw 
out the ways in which the potentials of blockchain are negotiated as part of its political effects, 
looking towards these negotiations to understand how political differences are made and 
sought materialised. Three approaches to the political are articulated to analyse Bitcoin and 
Ethereum as case studies and shift their terms of debate. Firstly, addressing the question of 
algorithmic determinacy, an approach is proposed for critically understanding a blockchain 
proposition that does not immediately revert to a competition of control between ‘human’ and 
‘machine’ through the notion of the insensible, drawing on work by geographer of the inhuman 
Yusoff (2013a). Secondly, drawing on political theorist Rancière (2010) a particular blockchain 
sensibility is articulated, addressing the question of the particular kind of ‘disruption’ that 
blockchain presents. Its specific provenance in political histories of decentralised network 
computation opens up political significance beyond its intersections with financial capitalism. 
Finally, addressing the question of blockchain as a resolution to the political, the thesis 
introduces the concept of dissensible as an ongoing potential for incompatible sensibilities 
and their negotiation. 
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1  Introduction  
 
This thesis addresses the question of the political in and through a technology that claims to 
solve it. The fascinating proposition of blockchain technology lies in the ability of an algorithm 
to determine consensus across a decentralised network without resorting to an external 
authority for decision and enforcement. As such, blockchain technology has been widely 
pitched as solving the problems of ‘trust’, ‘authority’ and ‘consensus’: if it can be 
mathematically proven that no one in particular has control of the network, then such a 
network can be used as a neutral, ‘trustless’ substrate for any potential application, facilitating 
connections between people, places and things (Nakamoto, 2008; Szabo, 2014; Wood, 
2014a; Economist, 2015). More specifically, ‘blockchain’ describes a linear chain of 
cryptographically hashed ‘blocks’ containing information about events. This linear history of 
events is both stored and verified in a decentralised manner: nodes in the network ‘witness’ 
events, and agree on which ones are considered valid through a consensus algorithm and 
hold the full record of agreed-upon events. This particular aspect, that consensus about 
events is arrived at algorithmically rather than through some external authority, force, law, 
doctrine or belief, is what has also lent blockchain the name ‘trust machine’ and ‘truth 
machine’ (Vigna and Casey, 2018). It is a proposition for an algorithmically determined and 
enforced truth of events that is arrived at without the need to trust any person or institution, 
provably beyond the control of any single part of the system.  
The promise of blockchain is that by resolving issues of decentralised consensus and trust, 
the need for any external mediation disappears, replaced instead by a trustless peer-to-peer 
network. External mediation refers to any person, institution or authority whether in network 
engineering, politics, law, finance or economics: a decentralised network would replace 
authority in which a consensus algorithm resolves any incompatible disputes and ensures 
consensus in the network; code would replace law and execute immediately and exactly as 
written; cryptography would ensure the authenticity of records and organise consensus; 
transactions would take place directly between nodes, circumventing the need for and control 
by financial institutions; and money creation would be determined by and executed through 
an immutable protocol rather than a government. This was the basis of the ‘disruptive’ 
potential of blockchain and why some have argued that it ‘changes everything’ (Robinson and 
Leising, 2015; McKinsey, 2016; Tapscott and Tapscott, 2018). The realisation and 
development of such a project turned out to be far more complex, and the political, in the 
sense of the possibility for things to be different and the negotiation over such differences, 
continues to creep back in. Nevertheless, ‘blockchain’ has managed to capture the 
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imagination and ongoing efforts of correction and maintenance across a variety of fields, 
backgrounds, people and places. Rather than immediately dismissing claims made for it, 
then, with this thesis I aim to ‘meet the blockchain halfway’ and ‘stay with the trouble’ (to 
paraphrase book titles of techno-scientific theorists Barad (2007) and Haraway (2016)) in 
order to understand how and why blockchain is being developed, maintained and corrected 
for. The thesis covers the tumultuous and formative early years, focusing on the two largest 
blockchain networks, namely Bitcoin and Ethereum: I trace the invention of blockchain in the 
peer-to-peer electronic payment system Bitcoin in 2008, and situate this within a longer 
history of anti-authoritarian decentralised network technologies; I trace these ideas through 
the ‘generalisation’ of blockchain in the launch of Ethereum in 2014, a project to make a 
‘Turing-complete’ protocol, able to facilitate any kind of application beyond currencies; and 
finally, I discuss two major conflicts in these cases in the years 2016 and 2017 in what has 
been called a constitutional crisis whereby the main proposition of blockchain, as a 
decentralised network protocol that would solve the problem of consensus and authority, was 
severely challenged (cf. TwoBitIdiot, 2017).1 These crises led to renegotiation of the meaning 
and purpose of ‘decentralisation’, the promises of trustlessness and a focus on questions of 
protocol governance in blockchain systems. Tracing through the specifics of these technical 
and political histories enables a more precise understanding of the ways in which blockchain 
as a ‘disruptive’ technology addresses questions of decentralisation, trust, consensus and 
authority. With this thesis, I aim to resituate blockchain within a broader politicised history 
such that its disruptive potential is better understood and its political implications can be more 
precisely analysed in the literature, as well as deliberately shaped in engineering and 
development practices.  
In this introduction, I first describe the three main ways I address the political in blockchain in 
what I describe as ‘cuts’, drawing in particular on philosopher Karen Barad’s onto-
epistemology (Barad, 2007) and the political theory of Jacques Rancière (Rancière, 2006, 
2010), and describe the main research questions that I look to answer. I then describe the 
broader context and importance of blockchain and the specific cases that I have worked with 
in the thesis. I finally give an outline of the thesis chapters and its overall structure before 
concluding.  
 
                                                       
1 Turing-completeness describes the ability for a given machine to simulate any ‘Turing machine’ – usually meaning 
able to run any potential type of computation. Most programming languages are Turing-complete, but blockchain had 
up until then been understood as part of a particular application rather than a computational substrate. 
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1.1  Three ‘cuts’ on the polit ical in blockchain 
The primary research question of this thesis draws together work by theoretical physicist and 
feminist philosopher Karen Barad and political theorist Jacques Rancière in order to ask what 
matters politically in blockchain? By ‘matters’, I refer to Barad’s understanding of the word as 
literally mattering as in making a material difference (2007, pp.132-185) and by ‘politically’ 
and I refer to Rancière’s notion of the political as the contestation and redistribution of 
sensibilities (Rancière, 2010, pp. 27–44). The political theory of Rancière describes ‘the 
political’ as a moment of disruption and redistribution to a given sensibility. By sensibility, he 
refers to a common sense understanding of what matters, what is right or wrong, who belongs 
or doesn’t, what is desirable or undesirable and so on. In this sense, the research question 
addresses the ways that blockchain distributes and redistributes political sensibilities in ways 
that come to matter also materially. In this thesis I use these two theorists to also answer this 
question by articulating three approaches to the political in blockchain: the insensible, the 
sensible and the dissensible. I elaborate on Rancière’s conception of the political by 
articulating my own concept of the dissensible, as a disruption to a given sensibility and the 
question of incompatible sensibilities. I elaborate further, raising the issue of the insensible, 
drawing on work by geographer of the inhuman, Kathryn Yusoff (Yusoff, 2013a), discussing 
the necessary limits of any given sensibility, of knowledge of what matters, as a problem for 
the preconditions of the political. Here, I briefly describe the more specific sub-questions of 
my research that have informed these three approaches. 
Bringing together Barad and Rancière in particular allows for an approach to the political in 
blockchain that crosses material, technical, social, political and economic distinctions. This is 
the main contribution of the thesis, but it also presents some limitations. Because significant 
work goes into analysing and shifting the onto-epistemological terms of debate, there is little 
scope to address the further implications of such a shift. This means that the thesis is 
primarily focused on epistemological and ontological questions of the two case studies, and 
perhaps more straightforward analyses of their immediate political implications are not 
addressed. For example, the different uses of Bitcoin as a currency and payment system or 
Ethereum as a protocol and platform, and the effects and implications of specific applications, 
are beyond the immediate scope of this thesis. Instead, the focus is on the protocols 
themselves, the communities developing blockchain projects, and the ideas, experiences and 
contexts that inform them as a means to clarify epistemological and ontological 
understandings of blockchain and shift the terms of critique, debate and development. Three 
sub-questions guided the research and led to this particular theoretical approach and a focus 
on the protocols themselves and developer communities, histories and contexts: 
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1. Which are the active ‘mediators’ in the blockchain assemblage, what differences do they 
produce and what political effects do they have? With this question, the aim has been to find 
out which aspects of ‘blockchain’ matter in terms of determining the political effects, and 
therefore also pointing to sites that might be done differently. Blockchain is positioned as a 
‘disintermediating’ technology, meaning eliminating ‘mediation’ such that, for example, in the 
case of Bitcoin, transactions take place directly between people rather than via a bank or 
payments company. One of the primary aims is to get rid of the need for ‘trusted third parties’, 
replacing these with a peer-to-peer network protocol. I have taken a critical approach to such 
claims of ‘disintermediation’ and instead understand the protocol to be a form of mediation in 
its own right, organising relationships and determining ways in which such a network might 
witness, authorise and execute a transaction. And so this question was designed in order to 
find out the particular forms of mediation taking place through the protocol design. I have also 
taken a critical perspective on the separation between technical and social concerns, 
conceptualising blockchain as an ‘assemblage’ comprising code, hardware, people, 
promotional material, ideas, technical papers and so on, instead of a coherent technical 
‘thing’. Retaining a certain openness to what comprises blockchain exactly came to make 
sense analytically, in particular because of its decentralised nature, where the protocol itself 
and, for example, what comprises ‘Bitcoin’ exactly, became contested (see Chapter 6). This 
research question has been informed by science and technology studies, literature and media 
theory that conceptualise of infrastructure and technologies as enacting an immanent politics, 
being an expression and continuous execution and enforcement of a politics in its own right, 
by shaping a priori what is possible or not and for who (Feenberg, 1999; P. N. Edwards, 
2003; Galloway, 2004; Latour, 2005). However, there are aspects of network infrastructures 
and algorithmic operations that exceed intention, control and full oversight (Seaver, 2014; 
Burrell, 2015; Amoore, 2016). In order to theorise such aspects, I draw on Yusoff’s notion of 
the insensible. This highlights and helps make sense of blockchain as a proposition for a 
technology initially beyond control by specific authorities, but eventually also humans and 
human sensibilities more generally (see Chapter 4). The insensible then forms the first cut on 
the political of blockchain. 
2. How do the developers and users of blockchain understand, represent and seek to shape 
the political implications of the technology in terms of decentralisation, trust and consensus?   
With this question, the aim has been to find out the ideas and assumptions informing the 
design of blockchain protocols. Concepts and terms such as ‘decentralisation’, ‘consensus’ 
and ‘trust’ are widely used across different blockchain projects – but it is not always clear 
whether the concepts are referring to a technical architecture, social conditions or beliefs, or 
intended effects. This question was in part informed by the idea of translation as employed by 
N. Katherine Hayles (2005, pp. 89-116), focusing my attention towards qualitative changes 
that happen in the ‘translation of worldviews’ when, for example, technological specifications 
 5 
are rearticulated as socio-political process, or conversely when socio-political ideas are 
encoded into technical architectures (for example ‘decentralisation’).2 But Hayles’ notion of 
translation seemed to imply a more linear, linguistically informed, located and deliberate 
process than seemed to be happening and so I later shifted this theoretical approach towards 
Barad’s notion of onto-epistemology. Here, concepts are understood as part of assemblages 
and apparatuses in ways that do not assume a linguistic privilege in determining matters. This 
has been important in order to make sense of the fact that a given developer’s intentions with 
a specific protocol design does not fully determine how it played out in any simple, linear 
transfer of idea to materialisation (discussed in Chapter 4). Concepts of decentralisation, trust 
and consensus would nevertheless in themselves continue to mobilise efforts to build, 
maintain and correct – such that, for example, engineers, mathematicians and so on develop 
new consensus algorithms in order to redress centralising tendencies in a given protocol 
design. This seemed to point to a more general sensibility in blockchain informing a tacit 
agreement about some overall desirable characteristics and properties that indeed cut across 
other distinctions between people and projects. Regardless of the confusion or broadness of 
the use of concepts like decentralisation, trust and consensus, it was clear that these are 
powerful in mobilising people and efforts to build, maintain and correct for in blockchain. This 
second question has led to draw the particular cut of the sensible, understood in the sense of 
Rancière, to form a distinct blockchain sensibility that holds a ‘blockchain assemblage’ 
together as a recognisable field despite its broad appeal, explaining more specifically the 
kinds of ‘disruption’ proposed. 
3. What are the political differences between blockchain-based developments, and where and 
how are these expressed? (E.g. in the code itself, in the organisational structure of the 
developer community, amongst the user-base or elsewhere?)  With this research question, the 
aim has been to find out the ways in which political differentiation takes place within and 
amongst blockchain-based projects. My intention has been to trace how and through which 
forms such differentiation is enacted, with the idea that this might explain firstly what matters 
politically to different projects, thereby giving an overview of the understandings, theories and 
politics informing blockchain projects, and secondly the ways that such ideas were being 
materialised – whether in the code, coding process, the company/organisational structure or 
deployment or otherwise. This question has been informed by political theory defining the 
political in terms of the possibility of dissensus, (incompatible differences about what matters) 
and the necessary negotiation and settlement of these drawing on Rancière and Mouffe in 
particular (Mouffe, 1993, 2005; Rancière, 2006, 2010). These theoretical approaches to the 
                                                       
2 See also Hayles, 2005, pp. 14-33. Her description of the relationship between digital text, code and what she calls 
the computational regime as a worldview continued to inform my research and in particular my analysis and writing 
for Chapter 4. 
 6 
political have suggested that a suitable strategy for understanding ‘the political’ in blockchain 
would be to look for sites of deliberate differentiation, but also, and in particular, moments of 
disagreement and incompatible positions and the ways in which these are resolved. This final 
question then led me to articulate the concept of the dissensible as the third cut on the 
political in blockchain, and a way to describe the ongoing potential for incompatible 
sensibilities to arise.  
Through Barad, such questions of the insensible, sensibilities and the dissensible gains 
material weight and becomes part of how things are made to matter – mattering politically, as 
well as materially. Barad, theorising at the level of quantum physics experimentation, situates 
ontological dynamics in relation to sensing apparatuses (Barad, 2007, pp. 97–130). Her onto-
epistemology describes sensing devices and beings as not only entailing a recognition of 
some external thing, but in fact is part of determining matters – making determinate what 
might otherwise be in an indeterminate state of potential (ibid.). She argues that this dynamic 
takes place by and through all manner of determining sensibilities; that is to say that not only 
humans determine what matters and how things come to matter (Barad, 2007, pp. 132–186). 
Barad, then, becomes a means to acknowledge non-human sensibilities in determining 
matters, such that not only humans are understood to be involved in creating material, nor 
political realities. This proves effective in particular for approaching the proposition of 
blockchain as an algorithmic means for determining things, lending some openness to such a 
proposition, while also giving tools for critically examining it from the perspective that there is 
nothing necessary, nor inevitable, about algorithmic modes of determination.  
 
1.2  A trustless world: context and cases 
Trust, as it is understood in network security engineering, is a bad thing. It means there is a 
potential vulnerability in the system, an attack vector that can be exploited. For large 
decentralised networks in particular, the aim is to achieve ‘trustlessness’, assuming that any 
aspect of the system might be an adversary. Through Bitcoin and the context of its invention, 
this understanding of trustlessness took on a broader appeal in popular anti-authoritarian 
sentiments, before being generalised in Ethereum and giving rise to ‘blockchain’ as a more 
general technology that a UK government report described would bring about ‘potential 
explosions of creative potential that catalyse exceptional levels of innovation’ (Walport, 2016, 
p. 4). Here I briefly describe the context in which this thesis has been researched and written 
and the main cases I draw upon.  
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Blockchain, as it is understood today, was invented as part of Bitcoin – a proposal for a peer-
to-peer digital payment system by the anonymous ‘Satoshi Nakamoto’. The project was 
introduced in a short nine-page whitepaper in 2008 outlining the principles and architecture of 
the cryptocurrency (Nakamoto, 2008). The idea initially circulated and was developed 
amongst the subcultural and political contexts of what is called Cypherpunk and 
cryptoanarchism – formed around the possibility and use of cryptography to radically shift 
balances of power (Assange et al., 2012).3 4 There had been previous attempts at creating 
internet money that would be beyond the reach of authorities. To mention two relevant 
precursors: DigiCash, a project by cryptographer David Chaum, had been initiated largely 
because of concerns for the growing significance of the internet for commerce. If an 
increasing amount of transactions were to take place online, this presented serious privacy 
issues, the most important of which would be the companies and payment systems that 
would hold people’s records of transactions. This concern is part of the reasoning for peer-to-
peer as a type of architecture that would ‘disintermediate’ such third parties involvement in 
payments. Another project, E-Gold, was more concerned with establishing an online 
equivalent of gold, with the understanding that this would be a ‘superior’ form of money. 
These ideas are also present in Bitcoin and its protocol design, on the basis of eliminating 
government involvement in money systems. Infamous for being the payment method of 
preference on the ‘Silk Road’ online black market, Bitcoin has throughout its history been 
contentious, initially associated with ‘the Darknet’ online black markets (Pagliery, 2015), as 
well as critiqued from a monetary and economic perspective (Golumbia, 2016; Stolfi, 2016; 
Gerard, 2017), and later associated almost entirely with exchange rate volatility and wild 
speculative behaviour.  
The network and project continued to grow, however, and the rapid highs and lows of its 
exchange rates only seemed to spark more attention, more media coverage and more 
interest. The cryptocurrency rose to fame beyond the ‘Darknet’ and hacker circles in 2011 in 
what the ‘ethical hacker’ Denis Jaromil Roio argues were two critical events: the first article in 
Forbes about Bitcoin, and the use of Bitcoin as a means to donate to whistle-blower project 
WikiLeaks (Roio, 2013). Major digital payment companies including MasterCard and PayPal 
had been blocking donations to WikiLeaks following their release of the US military war logs 
containing evidence of the killing of civilians (Ball, 2011; Matonis, 2012; Roio, 2013; Rizzo, 
2014).5 From early on in its history, Bitcoin has thereby had a real and symbolic presence as 
a global currency beyond and against the control of governments and global financial 
institutions, catching the imagination and attention of anyone sceptical of authority. The 
blockchain protocol distinguishes itself as embodying, on the one hand, a political and 
                                                       
3 See https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/manifesto.html  
4 See https://activism.net/cypherpunk/crypto-anarchy.html  
5 See also https://wikileaks.org/Banking-Blockade.html  
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ideological proposition in its very structure by encoding notions of distributed authority, 
validation and trust which, on the other hand, are used and implemented for a variety of 
different political purposes. Bitcoin remains contentious, critiqued on the basis of it facilitating 
illicit trade (cf. Bradbury, 2014; Martin, 2014; Finklea, 2017), encouraging speculation (cf. 
Christian, 2014; Farrer, 2018), not being sound money (cf. Mittal, 2012; Lo and Wang, 2014; 
Constable, 2017), being the cause of scams and fraud (Posner, 2013; McMillan, 2014; 
O’Brien, 2015), and not being environmentally friendly (cf. Malone and O’Dwyer, 2014; 
Gabbatiss, 2018). But in the meantime, ‘blockchain’, a particular aspect of the Bitcoin 
architecture (sometimes described in the even more broad terms of ‘distributed ledger 
technology’) was to become a more palatable technological proposition, bringing about a 
‘Cambrian explosion of blockchain start-ups’ (Robinson and Leising, 2015), with a UK 
government report going so far as to state that:  
The progress of mankind is marked by the rise of new technologies and the human ingenuity 
they unlock. In distributed ledger technology, we may be witnessing one of those potential 
explosions of creative potential that catalyse exceptional levels of innovation. 
– Walport, 2016, p. 4  
‘Blockchain’ became part of several new industries given the names FinTech for financial 
technologies, RegTech for technologies in the field of law and DemTech for democratic 
technologies.6 7 8 This shift in attention from ‘Bitcoin’ and cryptocurrencies as largely Darknet-
associated to ‘blockchain’ as a legitimate technological breakthrough was largely articulated 
in and through the launch of a project called Ethereum, introduced at a Bitcoin conference by 
the then 19-year-old founder of Bitcoin Magazine, Vitalik Buterin. The Ethereum project was a 
project to generalise the blockchain such that instead of verifying and storing transaction data 
in a decentralised manner, any kind of computation could be held and executed across a 
decentralised network. The suggested applications would be so-called Smart Contracts (code 
that would execute automatically in the network), as well as Decentralised Autonomous 
Organisations (DAO) and Decentralised applications (dApps), discussed in 4.2.1, which had 
broader appeal for the potential efficiency gains and potential ‘RegTech’ applications. 
A trustless architecture in terms of information security practices entails a secure architecture, 
whereby no single aspect is entirely depended upon. Ethereum, in generalising the Bitcoin 
                                                       
6 FinTech, see for example https://www.pwc.com/sg/en/publications/fintech-apac-landscape-devt.html and 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/502995/UK_FinTe
ch_-_On_the_cutting_edge_-_Full_Report.pdf  
7 RegTech, see for example https://complyadvantage.com/blog/what-is-regtech/ and 
https://www.techworld.com/picture-gallery/startups/uk-regtech-startups-watch-3648554/ and 
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/insights-on-business/banking/blockchain-kyc-game-changing-regtech-innovation/  
8 DemTech, see for example https://demtech.io/ and https://demtechvoting.com/ and 
https://demtech.chathamhouse.org/ and https://dcentproject.eu/  
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architecture, also generalised the question of trust and trustlessness, from its explicitly anti-
authoritarian context in Bitcoin to a broader question in business, finance and politics. 
Cryptographic proofs became a solution to the ‘trust’ problem for any context or situation – 
and blockchain, from its pre-history in decentralised network technologies seeking to defeat 
authorities, became a ‘disruptive’ technology on the basis of automation and potential 
efficiency gains. In this thesis, I argue that there are significant issues, technically, politically 
and socially when ‘trust’ as a problem is generalised, whereby much of the purpose of 
blockchain loses its meaning. With this thesis, I aim to rearticulate some of the disruptive 
potential of blockchain that goes beyond efficiency gains and resituate blockchain in a more 
politicised history. By doing so, the specific applications, attraction and political significance of 
blockchain are also clarified.  
Blockchain, in the meantime, continued to find interest amongst explicitly anti-authoritarian 
political contexts. It is worth briefly describing a third case study which over the course of my 
data analysis receded to the background, but which nevertheless has informed much of the 
context of this study. Bitcoin and blockchain were being developed also during a time of large 
decentralised social movements across North Africa in the Arab Spring, Europe in the 
movement of the squares in Spain, Greece and Portugal and Occupy in the US (cf. Gutiérrez-
rubí, 2011; Alcazan et al., 2012; Gerbaudo, 2017). Emerging in this geo-political context, the 
Bitcoin protocol started to be framed as addressing the lack of trust in existing financial and 
governance institutions – not by repairing legitimacy, but by creating a system that works 
regardless of and despite malicious intent by any actor. In other words, a ‘trustless system’, 
designed for a trustless world. At the time, there were experiments amongst social 
movements for creating new social currencies, a particularly ambitious one is Faircoin, a 
project to develop a cryptocurrency for the global cooperative movement, which made out a 
third case study during my empirical research. Faircoin was started by the Spanish anarchist, 
Enric Duran. In 2013, Duran left Spain after being bailed out of prison, having taken out loans 
in banks across Catalonia totalling about €500.000. He declared publicly that he would not 
repay the loans and instead used the money to support cooperatives and anarchist projects in 
the region and set up what is called Faircoop – an organisational vehicle to expand existing 
networks of cooperatives in Catalonia to an international scale. The movement employed 
what they called ‘tax-disobedience’ strategies and aimed at an exit from existing financial and 
political structures by building new ones in their place. Faircoin would be ‘the first democratic 
and assembly-based cryptocurrency’, and would facilitate exchange in the network as it grew 
globally.9 Faircoin was a ‘fork’ of Bitcoin, drawing on but significantly modifying aspects of its 
code. The attraction from an anarchist perspective was the possibility of scaling otherwise 
locally bound social currency projects. As a cryptocurrency, Faircoin is a fascinating 
                                                       
9 Quote from an interview with Sebas, a Faircoin developer, in Girona, November 2016. 
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proposition because it operates with the inverse security assumptions of Bitcoin and 
Ethereum: Faircoin as a technical architecture heavily relies on building social trust while 
Bitcoin and Ethereum are designed to operate under conditions in which anyone might be an 
adversary.  
In selecting Faircoin as a case study, I sought comparative insights that would allow me to 
analyse which aspects of cryptocurrency protocol designs were considered to matter and how 
these were coded differently with different politics in mind. In this sense, Faircoin was a useful 
comparative case in order to better understand the specificity of Bitcoin and Ethereum and 
the sensibilities that informed their design. However, as a case on its own, Faircoin brought 
up very different theoretical questions than those raised by Bitcoin and Ethereum, and has 
therefore not been treated in any significant manner in the thesis. This is equally true for other 
significant projects, such as Holochain, that deliberately encode a different political intention 
and ethos, but which are beyond the immediate scope of the thesis. I explain this in more 
depth in Chapter 3 where I describe my methods. It is the hope, nevertheless, that by 
rescuing and articulating a more specific history and context of Bitcoin and blockchain, and 
reground the conditions of debate, that such projects also will benefit from such clarification. 
 
1.3  Outline of the thesis 
Here I briefly describe the overall structure of the thesis and contributions made in each of the 
three ‘cuts’. After introducing blockchain and describing the broader reasoning and context for 
this thesis in this chapter, in the next, Chapter 2, I lay out the theoretical foundation for the 
thesis in more detail, introducing Barad’s onto-epistemology and discuss its merits as a basis 
for research on blockchain. I describe the theories and thinking informing the three ‘cuts’ I 
have taken in this thesis, discussing each in relation to debates in the literature. The debates 
that I address have a relatively wide range, from new materialism and animism to platform 
economics and political theory, so I briefly describe how and why I draw from such disparate 
sources and discuss the merits of doing so. In Chapter 3 I describe and discuss the research 
methods and methodologies that I have employed in doing this research. The chapter 
introduces the research design and cases, the reasons for selecting these as well as the 
reasoning behind a case study approach. I discuss my positionality in the field and ethical 
issues arising from this particular research and positioning as a ‘critical insider’ in the field. I 
then describe the research phases and data gathering and the ways in which I went about 
analysing the data, and the limitations and scope of my particular methodological approach.  
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Apart from the extensive theoretical discussion in Chapter 2, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 form the 
main body of the thesis and comprise three empirical chapters that are shaped by my three 
‘cuts’ in the field. Each of these is structured in a similar manner: I first introduce the chapter 
and the particular ‘cut’ to questions of the political. I then address aspects of the Bitcoin case 
study in the first half and the particular understanding of ‘blockchain’ that comes to matter 
through this cut. In the second half of the chapter I address aspects of the Ethereum case 
study as a generalisation of blockchain and the implications of that particular cut. Each of the 
chapters therefore addresses both case studies, approaching them through the insensible, 
sensibilities and the dissensible.  
The main contribution of Chapter 4, titled A politics for the insensible, is to articulate and 
address the question limitations of a blockchain mode of determining trust and consensus. I 
do this firstly through a clarification of the very specific ways that ‘consensus’ is arrived at in 
Bitcoin through an arrangement of cryptographic proofs. The chapter in this sense looks to 
make specific what is otherwise framed in general terms, namely concepts of 
decentralisation, trust, consensus and autonomy. I aim to describe the very particular ways 
that ‘consensus’ is understood and achieved in blockchain, through what is called ‘proof-of-
work’ and other rules that form the consensus algorithm. I do this in order to be able to 
discuss how Bitcoin was suggested to have solved the problem of trust by introducing a 
decentralised architecture based on cryptography proofs. Because the architecture is based 
on cryptographic proof rather than needing to trust someone, it is claimed to be ‘trustless’. 
Through this discussion of the Bitcoin protocol, the main aim and achievement is to trace 
through these claims of trustlessness, and point to their precise limitations, such that it can be 
made clear for who and what exactly such an architecture can be understood as trustless. 
The second half of the chapter describes the Ethereum protocol and the ways in which it 
generalises the Bitcoin architecture, both in terms of the kind of data stored in the blockchain, 
but also the creation of value tokens as a means to coordinate computational resources. I 
then discuss the specifics of generalizing the conceptualisation of trust, and how it has 
informed the development of types of applications determined through algorithms designed to 
be beyond the control of humans. Here, I articulate limits to algorithmic modes of determinacy 
on the basis of Barad’s notions of multiple forms of determinacy (Barad, 2007, pp. 132-185) 
and Yusoff’s notion of the insensible (2014a). The contribution here is to shift the ground of 
debate and add to the literature that suggests that algorithmic forms of determinacy can be 
critically addressed without necessarily having to assume or reassert complete control or 
knowledge by humans (Kitchin, 2014; Seaver, 2014; Burrell, 2015; Amoore, 2016; Amoore 
and Raley, 2017). It therefore presents a useful ground from which to critically discuss 
blockchain and algorithms that does not immediately construct a competition for control 
between humans and machines.  
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The main contribution of Chapter 5, titled Blockchain sensibilities, is to articulate the specific 
sensibilities that hold the blockchain assemblage together and their specific pre-Bitcoin 
provenance in the political histories of network technologies. Explaining why and from where 
decentralised network projects came, the specific form of anti-authoritarianism that informs 
the sensibilities can be foregrounded, which also suggests a slightly different angle from 
which to understand the ‘disruptive’ potential of blockchain. I draw out this history to address, 
in particular, criticisms of blockchain as reproducing the logics of capitalism. I do not negate 
these, but draw on Gibson-Graham’s diverse economies approach (Gibson-Graham, 2008) to 
open up a space that exceeds questions of capitalism. By doing so, I articulate the specific 
computational affiliations of a blockchain sensibility which also point to the ways in which in 
particular Ethereum seeks to become a general platform for any potential economic, political 
or social system. By placing blockchain in the politicised histories of decentralised network 
technology rather than in and only in relation to questions of capitalism, the thesis suggests 
redrawing the political map of blockchain. This repositioning turns out to be hugely informative 
for understanding the particular aims and intentions of blockchain, in particular the attraction 
of developing code (Smart Contracts) and types of organisations (Decentralised Autonomous 
Organisations) that are beyond control. The concerns, I argue, pertain primarily to questions 
and concerns of network computation and information security practices, the aim being 
developing systems that cannot be targeted, controlled and shut down by any authority. In 
this sense, I am to draw out a ground from which to address the merits of blockchain that are 
not immediately concerned by and that exceed questions of capitalism as a way to carve out 
some forgotten political space. 
The main contribution of Chapter 6, titled Dissensible matters, is to discuss the ways in which 
incompatible differences are resolved in and around a technology that was supposed to have 
solved consensus. I do this by tracing two major conflicts in Bitcoin and Ethereum. The so-
called Bitcoin scaling conflict was a conflict over a technical issue of how to scale the Bitcoin 
network without compromising on decentralisation. The conflict brought to the foreground the 
ways in which protocols are or should be managed in a decentralised system, raising 
questions of balances of power across different actors and causing significant discussions 
about protocol governance and scaling that were to last several years. The Ethereum DAO 
exploit was a hack of the first explicit attempt at developing a Decentralised Autonomous 
Organisation (DAO) that would be controlled purely on the basis of its Smart Contract code 
and be beyond human control. A hacker exploited part of the contract code to siphon off large 
amounts of Ethereum cryptocurrency, ether, causing the Ethereum Foundation to enact what 
is called a ‘fork’ in the code – essentially creating a new version of Ethereum and records of 
events in which the hack had not taken place. This caused significant debate about the 
purpose of decentralised systems and the promise of trustlessness. In this chapter, I 
introduce the concept of the dissensible, suggesting that dissensus is never finally resolved; 
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its negotiation merely changes character. Such changes to the ways in which dissensus is 
resolved nevertheless matter, however, because they determine who or what has the 
capacity to take part in determining how dissensus is negotiated and resolved.  
The chapters are to some extent chronological in the sense that Chapter 4 discusses some of 
the pre-Bitcoin history of peer-to-peer in the ‘90s and early ‘00s, Chapter 5 addresses some 
of the determinacy that characterised the early years of blockchain in the years 2008 to 2016 
while explaining the protocols and the ways in which this determinacy is encoded, and 
Chapter 6 describes two major crisis that caused rearticulations of such a determinacy in the 
years 2016 and 2017 and opened up the industry and efforts towards more sophisticated 
understandings of consensus protocols and the political.  
Finally, in the concluding Chapter 7, I recap and reflect on the main contributions of each of 
the three onto-epistemological ‘cuts’ that I articulated and worked with in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
I outline the limitations of these approaches and further research that they open up. I also pick 
up on and discuss a thread that carries through each of these three main chapters, namely 
the question of limits, edges and relationships. If cryptographic proofs can determine trust in a 
given piece of data and decentralised network, it invites the question of the precise limits of 
such trust, what happens beyond its edges and how such a form of determinacy relates to 
other ways of determining things.  
The Disassembling the Trust Machine thesis is driven by the question of what matters 
politically in blockchain technology. The aim is to shift the preconditions of debate about the 
proposed disruption by blockchain for ‘legacy systems’.10 Blockchain technology is in part a 
proposal to resolve ‘the political’ through technical means: decentralised networks to solve the 
problem of authority; cryptography to solve the problem of systems integrity; game theory and 
incentive design to solve the problem of security and malicious behaviour. Involving political 
and economic dynamics in the protocol design has also opened up computational systems to 
political and economic dynamics. Without further ado, the in next chapter I describe the 
theoretical tools I have developed in order to disassemble the blockchain ‘trust machine’ and 
reassemble it again in three different ways. 
  
                                                       
10 In discussion with people in blockchain contexts, political, legal and financial systems are often referred to as 
‘legacy systems’. 
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2  The insensible, sensible and 
dissensible  
 
When you step into the conversation about the political in relation to blockchain, you’re hit by 
a cacophony of claims, concerns, hopes, sales pitches and opinions. Excitement and worry 
ripple through the conversation, and it’s tricky to not immediately ‘take sides’ in determining its 
political implications. This is because blockchain, as a proposition, is often treated as a 
coherent thing, while at the same time its determination and boundaries are in themselves 
highly politicised questions. My intention with this PhD project is to suspend judgment, and 
instead observe and describe these debates as part of an ongoing process of articulating the 
political significance and implicit politics of ‘blockchain’. I therefore consider these very 
debates as to the definition and implications of blockchain to have political implications in their 
own right (as also noted by Golumbia, 2016; Reijers & Coeckelbergh, 2016), and will look 
closely at how these form part of a political reasoning, inform the technical materialisation of 
blockchain and shape the development process.  
Bitcoin was a proposal to solve a problem of ‘authority’ and ‘consensus’, as articulated and 
addressed through the specific and particular form it takes in computer network information 
systems. Very quickly, and as the remit and project was expanded from payment systems 
and cryptocurrencies to the blockchain and databases and computation more generally, the 
Bitcoin consensus mechanism appeared to offer a solution to problems of authority in 
potentially any field or industry. And so a body of popular literature emerged, describing 
blockchain as a radical disruption and transformation of all aspects of governance, money, 
economics and politics (cf. Swan 2015; Tapscott & Tapscott 2018; Filippi & Wright 2015; 
Vigna & Casey 2018). The challenge is how to think of the political in relation to a technology 
that claims to solve it – while also being attentive to how such a proposition nevertheless 
becomes real in the sense of mobilising and materialising efforts, even as these 
materialisations never fully correspond to the proposition. In order to do this, a theoretical 
approach is needed that can assist in tracing and articulating how ‘blockchain’ is determined 
in different ways and the political aspects of this determination.  
How things come to matter, in the sense of becoming determined as material things as well 
as in the political and ethical sense of having importance, are two of the main questions 
raised and articulated by the philosopher Barad in her onto-epistemology ‘agential realism’ 
(Barad, 2007, pp. 132–185). Using Barad’s approach as well as her conceptual vocabulary 
throughout this PhD then brings to the foreground the question of determination as a political 
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and ethical question. Perhaps even more crucially, Barad’s onto-epistemology does not 
presume that determination is solely in the hands of humans, but instead positions processes 
of determination through a quantum physics perspective as an ongoing dynamic of 
materialisation across any scale, materiality or lifeform (Barad, 2007, pp. 247–353). Such an 
approach lends a certain openness to some of the propositions and hopes for blockchain, 
namely by involving non-human dynamics (in this case maths, network computation and so 
on) into what have previously been considered the solely human domains of politics, 
economics and law. Conversely, her approach is also helpful for broadening the scope of 
what is understood to constitute ‘blockchain’ to include human, social and other dynamics. 
This is important exactly because claims made of blockchain are so heavily based on 
assumptions of a purely objective technical realm that exists separately from what are 
perceived as necessarily subjective humans. The political can be sensed through and in 
different aspects that form ‘blockchain’ at different times and places, not only as a technology 
but also as a set of ideas, headlines, whitepapers, promotional material, developer cultures 
and so on. Because the idea of ‘blockchain’ is a hook for different and contested agendas, 
and because it proposes a radical reconfiguration of the political, neither ‘blockchain’ itself nor 
its political significance should be fully pre-assumed from the outset. Instead, its articulation 
as political is the primary question and endeavour of this thesis.  
In this chapter I set out the theoretical approaches, debates and concepts, drawn on in 
Chapters 4-6, that I employ in order to articulate and clarify political dynamics in ‘blockchain’. I 
complement Barad’s onto-epistemology with an understanding of the political that I draw from 
political theorist Jacques Rancière, namely as a moment of a disruption and redistribution of 
‘the sensible’ (Rancière, 2006, 2010). The combination of Barad and Rancière’s thinking 
allowed me to draw three ‘cuts’ in the field, addressing the question of what matters politically 
in blockchain from three different angles, namely the insensible, the sensible and the 
dissensible. I discuss each of these in relation to a rather diverse set of debates, as will 
become clear below, ranging from animism to platform economics. This broad range is the 
result of, and is hopefully justified by, a methodology that relied almost exclusively on my 
research questions, which meant that I crossed a number of fields and debates while seeking 
their answers. This broad range of debates is also shaped by adopting Barad as a means for 
overcoming technological and human determinisms, which does open up my research 
question to possible answers from fields that address the political, the non-human and the 
technical as well as the economic. Instead, by allowing my research questions to guide this 
methodology, a certain rigorous thread has nevertheless been maintained. This chapter, and 
the thesis more broadly, should therefore be read as outlining three possible ways in which 
the political might be addressed as a question of blockchain, rather than offering an 
exhaustive review of their related literature and debates. Instead, the focus remains on how to 
approach the political in blockchain; this thesis forms an exploration of this. 
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Addressing the political through the notion of ‘sensibilities’ rather than through explicit 
opinions, theories and ideology opens up a much broader theoretical field. It means that the 
political as a potential for disruption, a moment of ‘dissensus’, is relevant for and can occur in 
and through any potential contexts, materialities and debates, including, in the case of 
blockchain, questions of ‘network attack vectors’ or debates about ‘blocksize’ in the Bitcoin 
blockchain and so on. It also raises the question of the insensible – that which has not yet 
been included or is simply beyond a given sensibility – and the challenge of how and whether 
to make the ‘insensible’ matter politically. These different approaches to the political imply 
different ‘cuts’ that include and exclude elements as comprising the very thing called 
‘blockchain’. I use the word ‘cut’ from Barad in reference to her explanation of onto-
epistemological cuts whereby phenomena are made determinate by drawing a cut through an 
otherwise indeterminate field (Barad, 2007, p. 148). And this thesis indeed is intended to 
contribute to determining the political possibilities and significance of blockchain. This chapter 
is structured as follows: I will first briefly introduce Barad’s onto-epistemology, known as 
agential realism. I will then articulate the insensible in relation to ‘blockchain’ as an 
instantiated technology and protocol, addressing its determinate claims. Here, I suggest a 
politics for the insensible, drawing on work by geographer of the inhuman, Yusoff (2013b) as 
a way to address that which is beyond a particular sensibility. The insensible might refer both 
to behaviours of blockchain, algorithmic and network systems, as well as forms of life and 
matter that are beyond the sensibilities and determination of such systems. I discuss ways of 
articulating and addressing the insensible, drawing on new materialism debates and animism.  
I then articulate the sensible as a theoretical cut on the field, whereby ‘blockchain’ describes a 
certain sensibility that informs projects and protocol development, regardless of the extent to 
which these manage to live up to such a sensibility. It nevertheless matters as an 
understanding of blockchain that shapes new projects, maintenance and corrections in efforts 
to materialise this ‘blockchain’. Here, I draw on the political as a reconfiguration of what 
matters and is made sensible, drawing on Rancière’s notion of the political as a ‘redistribution 
of the sensible’ (2010, pp. 27-44), where, in Baradian terms, new things emerge as mattering. 
Drawing on what Gibson-Graham introduce as diverse economies (2008), this approach then 
looks at how these new sensibilities emerge in relation to other political (and economic) 
spaces.  
In the last section of the chapter, I articulate the dissensible, as the ongoing possibility for 
things to be different, and for such differences to be incompatible. Here, I draw on primarily 
political theorists Mouffe (2005) and Rancière (2010, 2006) in order to focus on the particular 
ways in which the dissensible is negotiated and managed. Such incompatibility either 
necessitates an expansion and redistribution of the sensible or another way to accommodate 
for the dissensible – in relation to and through a technology that was supposed to have solved 
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dissensus. Where the protocol was supposed to solve the political, in turn the management of 
the protocol became politicised, and code repositories became a vocabulary for modes of 
governance. The next chapter will then describe my methods and how I arrived at these 
approaches through my empirical research.  
 
2.1  Meeting the blockchain halfway 
The intention in this thesis was to ‘meet the blockchain halfway’ by following claims made of 
blockchain through to their historical and technical sources in order to understand how it 
came to be as a political proposition, why and how claims made of it matters, how they are 
sought to be encoded and enacted, and how they play out, addressing the political in each of 
these moments. The challenge is to find perspectives of the political that can speak to or at 
least recognise the non-human as mattering, because a major aspect of blockchain is to draw 
in and involve non-human cryptographic and algorithmic processes and dynamics in 
determining and executing the political. A second and related challenge was to find 
perspectives that would not be entirely seduced nor frightened by such a mathematical and 
computational conversation, but instead would be able to listen and look at the world as 
described and determined by these. This required an epistemology, and indeed ontology, that 
would allow for a rigorous tracing of political dynamics but also suggest some resolution to, 
and ways of making sense of, social or technological determinisms. This became only more 
urgent as the empirical research progressed, making increasingly clear that decentralised 
systems make such questions of social and technological determination even more complex 
(meant in terms of complexity, not just ‘complicated’). This entails shifting the ground of 
debate away from the question of whether ‘the technical’ or ‘the social’ is a more appropriate 
means to resolve the political, and instead focusing on how assemblages, which include 
technical, social and other elements, come together to enact a given condition – or fall apart 
under other circumstances. Here, the relational is foregrounded as ontologically determining, 
in that relations are what shape the characteristics of a given assemblage rather than being 
predetermined.  
In this section I discuss and define some of the main concepts used in Barad’s onto-
epistemology (Barad, 2007), which have significantly contributed to my work tracing what 
matters politically in blockchain: re-grounding of the concept of objectivity; apparatuses as 
material-discursive; techno-scientific practices as performing a ‘cut’; the ethical and political 
implications of a ‘cut’ as onto-epistemological; a ‘cut’ as ontologically determining 
‘phenomena’; phenomena as ‘entangled’; and these onto-epistemological cuts as not 
necessarily enacted by a deliberate agency of humans but as entangled quantum states.  
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2.1.1  Onto-epistemological approaches 
In her onto-epistemology Barad draws in epistemological work and conceptual developments 
as part of an ongoing, never final ontological process in what she calls agential realism 
(Barad, 2007, pp. 132–185). Onto-epistemology and the foregrounding of the relational 
aspect of ontological processes of becoming is not a unique contribution from Barad (cf. 
Appadurai, 2015; Bennett, 2010; DeLanda, 2004; Haraway, 1992; Latour, 1992; 
Papadopoulos, 2011; Strathern, 1996). As part of what has been discussed more broadly as 
an ‘ontological turn’, such approaches argue that descriptions, language and the social should 
be understood as part of materialising how the world evolves, unfolds and becomes. Onto-
epistemological approaches do not assume that ‘things’ have innate essences, instead 
focusing on how a given thing becomes and is determined, also materially, in relation to and 
by other phenomena. The attraction of Barad in this case is that she takes as her starting 
point techno-scientific practices, and does so in a way that is coherent with the 
epistemological approaches of these practices rather than taking them as object of 
observations. Her onto-epistemological approach therefore lies in the possibility of meeting 
such practice – in this case blockchain development, computer engineering and cryptographic 
research – ‘halfway’ and being involved in shaping them. 
Blockchain has been proposed as a technical solution to socio-political dynamics, based on 
the premise that as a technical apparatus it is neutral, objective and separate from the socio-
political whims of humans and ‘messiness’ of the world. And yet, as described and discussed 
in chapters 4-6, ‘the blockchain’ cannot be so easily extracted from the world, nor from the 
humans that code and use the systems. How then to understand the relationship between an 
objective world, the mathematics and technical architecture that form the blockchain and 
subjective opinions, perspectives and behaviour? Barad addresses the tendency to divide ‘the 
objective’ from ‘the subjective’ head on through the work of quantum physicist Niels Bohr 
(Barad, 2007, pp. 118-131 and pp. 153-155). Rather than understanding the objective as a 
fixed material exterior reality, which we in our limited subjective interiors attempt to 
understand by probing with scientific apparatuses, Barad situates such probing, sensing and 
describing as material-discursive practices that are part of, not separate from, the making and 
remaking of material reality.  
Barad takes as her explanatory starting point the famous wave-particle duality in quantum 
physics, whereby one experimental arrangement measures light as a particle and another as 
a wave. She draws on Bohr’s explanation of this contradictory state of affairs; that this is 
evidence that the characteristics of light are indeterminate until and unless they are met with a 
given measuring device, which at that point determines a phenomenon with a set of 
characteristics (Barad, 2007, pp. 97–130). Rather than the device measuring some intrinsic 
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nature of light, the relation between the measuring device and light determines a given 
phenomenon – for example, determining light as either particle or wave. What this means, 
argues Barad is that the measuring apparatus is itself part of an ontological process of 
determining and materialising a given phenomenon (ibid.).  
The apparatus is not a neutral measure of an objective exterior but is implicated and matters, 
literally, by making what she calls an agential realist ‘cut’ in an otherwise indeterminate field, 
and taking part in determining a phenomenon with distinct characteristics. Barad is careful to 
state that not every arrangement will be effective. Not every apparatus will simply materialise 
new realities at the whims of an engineer or scientist, and she explains this by drawing in the 
non-human as active in the given arrangement rather than as mute matter to be manipulated. 
This is also how she explains that some things ‘work’ and others don’t, regardless of an 
individual person’s will or opinion (Barad, 2007, pp. 167-175).11 The material and non-human 
both have a presence, a way of being that needs to be worked with effectively in order for a 
given apparatus to be successful and effective. The notion of objectivity is then re-grounded 
here as the ability to accurately describe the set of conditions and arrangement that would be 
able to reproduce and determine the same phenomena. Rather than describing a fixed, pre-
existing reality, then, Barad, via Niels Bohr, defines ‘objectivity’ as the ability to accurately 
describe the conditions that would produce and materialise some phenomena such that it can 
be reproduced. Importantly, and in a significant leap from Bohr’s explanation of a laboratory 
situation, the material-discursive apparatus in Barad’s thinking is expanded to a meta 
(quantum)physics, whereby any observing agency might enact an agential realist cut in a field 
of ontological indeterminacy. Agential realist cuts are enacted through all kinds of human and 
non-human entanglements – not only in the laboratory or by humans. The ethical and political 
implications of this shift in definition for blockchain are significant: rather than existing as an 
objective ‘truth-machine’ exterior to human, historical and socio-political dynamics, 
‘blockchain’ is comprised of a collaboration between a vast array of materials, thinkers, 
notebooks, experiences, institutions and concepts, like ‘decentralisation’, and so on that come 
together to materialise a new set of conditions, literally shaping what matters.  
The agential realist cut in an otherwise indeterminate field entails exclusions; when light is 
determined as a particle, its potential to be a wave is excluded. This determines a different 
state for light, and more broadly a process of ontological differentiation. The construction of 
such onto-epistemological apparatuses and the ‘cuts’ that they perform are therefore deeply 
ethical and political, less because of who enacts them and with what intention and more 
because they literally matter and are part of materialising reality. This raises the questions of 
                                                       
11 STS literature has also articulated and problematised the question of what it means that something ‘works’, 
describing how such a concept as well as our current understanding of for example efficiency and so on is also 
contingent on historical, cultural, social and political contexts. 
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‘... how different differences get made, what gets excluded, and how those exclusions matter’ 
(Barad, 2007, p. 29) and demands a careful attentiveness to such practices. 
...attending to the complex material conditions needed to specify "intentions" in a meaningful 
way prevents us from assuming that "intentions" are (1) pre-existing states of mind (2) properly 
assigned to individuals. Perhaps intentionality might be better understood as attributable to 
specific sets of material conditions that exceed the traditional notion of the individual. Or 
perhaps it is less that there is an assemblage of agents than there is an entangled state of 
agencies. 
– Barad, 2007, p. 23 
 
The difficulty of the agential realist approach is therefore that it refutes any possibility of 
definitively assigning intention or agency (and therefore ethical and political responsibility) as 
belonging to any given individual, institution or system, whether human or non-human, 
instead directing attention towards tracing and carefully unpacking the ways in which 
phenomena become determinate in each and every entangled case. Though extra work is 
then required when making use of an onto-epistemological approach that does not assume 
neatly organised agencies, its use allows us to understand the potential for complex 
distribution of agencies, enactment and enforcement that are operationalised in and through 
‘blockchain’.  
Understanding blockchain as assemblages, and through Barad’s notion of entanglements, 
helps articulate more precise questions about what matters in shaping the political 
significance of it rather than assuming this already whether in socio-political contexts or 
mathematical purity. Analysing blockchain as assemblages therefore makes it possible to ask 
more specifically what exactly comprises the blockchain assemblage, and how and by who it 
is determined. What is excluded in this determination? How does the assemblage deal with 
mutually exclusive positions? What holds the assemblage together over time and how does it 
develop? These questions are pertinent for any analysis of blockchain exactly because, for 
example, even the delineation of what and who exactly comprises ‘Bitcoin’ turns out to be 
politically significant and indeed contested/contestable (see Chapter 6). The running concern 
of this thesis is thus Barad’s agential realist ‘cut’; determining the matter of blockchain; what 
does or does not matter politically; and tracing clues across cultures, beings, materials and 
contexts in order to understand who, how, and why things are determined the way they are. 
This is, in turn, also the task of the thesis itself: to offer up another set of ‘cuts’ in the as yet 
indeterminate aspects of blockchain as a political phenomenon. In Baradian terms, the three 
approaches to the political pursued in the thesis then can be stated firstly, in terms of the 
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insensible, and the question of an ethics and politics that is aware of the exclusion also 
performed in the cut; secondly, in terms of the sensible, whereby the cut literally remakes 
(redistributes) the sensible; and finally, in terms of the resolution of the dissensible, whereby 
mutually exclusive onto-epistemological positions are negotiated.  
Throughout the thesis, I employ concepts and understandings from Barad’s ontoepistemology 
in relation to other theorists of the political, and explaining these as I go along. To conclude 
this overview of Barad’s contribution, it is important to note a few limitations to such a 
Baradian approach. By drawing in the non-human and questions of quantum entanglements, 
there is a risk of losing sight of the people, places and situations that are part of determining a 
matter. To put it differently, if agency and intentionality is from the outset presumed to no 
longer rest in a specific decision-maker, person, institution or otherwise, such moments of 
decision, where things indeed are determined, can easily be overlooked. It is essential 
therefore that the employment of Barad’s theoretical approach does not lead to abstractions 
whereby specific things, people, places and so on are not considered to matter because they 
are not sole ‘possessors’ of agency. Rather the opposite: exactly because one cannot 
presume that agency and intentionality necessarily and always lies with a given person or 
institution or device, one needs to pay extra attention to the detail in such moments in order to 
understand who or what is part of enacting a ‘cut’, of determining a matter.12  
 
2.2  The insensible 
The following section turns to the question of how ‘blockchain’ is materialised and enacted in 
and through whitepapers, protocols and computer networks as an immanent and continuously 
executing politics. The political as a redistribution of the sensible is challenged here in terms 
of the limits of the sensible. The insensible suggests limits to what can be sensed and 
determined through blockchain protocols; a haunting awareness of that which exceeds the 
sensible. It raises the questions of what exactly can be known about the immanent politics of 
protocols as they interact with large network infrastructures, and whether is it possible to be 
ethically and politically responsible towards the insensible in the design and deployment of 
deterministic blockchain systems. This section looks at questions regarding what can be 
known about the matter of blockchain as a material, technical system first by discussing the 
                                                       
12 Another assumption that should be highlighted here is that when I use Barad’s concepts in this thesis I assume 
that the quantum-scale insights that are at the basis of her ontoepistemology can indeed be extrapolated to other 
scales. However, because using Baradian concepts proved pertinent for developing a different understanding of the 
ethical and political in relation to blockchain, I decided to proceed and work with this assumption. 
 23 
determinate claims of blockchain protocols and their limits. Secondly, by drawing on literature 
from what has been called new materialism debates, in particular in relation to non-human 
agency, questions of control are addressed from the perspective of material agencies.  
2.2.1  Determinate and emergent 
 
if the insensible alerts us to the work of sense in securing the bringing into relation, its 
configurations, and its a priori orientations, then it also points towards modes of exclusion 
and forms of resistance in our thinking with non-human others  
– Yusoff, 2013a, p. 224 
Dealings in this proposed system would have several attributes not often found in the real 
world. The incorruptibility of judgment, often difficult to find, comes naturally from a 
disinterested algorithmic interpreter.  
 – Wood, 2014a, p. 1 
The promise of the ‘disinterested algorithmic interpreter’ that Ethereum developer Wood 
describes above in an early technical paper outlining the Ethereum project is a proposition to 
determine relations in a manner and through a mode that is non-human. The algorithmic 
interpreter here is a promise of complete control, as an incorruptible system, the legitimacy of 
which is, at the same time, premised on it being beyond control (by any single human). The 
insensible raises questions of limits to the political that is both internal and external to such 
claims of a disinterested algorithmic interpreter. A politics of the insensible is to raise the 
question of how to take into consideration that which cannot, has not yet or will never be 
made sensible in a given registry; a haunting awareness of ways of reasoning and events that 
exceed human comprehension both internally in complex networked and algorithmic systems 
as well as externally amongst lifeforms and things that never will enter into contact with such 
algorithmic modes of determination. If the political comes to matter through a disruption of a 
given sensibility, the insensible raises the question of before or beyond the political; that 
which might never directly make its self matter to our sensibilities and sensing apparatuses.  
The issue of response/responsibility towards the insensible is raised by geographer of the 
inhuman, Yusoff, in the context of loss of biodiversity and the awareness of mass extinctions 
of forms of life that have not been and never will be known or registered: ‘…that which is 
strange, nonintuitive, insensible—that which is remote from human comprehension or 
intelligibility—like phytoplankton, seeds, fungi, geological epochs, or multi-celled organisms at 
the beginnings of time’ (Yusoff, 2013a, p. 225). But the concerns she raises are not about 
constructing a sentiment or sensibility to imagined ‘micro/macro limit experience at the chapel 
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of extreme environmentalism’ (ibid.), but are designed to raise a broader question about how 
we (don’t) relate to that which is at the limits of or simply never will be sensed, whether 
mineral, biological and including technological or otherwise. The insensible makes itself felt 
here in two ways: as an awareness of the limits of the protocol in taking into account and 
being able to determine all that matters, given that what matters might be beyond and may 
never enter the realm of the sensible; and as the possibility that this algorithmic interpreter 
itself, as a networked system that interacts with other systems, might be beyond the 
immediate visibility, comprehension and sensibilities of humans. Although what matters, 
along with certain intentions, values and concepts, will inform a given technology, they do not 
fully determine the effects. The ‘blockchain’ that suggests itself for political analysis through 
this second set of debates is the realm that tends to be understood as the purely technical 
one, articulated in whitepapers, code GitHub repositories, hardware and other traces of the 
technical.  
Determinacy 
The aim of resolving the political through a disinterested algorithmic interpreter stems from 
ideas of humans and human language as biased, flawed and vague, whereas the languages 
of mathematics and code are understood as pure in that they express universal principles and 
execute as written rather than through unpredictable interpretation: code not only describes, it 
simultaneously executes (Galloway, 2004; Hayles, 2005).13 The Ethereum blockchain is 
described by Wood in the technical paper as ‘a system such that users can be guaranteed 
that no matter with which other individuals, systems or organisations they interact, they can 
do so with absolute confidence in the possible outcomes and how those outcomes might 
come about.’ (Wood, 2014a, p. 1) It is a project to establish a layer of determinate relations 
that, regardless of who, what or where, will execute as written. This is described as 
constructing a neutral outside or beyond ‘the real world’ (see quote above), a layer in which 
disinterested execution comes ‘naturally’. Claims of such technical, otherworldly or 
mathematical neutrality can be unpacked in several ways drawing on different strands of 
Science and Technology Studies literature (STS). Instead of assuming that technology exists 
and executes along objective and pure pathways that are autonomous and beyond the will of 
necessarily subjective humans, STS literature situates the forms that technologies and 
infrastructures take as emerging from and as part of a broader set of conditions. This includes 
social dynamics (Callon, Law and Rip, 1986; Star, 1999; Latour, 2005), historical contexts 
(Daston and Galison, 1992) and as expression of political and cultural struggles that in turn 
determine which development pathways are chosen (Feenberg, 1992; P. N. Edwards, 2003). 
Importantly, social and political concerns are articulated as being the very reason and 
                                                       
13 Even if we understand language as performative rather than representational, it performs in a multitude of ways, 
predicted and unpredicted, while code executes a more limited, predefined set of functions.  
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conditions for how a given technology or infrastructure emerges and develops in the particular 
ways that it does.  
If technology were a form of material politics, an ongoing silent enforcement of a given order, 
then disentangling the political and ethical ideas that have been the basis for the technology 
would reveal its politics. Tracing the theories along with the social, political, economic and 
cultural contexts that inform a given protocol then would also open up the possibility of 
political differentiation by deliberately introducing a different set of theories and contexts to 
inform what is encoded and enacted. However, such deliberate political differentiation still 
assumes technological determinacy in the sense of determining a different set of ideas in and 
through the protocol. The promise of determinacy has its own impetus towards articulating 
ever more in and through the protocol in order to determine and control more and more 
effects. Determinate systems seem to offer the ability to determine effects, and the temptation 
to harness such infrastructures ‘for good’ by encoding a different set of politics into them. And 
yet it is unclear, especially in complex networks systems, how much can be deliberately 
determined through a protocol. 
If a protocol can be considered an encoding and continuous execution of a given distribution 
of the sensible, then the political plays out in terms of encoding a different sensibility. The 
blockchain protocol determines transactions, relations and agreements, and promises a 
disinterested, continuous execution of such determinate conditions. The problem with 
determinacy is not only about whether the right ideas have gone into its construction, but also 
about the need to determine ever more things through a particular determining apparatus in 
order to establish and secure a given order of things. This raises some initial questions the 
regarding the limits of protocological determination, in the sense of what and how much can 
or should be determined through these. In the context of blockchain and IoT for example, to 
what degree should such infrastructures be embedded into things, people and places, and 
what kinds of situations (political, economic, legal, religious, emotional etc.) can be 
determined through them? 
Already the question of limitations or edges is of concern in the information security 
community; a secure protocol is meaningless if the security conditions of interactions with the 
protocol by different actors are not addressed and taken care of. What this reveals is that a 
protocol can be trustless and yet require plenty of trust. A few authors in the field of 
Information Security research do in fact discuss the limits to what can be determined through 
the protocol, suggesting a shift in attention from systems themselves to acknowledging and 
designing for the interactions and understanding this space as primary in terms of how 
security plays out in practice (Zurko and Simon, 1996; Herley, 2009). Rather than determining 
things in the protocol, such approaches allow the design space to include and begin from 
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other sensibilities and to include those who are using and interacting with the system. 
Questions of the limits to the design space in terms of what a protocol can determine have 
also entered blockchain debates, primarily in questions regarding ‘off or on-chain governance’ 
whereby dynamics outside and beyond the protocol are drawn in as relevant and important. 
Such a change in perspectives on what matters (from the system architecture to interactions 
with it) are welcome; however, the articulation of sensibilities other than those of the system 
itself still leaves the question of that which might never make itself visible, and as such will not 
demand or set limits on a protocological determination. The ethical and political response 
suggested by Yusoff in questions of biodiversity is for a kind of ‘spaciousness’ that allows for 
the undetermined, the insensible (Yusoff, 2013a, p. 223). This entails holding back on 
determining things or relations through any one sensibility, not only when and through 
contestation where something makes itself sensed as mattering, but because, to a large 
extent, what matters can never be finally or fully known.  
Emergence 
The insensible does not only pertain to what lays beyond the reach of an algorithmic 
interpreter, but also internally, raised by the literature as the question of the limits of fully 
knowing algorithms. The question of what can be known, and whether knowledge, sensibility 
and relatability are necessary conditions for an ethically and politically informed response, is 
also debated in relation to the internal dynamics of algorithmic systems. These challenges 
have been articulated partially with regards to access (proprietary algorithms), and partially 
with regards to technical knowhow, both in a sense suggesting the need to open the ‘black 
box’ and reveal the internal workings such that they can be placed under political (democratic) 
and ethical scrutiny (Pasquale, 2010; Dodge and Kitchin, 2011; Kitchin, 2014; Seaver, 2014). 
Blockchain systems, however, are open source by the necessity of their security model and 
decentralised execution. The fact of their open source nature of course does not address 
issues of unequal distribution of technical knowledge and code literacy, but even in this realm 
a lot of work goes into making the coding languages easy to access. In addition, many 
explanations of different aspects of the systems are given precisely because such 
explanations are necessary to convince people of the efficacy of the systems and to recruit 
more computational power and peers to the networks. But there is another aspect to the 
unknowability of even open source algorithmic systems; Burell describes this as a ‘form of 
opacity centring on the mismatch between mathematical procedures of machine learning 
algorithms and human styles of semantic interpretation’ (Burrell, 2015, p. 3) in her study of 
machine learning. When unpacking the black box one might simply encounter a form of 
reasoning that is not within the realm of human sensibility and comprehension. 
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For Seaver, there is a further issue, namely that a concern with the legibility of technical black 
boxes gives the impression that ‘If only we had access and if only we had the expertise, then 
all would be clear and we could get on with our critical assessments. I want to suggest that in 
fixating on access and expertise, we reify a deficient understanding of how algorithms exist 
and work ‘in the wild,’ (Seaver, 2014, p. 3). The strategy here then is to trace the effects as 
they play out, and in a sense, for which complete knowledge and oversight of the inner 
workings are not always necessary. Amoore, in her work on the emerging dynamics of 
algorithmic systems, challenges even this strategy because of the ways in which algorithms 
might continuously change and adapt to circumstance (Amoore, 2016). The implications of 
algorithmic systems are largely dynamic, emergent and contingent, and are therefore not 
necessarily known, even to those who develop them (Seaver, 2014). These implications 
indeed have emergent dynamics, which challenges the idea of being able to fully understand 
political implications by understanding the intent of designers and engineers. The meaning of 
one algorithmic design cannot be determined without tracing how it plays out in relation to 
data and the networks it operates in and in relation to. Big data and algorithms form part of a 
set of complex, emergent geo-political security practices in which threats and targets are not 
predefined by any single actor (Kitchin, 2014; Amoore and Raley, 2017). Interactions between 
technical, geographical, political and legal systems are brought together and described by 
Bratton, theorist of planetary computation, as an ‘accidental megastructure’ (Bratton, 2016). 
Drawn as a stack diagram, he articulates ‘layers’ that interact and through which different 
kinds of sovereignties are articulated and enacted by actors that might be more or less able to 
mobilise such layers and their interactions for specific agendas and purposes.  
The insensible haunts the sensible here in terms of the systems themselves and their forms 
of reasoning, which seem to be beyond complete human comprehension, due to both scale 
and the particular computational modes of reasoning. Regardless, some form of political and 
ethical response is demanded in and through the ways in which algorithms determine 
political, economic and security (Amoore, 2006) conditions. In the face of such complexity, 
mathematical methods have been developed to attempt to address and understand whether, 
for example, a given system would meet formal specifications (the promise of ‘formal 
verification’). The ways in which such methods relate to questions of social justice, political 
contestation or otherwise is a broad area of research and action and is still very much in 
formation.  
Blockchain promises more control, in the sense of determining and executing set conditions, 
but also aims to be out of control, in the sense of being beyond the influence of humans in 
order to satisfy the claims of neutral algorithmic interpreter. The ‘algorithmic interpreter’ 
becoming part of larger computational systems and shifting datascapes in many ways 
presents its own internal ‘insensible’, a non-human reasoning and enactment. For some, this 
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translates into a mode of power and a form of decentralised authority that takes on a non-
human life of its own (and to the extent that negative effects of such systems are justified by 
the system existing and evolving along a logic that is more rational than the human and 
therefore ‘superior’ in evolutionary terms in what I have discussed as a ‘systems primacy’ 
(Nakamoto, Bridle and Brekke, 2019, pp. 21-22)). In order to make sense of non-human and 
insensible matterings, I draw on new materialism debates. In the following I discuss three 
different ways that such debates help navigate the terrains of ethics and politics that 
acknowledge the non-human reasoning and emergent characteristics of such systems. Most 
importantly, to be able to do so neither necessitates restoring full control, responsibility and 
authority to humans, but neither do they necessitate relinquishing all determining agency to 
an algorithmic interpreter. 
2.2.2  New material isms 
New materialisms literature discusses the material world as having its own forms of agency. 
Instead of mute or dead matter to be manipulated and used by humans, the material world is 
analysed as affecting humans in ways that challenges assumptions about human control, 
agency and responsibility (cf. Bennett, 2010; DeLanda, 2004; Haraway, 1991; Latour, 1992). 
Going further than acknowledging the ways in which materials, landscapes, infrastructures 
and technology shapes and affects what people can or want to do, this literature 
acknowledges the cultural practices and experiences that describe a ‘vibrant’ effects of 
material things we surround ourselves with and relate to; things as animated, having agency 
and being alive. Assigning agency to the non-human resonates with and is pertinent to 
blockchain discussions in terms of how non-human agency is deliberately constructed and 
implicated into political, economic and legal determination. I argue that this plays out in 
several ways; firstly as a form of algorithmic animism, where the system is understood as 
becoming sentient; secondly as techno-scientific collaborations with non-human forces; and 
thirdly to questions of affinities and alliances that cross assumed divisions between human 
and machine, or human and biological. 
Addressing the question of complex systems as having non-human agency raises some 
important ethical and political issues. The most immediate is that ‘complexity’ and non-human 
agency potentially pose problems for assigning responsibility and enforcing accountability. 
This theoretical approach at times seems to bypass a perhaps more straightforward tracing of 
decision-making and power dynamics. In large decentralised systems, control is felt as being 
elsewhere, but that might simply mean that determining infrastructures have been heavily 
privatised by entities taking advantage of systemic complexities and obscurities (Greenfield, 
2017). And so a new materialisms approach needs to be traced through with care and 
attention to avoid conjuring a diffuse algorithmic spirit that obscures issues of economic or 
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political justice. Such issues open up questions of the very possibility of ethics and 
accountability in relation to non-human systems and modes of decision-making and 
execution; this is a broad area of debate across AI, new military strategies, finance and so on 
(cf. Johnson & Noorman, 2014; Noorman, 2014). The aim of involving new materialism 
debates here however is less to resolve ethical questions in relation to complex systems, and 
more to be able to describe and explain the different ways in which the non-human is 
articulated in and through blockchain. It also allows us to address the political implications of 
these.  
Algorithmic animism 
Blockchain, as a proposition to resolve problems of authority and power through a 
decentralised system, is discussed not only in terms of decentralising power across new 
constituencies but more so as entailing a shift in agency and control from humans more 
generally to the mediating system itself. Anticipating combinations of blockchain and artificial 
intelligence (AI), agency and control is sought removed from humans/human-centred 
institutions. Instead it is assigned to systems with forms of reasoning that are non-human, 
whereby Smart Contract, transactions, agreements and various other actions and reasoning 
can take place between digital entities, or physical things (IoT) that have been granted digital 
identities. In terms of the underlying protocols, these have been noted as an ‘internet techno-
leviathan, a deified crypto-sovereign whose rules we can contract to’ (Scott, 2014); as an 
algorithmic sovereignty (Roio, 2018) that might or might not turn out to be benevolent; or as 
the more metaphysical ‘Singularity’ and so on. When agency is assigned to and understood 
as belonging to different kinds of entities with inherent characteristics, these are set up for a 
relation of comparison and competition about who, human or machine, might be most fit for 
determining, classifying, ruling and executing a given task.  
One way to escape the bind of humans versus an algorithmic authority (either benevolent or 
malicious), yet not have to conversely assume humans are or should always be in control, is 
to draw on those approaches to non-humans that avoid assigning definite agency and 
aliveness to one form over another. One such field is the study of animism. In studies of 
animism, practices and cultures are discussed in which agency, aliveness and consciousness 
are not assigned in hierarchical and definite categories – such that humans are the most 
alive, with the most agency, leaving animals second and rocks and minerals after. Such an 
approach can be helpful by foregrounding relational understandings of agency and aliveness. 
This allows for a different kind of openness to the possibility of some algorithmic forms of 
agency that might indeed come alive and matter to some people and in certain 
circumstances. But at the same time it is helpful for negating any universal necessity or 
inevitability of such agencies as mattering or having to matter to everyone. Rather, it is one 
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form of agency amongst others – whereby the question might become what kinds of 
relationships are presumed exactly, with who and so on. There are tendencies in blockchain 
that speculate on and build towards the idea of the Singularity, the idea that artificial 
intelligence will reach a tipping point at which point an explosion of artificial consciousness will 
happen that supersede human comprehension and control. In a sense, addressing the field 
from the perspective of animism is to suggest a shift in the monotheistic underpinnings of 
notions of ‘singularity’ and thereby also diffuse the expansionist dynamics implied. 
In a post-colonial re-reading of spiritual practices that were in colonial anthropology given the 
name ‘animist’, such practices were understood within their own framework of understanding 
and meaning (Bird-David, 1999; Harvey, 2005). To explain one such example that highlights a 
relational approach to agency that does not require categories of alive or not: the 
anthropologist Bird-David describes how the Nayaka hunter-gatherers understand a particular 
rock to have a spirit. She notes and emphasises that this does not mean that they understand 
all rocks to have spirits. Instead it is a very particular rock, which fell and hit someone from 
the community at some point in the past. What she takes from this is that a relation was 
formed at that moment; the rock came to matter, so to speak. Things become alive when they 
make themselves felt and when a relationship is formed. The relationship is not necessarily 
sentimental, but, like most relationships, can be malicious, annoying, entertaining, loving or 
abusive. The subsequent rituals take care of, develop and resolve such relationships. This 
aliveness of things, then, is a contingent and context-specific form of mattering rather than a 
project for a universal registry, list or legal framework around what matters, and also does not 
necessitate agency, aliveness and mattering as liberal personhood (cf. Appadurai, 2015; 
Haraway, 1991). This subtle difference, between agency as a force rather than an inherent 
quality, and aliveness as relational rather than absolute, has implications for how the 
agencies of things are then translated into political and ethical approaches. In the case of a 
generalised registry of agency, where agency is understood as ‘belonging’ to and inhabiting 
an increasing number of beings, the question then becomes where to draw the line; whether 
more and more things are recognised as beings and assigned agency. Even more tricky is 
the question of how such beings are able to ‘speak’ in and through existing rights frameworks 
for those of us considered ‘alive’ (in say a parliament of things, or being a party in say a Smart 
Contract) (Latour, 1992; Galloway, 2005; Yusoff, 2013a).14  
Conversely, the exclusions are also context-specific, meaning that things considered to be 
inconsequential or not living to a given sensibility are not precluded from being alive in terms 
of a different (human or non-human) sensibility. What this suggests is the need for 
spaciousness (Yusoff, 2013a) for such other insensible sensibilities to exist and a trust in their 
                                                       
14 See the Terra0 project for example: https://terra0.org/  
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claims. More importantly it does not allow for a ‘neutral’ position because all positions and 
sensibilities imply exclusion – and so the ethics and politics are shifted towards deliberately 
enacting such exclusions based on the knowledge and experience at hand and what matters 
there. In terms of blockchain, this means that it is possible to acknowledge non-human modes 
of determination and execution while also enacting limitations on such agencies through 
deliberate and responsible exclusions of these, making decisions about where such agencies 
should matter or not. 
Non-human determinacy  
In terms of the techno-scientific, Barad’s approach to the scientific apparatus also comes in 
hugely helpful for opening up some careful pathways through questions of non-human 
agencies. In her onto-epistemology, it is the particular ways in which all elements come 
together, the material but also the human and conceptual that determine the potential; what 
will or will not work in a given design. This includes material elements as well as conceptual 
such that the possibility of Bitcoin is made up of mathematical models, the idea of a rational 
economic agent, an understanding that ‘centralisation is bad’ and the abstract concept of the 
‘rational economic agent’ all come together with the SHA256 hashing algorithm, and the 
excitement of someone running a full node and the precious metals and fibre optics. There 
are aspects of a technology that are not fully determined by an engineer or policy maker but 
by, for instance, some dynamics of mathematics or the capacity of fibre optics. These need to 
be effectively collaborated with in order for a system to ‘function’ as intended. Conditions can 
be made determinate within and for a given system through effectively ‘assembling’ those 
(humans and non-humans) present to enact different forms of agency (Latour, 1992) to 
perform predictable outcomes. Such forms of constructed and predictable determinacy lend 
themselves to fantasies of control by constructing ever more determinate conditions and 
apparatuses.  
Determinate apparatuses can never sense everything that potentially matters, and this has 
been discussed above. But Barad’s notion of indeterminacy raises a second issue: 
determinate conditions also open up new fields of potential, new indeterminate conditions. 
The indeterminate follows continuously behind attempts at determinacy, and so striving for 
control through determinate systems will never be complete or final, but will only ever 
continue to open up new fields of indeterminate potential. These may be more or less 
acknowledged and make themselves more or less sensed in ways that suggest different 
kinds of response. Processes of determination do not only happen through techno-scientific 
apparatuses but through ‘agential cuts’ that can be enacted by and through other intra-
actions. Importantly, indeterminate potentials are not the same as the insensible; the 
insensible might very well be other modes of determinacy (in the Baradian ontological sense), 
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and, in turn, the apparatuses constructed through techno-scientific practices might very well 
open up fields of indeterminate potential that are made determinate through other, non-
human, biological apparatuses. Determinate modes can have effects on the insensible, both 
as potential – the field of indeterminacy in a Baradian sense – and also as the unknown 
modes of determination and sensibility. How to allow for or ensure ‘spaciousness’ in terms of 
diagrams of networks then becomes a question worth exploring. It poses a significant 
challenge to familiar modes of theorising and operationalising in terms of both engineering 
and political theory because it is a stance that does not seek to fix things, neither in the sense 
of repair nor in the sense of determining in a final manner. 
Non-human alliances  
Theorising of material relations in de/anti-colonial literature disrupts assumptions about 
human and non-human agency, foregrounding how humans have also been considered and 
treated as resources to be extracted, objects to be used or manipulated (Yusoff, 2013a, 
2013b; McKittrick, 2014); ‘that there is no accumulation without dispossession in both social 
or geological worlds’ (Yusoff, 2017). Agency, understood through such approaches, is not 
necessarily or always about expanding a circle of what is considered to be alive with valid and 
recognised forms of intelligence and associated rights, partially because such agency, when 
assigned within existing political and legal frameworks, is always of a kind that has been 
predetermined by such institutional frameworks, demanding particular capacities (a language, 
a way of being and speaking). In terms of blockchain, this means that blockchain systems, far 
from being ‘neutral’, require the development of certain capacities that in turn encourage new 
forms of subjects with the capacities to act within the given system.  
A more important point raised through de/post-colonial theorisation of the material is the way 
in which these shift the focus from needing to determine what is ‘alive’, ‘has agency’ or ‘is 
sentient’, to a question of the particular quality of the relations formed – propertied, extractive, 
collaborative, toxic and so on. If the material becomes alive on the basis of relationships, what 
becomes important is the particular qualities and nature of these relationships. The attention 
shifts from locating definite sites or beings of agency and control towards the quality of the 
forms of relationships that are assembled, which make some things more like inanimate 
objects and other things more like animate subjects. Drawing on the non-equivalence, 
relationality and contingencies above, these particular forms of ‘aliveness’ depend on the 
sensibilities involved and the ways in which these are then translated into and determine 
relationships. The understanding of agency here shifts from one that assumes human 
determination in shaping inanimate or controlling semi-animate matter towards one in which 
what is animate or not is not presupposed but becomes clear only within a given relationship 
and assemblage.  
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To put it differently, it is a perspective that takes into account that both humans as well as 
non-humans can be, have been and are related to in an extractive manner as resources, but 
also can be, have been and are related to as persons. Alliances and affinities are not 
necessarily granted amongst humans, who equally are related to as mute matter, objects, 
resources to be extracted and so on. Instead, this perspective articulates the existence of 
other forms of alliances that cut across distinctions between, for example, humans and nature 
(in environmental debates, cf. Yusoff, 2013b) or humans and machines (in post humanism 
debates, cf. Braidotti, 2013; Haraway, 1991, 2016; Hayles, 1999). Some humans might 
associate with and defend an animal species or a given natural habitat against other humans, 
and indeed the affiliation of people with machines and systems that they have created and 
nurtured (captured and reflected on nicely in stories by Silicon Valley software engineer 
Ullman, 2013). This also opens up the possibility of an analysis of protocols that focuses on 
the kinds of relationships that are articulated through and in relation to these. 
 
2.3  The sensible  
In this section I discuss the political in the sense of political theorist Rancière’s disruption of a 
‘distribution of the sensible’ (Rancière, 2010, p. 92). From the discussion of the insensible as 
a precondition for and challenge to the political, I propose this particular articulation of the 
political as involving sensibilities as an extension of Barad’s onto-epistemological description 
of how things come to matter. Here I will be tying Barad’s agential realism to a more explicitly 
political conceptualisation of disruption and order, which offers up particular kinds of 
questions and ways of tracing through what matters politically in blockchain. After discussing 
the thinking of Rancière in relation to Barad, I draw on the notion of ‘diverse economies’, 
articulated by the economic geographers Gibson-Graham (2008). Where Rancière’s thinking 
suggests an understanding of disruption that forces the redistribution of a given sensibility 
such that new things come to matter, Gibson-Graham’s emphasis on already existing 
diversity suggests an acknowledgement of multiple sensibilities instead, highlighting their 
changing relationships rather than eventual inclusion. A ‘diverse economies’ approach 
thereby points towards the importance of analyses of ongoing and existing relationships 
between diverse (economic) orders of the sensible rather than assuming, analysing and 
critiquing a singular (capitalist) reality. Attentiveness to already existing economic diversity 
external to capitalism in the meantime also opens up questions of already existing diversity 
internally in blockchain development that does not overlap neatly with notions of 
capitalism/anti-capitalism, and allows for an articulation of these as mattering politically. I end 
the section with a discussion of the limits of notions of the sensible in relation to the insensible 
above, in networked systems and their interactions with the world that cannot be fully sensed 
or known as such (Amoore, 2016; Ito, 2017).  
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2.3.1  Disruption and redistr ibution  
The sensible in Rancière’s notion of the redistribution of the sensible should be read both in 
terms of what literally can be sensed (that is seen and is visible and so on) as well as what is 
sensible, in terms of making sense, being valid and legitimate in a given context (Rancière, 
2010, pp. 27–44). It describes a ‘common sense’ in a given community; that which is 
considered legitimate speech, action and subject for a given place and time. A distribution of 
the sensible suggests a spatial and experiential sensibility, and refers to the more explicit 
formalisation of such order through law and policy, but also to norms, culture, manners of 
speech and architecture; that which is the result of and continues to enforce a given order of 
things (ibid.). The political is then articulated as anything that disrupts this given order and 
redistributes the sensible. This can for example refer to struggles around recognition of a new 
kind of subject(ivity) and rights, or around the ability to perform certain activities and actions in 
a given place and so on (ibid.) and is therefore a conception of the political that reaches 
beyond existing political institutions into potentially any context and space. As a diffraction of 
Barad’s agential realist cut (Barad, 2007, pp. 132–185), Rancière’s understanding of the 
political can be understood as the disruption, disputes and struggles around what matters and 
is made to matter (made sensible) that was not previously sensed as mattering in the register 
of a given order. This conception of the political is not limited to institutional, nor indeed 
human, contexts but can be articulated as anything that makes itself sensible and matter 
where before it did not. The sensing and mattering of CO2 in climate debates would be an 
obvious example, and in the context of blockchain this might be, for instance, cryptographic 
‘Schnorr signatures’. With this combination of Barad and Rancière, I am making some 
assumptions of compatibility – the most important of which is the relationship between 
Rancière’s notion of sensibilities (Rancière, 2006, 2010; Dikeç, 2012) and Barad’s discussion 
of sensing and measuring apparatuses as part of onto-epistemological entanglements that 
have determinate, and material, effects (Barad, 2007). In this sense, I draw Rancière’s notion 
of the political into Barad’s quantum physics, relating it to questions of material determinacy 
and the non-human in an admittedly experimental manner that suggests (and requires) further 
research and debate. 
The concept of ‘the sensible’ in Rancière’s work (Rancière, 2006), having emerged from 
political contestation of European liberal institutional frameworks, tends to question the way 
subjects are recognised as having different rights of speech and action within a given political 
community. Such an order, as a distribution of the sensible, assumes a moment of disruption 
and then an expansion and new inclusions into the sensible register. This inclusion requires 
visibility and recognition from a sovereign or a public that is made to sense a disruption, and 
assumed to eventually acknowledge and include the matter in a redistribution of sensibilities. 
It assumes a sensing agency (indeed, the apparatus in Baradian terms) and in the liberal 
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context a distributor of rights, whether the state, a sovereign, the public, community or 
otherwise, that would eventually recognise and include the new subject and arrangement into 
a new distribution of the sensible. In blockchain, this singular sensing agency, a ‘central 
authority’ is in many ways is exactly what is being contested through the proposition of 
network decentralisation and the involvement of non-human determination. As outlined in the 
introduction, the proposition and claim of blockchain is to shift the sensing agency from 
humans, replacing it with what some articulate as an ‘algorithmic sovereign’ (Scott, 2014; 
Roio, 2018). In other words, it is not a disruptive project that seeks inclusion into a given 
sensibility, but rather a project addressing and looking to disrupt the very mode and method of 
sensing and determining what matters.  
External disruption 
Politics revolves around what is seen and what can be said about it, around who has the 
ability to see and the talent to speak, around the properties of spaces and the 
possibilities of time.  
– Rancière, 2006, p. 12 
The notion of the political as a redistribution of the sensible offers a precise yet broadly 
applicable definition of the concept of disruption as that which forces a redistribution of a 
given distribution of the sensible. Understanding the political as a moment of disruption to a 
given order points immediately to one of the main claims of Bitcoin and blockchain: that it is a 
disruptive technology that redistributes who or what validates 
transactions/information/agreements, determines their value and organises global value flows 
and the enforcement of agreements. This disruptive promise of both Bitcoin and blockchain is 
broadly proclaimed to be a redistribution of such capacities and tasks from the given order of 
things of banks, governments and legal systems to new agencies, both human and non-
human. As highlighted in the quote above, this entails not only shifting capacities from one set 
of agencies to another, but also a translation of such capacities into other forms and spaces. 
In this case, one might say from politics articulated and debated through policy, to politics 
articulated and debated through code, mathematics and algorithms. The translation then 
demands a different set of talents and abilities to navigate these new sites of the political.  
Bitcoin and blockchain are frequently claimed as a radical disruption of the established 
monetary, financial, political and legal order of things (cf. Vigna & Casey, 2018). In the 
meantime, the financial industry and government departments have begun to take an active 
role in the field, from hiring developers to funding research and projects, publishing, 
developing products and so on. And so the question of disruption as a redistribution of the 
sensible and shift in the given order has begun to be scrutinised within and from outside of 
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the field in attempts to draw out the exact ways in which the technology is supposed to be 
disruptive. Legal scholar Herian argues, in a paper that examines the shifting notion of 
disruption, that disruption has been subsumed within the existing order as simply a 
competitive new product on the market: ‘The blockchain horizon is one in which more 
capitalism and with it the further and deeper entrenchment of capitalist class power are likely 
outcomes based on the present course of blockchain research, development and 
implementations’ (Herian, 2016). Rather than redistributing the sensible and making new 
things matter, blockchain applications are pitched as superior services or as opening new 
markets, but always within the same familiar dynamics of late capitalist modes of economic 
accumulation. And yet, looking at debates about the latest evolutions of capitalism in the 
literature – what has been called platform or surveillance capitalism and digital monopolies – 
these are exactly the industries and infrastructures that blockchain projects claim to disrupt. 
Herian locates the particular evidence of capitalist co-optation not only in the involvement of 
existing financial and corporate actors but also and in particular through the question of 
permissioned or unpermissioned blockchains. This ‘particular’ offers a far more important 
insight into the political differentiation emerging in and through the field than a critique based 
on markets and capitalism, because it stays with the vocabulary and emergent political 
sensibilities of blockchain and the communities forming around them. 
The more explicit and radical forms of disruption proclaimed for blockchain attempts to resist 
a given distribution of the sensible, understood here as ‘centralised’ registers of sensibility, 
including legislation, political acceptance and so on. Rather than disruption followed by 
inclusion, the ambition is to replace such registers with a different – algorithmic – kind by 
‘literally coding the world they wish to see’ (Manski & Manski, 2018, p. 152), entailing a 
disruption followed by an ‘exit to the internet’ (Scott, 2014). The concerns and vocabulary do 
not neatly overlap with concerns that have formed with and through existing distributions of 
the sensible then, such as ‘anti-’ or ‘pro-’ capitalism or even left and right, but along a 
technical vocabulary that has gained political significance and draws the political along 
different lines – such as the line between ‘permissioned’ or ‘unpermissioned’. And so in the 
construction of new ‘digital territories’ and ‘algorithmic sovereignties’, aspects of state 
functions (security and enforcement of property, for example; see Käll, 2018) as well as 
capitalist and financial dynamics (markets and profit concerns) are indeed uncritically 
operationalised and deployed. However, they are done so in new ways and along a different 
set of ethical and political concerns that are not entirely covered by existing critiques of state, 
capitalism and financialisation and so are worth tracing and articulating in some detail. 
Critiques of blockchain concerned with the ways in which they further capitalist tendencies 
require some careful unpacking in order to understand exactly which tendencies are 
promoted and how these dynamics are transformed in the process.  
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Internal sensibility 
Understanding the political as a redistribution of the sensible suggests a distribution of the 
sensible for any given setting or context, including the proposition for a technological 
resolution to political problems. This also entails an internal ordering of what are considered 
sensible and legitimate subjects, speech and action for different places and times within 
blockchain assemblages themselves. Meeting the blockchain halfway then, and taking 
seriously the proposition and possibility of new algorithmic sovereignties and territories, the 
concern becomes tracing what matters politically to such new constituencies forming around 
and in these, which should also say something about the order that is proposed and sought to 
be materialised through blockchain protocols and applications. 
My concerns here are the political reasons and reasonings for blockchain, as understood and 
articulated by the constituencies forming around and through these. Namely, what matters to 
them, what gave rise to a given assemblage as a political and what holds the assemblage 
together. I also aim to do so in a way that does not immediately associate these with a 
capitalist agenda, but takes seriously the diversity of projects and actors in blockchain and 
their collaborations. That is not to dismiss arguments that the technology might simply 
reproduce, further and innovate on aspects of capitalist dynamics, but rather to draw a slightly 
different field of possibilities that foreground a different set of concerns than capitalism/ anti-
capitalism. If blockchain is analysed only through the lens of how and where it reproduces 
capitalism, it misses out on a large part of the story, and also misses out on the potential of 
the ‘disruption’ it proposes. To put it bluntly, blockchain sensibilities seem less concerned with 
‘capitalism’ (understood simply as another tool in the toolbox) than with notions of 
‘centralisation’, ‘trust’ and so on. In fact, the main principles, aims and attributes claimed for 
the systems quickly appear, signifying the political reasons of the blockchain assemblage: 
decentralisation, and along with it, disintermediation, privacy, transparency, net neutrality, 
trustlessness and more. In Chapter 5, I trace this sensibility through cultural histories of 
decentralised to networks, in Cypherpunk, peer-to-peer communities and open source culture 
more generally. The intention here is not to claim these as being the ‘true’ politics of 
blockchain, but instead to open up two interrelated research possibilities: firstly, to trace 
emerging distribution of the sensible in blockchain as described by constituencies, 
descriptions and concepts that are important for shaping the purpose and direction of 
projects, informing priorities as well as limits to what is acceptable and so on; and secondly to 
address the concepts and principles that form a blockchain sensibility as mobilising in and of 
themselves, bringing together people and efforts from across the political spectrum. In some 
ways, the concepts function as what linguist McGee calls ‘ideographs’:  
An ideograph is an ordinary language term found in political discourse. It is a high-order 
abstraction representing collective commitment to a particular but equivocal and ill-defined 
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normative goal. It warrants the use of power, excuses behaviour and belief, which might 
otherwise be perceived as eccentric or antisocial, and guides behaviour and belief into 
channels easily recognised by a community as acceptable and laudable. 
– McGee, 1980, p. 15 
The intention is not a linguistic or discourse analysis of blockchain assemblages, although 
that effort is worthwhile, and has been commenced by, amongst others, Reijers & 
Coeckelbergh, 2016. Instead, the question is the specificity of these concepts and the way 
they came to matter politically in these blockchain assemblages. The anthropological work of 
Coleman (Coleman, 2009, 2014) amongst hackers involved in the field of InfoSec (information 
security) and the amorphous hacker network Anonymous is a valuable resource here as it 
highlights the particularities of the culture, ethic and politics of different internet cultures as 
important in shaping targets and strategies, and in defining the specific logic of who is 
considered an ally and who is an enemy. This cultural history and detail has largely remained 
untold, both in the literature around blockchain and across blockchain assemblages. This 
context is taken for granted, in part because the concepts describing what matters in the 
technology are indeed ‘equivocal and ill-defined’ (McGee, 1980, p. 15) in the political and 
social meanings, if not also in the technical. Such vagueness, however, in some sense holds 
the assemblages together regardless of differences in terms of how they are implemented 
and understood. It also allows for alliances between what might otherwise seem contradictory 
socio-political positions. More importantly, however, the differences between their 
interpretations became the very space in which a new politics is negotiated and formed in and 
through disputes around the definitions, operationalisation and materialisation of blockchain 
epistemologies.  
The explicit articulation of these ‘ideographs’, principles and politics and the excavation of 
their histories in internet-based political culture therefore contribute to opening up space for 
political potentiality beyond proclamations about capitalism. I take seriously what matters to 
those developing the technology as an integral part of shaping the field of political possibility 
along and through a different set of concerns. This entails tracing the vocabulary, principles 
and intentions of peer-to-peer, Cypherpunk and open source internet cultures to understand 
the particular form of disruption proposed through these sensibilities – and to do so in order to 
carve out some lost spaces of political possibilities in the field. By placing Bitcoin and the 
blockchain into a longer history of decentralised systems that stretches back to the ‘90s 
(Troncoso et al., 2017), the fidelity more broadly is to these principles and to computation, into 
which economic theories are operationalised in different ways. The attraction of Bitcoin, for 
many involved in the development and maintenance of peer-to-peer decentralised networks, 
was the possibility of developing a decentralised system that would ‘pay for itself’. It pointed 
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towards the possibility of economic autonomy for such systems and the communities that run 
them. This does not mean there is an entirely uncritical approach to modes of accumulation, 
but rather that these do not overlap in any neat way with what might be recognised as right or 
left political economic thinking or solely concerns about capitalism. Instead, a different set of 
concerns is foregrounded, brought together through broad concepts of decentralisation, 
consensus, trust and so on, whose ambiguity both mobilises across the political spectrum as 
well as articulates potential contradictions with late capitalist modes of accumulation as areas 
of legitimate political dispute – even when they take the form of new business models rather 
than new political parties or social movements. The ‘blockchain’ that suggests itself for 
political analysis through this onto-epistemological cut of the sensible includes descriptions 
and concepts by the constituencies formed around blockchain as a project, their definitions 
and articulations of the political and reasons for being involved, both as a disruption externally 
and a proposition for a different sensibility and sensing agency.  
2.3.2  Diverse economies 
Diverse economies was proposed by Gibson-Graham as a subject field and emerging 
research community in a paper seeking to intervene into critical economic geography by 
foregrounding already existing diversity of economic practices (Gibson-Graham, 2008). The 
intervention sought to challenge the assumption of capitalism as an all-encompassing 
system, and problematise the ways in which alternatives are thereby marginalised, 
overlooked and under acknowledged. For some time now, they argue, critical literature on 
capitalism has simply not been helpful for expanding other economic modes and possibilities. 
They argue that ‘other worlds’ than a capitalist one already exist but are underappreciated – 
also, and importantly, by critical thinking concerned only with the new frontier of capitalist 
accumulation. Instead, they suggest, non-capitalist economic activities, when considered 
together, in fact outweigh strictly capitalist ones (Gibson-Graham, 1996). Capitalism can 
therefore realistically be considered as already only one among many economic modes, and 
as indeed dependent on such other modes of re/production. By foregrounding already 
existing alternative economic practices, these can in turn be validated, recognised and 
strengthened.  
An important possible oversight in analyses that seek to conceptualise a given order of things 
and the potential for its disruption is that a given distribution of the sensible is never singular. 
There are always multiple distributions and sensibilities that coexist and continue to do so that 
are often excluded in order to maintain coherence. A diverse economies approach to the 
political economic sensibilities of ‘blockchain’ helps to articulate diversities and potentials 
amongst blockchain projects and in relation to existing capitalist dynamics and assess these 
less as either full blown hyper-capitalism or an alternative that either fails to, or succeeds in, 
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replacing existing capitalist and financial systems, and more as propositions and potentials 
within a diverse field of economic dynamics. A diverse economies approach also radically 
shifts the focus of attention from building internally coherent systems to an understanding and 
treatment of the interrelationship with other existing systems as mattering at least as much. 
This poses a challenge and promotes an interesting area of political and strategic research in 
terms of blockchain protocols and their design, such that interrelationships and dependencies 
on for example exchange rates and the dollar or yen is brought into the narrative of how such 
infrastructures operate politically, rather than dismissed as irrelevant or unfortunate 
speculative behaviour. The approach, in other words, opens up a significant shift in the 
treatment of blockchain (and capitalism) as self-coherent systems, both internally and 
externally. 
Diversities instead of ‘externalities’ 
Gibson-Graham’s diverse economies approach can be read as a contribution to a longer 
history of feminist political economy. A major contribution of the field has been to situate 
capitalist modes of production in relation to, and as dependent on, reproductive work ‘outside 
the factory’. The aim was to make work done by women and others in the home and 
communities visible and recognised as mattering and having value in terms of the economy. 
The important contribution of Gibson-Graham is that rather than conceptualising other modes 
of re/production as ‘externalities’ to be included into and accounted for in a general economic 
sensibility, they argue for acknowledging diverse economic spaces in their own right. This 
repositions such activities from external and marginal with demands for inclusion, to one of 
diversity, instead considering the relationships and interfaces between them and a capitalist 
system, or other interfacing economic systems, as ongoing sites of political articulation.  
The main lesson here, both in terms of capitalism and blockchain systems, is that it is a 
fallacy to treat such systems as singular and hermetic as they are always in relation to other 
systems and spaces, the relations, boundaries and interfaces of which are constantly being 
negotiated. In other words, different economic modes and ways of being should not be 
treated as ‘external’, but rather understood as differentiated – an ongoing continuous 
difference, the relations between which can be configured as extractive, collaborative or 
otherwise, but which are there regardless. This challenges teleological tendencies in literature 
on blockchain (and capitalism), where the imaginary is singular, necessitating eventual 
overthrow of existing systems and takeover by new and better ones. Instead, a diverse 
economies approach acknowledges that there are already, and always will be, other 
economic modes, and these need to be acknowledged and treated with careful attention. A 
diverse economies approach suggests a different possibility of political analysis and strategy, 
namely a deliberate consideration, articulation, design and shaping of coexistent and 
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interdependent economic modes. The project then becomes less about the disruption of a 
singular sensibility (whether articulated as ‘capitalism’ or ‘centralised systems’) to be followed 
by a redistribution of the sensible through inclusion of a previously marginalised ‘external’ into 
the modes of a reformed system, and more an expansion of diverse economies and 
reconfiguration and deliberate articulation of the terms of their relations to a capitalist 
economic sphere.  
Internalities 
These lessons pertain not only to analyses of a relationship of blockchain projects to 
capitalism and other already existing economic diversity, but also internally in the blockchain 
communities in terms of how blockchain protocols tend to be described as hermetic systems 
by excluding dependencies and relations with existing economic, political, legal, infrastructural 
(and so on) systems. Computational or protocological affiliation in this sense serves the role 
of ‘capitalism’ in Gibson-Graham’s analysis (Gibson-Graham, 2008): a totalising explanatory 
framework, that is either foregrounded in utopian and dystopian narratives or sits in the 
background as an omniscient ‘neutral’ substrate for the coordination of decentralised 
behaviour (cf. Buterin, Hitzig and Weyl, 2018). In adjusting the insights of diverse economies 
towards the exclusions that are performed in order to articulate blockchain coherence, I aim to 
direct attention to the ways in which, for example, ‘cryptoeconomic’ dynamics necessarily 
relate to, and will continue to relate to other economic spaces. This shift in perspective brings 
out questions that are often sidelined in discussions in the blockchain community as 
unfortunate dynamics that are not relevant to the underlying technology, while being hugely 
important practical issues. These questions relate to things like regulation, exchange rates 
and geo-political, environmental and geological differences; the many ways that 
cryptocurrency and blockchain projects relate, resists, incorporates or competes with existing 
economic systems and processes. These matter for how the political effects play out and 
should therefore be taken seriously. In fact, interrelation with other systems is an extremely 
strategic point for articulating power dynamics in terms of flows of resources, touching on 
questions of sovereignty, autonomy and control.  
There are three things to take away here. In Baradian terms, the ‘cut’ of what is considered 
relevant or not in a description of blockchain matters, and a diverse economies approach is a 
cut that brings to the foreground ‘the political’ in articulating relationships between already 
existing as well as potential diversity of systems and sensibilities. What is considered 
important politically, then, is the articulation of relationships with a diverse set of economic 
spaces and modes rather than a singular analysis of decentralisation in relation to 
centralisation (or capitalism). The configuration and shaping of those relationships matter; it 
can be one of invisibility and ‘externality’, it can be one of exchange and so on, but what is 
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important to keep an eye on is the power dynamics that are articulated through these 
relations and how different spaces are expanded or suppressed in the process. Recognising 
and foregrounding relations does not in and of itself address the politics and power dynamics 
of such relations. It merely recognises these as a site for (potentially violent) political 
negotiation and articulation. Secondly, this lesson on already existing diversity pertains not 
only to critics but also to proponents and developers of blockchain. What is or is not 
considered relevant to blockchain protocols matters. Where the line is drawn around the 
design space of what the protocol should determine matters, but more importantly, the way 
that line interfaces and relates to other systems is not a marginal question that can be left to 
happenstance but is hugely significant in determining the effects of a given system. Finally, 
and importantly, by focusing less on some complete story of what blockchain is and more on 
how it becomes in relation to different economies and contexts, we begin to see what matters 
to the community and the field of possibilities and tensions in terms of its development paths.  
By drawing in Gibson-Graham’s notion of diverse economies, my aim is to open up a space 
for research within critical blockchain literature that does not take its likeness to capitalist 
economic modes as its necessary starting point, but to instead look towards the diversity of 
economic spaces and the articulation between them as important points of political possibility 
and determination. The blockchain assemblage itself is not fully determined through capitalist 
economic ideas, but has a slightly different notion of ‘disruption’ and set of concerns related 
more to computation, decentralised networks, information security practices and notions of 
‘authority’, which in fact open up a different field of potentialities in terms of how the 
technology could play out. I argue that it is important to take the concerns of the communities 
building the protocols and platforms seriously as a factor in the shaping of the political 
possibilities in the space. These open up further questions to be explored in and through 
research into emerging blockchain constituencies, including identifying the ways that 
blockchain is described as relating to other economies, systems and spaces, how these 
relations are understood politically and how they play out. This work seeks to carefully draw 
out potential contradictions and fault lines between existing sensibilities and those that 
blockchain open up for, to understand the specific kinds of disruption proposed and made to 
matter.  
 
2.4  The dissensible 
In my third and final Baradian ‘cut’ I articulate the dissensible as an approach to the political 
that addresses the persistent emergence of incompatible positions and the ways in which 
these are expressed and negotiated. By using the term ‘dissensible’ I draw on political 
theorists Laclau and Mouffe and their emphasis on ‘failed unicity’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001; 
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Mouffe, 2012, p. 29), as well as Rancière’s work on dissensus as the basis of the political 
(Rancière, 2010) and the precondition for a ‘redistribution of the sensible’. The proposition of 
Bitcoin and blockchain was, and still is to a large degree, to translate political and economic 
questions into a technical problem of decentralised consensus, and then solving it through 
technical means. The debates in the previous two sections address firstly the matter and 
material politics of blockchain and the insensible as the limits to what can be political known, 
and secondly how blockchain came about as a political sensibility. The dissensible is a 
response to the idea of a ‘consensus protocol’ as resolving the problem of the political, in any 
final manner, drawing out and highlighting what might be the dissensus protocols in operation, 
protocols understood here in a broader sense of the formal or informal ways that 
disagreement and incompatibility is dealt with. The dissensible addresses how disagreement 
and incompatibility is managed within the proposition of a technical solution to the political 
and the governance methods developed and employed to do so. The ‘blockchain’ that 
suggests itself for political analysis through this third set of debates includes core developers, 
full nodes, miners, developers mailing list discussions, GitHub processes (forking, pull 
requests and so on), in fact all the actors that are involved in contesting or maintaining a 
given version of the blockchain. In this final section, then, I discuss the thinking of political 
theorists that take as a starting point a constant potential for dissensus, and therefore the 
need for the political as a realm in which to resolve such dissensus under conditions of 
incompatibility.  
2.4.1  Dissensus protocol 
Mouffe and her collaborator Laclau, ground their understanding of the political in a 
conceptualisation of the universe as fundamentally divided ‘where the primary ontological 
terrain is one of division, of failed unicity.’ (Mouffe, 2012, p. 29; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). They 
critique perspectives that are based on the notion, metaphysically or otherwise, of a unified 
whole, because the articulation of such a whole always entails exclusions of that which was 
not included in the description. This conception of collectives as always and necessarily 
exclusionary argues for the persistence of the political in that there is always the possibility of 
excluded positions to make them selves felt, and therefore there is always a need to be able 
to negotiate these. Mouffe refers to this as agonism (Mouffe, 2005, pp.19-21), which I treat as 
the possibility of dissensus. This failed unicity, they argue, entails that there will always be a 
need for some kind of terrain through which to negotiate differences and incompatibility as 
and when it arises – the political, in other words, will never be solved and is a constant 
condition. There will always be something external to a defined collective, always some form 
of border determining the edges. In a Baradian sense, what matters are how such exclusions 
are articulated, and the ways in which they are attended to or managed when and if they 
make themselves felt. Through this understanding then, the political is never solved; it is 
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simply reconfigured. And so, in blockchain systems, while the protocol seeks to resolve 
questions of how to conduct politics, in a sense automating aspects of the conduct of politics, 
the political is thereby shifted into the realm of the technical, and is played out in technical 
disputes over protocol changes. A focus on dissensus thereby initially offers a methodological 
approach as to how to trace the political in and through blockchain systems, by paying 
attention to conflict, technical or otherwise, understanding these as political and analysing the 
ways they are resolved. Looking at development processes and pathways and code 
governance also reveals how things might have been and still could be different.  
Mouffe discusses the issues of dissensus in relation to exactly such institutional forms that 
were supposed to accommodate for processes of mediating dispute through political debate 
and deliberation, namely European/US liberal democracy in the years preceding the 2008 
global financial crisis (Mouffe, 2005, pp.83-89). She looks at what happens to the possibility 
of dissent in contexts where an overall consensus about the means though which to address 
dissensus is assumed. The reason for this is precisely because while this political climate 
prided itself on allowing free speech and open debate, the institutions and political framework 
itself were in the process assumed to be universal and unquestionable (ibid.). And so, her 
argument is that in the specific context of liberal democracy there is a certain space for 
disagreement, a legitimate kind of dissensus, but only within the predefined forms and 
formats of established institutions. In her account, the effect of such an inability to politically 
question the institutions and economic organisation that represented the liberal democratic 
project was to marginalise dissent (Mouffe, 2005, pp.76-83) . This attention to the political and 
the ways in which it can or cannot be expressed point towards two further questions of 
blockchain as a proposition to resolve or automate the political – namely, what are the 
broader effects of reconfiguring the political as a technical question, and secondly, how is 
dissent, as an ongoing possibility, managed in these systems? 
Mediating the political 
In this discussion of the post-political liberal democracies, Mouffe opens up questions around 
the effects of assuming these as neutral and universal mediators of difference (Mouffe, 2005). 
She is concerned with the effects of shutting down the possibility of the political understood as 
agonistic and dissensual. In her analysis of liberal democracy, the liberal consensus by 
assuming particular forms through which politics would be conducted in turn reconfigured the 
political (agonistic forms) as moral debate, shifting fundamental differences into a realm of 
morality (Mouffe, 2005, pp.72-76). Far from solving ‘the political’, this instead turns what she 
terms ‘agonism’, which I address here through Rancière’s notion of ‘dissensus’, into a violent 
form that in turn is also expressed through post-political absolutes. Mouffe argues that in 
liberal democracy what was previously the Left and the Right has been reconfigured as moral 
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questions of ‘right and wrong’ (Mouffe, 2005, p.5), meaning that this is no longer a dispute 
between fundamentally different but nevertheless acknowledged positions, but instead one 
between a perspective that has the right to exist (liberalism) and another which does not (that 
in turn become ‘extremism’, ‘nihilism’ or ‘populism’ and so on). And, she argues, this 
reconfiguration creates violent responses from those who hold positions that, from the 
perspective of liberal democracies, are not supposed to exist (Mouffe, 2005, pp.76-83). 
Dissensus can be configured as indeed political questions or pushed into other forms such as 
morality in her example. Such other forms through which to deal with dissensus never finally 
solve the issue, but do change the ways these erupt and are made to matter, and therefore 
matter in themselves.  
What I suggest here, via Mouffe, is that the form of mediation and resolution of dissensus will 
affect the ways in which disagreement with the particular form of mediation expresses itself. 
The medium matters, so to speak, for the ways in which the political is made to matter. And 
so reconfiguring the political into a technical problem and solution might also reconfigure the 
way agonism or dissensus can be expressed and made itself felt both in terms of internal 
dispute over technical changes and also with the protocol as a mediating form in itself. This 
raises the questions of how dissensus is resolved in blockchain assemblages that claim to 
have solved dissensus already through algorithmic means, and also what expressions of 
dissensus is considered legitimate and what which are excluded. If the protocol becomes 
what the liberal democratic institutions were in Mouffe’s analysis – the only legitimate medium 
through which to conduct politics – then the political, as incompatible difference, as the 
dissensible, will make itself felt elsewhere in unexpected forms.  
The blockchain space saw a significant shift in perspective and attention following some 
major disputes around code changes in Bitcoin and Ethereum, which made the community 
start to consider questions of governance and in particular protocol governance and the 
extent to which it lives up to the ideal of decentralisation. The management of disagreement 
and incompatibility was put centre stage and new forms of governance began to be 
articulated with new justifications of these. Forking code repositories, for example, was 
articulated as the means through which these systems would manage and accommodate 
dissent in the governance of code (the topic of Chapter 6). But the question of agonism raised 
by Mouffe is precisely not aimed towards seamless management of different perspectives on 
what matters (which to some extent was the aim of liberal democracies), but rather to allow 
the possibility for different perspectives to meet and clash on a variety of territories. Just as 
the political made itself felt in the blockchain world through protocol disagreements, it was 
immediately and swiftly integrated into questions of governance, meaning the most effective 
management of differing positions. And so a final resolution of the political problem of 
difference was once again assumed through ever-more sophisticated mediation mechanisms 
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combining markets and networks into new configurations. The political, in the meantime, 
cannot quite be contained within the notion of governance. The concept of governance tends 
towards management while the point of Mouffe’s work is that the political cannot always be 
managed and will erupt in illegitimate forms. 
Neutralising the political  
It is only if the political is considered something to be finally resolved that the need for a 
neutral mediation emerges. A neutral mediator would then resolve issues of difference and 
agonism as and when it emerges, and, rather than addressing difference, the political is 
therefore addressed through a search for neutral or universal principles upon and through 
which such a system can be built. There are, in this sense, significant similarities in the claims 
made of both decentralised protocols and Mouffe’s reading of liberal democracy: that they 
mediate and provide the substrate for coordination amongst competent free agents, and that 
they do so in the most rational and just manner. The political aim of decentralisation can 
arguably be understood in this manner to establish a maximum freedom through a substrate 
that coordinates behaviour in a supposedly neutral and fair manner. A response then, to both 
technical and institutional claims of neutrality, has been to re-politicise these and show the 
ways in which they require certain capacities in order to navigate effectively, with implicit 
biases and inequalities that follow.  
By politicising such propositions for neutral mediation and resolution of difference seems to 
open up a problem of infinite regression: if the protocol is political, then there should be a 
means for voicing dissent about the protocol. If the means for voicing dissent about the 
protocol is also political, then there should be a means for voicing dissent about this too – and 
so on. This plays out in blockchain through discussions and questions of governance 
mechanisms, and in the ways in which many projects – particularly after the major politicised 
protocol disputes – sought to position themselves as ever more universal, neutral 
technologies, from platforms, to protocols, to language, in order to be that neutral substrate 
upon which difference can emerge and play itself out. However, if the question is not about 
resolving the problem of the political in any final manner, the conceptual problem of infinite 
regression disappears. Instead, attention and consideration can shift towards the ways in 
which a given reconfiguration of the political – in this case into a set of technical problems and 
management processes – affects and changes the ways in which dissent and dissensus is 
expressed and resolved both internally through the protocol and around it through those that 
chose not to engage via the protocol. Dissensus, and what Mouffe understands as the 
fundamental condition of agonism, is the continuous possibility of negation of any common 
substrate in the first place, whether protocological, ideological, religious or institutional. And, 
to draw Rancière back in (2010), such a negation can be hugely generative in that it 
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redistributes and redefines the landscape of what matters, what was previously insensible 
(Yusoff, 2013a) or what in the case of blockchain might be better understood as the 
redistribution of the sensible and possible, and a literal development of a digital territory and 
space where new things are possible and new constituencies are formed (Roio, 2013). This 
also raises the question of what holds the assemblage together and where the limits of 
acceptable dissensus lie before something is simply considered an invalid position and 
excluded, and how such forms of dissensus are expressed.  
 
2.5  Conclusion 
In this chapter I have drawn together disparate theorists and debates in order to propose 
three ‘cuts’ in the political significance of blockchain. The first cut is framed by Barad’s 
treatment of determinacy and indeterminacy as not ‘belonging’ to a specific field, discipline or 
form of agency (social, algorithmic or otherwise), but rather as entangled, whereby 
phenomena are made determinate and made in/to matter by all sorts of sensing agencies 
drawing ‘cuts’ and making things (into) matter (Barad, 2017, pp. 132-185). Things are 
determined in many different ways by many different forms, making the question one of which 
is the most appropriate and beneficial and for whom, rather than making a necessity of an 
algorithmic one on the basis of ideas of objectivity. I elaborate this cut further by drawing in 
Yusoff’s discussion of the ‘insensible’ (2013a): not only are there multiple ways in which an 
indeterminate field is made determinate, there is also the matter that these ways might not be 
immediately sensible. Whether algorithmic, animal, mineral or otherwise, these suggest 
sensibilities that might never make themselves explicitly knowable and sensible to a given 
registry. This cut further suggests that instead of any singular human/legal/political/economic 
blockchain registry of what matters, there are affinities and alliances that already cross these 
categories. I suggest that this enables an approach to further analysis of blockchain protocols 
whereby their determinate qualities might be interesting and potentially useful, but are not 
assumed to be the only or most appropriate means for determining things. The insensible 
therefore suggests a detailed analysis of the very particular kind of determinacy enacted in 
and through blockchains, its limitations and why parts of the blockchain community find it to 
be a better way of resolving and determining the political. This is the topic and focus of 
Chapter 4 and the first ‘cut’ on the political matter of blockchain.  
There are other angles and debates that could have been brought to bear on questions of 
blockchain protocols and their political and ontological implications. One major omission that 
is worth briefly highlighting here is the literature and debates that articulate network 
infrastructures as intermediating and making possible a ‘collective consciousness’ whereby 
internet infrastructures facilitate forms of collaboration where the whole is greater than the 
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parts (cf. Bria and Roio, 2014; Kennedy et al., 2001; Halpin and Thompson, 2009; Rifkin, 
2014; Rogers et al., 2015). Instead of conceiving protocol and algorithms as new forms of 
sovereignties beyond human control, such articulations and projects aim towards a different 
understanding of democracy, whereby network infrastructures make possible new forms of 
collaboration, knowledge-sharing and decision-making that reorganises what is politically 
possible in important ways – towards a form of direct democracy at scale. I chose to omit this 
very important set of debates for two reasons. The first is that the mood and analysis around 
such debates has shifted significantly with the growing awareness of the ways in which 
network infrastructures are used for commercial, geo-political and state-based surveillance 
and targeting. This decision, to address the very preconditions of debate, has also meant that 
other opportunities in terms of blockchain protocol analysis – for instance in-depth 
comparative analysis of different consensus protocols in the field – are beyond scope, yet 
have formed an empirical backdrop nevertheless. Secondly, and related to the first point, this 
shift in mood and awareness seemed to lend resonance to ideas forming part of a blockchain 
sensibility that is heavily concerned with not only security and privacy but broader issues also. 
In other words, I found that limiting the scope to address ideas, attitudes and a sensibility 
coming out of blockchain proper to be a more pressing and compelling concern. Assessing 
the possibilities of using blockchain for such purposes of new forms of democratic life or more 
egalitarian economic dynamics is absolutely related to but beyond the immediate scope of 
this thesis.  
The second ‘cut’ is framed again by Barad, but this time more explicitly assisted by Rancière’s 
notion of the sensible (Rancière, 2010, pp. 27–44). With this cut, I suggest that there is a 
sensibility that holds blockchain together as a recognisable assemblage, despite significant 
differences in terms of political and economic ideas. This sensibility can indeed present a 
disruption and redistribution of other sensibilities. I draw on Gibson-Graham (2008) to 
sharpen this cut, such that both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ diversity is taken seriously in the 
analysis. This means that the diversity of economic and political ideas in the blockchain 
assemblage suggests that what holds the assemblage together is not primarily economic or 
political ideas such as ‘capitalism’, but a different sensibility that intersects with capitalist 
notions or indeed other economic ideas in different ways. It also suggests an external 
diversity, such that blockchain systems, projects and protocols are never a wholesale 
replacement of some complete system. This suggests that analyses of projects and protocols 
cannot be so easily addressed as hermetic complete solutions to the political, but rather 
should be addressed and analysed in terms of their relationships and dependencies on other 
already existing economic and political dynamics. Drawing out and understanding such a 
blockchain sensibility and its provenance is the topic and focus of Chapter 5, and this thesis 
will discuss the relationships to both an internal and external diversity.  
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The limitations of this approach are largely due to the priorities being an intervention on the 
terms of debate. A potential alternative theoretical approach might have been to draw directly 
on heterodox economic literature, including a broader field of feminist or commons-based 
economics. This might have more directly achieved what I discuss as a possibility by drawing 
in Gibson-Graham’s notion of diverse economies – namely, to redraw what is possible and 
what matters in relation to blockchain and cryptoeconomics, and not assume a singular 
capitalist reality. My admittedly difficult decision to not take this particular theoretical approach 
was in large part due to my selection of case studies, Bitcoin and Ethereum, on the basis of 
being the two largest projects that arguably set standards for the rest of the blockchain 
industry. If I were to say anything about a blockchain political sensibility proper, these cases 
would need to be a primary focus. An alternative approach might have been to include 
heterodox economics, and work with comparative cases to flesh out such differences and 
diversity. This was indeed the initial intention, and, as I explain in the introduction and in 
Chapter 3, I had included the Faircoin case for this reason.15 However, by doing so, I would 
have opened up a different set of debates focusing more on economic theories and their 
enactment through technological infrastructures. I made the decision to address the political 
and articulate a blockchain sensibility proper. This does open up interesting possibilities for 
further theoretical work, however, to understand the relationships between such a sensibility 
and political economic ideas. Similarly, and on the topic of the economic, another body of 
literature that I have largely excluded from discussion is that pertaining to monetary theory 
and complementary currency debates in relation to cryptocurrencies (cf. Bollier, 2014; Peters, 
Panayi and Chapelle, 2015; Roio and Sachy, 2015; Roio et al., 2015; Scott, 2018). Again, the 
decision to omit this literature was largely because the focus of this thesis, and this particular 
analytical ‘cut’, is blockchain and the political more generally, rather than currency 
applications and their economic implications, although these do interrelate as I discuss further 
in Chapter 5.  
The final Baradian cut that I have set up in this chapter, once again with Barad and Rancière, 
but this time sharpened by the political theories of Mouffe, has allowed me to introduce my 
concept of the dissensible. Here, I point to the political as an ongoing potential for things to be 
different, for incompatible sensibilities to arise. This suggests two issues that I discuss 
through Mouffe and Barad: firstly, that such incompatibilities raise the question of how they 
are resolved, not in any final manner, but as delineating the contexts and conditions through 
which incompatibility is considered to be best negotiated; and secondly, that the method for 
resolving such incompatibility matters, qualitatively, by assuming and requiring certain 
capacities over others. This cut suggests that the issue of consensus is not resolved in any 
final manner by a blockchain consensus algorithm, but merely shifts the question of 
                                                       
15 See https://fair-coin.org/ see also https://holochain.org/ as another example of heterodox economic thinking in 
relation to blockchain, or in this case hash trees rather than blockchains. 
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dissensus to other realms, layers and modes of expression. As is discussed and exemplified 
in Chapter 6, this requires an analysis of the governance of the protocols themselves and 
their mode of resolving consensus. Solving the political through a network protocol means 
that dissensus is translated into a question of security, attack vectors and honest or malicious 
behaviour.  
My discussion of Mouffe, Rancière and Barad as a way to draw this cut once again leaves 
much literature that could have been theoretically fruitful. And, again, the motivation has been 
to focus on explaining and shifting the terms of debate by articulating the question of 
dissensus, and the qualitative importance of how the dissensible is resolved. This has left 
perhaps more direct approaches to the question of protocol governance beyond the scope of 
this thesis. Related debates and literature that might inform protocol governance more directly 
pertain to management and organisational theories, as well as certain branches of political 
theory that deal with decision-making structures and processes, in particular decentralised 
ones. A second, slightly tangential but potentially fruitful area would also have been 
discussions of sovereignty as a way to articulate a more precise remit of protocol governance. 
Because blockchain in many ways is a technology that explicitly aims to delineate and secure 
a kind of networked space beyond the control of perhaps more traditional ‘sovereigns’, there 
is a project and claim here of articulating new forms of sovereignties. These include projects 
(see for example Bitnation) and ideas for specifically digital, planetary and ‘self-sovereign’ 
kinds (Gupta, 2015; Bratton, 2016; Reijers, O’Brolcháin and Haynes, 2016; Smolenski, 
2016).16 17 Such debates and cases are unfortunately beyond the immediate scope of this 
thesis, but suggest some interesting areas for further research.  
A limitation, or rather tendency, of a Baradian approach is that by drawing concepts from 
quantum physics into the political, social and technical, such as ‘entanglements’, 
‘determinacy’ and ‘indeterminacy’ and so on, we might obfuscate a more direct description of 
a social world and political stakes – who is doing what in a given situation. This requires some 
careful attention, and necessitates extra descriptive work such that Barad’s concepts instead 
can be effective for opening new angles while remaining precise. I turn now to the next 
chapter in which I discuss the research questions that I have sought to answer through these 
three cuts, the methods and methodologies and case studies that I have employed to do so.  
  
                                                       
16 https://tse.bitnation.co/  
17 See for example https://blockchainhub.net/self-sovereign-identity/ and 
https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/16693/329797/blockchain-and-self-sovereignty-in-the-age-of-consent  
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3  Research methods 
 
The main question that I seek to answer in this PhD thesis is the question of what matters 
politically in blockchain technologies. By ‘matters’ I mean literally mattering in the sense of 
making a material difference for what is developed and how, and how this in turn plays out. 
What I want to find out are the aspects of the protocols and their designs that are key for 
determining one outcome over another; in other words, a potential moment and place of 
decision and difference, which might in turn be a potential site of the political, the negotiation 
of such difference. The reasoning is that if blockchain is a technology aiming to resolve the 
political – a ‘technical system’ that ‘off-loads authority onto a transparent and public 
consensus history, created and validated by the protocol and some of its users’ (Kreutler, 
2018) – then the key for understanding this particular resolution would be in the protocol itself 
and the ways in which it organises, settles and enforces a ‘consensus’ in the network. My 
motivation for, in this sense, insisting on ‘the political’ in a technology claiming to resolve it is 
motivated by a concern for the possibility that things might be different, can be coded 
differently and that there is nothing inevitable nor necessary about a particular consensus 
protocol design.  
Because of such a focus on technical determination and the politics of protocols, my initial 
assumption was that consensus algorithms implied a shift in site and form of the political 
decision from what might normally be considered political questions, disputes and 
disagreements to technical questions about the very means for their resolution. Therefore the 
moment and site of political decision would also have shifted to the design and coding of the 
protocols themselves – the decisions made by protocol developers, systems designers and 
cryptographers – as mattering politically for determining the effects of this technology. This 
assumption was to cause some analytical difficulties (discussed 3.2.4 below) but, in the 
meantime, it informed the scope of my methods and the focus of my research setting: the 
whitepapers themselves, the ideas and assumptions informing their design and the 
communities developing these were the main focus of and setting for my research, informing 
the questions I looked to answer and the methods I employed for doing so. 
In this chapter, I describe my methodological design and its implementation and also reflect 
on its limitations. The chapter is structured as follows: in section 3.1 I describe my research 
design and how my research questions led me to take a case study approach, as well as the 
particular selection of cases. During the course of my analysis I dropped one of the cases, 
namely Faircoin, and so I briefly discuss the reasoning for this and the ways in which the case 
nevertheless has informed aspects of the research. I conclude the description of my research 
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design by addressing my own positionality in the field and the ethical questions arising from 
this and from studying the blockchain field more generally. Section 3.2 gives an overview and 
description of the different phases of my empirical research and the methods I employed in 
those phases. In 3.3 I describe the approach and process of data analysis and the path I took 
arriving at the overall structure of this thesis. Research questions will always in themselves 
entail certain assumptions and I have as much as possible sought to make these explicit and 
to discuss alternative approaches that might have been fruitful and the reasons for my 
decisions. I conclude the chapter by reflecting on the main assumptions and limitations of my 
methodological design.  
 
3.1  Research design and posit ionality 
In this section I describe my research design, the research questions that informed it and 
discuss its limitations. My research design and methods were heavily driven by my research 
questions, which took me across mediums, places, disciplines and contexts. The research 
questions are therefore key to the decisions I made during my empirical research and form 
the backbone of my methods. As discussed in the introduction chapter, three main questions 
informed my research design:  
1. How do the developers and users of blockchain understand, represent and seek to 
shape the political implications of the technology in terms of decentralisation, trust 
and consensus? 
2. Which are the active ‘mediators’ in the blockchain assemblage, what difference do 
they produce and what political effects do they have? 
3. What are the political differences between blockchain-based developments, and 
where and how are these expressed? (E.g. in the code itself, in the organisational 
structure of the developer community, amongst the user-base or elsewhere?)  
The form of these three research questions suggested that their answers may not necessarily 
be found in any one particular place, document or interview, but that anything potentially 
mattered a piece of code, the location of a given conference, a discussion board, assembly 
on the group chat application Telegram, keynote speech or logo of a given project. The 
research process, then, was more akin to tracing clues. Attempting to answer these three 
questions required going in-depth into the ideas informing projects and protocols as well as 
the contexts, disputes and debates surrounding their development. This led to a decision to 
take a case study approach to focus on a limited research environment rather than address 
the blockchain field as a whole. 
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3.1.1  Research design: case studies 
I initially chose three case studies – Bitcoin, Ethereum and Faircoin – with the aim of 
understanding processes of deliberate differentiation and enabling a comparative approach 
between these. The intention was that each of the cases would reveal different aspects of the 
ideas and possibilities in blockchain technology, as well as allowing for a comparison that 
might reveal political intent and effects. The three case studies were therefore selected on the 
basis of providing a good general understanding of ‘blockchain’ as well as the particular 
instantiations of different political assumptions and aims. This justification was later confirmed 
as the Bitcoin and the Ethereum networks grew to become the largest and second largest 
blockchain networks, therefore setting much of the standard that the rest of the industry and 
community would respond to, while the Faircoin project drew from and articulated a distinctly 
different and politically motivated understanding of decentralisation, trust and consensus. It 
also became clear that not only were there stated differences that covered unique angles on 
the technology in each case, but that this was also materialised in different consensus 
algorithms at the core of each project that pointed to deliberately different development 
pathways. The first was the initial invention of consensus algorithms in Bitcoin, using what is 
called ‘proof-of-work’ cryptographic hashing (explained and discussed in detail in Chapter 4). 
Ethereum then looked to change the Bitcoin protocol because of issues of energy waste and 
possible centralising tendencies, developing a ‘proof-of-stake’ algorithm to take its place. 
Finally, Faircoin invented a ‘proof-of-cooperation’ algorithm with the intention of removing 
market dynamics from the protocol operations and introduce more community-based 
oversight drawing on socio-political rather than technical understandings of trust and 
consensus.  
Over the course of my analysis, however, I decided to let the Faircoin case recede to the 
background, as it opened up a range of new debates and themes that were beyond the scope 
of this thesis. The Bitcoin and Ethereum cases raised the question of the possibility of 
replacing aspects of political decision-making and enforcement with forms of algorithmic 
mediation. The consensus algorithms in their architectures became propositions for a 
resolution of the political in and through an algorithmic or protocological agency, which Roio 
terms ‘algorithmic sovereignty’ (Roio, 2018), and which I discuss as a form of animism in 4.2. 
While the Faircoin case served to highlight this very novelty, to do it justice as a case study in 
its own right required drawing on and opening up a different set of debates, including but not 
limited to social movement organising strategies, heterodox economics and alternative and 
social currency projects, all of which are highly relevant to blockchain discussions and 
developments but require and deserve a fuller treatment in their own right. The focus, in other 
words, became what might be articulated as common sensibility amongst blockchain projects, 
such that it is possible to even speak of a coherent ‘blockchain industry’ or ‘community’ in the 
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first place, and the kinds of politics that are being shaped through such a sensibility. I here 
introduce each of the cases, including Faircoin, to give an idea of how each of them enabled 
me to address my research questions.  
Bitcoin: the invention of the blockchain 
Bitcoin was first introduced in a post to the Cryptography mailing list by the anonymous 
Satoshi Nakamoto, who subsequently articulated the Bitcoin project into a concise whitepaper 
outlining its reasoning and design in a short nine-page document (Nakamoto, 2008).18 The 
project was a proposal for a peer-to-peer electronic payment system, a transaction system 
without the need for trusted third parties to facilitate payments. There is a large body of work 
that discusses Bitcoin as a form of money, addressing questions of currency design, the 
nature of money and so on (cf. Roio, 2013; Robleh et al., 2014; Cheang, Rivoire and (eds.), 
2015; Peters, Panayi and Chapelle, 2015; Vigna and Casey, 2015; Bjerg, 2016; Scott, 2018). 
My focus in this thesis is specifically on blockchain and I therefore treat the Bitcoin case 
primarily as the invention of this particular data verification and storage method that it 
comprises, rather than assess its appropriateness as ‘money’ per se. As I argue in chapters 4 
and 5, however, the monetary and economic decisions and aspects of blockchain protocols 
cannot be so neatly separated from its data structure and computational approach, and so my 
research does also address these aspects of the cases. There is justification for such an 
approach in that the Bitcoin whitepaper itself has not a single reference to monetary or 
economic theories and so what arguably holds a blockchain assemblage together are 
primarily particular computational ideas, an observation that I expand on in Chapters 4 and 5 
(Nakamoto, 2008; Nakamoto, Bridle and Brekke, 2019). The Bitcoin case study was intended 
to provide the backdrop to the two subsequent case studies; by understanding the ‘original’ 
blockchain, I would then be able to compare and analyse the ways other projects sought to 
differentiate from Bitcoin, pointing to moments of decision and deliberate differentiation, the 
case serving as a basis for answering each of my three research questions. Over the course 
of the analysis, the Bitcoin case instead became the main case in my thesis, a key point and 
project through which to understand how concepts and understandings from network 
computation became more broadly relevant, and in turn generalised and ‘tokenised’ (in the 
sense of integrating currencies as a core aspect of decentralised protocol design) as I discuss 
in Chapter 4 and 5.  
Ethereum: generalisation of the consensus algorithm 
Ethereum inventor Vitalik Buterin was one of the first to explicitly articulate and build 
‘blockchain’ as significant in and of itself, and therefore as more than a proposal for 
                                                       
18 See http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2008-October/014810.html  
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decentralised electronic money.19 Ethereum launched in 2014, some years after Bitcoin and 
after a period of ‘alt-coins’, which were experiments with different cryptocurrency designs in 
the wake of Bitcoin. The aim of Ethereum was to expand the remit of Bitcoin from being a 
decentralised payment system (the invention of ‘cryptocurrencies’) to a more general 
decentralised system able to handle any kind of application (reframing Bitcoin as the invention 
of ‘blockchain’.) Ethereum in this sense also marked the expansion of the understanding and 
operationalisation of concepts in Bitcoin, the ‘platformisation’ of blockchain and decentralised 
protocols (see Chapter 5). I therefore chose the Ethereum case study with the intention of 
understanding the ways in which the specific assumptions, ideas and logic of the Bitcoin 
consensus algorithm were generalised to serve any kind of currency, protocol or application. 
This in turn, would address my first research question, making more evident some of the core 
ideas informing Bitcoin by building and expanding on these, as well as my second research 
question, pointing to some of the ways that concepts of decentralisation, trust, consensus and 
related concepts are operationalised. Because Ethereum launched as I was beginning my 
PhD research, I had the opportunity to follow the case as it developed, which also saw the 
project, developers and enthusiasts work through very fundamental questions about the 
ability to replace authority with code – culminating in a major conflict and ‘fork’ of the project 
towards the end of my empirical research. The question of the political re-emerged through 
these conflicts in the Ethereum community itself. As the research progressed, my third 
question, and methodological strategy of focusing on difference, disagreement and disputes 
(whether technical or otherwise) were both fully justified and served as a timely input to the 
debates at the time (outlined below).  
Faircoin: political differentiation 
I chose the third case study, namely Faircoin as it represented a deliberate and explicitly 
political differentiation from both Ethereum and Bitcoin, started by anarchist networks in 
Catalonia, Spain, in 2014.20 The project was initiated and funded by the anarchist Enric 
Duran, who had escaped from Spain after publicly declaring that he had taken out loans from 
banks amounting to €500,000 between the years 2006-2008 that he was not intending to 
repay.21 Instead, the money went to fund infrastructure, land and capacities of what was 
called the Cooperativa Integral Catalana (CIC), a cooperative network with the aim of an 
‘integral revolution’ that would involve a transformation of the means to support ‘all aspects of 
life’, which also incorporated several local social currencies and bartering networks.22 
Through the CIC Duran in particular sought to politicise aspects of money, finance, 
accounting and taxation, not just in terms of critique of established processes and institutions, 
                                                       
19 See What is Ethereum (2014) available from: http://youtu.be/Clw-qf1sUZg [accessed 24.03.2015]  
20 See https://fair-coin.org/   
21 See https://vimeo.com/darkoptimism/robinbank  
22 See https://cooperativa.cat/es/  
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but as a direct action strategy, also called ‘tax disobedience’. When Duran escaped court by 
leaving Spain, he sought to expand many of the ideas of tax disobedience, financial, 
economic and political autonomy of the CIC, and FairCoin was launched under the 
organisational umbrella of FairCoop with the motivation to scale these initiatives to global 
scale – a global social currency for use amongst cooperatives across the world and under 
direct democratic control. 
Many of the critiques of existing institutions and strategies of disobedience have significant 
and interesting overlaps with the cryptocurrency ecosystem more broadly, although the 
political reasoning varies significantly. The Faircoin project draws on explicitly social 
movement ideas of ‘decentralisation’ as well as consensus, trust and other major concepts in 
blockchain. The Faircoin project altered the Bitcoin consensus algorithm in order to 
correspond with ideas that prioritised direct democratic oversight over algorithmic processes, 
naming the ‘global assembly’ as the primary determining body. This reliance on assembly-
based decision-making, and the mediums through which assemblies took place – which were 
a combination of Telegram group chats and online pads for note taking – suggested a 
different set of questions, theories and literature than were my primary concern in this thesis, 
and so have not been included in the empirical chapters. I include the case here, and discuss 
it briefly in the conclusion, because it nevertheless served as an important marker of 
differentiation during data-collection and in my analysis and therefore forms part of the 
analytical backdrop even if not explicitly discussed in the empirical chapters 4-6.  
3.1.2  Ethics and posit ionali ty 
Over the course of the research, I increasingly took the position of critical insider in the field, 
being invited to contribute to educational material and public debates about blockchain by 
people in the industry (see specifics below). Researching a field that I myself was becoming a 
participant in raises some ethical concerns and questions about positionality, transparency 
and the effects on the field I am researching as well as my findings. I briefly discuss these 
here before discussing the limitations of my research methods. 
Issues of ethics and positionality, in particular when it comes to participatory methods, 
concern differences in power dynamics, questions of transparency and not causing harm (cf. 
Community-based Participatory Research: Ethical Challenges, 2011). In the case of my 
empirical work, the communities I was studying were mostly highly educated researchers and 
developers from technical backgrounds, themselves engaged in research. This meant that my 
position as a researcher was neither unusual nor a threat, but in fact welcomed by the 
communities and industry, in particular because of my social sciences angle on a technical 
field grappling with questions of power and radical reorganisation of economic, political and 
social processes. Furthermore, the blockchain community is one that is exceptionally aware 
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of issues of security, privacy and transparency, such that information and opinions are often 
radically open. Code, papers, opinions and interactions tend to be fully published, often 
leaked by the community itself; if, on the other hand, these contained sensitive data, this was 
made very clear to me and the documents were cryptographically secured. I was generally a 
bystander of such dynamics of hiding or revealing, witnessing as a chat log was published 
following the Ethereum DAO exploit for example (see Chapter 6). That is to say that I worked 
almost exclusively with data and information that were already made public, discussing 
personas and positions that were in the limelight already as public figures.  
It is worth explicitly stating that Bitcoin, blockchain and cryptocurrencies are, as mentioned in 
the introduction, associated with and implicated in illicit and geo-politically contentious 
activities, markets, hacker cultures and politics, the ‘Darknet’ and so on. Had I addressed 
more practical case studies, for example hacker involvement or the uses of blockchain by 
political movements, there would have been significant questions, ethical and technical 
aspects to address – confidentiality and the security of identities in particular. However, my 
study has focused on people and places that are not currently under threat legally or 
personally, and draws almost exclusively on material that is already widely published and 
openly available online. When I engaged in more private conversation, it would usually be to 
seek verification or clarify details of online rumours. These conversations were neither 
recorded nor registered and do not form a substantial part of my data. For the few recordings 
and interviews that I did conduct, the usual ethics of seeking explicit consent apply. 
In terms of access to the community itself, developer conferences and meet-ups were 
generally very open and inclusive spaces, making it easy to engage with. This earlier work, 
and the assistance of my colleagues in computer sciences, also gave me a means to check 
my technical understandings. Following an invitation by a blockchain developer training 
company, B9Lab, to write a ‘Hippocratic oath’ for blockchain developers, I became 
increasingly drawn in as a ‘critical insider’ in the field.23 Where I had begun my research from 
the position of critique, sceptical of many of the projects I was looking at, in the empirical work 
I found that critique was generally welcomed and that many people were themselves openly 
grappling with questions and concerns about what they were building with blockchain. This 
realisation significantly impacted my research, interpretation and analysis. My approach 
increasingly became to, in the words of Haraway, ‘stay with the trouble’ (2016) and, in the 
words of Barad to ‘meet the’ (blockchain) ‘halfway’ (2007). I found that the developers, 
computer scientists and engineers were themselves grappling with the ways the technology 
might not be living up to claims made of it, and were correcting, building and addressing this. I 
wanted to take these efforts seriously, and instead of keeping at a safe distance, to contribute 
                                                       
23 See https://www.b9lab.com/  
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my own critical work to this process of shaping the possibilities and directions of the field. 
Such an approach might be understood to compromise the ‘objectivity’ of the research: if I 
myself was beginning to have an active stake in how projects and debates in the industry 
developed, would this not in turn affect and potentially compromise the integrity of my 
findings? Furthermore, would it not also represent a conflict of interest? In reference to 
Barad’s approach to ‘objectivity’, there is no ‘outside’. An observer, and any description of the 
observed phenomenon will in turn affect its very determination. Indeed this is usually an 
ambition in research, to contribute to knowledge about a given field such that it can be 
understood and developed further. It becomes less important to construct a position of neutral 
outsider, and instead essential to articulate and explain the nature of the interest and stake in 
the field, the motivations behind the research, the ways in which the material and phenomena 
were engaged with and the reasons for the arguments made. My intention with this thesis is 
not only to go out and ‘find’ what matters politically in blockchain, but to take part in 
articulating this, and make the claim of what kinds of things matter as a contribution to a 
broader conversation. It is also important to state that this did not involve any direct material 
or financial stake: I did not at any point work directly for, or receive any remuneration from, 
any Bitcoin affiliated companies, nor from Ethereum. While B9Lab at the time of my work with 
them were offering Ethereum courses to developers, the work I conducted aimed to contribute 
to a critical reflection on the systems that developers build.24 It is also worth stating that 
throughout the research period, I only held small amounts of bitcoin (the most I had at any 
one point was 1btc) and ether (2 ether) for research purposes, in order to test wallets, Smart 
Contracts and transaction systems and that I have not, as of writing, exchanged for other 
currencies.  
 
3.2  Data collection and analysis  
My empirical data gathering took place primarily between June 2015 and June 2017, and took 
the form of three phases with different methodologies. In the meantime, the blockchain field 
was rapidly changing and developing, and so strictly speaking, I continued to keep informed 
on more general tendencies and changes to the field throughout the writing phase from July 
2017 – February 2019. To give an overview, the table below outlines the different phases as 
well as my aims, methods and results of each. I then describe in more detail these phases of 
my empirical work, the kinds of methods I employed and data I was gathering. I complete this 
                                                       
24 My work can be viewed here: https://blog.b9lab.com/proposing-the-satoshi-oath-for-developers-69003cffb022. For 
full access to review the ethical course material that I wrote, please contact B9Lab. 
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section with a discussion of how I went about analysing the data, arriving at the structure of 
this thesis and its main arguments (see Table 1 below). 
 
 Aims Methods Result 
Phase 1:  
Sense-check 
Sense-checking 
case studies and 
blockchain as 
focus of the 
thesis. 
Netnography (code repositories, 
online forums and blogs, email 
lists of case studies, chatlogs); 
Government and industry reports; 
Reporting in major media outlets. 
The cases were 
considered significant, 
representing main 
projects in the industry 
and significant variation 
for comparative study.  
Phase 2: 
Technical 
understanding 
Gaining and 
testing my 
technical 
understanding. 
Reading whitepapers and 
technical literature; 
Practical use of Bitcoin, Ethereum 
and Faircoin, trying wallets, and 
transactions; 
Conducting interviews; 
Watching video archives of early 
cryptocurrency interviews.  
I wrote several 
iterations of my own 
explanations of the 
architectures, and 
drafted glossaries. 
Phase 3: 
verifying 
descript ions 
and 
understandings  
Sense-checking 
my own technical 
and conceptual 
understandings. 
Writing educational material 
adopted by industry;  
Doing public presentations for 
technical and non-technical 
audiences related to the industry; 
Participating in technical 
seminars.  
I was satisfied that my 
technical understanding 
had reached a sufficient 
level – verified by 
industry adopting my 
writing, and through the 
responses to my public 
presentations. 
Table 1. Phases of data collection.  
3.2.1  Empirical phase 1: sense-checking the cases 
The aim of the first phase of the empirical research was to address the potential issues of 
studying a very new and emerging technology and sense-checking the selection of case-
studies by ensuring that these had a) active developer communities, b) growth as projects 
and c) enough uptake and investment (financial and/or social) to assume ongoing 
development, at least in the medium term. This took place between June 2015 and June 
2016. Ethereum had only recently launched, and their first developers’ conference took place 
in the City of London just as I began fieldwork.25 Faircoin had only just commenced with a first 
‘airdrop’ distribution of coins a year earlier.26 This phase also entailed getting a preliminary 
overview of where these projects sat in relation to the broader field of blockchain development 
to see whether there were more suitable cases or if indeed Bitcoin, Ethereum and Faircoin 
could be argued to represent a diversity of the field in general and meaningful differences in 
                                                       
25 Ethereum DevCon 1, Gibson Hall, City of London November 2015 https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/09/24/devcon-is-
back/ 
26 See https://wiki.fair.coop/en:faircoin:start  
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development pathways more specifically. The methods I employed in in this first phase were 
primarily ‘netnographic’ (Kozinets, 2015) observation and following the online and offline 
communities of the different case studies, taking notes and writing observations (see 
Appendix for details). I approached the field largely through the lens of science and 
technology studies (STS) (Law, 2016). Inspired by Latour’s use of multiple notebooks (Latour, 
2005) I wrote extensive notes and used writing as a research method at the early empirical 
stage as a means to reflect on and articulate my observations in relation to my research 
questions. I also paid attention to more general media reporting on cryptocurrencies and 
blockchain as well as government and thinktank reports (Erb, 2015; Naughton, 2016; Walport, 
2016). From this material, I concluded that the cases and ‘blockchain’ more generally were 
significant and likely to be long lasting enough to warrant further study.  
It became clear that the field was rife with inflated claims of social and political transformation 
as well as new blockchain projects vying for attention. It was not always easy to tell what 
might be a ‘scam’ from longer-lasting, more serious projects, and whether claims were in any 
way pursued in actual technical development. To ground the research further and get a better 
understanding of the people, industries and investors involved I attended local meet-ups and 
gatherings, initially in London (see Appendix). These included, Coinscrum, a monthly meet-up 
for all types of cryptocurrency projects based in Shoreditch, London; the Robin Hood Coop 
‘office’ in London August 2015, housing a hedge-fund coop with the idea of hacking the 
financial industry for social good; and the Tuttle meet-up in the City of London and social 
events in the cryptocurrency community. Between 2015 and 2017 there was a continuous 
stream of blockchain-related events, further proof of a growing institutional and business 
interest in the technology and what seemed like a positioning of London as a centre for the 
emerging FinTech industry more generally. These industry events helped give an idea of the 
types of actors interested in and working on blockchain, find out more about the aims and 
interests of investors in current blockchain development – in particular to understand what 
seemed to be a radical shift taking place from the early days of Bitcoin where the project was 
mostly associated with criminal activities and largely seen as undermining existing financial 
institutions to a new-found focus and hype on the blockchain as a piece of financial innovation 
for these very institutions.  
After this first phase of data gathering I concluded that the selected cases had active 
communities who also, to a large degree, varied in their political aims and ambitions. Satisfied 
with the cases and the focus of the research overall, the next step was to ensure a deep 
understanding of the technical architectures of the three case study platforms in order to be 
able to distinguish claims from actual effects and be able to analyse the intentions and 
implications of their designs. 
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3.2.2  Empirical phase 2: technical understanding 
The second phase of the empirical work partially overlapped with the first, with the most 
focused data gathering work occurring between November 2015 and June 2016. This phase 
involved immersing myself further in the field in order to a) familiarise myself with the 
applications by trying different wallets, using the cryptocurrencies and explore Smart 
Contracts; b) gain a deeper grasp of the technical architectures; and c) develop better 
understanding of the communities involved and the evolution of the industry. In order to 
ensure a good grasp of the technology, from a user perspective as well as its architecture and 
its rationale, I started my research of each case study with a thorough reading of their 
whitepapers – high level descriptions of the intention, purpose and core technical proposition 
of the currency. The methods I used in this phase involved researching the different clients, 
wallets, applications and currencies, reading technical papers and tracing in particular 
historical papers on cryptography in order to understand how it is employed in blockchain 
(see Appendix for details). I would then write up my own descriptions of the architectures in 
order to test my level of understanding at this point, which also became an exercise in 
translation. This process brought up an issue of slippage of meaning between technical 
terminology and socio-political practices, both by myself and in the manner in which the 
applications were presented; for example, with the notion of ‘decentralised consensus’, 
referring to a computational problem that simultaneously presented a tempting socio-political 
proposition. The awareness of such slippages informed my observations and questions in 
interviews and at events. I conducted a number of semi-structured interviews (see Appendix). 
As it turned out, most of these repeated information and attitudes that were already evident 
and available in online videos, posts and discussions. This was likely due to the timing of the 
interviews in early-to-mid 2016 when the industry was experiencing a boom, making it difficult 
to move beyond the surface of excitement and selling of ideas. On the one hand the 
interviews thereby served to confirm coherence between information and attitudes expressed 
in online material, but also meant that I took the decision to draw on such online material as a 
primary source rather than seek out further interviews (see Appendix). Had the interviews 
taken place a year later, during and after some of the major forks and disputes in the 
community, and had my own understanding of the field and the stakes reached a sufficient 
level, the interviews might have been more focused and insightful. Regardless, a large part of 
discussions and activity in blockchain takes place online, and the community has a culture of 
openness and leaking, so there was plenty of available data to work through. I drew heavily 
on these resources, in particular on the work by filmmaker Tomer Kantor and the IamSatoshi 
production team who had been extensively documenting and interviewing key figures and 
developments in blockchain from the early years.27  
                                                       
27 See https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=IamSatoshi and Ulterior Motives interviews by Tomer Kantor. 
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During this period Bitcoin was going through a prolonged conflict over a fundamental change 
to the protocol, which also signified a potential change to the governance structure of the 
currency. Instead of having to rummage around the Bitcoin GitHub repository on my own 
trying and draw out issues of governance and power, these events brought such questions 
immediately to the foreground.28 I traced the conflict across discussion boards, email lists and 
news outlets, writing and rewriting descriptions of the conflict (see Appendix). Discussions 
oscillated between technical, ethical and political concerns, bringing out questions around 
technological determinism and the impetus and assumptions that drive and shape 
development pathways. It also became clear that there were fractions and interests in Bitcoin 
that I was not able to fully grasp. In the case of Bitcoin and Ethereum, the plethora of 
information, sites, blogs, rumours and claims online proved tricky, so I initially relied on 
informal conversation with contacts in the industry (explained in ethics and positionality 
above) to verify rumours. In the case of Faircoin, online documentation was fairly opaque. 
The project was based more on assemblies, the chat application Telegram and trusted 
networks. In order to get a fuller understanding of the cooperative movement context and 
actual usage of the currency on a day-to-day basis, I undertook three field trips to Catalonia 
and one to Athens over the course of 2016 (see Appendix).  
To get a better understanding of Faircoin, I stepped away from the explicitly FinTech and 
start-up-oriented events and started tracing the political alternatives being developed. I took 
part in seminars with social currency networks and the city of Barcelona, which also had 
attendance by local Bitcoin entrepreneurs as well as a cryptocurrency ATM hardware 
company. I omit the details of these seminars here in part because my thesis no longer 
addresses Faircoin, social currencies and the Catalan case explicitly, and therefore will not be 
able to contextualise these seminars in an adequate manner. It is worth mentioning, however, 
because conversations with the ATM hardware company in particular were very revealing 
with regards to the amount of practical and logistical work that was being put in to establishing 
infrastructure for international currency circulation even under conditions of extreme legal 
uncertainty. I traced the Faircoin infrastructure and project through two more field trips, 
including a location where Faircoin founder Enric Duran was in exile. Apart from interviews 
with Duran and other core Faircoin developers I also visited the Faircoin project spaces Aurea 
Social in Barcelona, the local and very active Girona Faircoin node towards the end of 2016 
and the offices of a Bitcoin ATM company operating in the Mediterranean. These visits gave a 
good insight into the enthusiasm and energy that infused the projects at the time where 
technical and legal architectures were being rapidly built and deployed regardless of their 
legal standing and uses. This seemed to cut across all cases, and also showed how the 
difference between what might be considered a ‘scam’ or simply mismanagement due to 
                                                       
28 A series of in-depth articles published in Coindesk by researcher Aaron Von Wirdum in particular helped for 
understanding the stakes of various actors and potential outcomes (2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c). 
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overambitious and enthusiastic ideas, development and experimentation was largely a matter 
of perspective – all projects operating in a legal grey zone. My grasp of the technical aspects 
of each project and the ways in which I sought to relate them to issues of governance and 
power still seemed untested and indeed my own role as a researcher within this field 
remained vague. So, in the third phase of the empirical research, I focused on publicly 
verifying my understandings of the cases and the ways in which I was translating these by 
taking part in events, presenting my research and observing how these might be received in 
the field. 
3.2.3  Empirical phase 3: verifying descript ions and f indings 
Overlapping with my research of the technical architectures, the aim of the third phase was to 
translate and validate my own understanding of the technologies by standing up to scrutiny in 
the field. To do this I became involved in the work of B9Lab, a company providing online 
training, talks and intensive workshops on Ethereum for developers as well as business 
people. With one of the first structured Blockchain training programs, the company sought to 
set the standards for the industry, and invited me to develop their ethical training module and 
a ‘hippocratic oath’ for developers.29 This allowed me to think through and test how the 
Ethereum community conceived of ethics, social relations and power in relation to the 
blockchain. Events surpassed my efforts in drawing out and making questions of power 
relevant to a technical audience: a major Ethereum-based project, The DAO, had been 
hacked for $60 million, throwing doubts on claims of neutral technology free from the 
intervention of potentially corrupt humans. Ethereum developers were forced to intervene, and 
decided to implement what is called a hard fork (splitting the Ethereum blockchain, see 
chapter 6) to cancel the hack, causing much controversy in the community and throwing up 
questions of governance and power in the process. I followed the hard fork closely and 
discussed the issues at stake with Ethereum developer Vlad Zamfir on the day it was taking 
place.  
I also held a number of public presentations for different types of audiences to begin to get 
feedback on my ideas. Initially at Re:Publica in Berlin, May 2016 (in collaboration with Elias 
Haase of B9Lab, and including a meet-up on Blockchain and governance), at the Nau Bostik 
cultural centre in Barcelona November 2016, at MediaLab Prado Madrid, November 2016 (as 
part of a hackathon on Collective Intelligence for Democracy) and a growing number of 
these.30 31 While the different events had quite different audiences, ranging from professionals 
                                                       
29 See https://blog.b9lab.com/proposing-the-satoshi-oath-for-developers-69003cffb022  
30 See: https://re-publica.com/16/session/blockchain-crash-course-and-challenging-consensus and http://16.re-
publica.de/en/16/session/blockchain-meet. Re:Publica also hosted a second session on blockchain and governance 
by Shermin Voshmgir, also very highly attended.  
31 See: http://medialab-prado.es/article/madrid-inteligencia-colectiva-para-la-democracia. Documentation here: 
https://youtu.be/0acyX7SlfME  
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in the broader field of technology (Re:Publica) to a mostly anarchist audience (Nau Bostik, 
Barcelona), all of them included people who had a deep involvement with cryptocurrencies as 
well as people entirely new to the field. My reasoning was that if I could explain the 
architecture to a new audience while not insulting those with strong technical backgrounds, I 
could safely assume that I had reached a sufficient understanding of the technologies to 
proceed with a rigorous analysis of governance and power. Indeed, the more blockchain-
aware people at the presentations were not only satisfied with the explanations I provided but 
were appreciative of a rearticulation of such architectures from the perspective of power and 
governance. The need for some contribution from social sciences to the field was generally 
widespread, possibly in part because of the backdrop of ongoing Bitcoin scaling conflict. I 
further verified and expanded my technical understanding by attending the mostly academic 
Bitcoin Summer School in Corfu, Greece, organised by the International Association for 
Cryptologic Research and UCL Computer Science department. Two insights in particular 
were gained from this: firstly, a hint of what was going to become the field of 
‘cryptoeconomics’ as I saw computer scientists discuss economic theory as part of their 
computational models in a presentation by Aggelos Kiayisas of the School of Informatics at 
the University of Edinburgh; and secondly, the specificity of ideas and aims of decentralisation 
in technical field, in particular through presentations and insights by Sarah Meiklejohn and 
George Danezis from the Computer Engineering department at UCL (see also Troncoso et 
al., 2017; Meiklejohn, 2018).  
3.2.4  Data analysis 
Throughout my data gathering, I had been writing and rewriting descriptions of the 
architectures, observations, difficulties and contradictions in the field, inspired by Latour’s 
method of keeping several notebooks (Latour, 2005); one for documenting the research 
process, one for observations that might be thematically organised, one for ‘writing trials’ 
testing different articulations and a final notebook to log how such articulations in turn would 
affect the context and people involved. Although my own writing practice has admittedly not 
proven so consistently and neatly organised, this method of separating out different types of 
writing and thinking exercises proved very useful for tracing through the field work and 
material. This practice also came to form a large part of my method of analysis, writing up 
how I was reasoning with the field, with public presentations continuing to serve as a way to 
further shape and test my analysis as I went along.  
During the fieldwork I developed and worked with a conception of three ‘layers’ in blockchain 
technology that, informed by my theoretical research, seemed to form different ways in which 
power and the political played out, namely protocol, governance and interfaces. The protocol 
layer would refer to the ‘technology’ of blockchain proper, implying an encoded politics that 
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would execute in an immanent manner, and which suggested that my task as a critical 
researcher was to reveal such a ‘hidden’ technological and infrastructural politics. The 
governance layer referred to the writing and governance of such protocols, in the form of the 
more explicitly politicised negotiations that were taking place in conflicts over protocol 
development in Bitcoin and Ethereum. My task as a critical researcher at this layer would be 
to lay bare the power dynamics at stake in the governance methods used for decentralised 
protocols. Finally interfaces implied the ways in which ‘the political’ in terms of actual effects 
always played out in relation to other contexts and conditions. Here, I understood my task as 
a researcher to be to highlight these often overlooked contingent political effects and 
articulate the importance of such contingency for understanding the political effects of 
blockchain. These layers served as helpful ways to focus the research, but in further analysis 
some of the assumptions underpinning these proved tricky and opened up new questions. 
The main issue I came to face in my analysis was how to define and address the ‘object’ of 
study more precisely.  
The object of my study was supposed to be ‘blockchain’, and my research questions were 
aimed at understanding the political implications of this object. But ‘blockchain’ in the 
meantime proved less contained than anticipated, operating in and through mediums, papers, 
promotion, code, ideas and attitudes that were not strictly limited to a technical coherent 
‘thing’. Those things that might be considered closest to the technical object of ‘blockchain’, 
such as the Bitcoin reference client for example, were themselves even up for dispute (see 
chapter 6); the Bitcoin reference client proved to be an unstable thing that would be updated, 
‘forked’ and run in different iterations and hardware, across various networks. This proved 
tricky in writing, then, because any description of ‘blockchain’ had to be qualified: was this a 
description of blockchain in its ideal form as written in the Bitcoin whitepaper, or did it 
describe how the network actually currently operated? Or would a description as it was 
experienced by different parts of the system, promoted, attempted legislated be more useful? 
From whose perspective was I speaking, and what purpose were my descriptions trying to 
serve? I struggled to avoid simply repeating the plethora of online descriptions of blockchain, 
as I was only too aware that these descriptions were not capturing the complexity of how both 
the idea and the technology of blockchain operated – but these nevertheless were important 
in themselves. In order to work through the entangled data, perspectives, observations and 
material developments, I developed and drew up tables to articulate my own distinctions in 
what was taking place – comparing use of concepts as discussed above (‘decentralisation’, 
‘trust’, ‘consensus’ and so on); comparing descriptions of applications to my own experiences 
of using these and broader reported effects; and comparing cases and changes to protocols 
and attitudes internally in projects over time – what I came to understand through Barad as 
onto-epistemological ‘cuts’ (Barad, 2007).  
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The issue of a non-stable object led me to describe a ‘sensibility’ rather than a thing, an 
emerging attitude of assumed ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘desirable’ and ‘undesirable’ that informed the 
field and the development of new projects and were common across all cases. The most 
obvious of which was ‘decentralisation’ as good and desirable and ‘centralisation’ as bad and 
undesirable. My use of the word ‘sensibility’ to describe these attitudes worked for two 
important reasons; firstly, because the term captures a general common sense rather than 
something more coherent such as a definitive ‘politics of blockchain’, for example, which 
simply did not ring true; and secondly, because it nevertheless did tie into ideas of political 
theorist Rancière, who describes the political as exactly a moment of disruption and 
redistribution of the sensible – namely a redistribution of what is commonly understood to 
matter. The term sensibility therefore proved helpful for understanding the particular form of 
disruption that blockchain presented, and to point to a moment of the political, a shift in what 
was considered to matter, while not assuming or demanding a definitive ‘politics’.  
Conceptually, working with ideas of sensibilities and sensing apparatuses tied in neatly with 
the onto-epistemology of Karen Barad (Barad, 2007). The ways in which sensing 
apparatuses, and indeed sensing agencies more broadly – whether human, technical or 
otherwise – are part of determining matters lent a certain acknowledgement to the 
deterministic aspects of systems designs, while simultaneously insisting on the limits to such 
determinacy (discussed at length in Chapters 2 and 4). Kathryn Yusoff’s theoretical 
articulation of the insensible in relation to the political then allowed me to shift my analysis of 
the protocols, instead of attempting to grasp complete coherence and knowledge of the 
stakes of a given design to instead understand this as the very condition of their development 
(Yusoff, 2013a). The ‘insensible’ then would be those unknown contingencies as well as that 
which has not been factored into the model but which nevertheless is understood to exist. I 
then developed my concept of the dissensible, drawing on political theorist Rancière 
(Rancière, 2010), as a means to describe the ongoing possibility of incompatible sensibilities, 
as a way to analyse the political in relation to a technology that claims to solve it. I developed 
a table as a means for organizing these three conceptual approaches, their theoretical scope 
and main questions in relation to the empirical material. I made consistent use of this table 
and, with these three ‘cuts’ in mind I went back over the empirical material. This table also 
came to inform the structure of my chapters: 
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Agential 
real ism 
Insensible 
A politics of matter 
Sensible 
How things come to 
matter 
Dissensible 
Resolving incompatible 
mattering 
The poli t ical 
The political as 
insensible, immanent and 
protocological 
 
The political as a 
redistribution of the 
sensible/ possible 
 
The political as 
dissensible, emerging 
incompatible difference 
Questions 
raised in the 
cases by 
these 
definit ions of 
the poli t ical 
How is this political 
proposition sought 
encoded, materialised 
and enacted? 
What is excluded in its 
determination? 
How did blockchain 
come to matter 
politically? 
How does the 
assemblage deal with 
mutually exclusive 
positions?  
How is dissensus 
resolved in the 
assemblage?  
What holds the 
assemblage together? 
Questions 
raised in the 
cases 
through this 
l i terature 
What are the deterministic 
limits of protocols? 
How can an immanent 
politics be understood 
when its implications are 
emergent and not 
necessarily fully 
visible/knowable?  
How does the protocol 
deal with indeterminacy 
and the insensible? 
What are some of the 
ways that blockchain 
applications relate to 
other economies, 
systems and spaces? 
How are these relations 
understood, politically?  
How do these relations 
play out politically? 
 
How is the political 
reconfigured in relation 
to ‘post-political’ 
protocols? 
What becomes the new 
legitimate mode of 
conducting politics? 
Table 2. Conceptual ‘cuts’ on the political and main questions asked of the empirical material. 
 
3.3  Conclusions and methodological l imitations 
In this chapter I described and discussed my methodological design, its implementation and 
how I went about analysing my data. I took a case study approach for the methodological 
design, drawing on mixed methods in order to trace through answers to my research 
questions in each of the cases. This involved a combination of ‘netnographic’ research, 
ethnographic observations, a limited number of interviews, writing as method and tracing 
through concepts across technical papers, promotional material and online discussions. I also 
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used my own public presentations as method for verifying my understandings and testing my 
arguments, in particular in relation to my technical understanding. The cases enabled me to 
go in-depth in my understanding of the technical architectures and the culture around their 
development. The Bitcoin and Ethereum cases were selected on the basis of being the two 
largest blockchain networks. In my further analysis, I take this to mean that these cases set 
much of the standard not only technically but also in terms of ‘sensibility’ for the rest of the 
blockchain industry. This is, to some degree, an assumption. Nevertheless, the two cases 
remain the largest blockchain networks. They form two important moments in the history of 
decentralised network technologies, such that recounting their particularities and histories are 
important in their own right, having opened up new fields of computation. To conclude the 
chapter, I briefly discuss some of the limitations to my approach and methodological design, 
some alternative approaches and the reasons why I did not pursue such alternatives. 
3.3.1  Methodological l imitat ions 
My initial assumption, that the political implications of the technology and site of decision-
making would be defined in and through protocol development, meant that my focus was 
primarily on the protocols and developer communities, rather than deployment and effects 
amongst people using the applications and technologies. This initial assumption brought with 
it significant analytical limitations and certain biases, the most important of which is that I 
thereby risked reproducing in my own work a certain technological determinacy that was very 
much present in the blockchain industry more generally: that what matters primarily is the 
protocol and the ways in which it determines things. An alternative approach to ‘the political’ 
in relation to blockchain might therefore have been to address the deployment and uses of 
the technologies, which might have been a more powerful angle from which to assess claims 
made of it – comparing claims with substantial research into its uses and effects in different 
contexts. Such approaches, however, have already been the focus of many critics of 
blockchain, and tend to produce analyses concerned primarily with disproving the claims and 
efficacy of the technology (O'Dwyer, 2015; Golumbia, 2016; Gerard, 2017; Vidan and 
Lehdonvirta, 2018). I wanted to address blockchain from a more open perspective, to meet 
the claims ‘halfway’ to paraphrase Barad (from the title of her book, 2007), in order to 
understand its merits and contribute to an articulation of what might be possible. In other 
words, instead of claiming that it is either ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ or ‘works’ or doesn’t ‘work’, I aim to 
understand in what sense it does or does not work, and how and why it is corrected for. I 
aimed for an approach that would be more open to the possibilities in the space, what is at 
stake in their materialisation and how this might be articulated and therefore shaped more 
clearly.  
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At a certain point in my analysis, however, I had to step ‘outside’ of the protocol so to speak, 
to be able to understand how its descriptions operated politically in themselves. This 
represented another analytical angle that critics have effectively employed for analysing 
blockchain, namely to address how blockchain operates as a narrative device, more effective 
as a story about money and power, than a technique, tool or technology (Golumbia, 2016; 
Reijers and Coeckelbergh, 2016; Kreutler, 2018). Such an angle might have benefited from a 
systematic discourse analysis in the field, but instead I opted to trace the use of concepts 
through histories of cryptographic and computational advancements, alongside forum posts 
and discussions, essays and commentary on Medium (an online publishing platform on which 
major actors in the industry tend to publish their reflections), mailing lists and technical 
papers. I did this because I did not want to emphasise a distinction between discourse 
(claims) and materiality (reality), but instead to understand how historical experiences, 
technical papers and networks played into each other and were entangled – an onto-
epistemological approach so to speak, whereby discussions feed into experimentation, 
changes to designs and ideas about the world. My hesitation was that discourse analysis, by 
overly focusing on words and ideology, might lend itself to the assumption that something 
else is happening in ‘reality’ while the discourse operates as a set of false claims or dubious 
ideology. Precisely because ‘Bitcoin is a technology whose social and political functions far 
outstrip its technical ones’ (Golumbia, 2015, p. 119), these would need to be addressed as 
part of the motivating factors as these social and political functions fed into ongoing efforts to 
materialise new technical architectures and resonated with experiences, projects and ideas 
across different contexts. 
Another alternative research design to understand some of the political implications of 
blockchain might have been to ‘follow the money’ so to speak, and analyse the specific 
individuals, companies and investment flows to achieve a map of different kinds of stakes and 
interests in systems being developed. This would have been a fruitful approach for analysing, 
in particular, the disputes around protocol changes that were playing out in the case studies 
(discussed in chapter 6) and gaining an understanding of who might have a stake in different 
kinds of outcomes. This approach might have given a good overview of the relationships, 
interests and stakes, but at the time did not seem an effective approach for gaining a deeper 
understanding of the political ideas and sensibilities that were forming and informing the 
assemblages. Such a social and value network analysis would be hugely valuable, but was 
beyond the scope of this thesis due to time limitations and the labour-intensive nature of such 
a mapping endeavour.  
The next three chapters form my three Baradian ‘cuts’ in the blockchain field. Chapter 4 
addresses the technical architectures of Bitcoin and Ethereum and their analysis in relation to 
the indeterminate and insensible. Chapter 5 traces the pre-histories of these architectures in 
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previous generations of decentralised architectures to understand the particularities of a 
blockchain sensibility. Situating Bitcoin and Ethereum in such a historical trajectory of 
decentralisation also allows for an analysis of what has changed with their invention, namely 
the platformisation of decentralisation and ‘tokenisation’ of protocols, the implications of which 
I discuss in this chapter. Chapter 6 describes two major conflicts in Bitcoin and Ethereum. I 
introduce the concept of the dissensible through which to discuss the ongoing possibility for 
things to be different and for these differences to be incompatible. The chapter discusses 
issues of dissesus over the governance of protocols that were supposed to have solved the 
problem of consensus and a resolution to this through ‘forking’ that I discuss as a ‘dissensus 
mechanism’.  
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4  A Polit ics for the Insensible 
… a kind of affirmative action for the formless. 
– Yusoff, 2013a, p. 224 
In this chapter I describe and analyse the Bitcoin and Ethereum protocols and how the 
techniques and technologies that form their architectures, specifically cryptographic proofs 
and decentralised networks, become the foundation for broader claims and perspectives on 
the political. I address and analyse the intentions of determining trust, truth and certainty 
through cryptographic proofs, and bring in the notion of the insensible to shift the ground of 
debate from a competition between humans and machines to a question of affinities. The 
chapter is structured as follows: I first explain some basics of cryptographic hashing and 
describe how cryptographic proofs are used in the Bitcoin architecture with the aim of 
eliminating the need for ‘trust’. I describe how trust is understood and operationalised in very 
specific ways in Bitcoin and decentralised network security, and the particular kinds of 
determinacy that these give rise to, before discussing the limits to this form of determinacy 
and the ways in which the network has emergent effects in ways that require contined 
correction and maintenance. I draw on Barad’s understandings of determinacy as enacted in 
and through different forms of agency in order to do so. In the second half of the chapter I 
then outline how the elements that make up Bitcoin are extended in the Ethereum platform 
with the aim of developing a generalised platform. This also extends ideas of a trustless 
system towards ideas of an autonomous system necessarily operating beyond human control, 
lending the system itself certain agency. I discuss some of the issues of the extension of 
algorithmic determinacy on the basis of an assumed universality of cryptographic proofs and 
decentralisation, suggesting a re-reading of such determining agency through ideas of 
animism. Instead, affiliations that cross human and otherwise are acknowledged, making the 
question not one of which is the most appropriate determining agency, human or machine, 
but rather what are the motivations for the necessity of an expanding algorithimic determinacy 
in this particular case. I conclude the chapter by arguing for a politics for the insensible, as 
both that which has not yet made itself matter, a moment before a political contestation of 
sensibilities, but also, and importantly, that which might never make itself matter, a beyond 
political contestation (Yusoff, 2013a). 
I use the concepts ‘determinacy’, ‘technological determinism’, ‘algorithmic determining 
agency’ and ‘determinate’ repeatedly in this chapter, refering to slightly different but 
interrelated definitions which are worth highlighting here. Determinacy in terms of systems 
designs means a design for which a certain outcome can be determined. This is the promise 
of cryptography, which becomes the foundation for a broader technological determinacy, 
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whereby certain technological developments are assumed to be necessary, natural or 
innevitable. I address and critique this second notion of determinacy through a Baradian 
materialist understanding of how things are determined, namely in a quantum sense as 
determining the state of a phenomenon which might otherwise exist as an indeterminate 
potential state. My argument is that the determinate properties in specific systems designs 
(cryptographic proofs in this case) is the foundation for a form of technological determinacy 
that argues for the necessity or even inevitability of an algorithmic determining agency on the 
basis of it being a more objective medium for determining matters. I counter the necessity of 
such technological determinism without having to thereby also negate the determinate 
properties of cryptography. Drawing on Barad, then, the determinate properties of 
cryptography form just one particular way of determining things, with very particular effects. 
What makes it ‘objective’ is simply the fact that the conditions for its reproduction can be 
precisely conveyed and enacted. Yusoff’s notion of the insensible suggests very real 
limitations to any determining sensibility by bringing awareness to the insensible, and thereby 
the impossibility of any given sensibility to fully determine or know what matters. What 
matters, and what is made to matter, becomes a question of affiliations rather than a universal 
registry. This makes the possibility of an algorithmic determining agency real, but also very 
situated – a project for and about the affiliations and desires of specific people seeking to 
realise such an agency, rather than a universal objective necessity.  
Before commencing, it is worth restating that the specific technical developments in 
blockchain move fast and so aspects of the description might be slightly outdated – the 
consensus protocol used in Ethereum, for example, is intended to change from the proof-of-
work protocol in Bitcoin to what is called proof-of-stake, presenting new design and 
conceptual challenges (some of which are discussed in 5.2.2). The technical descriptions are 
mostly high-level, however, and the main characteristics of the Bitcoin consensus algorithm 
are likely to remain as a standard from which other algorithms differentiate. The main 
intention of this chapter is to describe the ways in which the technical architectures form and 
inform conceptions of the political, rather than a description of the state of development and 
capacities of ‘blockchain’. 
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4.1  Replacing authority with cryptographic proofs 
In words from history, let us speak no more of faith in man, but bind him down from mischief by 
the chains of cryptography.32  
– Edward Snowden, quoted in Greenwald, 2014, p. 24 
What is needed is an electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof instead of trust. 
– Nakamoto, 2008, p. 1 
The main proposition of Bitcoin is to replace the ‘authority’ needed for running current 
payment systems to function with cryptographic proofs. Cryptography is a powerful tool that, 
as opposed to, for example, the law or armies, does not require many resources to operate. It 
is an ‘asymmetric’ technology (Buterin, 2016a), and as such has inspired ideas of resisting 
and holding accountable powerful actors, to ‘bind him down from mischief by the chains of 
cryptography’ as whistle-blower Edward Snowden proposes in the quote above. The 
comment is a reformulation of a historical quote about the US constitution by Thomas 
Jefferson and is telling of the ways in which cryptography, and the idea of code as an 
immediately executing language (code as law), is understood as a more powerful means for 
enforcing fairness, addressing power and the corruptibility of humans. It also shows that using 
cryptography as a means to counter authorities is not unique to Bitcoin but part of broader 
Cypherpunk, hacker and InfoSec digital cultures. Bitcoin and blockchain are developments of 
such ideas of establishing a neutral and incorruptible governing apparatus that would hold 
authority in check. What did, however, turn out to be unique in Bitcoin and blockchain were 
the ways in which these ideas became generalised and turned into a proposition for not only 
enforcing transparency and protecting privacy against authorities, but to replace authorities 
entirely. It is the reason for why, for example, an enthusiast at a London Bitcoin meet-up in 
late 2014 explained to me ‘I don’t believe in politicians – but I believe in maths’.  
In the following, I describe some of the basics of cryptographic proofs and the ways in which it 
is used in Bitcoin to resolve the need for authority and then give an overview of the Bitcoin 
architecture and protocol. I then discuss some of the contradictions and difficulties of its 
implementation and how, by drawing a cut separating this ‘perfect thing’ from necessarily 
corruptible ‘mushy humans’, what I argue to be a form of systems primacy emerges whereby 
these can be sidelined as an unfortunate effect of imperfect humans. It is only by drawing that 
cut that the system can be construed as being beyond the control of humans, while long 
hours of human work, knowledge and effort are put into making it a reality. I then discuss 
                                                       
32 Snowden is reformulating a quote of Thomas Jefferson: ‘In questions of power then, let no more be heard of 
confidence in man but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution. 
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ways in which the insensible comes to haunt the certainty of cryptographic proofs through an 
awareness of the limits to what can be determined and known through and in the protocol. 
This then lays the ground for the next half of the chapter, which describes the Ethereum 
project as a generalisation of Bitcoin expanding on ideas of autonomy, trustlessness and 
decentralisation to form a kind of algorithmic animism.  
4.1.1  Cryptographic proofs in Bitcoin 
Cryptographic proof is the ability to prove something with mathematical certainty. It is a set of 
techniques and algorithms that take advantage of a particular mathematical phenomenon 
called hashing, whereby some data, when run through an algorithm, will produce a string of 
characters unique to that data. It is highly unlikely, probabilistically unlikely, that any other 
data will produce that same output when run through that hashing algorithm.33 What this 
means is that the integrity of a given record can be cryptographically verified; if anyone has 
tampered with it this can be checked by running the data through the same hashing algorithm 
to see if the output is different. This is what is meant in the whitepaper by an electronic 
system based on ‘cryptographic proof instead of trust’. The integrity of the data is verified 
through mathematical probability rather than trusting an authority or someone’s word for it. 
Add a timestamp and it can be proven when a given record was made. Hash these together 
in a ‘chain’ or a ‘tree’ by referring to a hash output of a previous record, and you have a linear 
history of provably secure records, of, for example, Bitcoin transactions.  
Cryptographic proofs are used widely and have come to serve a variety of data security and 
authentication functions used across several industries for the integrity of digital records and 
information. Research and development of new hashing algorithms has been ongoing since 
the late 1970s, developing new algorithms and functions with different properties and security 
models (cf. Merkle, 1979, 1982; Preneel, 2010).34 35 It is the basis of things like public key 
                                                       
33 The exact probability, and hence certainty, depends on the hashing algorithm that is used. The likelihood of two 
different messages producing the same hashed output is highly unlikely (these events are called ‘collisions’). SHA1 
(Secure Hash Algorithm 1) was a cryptographic hashing algorithm developed and published by NIST (National 
Institute fro Standards and Technology, USA) in 1995, but research in the early 2000s led to higher plausibility of 
collisions (Preneel, 2010). ‘This shows that for long term collision resistance (10 years or more), a hash result of 192 
or 256 bits is required.’ (Preneel 2010:2). SHA1 produces a 160bit output (for example, hashing the file test.rtf returns 
4ceb6c436b0c7a8f279233e65492786a24b43e5d), so to increase security, NIST published three new hash functions 
(Preneel, 2010:6), amongst others SHA-256 which produces a 256bit output (in which that same test.rtf file would 
return f0a9dba07065d989cb3b6e1e2bc1bbd48a2844e7dc1192a76e81a901aaf1de0d). See 2007-2012 NIST 
(National Institute of Standards and Technology) SHA-3 competition for developing a new set of cryptographic 
functions. 
34 Even cryptographic hashing, while frequently assumed to be bulletproof, requires constant upgrading and 
maintenance in order to remain secure as computational capacity increases and new attack vectors are found. While 
larger size outputs are more secure because the likelihood of a different data input outputting the same string (what is 
called ‘collisons) with a diminishing likelihood of finding collisions, they are also more expensive to compute. Bitcoin 
uses the SHA-256 cryptographic hash function, making it extremely unlikely that a ‘collision’ would happen. Given 
that even a slightest change to a message would produce a different output when hashed (unless in the highly 
unlikely event of a collision), the hashing function is a way to verify data integrity and ensure that a message has not 
been tampered with.  
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cryptography, Merkle trees and digital signatures, each of which are used in Bitcoin 
and many cryptocurrencies. Public key cryptography ensures that a message cannot be 
intercepted and is read only by its intended recipient. Here, cryptographic hashing is used to 
create a set of keys: one that can encrypt (a public key) and another that can decrypt (a 
private key that is kept secret). A person can share their public key with the world, so that 
anyone can write a message and lock (encrypt) it with their public key, meaning that it 
cannot be read. Only they (or someone in possession of their private key) can unlock, 
decrypt and read that message. The public key encrypts messages to be sent to the owner; 
the owner then uses the private key to decrypt messages. In digital payments, transactions 
are messages, and so for Bitcoin, public key cryptography is used as a way to determine 
ownership of a given message.  
Cryptographic keys are also used for digital signatures, so that it can be proven that a 
message has been sent by a given source. The network can then verify that the transaction is 
indeed coming from the correct ‘owner’, by checking the signature against a public key. Only 
a person with the correct keys is accepted as having sent that message, or ‘spent’ that 
transaction.  
 
Figure 1. An illustrated version of Nakamoto’s diagram of bitcoin transactions, 2008. Each transaction 
‘output’ is linked to a previous transaction ‘input’ by the owner(0) signing the transaction data as well as 
the public key of the new owner(1) associated with a specific address and timestamping it.36  
                                                                                                                                                              
35 Ralph Charles Merkle’s 1979 Secrecy, Authentication and Public Key Systems report gives a very good outline of 
several basic concepts used in cryptography, including public key encryption, the use of these for digital signatures, 
and storing data in trees as an alternative form of verification to public keys.  
36 A good analogy is to think of this as an email address for money, you can have as many of them as you like, and 
they are not necessarily linked to your identity. 
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Rather than an actual coin, a bitcoin can be more accurately described as a chain, proving 
changing owners and records of accounts. Each transaction (output) refers back to a digital 
signature of where that value came from (the previous transaction input). In this sense, ‘We 
define an electronic coin as a chain of digital signatures’ (Nakamoto, 2008, p. 2). Transactions 
are thereby spent by unlocking funds associated with a given address using a private key 
associated with the public key that was hashed and signed by the previous owner; the next 
owner is determined by the current owner signing and hashing the public key of the person 
they want to send to. In other words, bitcoins are not self-contained ‘coins’ exactly, but rather 
a chain of spent and unspent transactions associated by signature with various addresses 
(see illustration above); a chain of transaction data that reaches all the way back to January 
2009 when the very first transaction took place.37 Cryptography is here once again used as 
proof – this time of ownership, using cryptographic keys, but also, and importantly, as proof 
that a given value spent in a transaction is genuine by proving its history through a public 
record of previous transactions. Transactions are thereby authorised through cryptographic 
keys, the hashed chain of transactions proves that the ‘coin’ comes from a valid source.  
So far then, cryptographic proofs are used to ensure the integrity of a record of transactions, 
can prove and secure ownership through public key cryptography and can prove transactions 
are coming from the correct source using digital signatures. But the main aim of Bitcoin is to 
replace the need to trust in any authority, third party or intermediary with a peer-to-peer 
trustless network. This means that all this also needs to take place in a decentralised manner, 
such that no single ‘authority’ holds this record of changing ownership. Decentralisation 
presents some complications in terms of systems designs, and in order to solve these 
Nakamoto drew together an unusual combination of ideas. Instead of a bank, payments 
company or other ‘authority’ holding the balances of accounts and records of transactions, the 
intention is that these are held, verified and enforced across the peer-to-peer network – 
otherwise a centralised node would simply act as a new trusted intermediary. It is a 
conception of decentralisation that is operationalised as a means to eliminate ‘trust’, which in 
turn is understood as a security weakness, an unnecessary cost and a potential uncertainty 
by introducing the possibility of reversing transactions:  
Commerce on the internet has come to rely almost exclusively on financial institutions serving 
as trusted third parties to process electronic payments. While the system works well enough for 
most transactions, it still suffers from the inherent weaknesses of the trust-based model. 
Completely non-reversible transactions are not really possible, since financial institutions 
cannot avoid mediating disputes. The cost of mediation increases transaction costs, limiting the 
minimum practical transaction size and cutting off the possibility for small casual transactions, 
                                                       
37 The Bitcoin blockchain can be browsed using various ‘blockchain explorers’. Here is a link to the details of the first 
bitcoin transaction between Satoshi Nakamoto and Hal Finney, an active contributor to the Cypherpunk email list: 
https://www.blockchain.com/btc/block/000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f  
 77 
and there is a broader cost in the loss of ability to make non-reversible payments for non-
reversible services. 
– Nakamoto, 2008, p. 1 
The way that ‘trust’ and ‘trustlessness’ are understood and operationalised here is very 
specific and has its roots in both Cypherpunk culture and network engineering (see Chapter 
5). The aim is to achieve a ‘trustless’ system for reasons of security: if a peer-to-peer network 
relies on any single node this opens up a security risk if that node happens to be malicious.38 
Mediation, as described by Nakamoto above, implies the possibility of reversibility and 
thereby uncertainty, and is assumed to also imply and extra cost. And so, in order to eliminate 
trust and intermediaries, instead of a bank or a third party registering and enforcing 
transactions, these are broadcast publicly to the network, which then witnesses them, checks 
their integrity and adds them to what is called a Merkle tree – a ‘tree’ of cryptographic 
hashes.39  
There are some problems, or to put it in the language of network engineers, attack vectors, 
that are particular to developing a decentralised payment network. These are important to 
trace through, not only to explain the reasons for the Bitcoin protocol design, but also 
because the very politics of different design considerations tend to be discussed and 
addressed in network security terms. The ways in which these different attacks were solved 
would, in turn, end up having significant political and economic effects in the field of 
blockchain and decentralised systems designs. One type of attack that is common to 
decentralised systems more generally is the DDoS attack (Distributed Denial of Service 
attack) describing the type of attack whereby a network is spammed in such a way to make it 
unusable. In the case of Bitcoin, such an attack could, for example, consist of someone 
sending many small transactions to overload the network. In order to prevent this kind of 
attack, Nakamoto drew on work done by cryptographer Adam Back in an earlier project called 
Hashcash, which predated Bitcoin (Back, 2002).  
Hashcash was a system based on research by Cynthia Dwork and Moni Naor in 1992, which 
suggested using computational difficulty as a means to combat email spam (Dwork and Naor, 
1992). The idea was that by making it computationally expensive to send emails, it would 
discourage spammers from abusing the network. Back developed this idea into Hashcash, 
                                                       
38 A trustless system is therefore a system in which a network needs to assume that not all nodes can be trusted. 
Networks are never 100% trustless. It can be assessed pretty accurately what percentage of the network needs to be 
‘honest’, meaning interacting in the network in the expected and accepted ways, in order for it to work. A trustless 
system is one that is designed in such a way that even if there are malicious actors, misinformation or other issues, 
the system’s integrity is maintained. 
39 A Merkle tree is an early form of hash tables, which are used in cryptocurrencies and decentralised systems that 
have come after Bitcoin in so-called distributed hash tables (DHT). This is a method of effectively storing and 
retrieving data across a network.  
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introducing the idea of proof-of-work, which was to become a major part of the Bitcoin 
consensus mechanism.40 This idea, of introducing cost as a means for solving protocol 
issues, became the means for introducing scarcity and economic dynamics into protocol 
designs, and would later give rise to the field of cryptoeconomics. 
For those not familiar with the ideas, proof-of-work is one of the more dense and unfamiliar 
aspects of the Bitcoin architecture. It is also a form of cryptographic proof, again making use 
of hashing. Nodes in the Bitcoin network are required to do some ‘work’ in order to be allowed 
to verify transactions: transactions are witnessed and then grouped into blocks, which they 
then run through a hashing algorithm.41 But the output needs to meet certain requirements in 
order to be valid, namely it has to output a string with a certain amount of zeroes in front, for 
example 000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a-6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f (the 
proof-of-work hash for the very first Bitcoin block of verified transactions). In order to produce 
a valid output, nodes try adding a random number (also referred to as a nonce) to the 
transaction data. They keep hashing different nonces with the transaction data until the output 
meets the requirement. This output is then the ‘proof-of-work’ and is published along with the 
nonce. Anyone can then check that the ‘work’ indeed has been done, by running the 
transaction data and the nonce through the hashing algorithm again to see if it produces the 
same output. This computational ‘work’, of repeated hashing of transaction data with different 
nonces in order to find a valid output, is called mining in an explicit reference to gold mining. 
Figure 2. Transactions are grouped into blocks that are hashed with a ‘nonce’. The hash output has to 
meet the requirement of the difficulty target, namely that it begins with a certain number of zeroes.  
                                                       
40 Since Bitcoin, alternative consensus algorithms using cryptographic proofs in different configurations have been 
developed and have become an area of research, development and creativity. See proof-of-stake, proof-of-presence, 
proof-of-cooperation, etc.  
41 The hashing algorithm used in Bitcoin is SHA-256. 
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The proof-of-work algorithm also operates as a solution to another significant problem for a 
decentralised payment system, namely how to get the network to agree on which transactions 
to consider valid, and how to secure the integrity of these records. This is also known as the 
‘double-spend problem’ in Bitcoin, or the ‘Byzantine Generals’ Problem’ in decentralised 
networks more generally (Lamport, Shostak and Pease, 1982).42 In a double-spend attack, a 
person might broadcast a transaction to some recipient to one part of the network and then try 
and spend that same transaction again by broadcasting a different recipient to another part of 
the network. In such a case, the decentralised network would require some method for 
agreeing on which transaction should be considered valid, without resorting to some external 
authority to settle matters. The competition to find a valid proof-of-work thereby functions as a 
provably random way for nodes to take turns in verifying transactions, ensuring that no node 
gets to continuously verify transactions (which would in essence make them an authority). 
The difficulty of the computational problem is known, and so the solution, what is called the 
‘proof-of-work’, cannot be faked, making each round an open competition for verifying 
transactions in which it is unlikely for any single actor to repeatedly ‘win’ and be able to 
determine transaction verifications at will. In other words, it is intended to guarantee a certain 
(and measurable) level of randomness in who gets to verify transactions in such a manner 
that verification cannot be consistently manipulated. Nakamoto compares this to voting:  
Proof-of-work is essentially one-CPU-one-vote. The majority decision is represented by the 
longest chain, which has the greatest proof-of-work effort invested in it. If a majority of CPU 
power is controlled by honest nodes, the honest chain will grow the fastest and outpace any 
competing chains. 
– Nakamoto, 2008, p. 3  
The voting analogy is of a peculiar kind (and turned out to be far from equal). Because mining 
is competitive and a whole network of computers are mining blocks, consensus on 
transactions is an emerging property: a miner elsewhere in the network might mine a 
contradicting block, which would cause what is called a fork in the blockchain. The protocol is 
therefore set so that the longest chain is the one that is considered valid. As more blocks are 
mined on a given chain it diminishes the possibility of a different, conflicting fork of the chain 
being longer and ‘winning out’. Mining a block in this sense also signifies agreement with that 
chain of transactions. It is in a sense a way of ‘voting’ on a given record of events.  
                                                       
42 First described in Lamport, Shostak and Pease, 1982, the Byzantine Generals’ Problem presents an example of an 
attack on a city by the Byzantine army: a number of generals have surrounded the city and communicate with each 
other via messengers in order to coordinate their actions. Knowing that a few of the generals might be traitors 
passing false messages, the question is how to ensure that the generals reach agreement on a common course of 
action. This example is used to describe a problem in computing of how to ensure reliability of the system if one 
component malfunctions (as described by Lamport et. al.) or in a distributed computing network where some nodes 
might be malicious, provide false data or attack the network.  
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Figure 3. The longest chain in the blockchain is always considered the most valid, represented here by 
the coloured blocks. Read from left to right, the lighter blocks are more recent and thus less ‘confirmed’. 
Because the longest chain is the most valid, in order to attack the system, for example to 
attempt a ‘double-spend’ or to change the transaction data, one would have to mine blocks 
faster than the rest of the network. An attacker would therefore in effect have to control more 
than 50% of the hashrate (another way to say mining power) in the network. It is therefore 
claimed that the security of the network increases as it grows and gains more overall 
hashing power (the amount of computational power that miners are putting into mining 
blocks) because it becomes more and more unlikely for any single actor to dominate or 
control all the mining nodes in the network.43 As the chain gets longer it therefore also 
becomes increasingly unlikely and it becomes impossible to change the history of 
transactions. 
There is another aspect to the proof-of-work consensus algorithm, which was to instigate an 
entire new field of computer engineering research. The repeated attempt at finding the nonce 
is called ‘mining’, because new bitcoins are created and distributed in the process. The 
intention with this design is to reward the work done to verify transactions and to do so in a 
way that would make it more profitable to contribute in this sense than to attempt an attack.  
He ought to find it more profitable to play by the rules, such rules that favour him with more 
new coins than everyone else combined, than to undermine the system and the validity of his 
own wealth. 
– Nakamoto, 2008, p. 4 
                                                       
43 It is worth noting a private conversation from early 2017 with the head of security for one of Google’s subsidiaries 
and cryptography expert, who mentioned that if the Bitcoin network gained enough value it would be trivial for a 
company like Google to dominate the hashing-power of the network, essentially breaching the security model. 
However, the question of what effect that would have on the network is a difficult one as it would rely on the assumed 
legitimacy of Google amongst the majority of users at that point, as it is likely that the current composition of users 
would leave the system if such a takeover took place. But the issue his comment points towards is that problems of 
security and authority might not in fact have been solved by the decentralised architecture but rather still rely on 
questions of legitimacy amongst ordinary users, as well as questions of network effect and choice in the face of 
breach of security and legitimacy. 
 81 
Mining is a competition for verifying transactions in which the incentives to do so are intended 
to act as deterrent for attackers. This has essentially entailed the introduction of economic 
dynamics into network security engineering and with it the field of cryptoeconomics, which 
draws on incentives for decentralised protocol designs. It has since inspired more research in 
this direction in which the behaviour of economic agents are employed in cryptographic and 
computational research and the development of security models and new consensus 
algorithms (cf. Eyal and Sirer, 2013; Bonneau et al., 2015; Kiayias, 2015). The difficulty of the 
computational problem of finding the right nonce is set so that it is solved on average every 
ten minutes, thereby simultaneously determining the rate of money creation in the network 
until a total of 21 million bitcoins are in circulation.44 This is one of the more explicit references 
to deflationary and right-wing economic ideas as discussed by Golumbia (2016) and 
expanded on in Chapter 5. 
The cryptographic proofs I have explained above and their relation to the Bitcoin network 
architecture and economics constitute the technical as well as political proposition of the 
Bitcoin. They constitute the processes and systems proposed to construct truths about events 
and certainty of records, in the absence (or intended absence) of any authority or trusted third 
party that might normally determine such things. Mining and the proof-of-work consensus 
algorithm form one of the more difficult aspects of the architecture to understand because 
they so radically re-conceptualise a whole range of problems and processes: incentives 
(mining rewards) are used to motivate competition (mining) to verify transactions (create a 
block), which simultaneously determines the rate of money supply (the mining rewards are 
new bitcoin), securing the network by disincentivising attacks and solving the problem of 
computational consensus (verifying transactions and ensuring integrity of value tokens). This 
particularly dense set of solutions is also an area of debate and differentiation as it draws in 
and operationalises concepts from classical liberal economics and game theory through an 
arrangement of mathematical probability and cryptography, consumes a large amount of 
energy and has had centralising tendencies.45 Other cryptocurrencies have in response 
sought to develop different consensus algorithms drawing from other economic, technical and 
social theories.46  
                                                       
44 The initial reward was 50BTC per block, which is halved every so often as the network grows, currently at 
12.5BTC, with an absolute limit of 21million BTC in the system. After this, the intention is that miners will continue to 
mine blocks and validate transactions, but will be rewarded through a system of transaction fees instead of new 
‘coins’. 
45 And indeed much thinking from the Mont Pelerin Society, most notably Friedrich von Hayek, see for example 
Golumbia, 2016 for a more in-depth tracing of right-wing economic thinking in Bitcoin.  
46 It is also one of the more criticised aspects of Bitcoin as it is considered a waste of energy. Other cryptocurrencies 
and blockchain projects have developed different consensus protocols for exactly this reason (see comparison of 
proof-of-work, proof-of-stake, proof-of-cooperation and so on). Proof-of-work remains by far the most used to date. 
Many of the other consensus algorithms are still being tested and developed. 
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This complex entanglement has been described as ‘truth machine’ (Vigna and Casey, 2018) 
and a ‘magic computer’ (Buterin, 2015), but it is worthwhile and important to disentangle how 
‘consensus’ or ‘truth’ is arrived at and what ‘magic’ is in operation in the blockchain 
consensus algorithm.47 If we take a closer look at how double-spending is solved and how 
consensus is arrived at in a decentralised network, there is in fact no need to determine which 
of the conflicting transactions is true because from the perspective of the system, it does not 
matter which is verified, as long as it is just one of them. What is ‘true’ or what ‘really 
happened’ is not of importance; these concepts are replaced by randomness and probability 
in the selection of which node (miner) gets to determine the ‘truth’ of which transactions 
happened in this round. Because the work of mining cannot be faked, each round is an open 
competition for being the node that determines which transactions are valid and thereby 
considered true in the network. The ‘consensus’ of the consensus algorithm should therefore 
not be misunderstood as some sort of agreement on the truth of events but rather as an 
incentive-driven settlement, the truth of which is decided on through randomised turns 
determined by expending CPU power. The ‘fairness’ of the consensus algorithm, or, rather, its 
legitimacy lies not in negotiations, consensus of opinions or some notion of justice or 
objective truth but in randomness and large numbers generating an operational computational 
consensus for the network.  
I have described the Bitcoin protocol and consensus mechanism as well as the ways in which 
cryptographic proofs, along with a decentralised architecture and economic incentives, are 
assembled with the aim of resolving the need for and possibility of authority. These 
descriptions and systems designs have an effect in their own right that exceeds their 
technical efficacy. They are convincing and powerful means of spreading and circulating 
ideas. This is acknowledged by several other authors who address a distinction between what 
is promised by the technology and its actual effects (Golumbia, 2016; Reijers and 
Coeckelbergh, 2016). But where Golumbia, for example, understands the Bitcoin architecture 
and its descriptions as vehicles for an economic ideology, I argue that the Bitcoin whitepaper 
and its systems architecture is convincing and powerful as a promise of an apparatus that is 
external to and beyond the control of human beings to replace authorities. In a sense, it is so 
convincing as to become more real to some than the ways in which the system affects people 
and contexts in which it is used, what I have called a ‘systems primacy’ (Nakamoto, Bridle 
and Brekke, 2019) whereby the deterministic capacities of cryptography become a certainty 
upon which all else can be constructed. This apparatus does indeed draw on markets as one 
element of arranging some exterior that would be more objective than humans, but as one 
ingredient of several. The deterministic conditions that are arranged in the architecture, 
verified and secured through cryptographic proofs, rather promise to finally resolve age-old 
                                                       
47 See https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/04/13/visions-part-1-the-value-of-blockchain-technology/  
 83 
issues of authority by replacing it with a provably secure, decentralised and therefore fair 
system. It suggests a promise of an objective, mathematical resolution to subjective, 
corruptible humans.  
4.1.2  Determinacy – trustless perfection and mushy humans 
Bitcoin is this perfect/trustless/mathematical machine, built – most unfortunately - upon a 
foundation of mushy humans. 
 – Gareth Williams, Bitcoin developers’ email list, April 27th 201448 
Cryptographic proofs promise the ability to determine trust. These are mathematical proof of 
events, relationships, ownership and decisions, indisputable because they are founded on 
mathematical rather than human statements. These proofs are understood to solve the 
problem of trust because they state what can be known, the construction of a scientifically 
provable fact, which in turn can be used to create deterministic systems and architectures. 
The Bitcoin whitepaper for many therefore described a ‘perfect/trustless/mathematical 
machine’, where the only flaws came about because it was necessarily built upon ‘a 
foundation of mushy’ and imperfect humans (see quote above). There are a few problems 
that come up when such mathematically proven, deterministic architectures go from being a 
specific strategy for certain purposes, in relation to specific authorities, to a general 
proposition to resolve the issue of ‘authority’ altogether. As a general proposition, the problem 
becomes how to understand and make sense of the limits of this form of determinacy. For 
example, the system itself is conceived, developed, maintained, used and built by humans, 
with and alongside specific material, social and economic contexts, which cannot be fully 
determined and secured through cryptography alone. A person can steal someone’s 
cryptographic keys and their funds, or cheat them on a cryptocurrency exchange; these 
situations matter a whole lot to those who experience them, but the transactions would 
nevertheless enter into a blockchain and be cryptographically proven and secured simply as 
transactions that have taken place. This raises the question of where exactly the limit to 
cryptographic proofs resides and what type of ‘trustlessness’ they construct, as well as what 
they can do in the mediation and enforcement of relationships, trust and truths and the 
system’s ability to determine things.  
The science and engineering of cryptographic proofs do ‘work’, in the sense that they are able 
to prove, secure and determine events and relationships, and yet it is clear that there is a limit 
to what these can determine and for whom. To put it differently, the Bitcoin architecture is 
trustless up to a certain threshold, and yet for most people, it actually requires a lot of trust in 
                                                       
48 See https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2014-April/005615.html  
 84 
order to use. The user has to ‘trust’ in the cryptocurrency exchange where they might 
purchase bitcoin, their listed exchange rate, the wallet developer, an online explainer of how 
cryptographic keys work and so on. How then to reconcile the science, the mathematics that 
makes up the trustless solution of Bitcoin, and the experience of using it? In the Bitcoin 
whitepaper, the problem with existing payment systems and the intermediation and authority 
that these require is articulated as one of trust. The problem that Nakamoto articulates is that 
trust requires mediation in cases when trust breaks down, and mediation is an extra cost and 
potential security threat. Developer Maxwell expands on this on the Bitcoin developers’ 
mailing list, a quote that is reminiscent of many other such descriptions of the radical potential 
of Bitcoin to resolve the issue of trust and authority:  
 
Bitcoin seeks to address the root problem with conventional currency: all the trust that's 
required to make it work— 
— Not that justified trust is a bad thing, but trust makes systems brittle, opaque, and 
costly to operate. Trust failures result in systemic collapses, trust curation creates 
inequality and monopoly lock-in, and naturally arising trust choke-points can be abused to 
deny access to due process. Through the use of cryptographic proof and decentralised 
networks Bitcoin minimises and replaces these trust costs. 
– Gregory Maxwell, Bitcoin developer, 201549 
The way that trust is articulated in Bitcoin is as a potential systemic risk and an unnecessary 
cost. A trustless system, on the other hand, implies that one does not have to trust any aspect 
of the system, or more precisely, in the good intentions of any other node in the network, as 
long as the majority of them are honest, in order to know that the network is secure and 
functions as intended. This became an enticing prospect when expanded from the realm of 
computer networks to financial, political and legal institutions. Indeed, this formula, in which 
trust and mediation are understood as problems that can be solved by replacing trusted 
relations with a trustless system, turned, through Bitcoin and through being generalised in 
Ethereum, into a vocabulary in the blockchain industry more generally to explain pretty much 
any problem with existing institutions and systems, and to pose blockchain as a solution to 
these by solving the ‘trust’ problem.  
The following is an example where this exact limit of trust and trustlessness is negotiated in a 
discussion on the Bitcoin developers’ mailing list from 2011. The discussion itself is not out of 
the ordinary. It is typical of many such discussions where a person writes to the developers’ 
email list suggesting a patch or improvement to the protocol, and the proposal is then 
discussed amongst the developers for its benefits or potential security issues. In this email 
                                                       
49 https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-December/011865.html  
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thread, a developer who is not part of the core development team, Parkins, raises a possible 
issue of a double-spending attack: two people in different locations might purchase an item 
with the same bitcoin, so that part of the network would register one transaction and another 
the other transaction.50 It takes some time for the transactions to propagate through the 
network, and yet more time for there to be enough confirmations (blocks mined) to know for 
sure which transaction is verified in the blockchain. In the meantime, in his example, at the 
location of the actual purchases, the scammers might have already left with their goods, 
leaving one of the merchants with an invalid transaction. The solution that Parkins wants to 
propose is that if a node detects double-spending it will not only drop the contending 
transaction, but will also send out a message to other nodes about this already at the stage of 
propagation before blocks have started to be mined, so that merchants might know 
immediately if there is a potential issue with their transaction. Bitcoin developer Matt Corallo 
responds: ‘There really is no reason to add the extra network complexity for this.’51 Corallo’s 
concern is that ‘adding more crap to the protocol’ could open up other possible issues like 
DDoS attacks, whereby the network could be flooded by additional messages.52 For Corallo, 
the problem of double-spending is already solved in the protocol as is, and therefore doesn’t 
need to be addressed further. For the merchants who might not see the double-spending 
attempt in time, Corallo suggests a ‘Bitcoin backbone’ of well-connected nodes that would 
witness large amounts of transactions and know whether there are any contradicting ones in 
the network. Parkins, increasingly frustrated, responds: 
>So, you peer with the largest > miners (a ‘Bitcoin backbone’ or large miners and 
merchants has been > suggested over and over again and really hasn’t 
happened) and modify  
It hasn’t happened, and yet it seems to be that this non-existent thing is your solution to 
the problem.  
>your client to, instead of dropping transactions which are > double-spends, 
keep both in memory pool and consider them both invalid > until one of them 
confirms.  
Well that’s what happens now. But that doesn’t help the poor sap who’s just handed over 
some goods. I want it so that small businesses can use the client to give them practical 
answers instead of this ‘0/unconfirmed’ stuff which requires understanding of the system.  
>This will work with 1, 2, or n scammers, doesn’t require any additional > 
network messages, and offers just as good, if not better security over a > double-
spend message.  
I’m not really trying to prevent double-spends – bitcoin already prevents double-spends. 
Also: the only difference between your suggestion (don't drop) and my suggestion (don't 
                                                       
50 See https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2011-August/000287.html  
51 See https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2011-August/000290.html  
52 See https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2011-August/000296.html  
 86 
drop but mark with MSGDOUBLESPEND) is a single number in the inv. I really don’t get 
the objection.  
– Parkins in discussion with Corallo, Bitcoin developers mailing list, August 4th 201153  
What is interesting about this discussion is that although the problem of double-spending is 
solved in terms of the Bitcoin blockchain security model, the risk still exists in practical terms 
for merchants. What I would like to highlight here is not the technical trade-off, nor whether 
Corallo or Parkins are right, but rather that there is a negotiation and separation out of what is 
a problem in the first place; what should be taken care of by the protocol and what constitutes 
a risk for and responsibility of those who choose to use the system.54 What starts to emerge 
is that there is a gradation of concerns from a systems design perspective, in which what is 
understood as an attack and security issue relates firstly to whether it is a threat to the 
survival of the system itself. For Corallo, if merchants care about the time it takes for sufficient 
confirmations to avoid double-spending they should make sure they are ‘peered with a well 
connected node’.55 It is an explicit decision about what is the responsibility of the protocol 
design and what is the responsibility of those choosing to use it. My argument is that this also 
defines the exact limit of the proposition of trustlessness and disintermediation. The 
merchants would trust a large miner supernode in order to run their businesses. For them, 
Bitcoin would then no longer, strictly speaking, be trustless. There is therefore a limit to how 
the Bitcoin architecture resolves the need for trust and determines and secures relationships. 
While this might seem obvious in the sense that a given technology cannot account for any 
and all of its potential uses and effects, this limit poses a philosophical problem to the 
fundamental claims of resolving authority as a general proposition. It raises the question of for 
whom or for what purposes exactly it ‘resolves authority’. For the hypothetical merchant in 
question, a ‘Bitcoin backbone’ of large miners would simply become another new form of 
authority, and this new authority has as of yet very few accountability measures and an 
operational merit that is both unfamiliar and as of yet undefined.  
This question, of who a given systems design serves, is addressed in different ways in Bitcoin 
and various other blockchain projects, and many engineers and developers are very 
concerned about the risks and issues faced by different users of the systems. But the promise 
of a mathematical resolution to authority more generally has also given rise to a tendency in 
Bitcoin and blockchain to what I call a ‘systems primacy’. In these accounts, a problem faced 
by a merchant, such as the one described above, or any of the other scams and scandals 
that have happened in Bitcoin would be assigned and explained as a problem of imperfect 
                                                       
53 See https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2011-August/000291.html  
54 Although Corallo does seem to have a point, that if the given node is slow to receive a potentially conflicting 
transaction message, there is no reason to believe that an extra kind of message about double-spending will do 
much other than multiply the amount of messages in the network. 
55 See https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2011-August/000296.html  
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humans. As in the quote at the beginning of this section: ‘Bitcoin is this 
perfect/trustless/mathematical machine, built – most unfortunately – upon a foundation of 
mushy humans.’56 Describing the system as perfect and humans as mushy serves a purpose. 
It entails a cut, determining what matters and what is excluded from mattering in the claims 
made of Bitcoin. In the meantime, a Bitcoin protocol is not the only sensibility to enact this cut, 
and is not the only determinate agency in the deployment of the system.  
In Baradian terms, the Bitcoin protocol can be understood as an apparatus that entails a 
certain onto-epistemological sensibility with determinate effects. Above I have described 
some of the more specific ways that this sensibility comes to matter in whitepapers, protocols 
and so on (which begins to open up how what matters cannot be fully determined through a 
single sensibility, evident across further materialisation in hardware and so on). As a Baradian 
apparatus, however, the ‘objectivity’ of the apparatus is not due to it being external to 
necessarily subjective humans. Instead, objectivity entails the ability to accurately describe 
the conditions to reproduce a certain determinate assemblage. The human, knowledge, 
papers and whitepapers, mathematical and market models, hardware and so on are part of 
what makes things matter. Because of this, there is a limit to particular modes of determinacy. 
Not everything is or can be determined through the protocol and the protocol is not the only 
determining agency. The trustless conditions that are sought to be determined have a limit 
and that limit also signifies exactly what specifically is being solved by determining certain 
relations and for who/what.  
The deterministic conditions promised in the model are, from a ‘systems primacy’ sensibility, 
all that matters. Anything else is rendered insensible; they should not and cannot be sensed 
as mattering because there is no mathematical proof. This is entirely coherent with the 
idealized description and sensibility of Bitcoin. This drawing of a boundary between a 
coherent and perfect core and mushy, imperfect humans allows for the integrity of the 
idealised system to remain intact while, for all practical purposes, trusted intermediaries 
proliferate (necessarily, as we have seen for the use of the system), the code is continuously 
updated and maintained (by mushy humans) and hacks take place with money lost. Such 
articulations are quite common in discussions on Bitcoin, blockchain and cryptocurrencies, 
but affinity with the ‘perfect machine’ does not always take such explicitly ideological forms. At 
other times, instead of ‘mushy humans’ this might be construed as an interaction between the 
perfect system and a ‘clueless end-user’. In these cases too the system itself is considered 
secure and coherent, and DDoS, and what are called Sybil and Finney attacks might have 
been addressed, whereas hacks and the collapse of exchanges, for example, are considered 
issues to do with user concerns rather than the Bitcoin blockchain itself. 
                                                       
56 See https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2014-April/005615.html 
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The solution here is not necessarily to include what has been rendered insensible into the 
Bitcoin sensibility. It is not necessarily that Corallo should take Parkin’s concerns into 
consideration and solve all the problems of merchants through the actual protocol itself. What 
I am highlighting is that this very limit to the trustless deterministic promises of Bitcoin 
matters, because it shows precisely the limits of what is taken care of in the protocol, and for 
whom, and what might need to be taken care of through some other arrangement. What this 
entails is to become aware of other sensibilities that the system and protocol might touch 
upon, and that much of the political effect and meaning of Bitcoin takes place here. Indeed, in 
the years 2016 and 2017, the deterministic claims of both Bitcoin and Ethereum as resolving 
issues of authority faced major crises. This shook many of the deterministic understandings, 
which began to loosen into more sophisticated ways of addressing power, trust, humans and 
authority (see Chapter 6). An interesting contradiction in deterministic understandings of 
Bitcoin as an objective system beyond the control of humans is that such claims require that 
such a system be simultaneously determined solely through a human agency – the author(s) 
of the Bitcoin whitepaper Satoshi Nakamoto – as well as entirely removed from human 
control. It assumes complete control in establishing a determinate apparatus that would be 
beyond all control. In part, I would argue, this contradiction is accommodated for through the 
disappearance and continued anonymity of Nakamoto. This disappearance also signified a 
disappearance of authority, which is necessary in order for the system to be beyond control, 
while allowing for the possibility of an initial inception of complete knowledge and control. 
Issues with the system design can then be argued as the problem of necessarily and 
unfortunately mushy humans, not pertaining to the original vision. What this also means is 
that highlighting the discrepancies between the stated deterministic vision and its 
implementation is not sufficient for challenging a deterministic understanding of Bitcoin 
because it merely points to issues requiring correction. A protocological analysis, whether as 
a critique (Bitcoin does not ‘work’) or intended as simply an explanation (this is how Bitcoin 
‘works’) is not sufficient in other words, because it takes as a starting point that the only thing 
that matters is the protocol. It takes the acknowledgment of other sensibilities and determining 
agencies to allow other things to matter.  
4.1.3  Emergence – a node is not just a node 
In his book from 2004, media theorist Alexander Galloway analyses the internet, looking to 
understand how control happens in decentralised systems (Galloway, 2004). He articulates a 
form of protocological power that operates by shaping the landscape of possible and 
desirable behaviour: in contrast to a ‘disciplinary power’, with stated regulation that punishes 
after the fact, ‘protocological power’ operates in an immanent manner, an immediately 
executing law, written in an executable language, that operates continuously by shaping the 
landscape of desirable action. This analysis is interesting in relation to Bitcoin and blockchain 
 89 
in that it describes so perfectly the ambitions and intentions of such systems, namely to 
eliminate disciplinary power and replace it with what is considered a more neutral, 
protocological power that does not operate through violence and punishment, but instead 
through incentives and immediately executing code.  
In this light then, it should be possible to reveal ‘the politics’ and political implications of 
Bitcoin by analysing its protocol. Indeed, the description and analysis of the Bitcoin protocol 
and systems design that I have engaged in above illuminates some of the ways in which 
particular sensibilities are materialised and sought to be encoded into the protocol, and this to 
some extent then does ‘tell’ something of the politics of Bitcoin. Through a protocological 
analysis I am able to describe the potential for cryptographic proofs to mediate trustless 
situations, the system itself becoming a trusted intermediary on the basis of mathematically-
determined high improbability of anyone being able to cheat, given the known deterministic 
conditions. Through this careful description I am also able to point to the exact limits of claims 
of trustlesness and determinacy – a concern that is rarely addressed explicitly but that is 
fundamental for practical applications of Bitcoin (and blockchain more generally) to make 
sense. The whitepaper, whether ‘true’ in its implementation or not, has a political effect in and 
of itself by presenting a particular project and justification of how Bitcoin intended to work. 
However, protocols do not fully and finally determine outcome in terms of effects. This is one 
of the pitfalls of a protocological analysis; to assume that a design, whether understood as 
determined by human assumptions or intent, or transcendental mathematical laws, 
deterministically produce some form of effects.  
An analytical approach that looks to explain the full implications of a system by analysing the 
protocol alone would merely replicate assumptions that everything can be explained through 
the protocol, that its implications are fully determined here. It assumes, in a sense, too much 
control and determinacy. In the meantime it also construes the political stakes in terms of 
whether a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ ethics or politics is encoded (it makes the project one of behavioural 
and total engineering). In the following, I carefully trace through the limitations to such an 
approach through the question of centralisation of Bitcoin mining, with the intention to arrive at 
an analytical standpoint that does not rely entirely on protocological determination, but takes 
into account mushy humans and multiple sensibilities of what matters and how things come to 
matter and allows space for the insensible. 
In the Bitcoin whitepaper, nodes are described more or less as equal. Here, the whitepaper 
outlines what nodes in the Bitcoin network do, and the process of how transactions would 
take place:  
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1) New transactions are broadcast to all nodes.  
2) Each node collects new transactions into a block.  
3) Each node works on finding a difficult proof-of-work for its 
block.  
4) When a node finds a proof-of-work, it broadcasts the block to 
all nodes.  
5) Nodes accept the block only if all transactions in it are valid 
and not already spent.  
6) Nodes express their acceptance of the block by working on 
creating the next block in the chain, using the hash of the 
accepted block as the previous hash.  
– Nakamoto 2008, p. 3 
The whitepaper describes a network where transactions are broadcast to all nodes, that each 
node collects new transactions into a block and so on, a network of equal nodes performing 
work for each other. The description is reminiscent of typical diagrams illustrating 
‘decentralisation’, dots connected to other dots via lines, nodes communicating with other 
nodes of equal sizes in what looks like a harmonious and horizontal arrangement. It looks 
democratic, everyone is participating and it gives an intuitional sense of equality. Networks as 
they are built and operate are more complex than that; they might be designed to 
communicate with nodes according to all kinds of criteria, including closest, farthest, most 
capacity, best reputation or otherwise. They also change over time and have important 
emergent characteristics. The Bitcoin network is indeed ‘open’ and anyone can theoretically 
contribute and set of up a node by downloading and running the Bitcoin client, but in the years 
since the Bitcoin whitepaper was published and the first Bitcoin transaction was registered, 
these tasks have become increasingly more specialised.57 Not all nodes necessarily '[collect] 
new transactions into a block’; Bitcoin wallets that will simply broadcast and witness have 
been developed and are widely used. Many of these wallets present an interface and do not 
necessarily give people control over their cryptographic keys, implying several layers of ‘trust’ 
for those using these services. From the intention of trustlessness this might be considered 
an undesirable compromise, but for someone not used to handling cryptographic keys, and 
generally not concerned with this notion of trust, it might be a more usable system, as long as 
there are other available accountability structures for the given wallet.  
Furthermore, not all nodes 'work on finding a difficult proof-of-work for [their] block[s]'; full 
nodes that might broadcast and witness transactions and check that these comply with the 
consensus rules, but not mine blocks, have emerged. This has largely been in response to 
                                                       
57 See https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin  
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mining becoming so competitive and difficult that so-called mining pools have developed.58 
These pools look more like a federated system than a decentralised system. In the Bitcoin 
whitepaper, the ability to mine is described as determined through CPU power. But as 
competition to mine increased, new, dedicated hardware was developed, so-called 
Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs), replacing CPU and making mining 
increasingly specialised and difficult to take part in. The development of ASICs is understood 
to have contributed to the centralisation of mining, and from this larger concerns over miner’s 
control of the Bitcoin network have emerged. In addition to nodes specialising, an entirely new 
network layer called lightning network, has been developed to allow faster transactions in 
parallel with the Bitcoin main net.59 In other words, a node is not just a node, and a network is 
not just a network. These develop and emerge into new specialised roles and configurations, 
and do so in relation and response to conditions such as mining incentives, hardware 
development, exchange rates, geographical location and conditions, legislation and so on. 
The Bitcoin network has emergent characteristics and also contingent effects that challenge 
any simple description of the system as ‘decentralised’, ‘disintermediating’ and ‘trustless’. 
These emergent effects, such as the centralising tendencies of Bitcoin mining, could be, and 
are, critiqued for their discrepancy with the original vision, used as an argument for how 
Bitcoin does not ‘work’ – that it claims to be ‘decentralised’, but in fact centralises. The 
problem with such an approach is that it argues from a deterministic standpoint: it 
presupposes that the protocol would be able to determine a decentralised system but that it 
doesn’t and that therein lies its faults. In fact, any analysis that overly relies on the claims of 
the protocol would come up against this issue of merely replicating a deterministic assumption 
of what protocols are able to do. In the meantime, engineers, enthusiasts, and so on are 
aware of the centralising tendencies and actively look to correct these as part of an ongoing 
effort to materialise what matters to them. The centralising tendencies of, in particular, Bitcoin 
mining form a well-known issue that subsequent cryptocurrencies and blockchain protocols 
have sought to address in new consensus mechanisms as well as hardware designs, for 
example countering the development of ASICs or basing consensus on stakes or other 
criteria rather than a hashing competition.  
The technical literature on blockchain is a rapidly expanding dynamic field, and while it is 
concerned with improving technical aspects, it would be a mistake to take these efforts as an 
uncritical engagement with how the technology develops. Critiques of technologically 
determinate claims made of blockchain risk reinforcing deterministic understandings of 
protocols if based on an ontological division between the social and the technical, because 
                                                       
58 See for example https://www.antpool.com/ and https://pool.bitcoin.com/  
59 See https://lightning.network/ 
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the issue then is construed as a conflict between who is the most appropriate agent of control 
and determination, the human or the machinic. This also makes for disciplinary divisions 
where social sciences take care of, and are necessarily on the side of, ‘the social’ and human, 
while computer sciences and engineering address ‘purely technical’ questions. The technical 
literature on blockchain projects in many ways distinguishes itself as explicitly and self-
consciously political, having largely emerged as an intervention into the political economic 
order (Meiklejohn et al., 2013; Musiani et al., 2016; Sirer, 2016; Azouvi, Maller and 
Meiklejohn, 2018; Buterin, Hitzig and Weyl, 2018). And so many of the social, political and 
environmental issues critiqued from the ‘outside’ are or tend to become areas of concern in 
the design and engineering, and are addressed in the form of new technical problem spaces. 
A critique of Bitcoin based on its failure to live up to its claims does nothing to challenge the 
idea of a system based on cryptographic proofs beyond control. It merely points towards a 
discrepancy in its implementation and thereby describes some aspect of the world that needs 
to be reorganised, corrected or reconfigured to materialise the vision.  
Rather than looking to access ‘the technical’, opening up the protocol, in order to critique its 
politics (with an aim to changing it ‘for the good’), an awareness of the insensible suggests a 
different approach that instead points to the limits of determinacy and how those limits are 
worked with. There are theorists in social sciences that are beginning to question the 
analytical strategy of ‘opening the black box’ in order to understand the ethical, political and 
social consequences of, in particular, digital networked technologies. Burrell discusses 
‘opacity’ in relation to machine learning (Burrell, 2015), in the sense of ‘corporate or state 
secrecy’ (pp. 3-4), and ‘technical illiteracy’ (p. 4), but also, and importantly in terms of the 
scale needed for useful application, that machine learning requires large amounts of data, 
and indeed makes sense of this data in ways that are not fully understandable for human 
scale reasoning and styles of semantic interpretation (pp. 4-5). Amoore also challenges the 
idea of gaining full transparency of datascapes that are emergent and ever-changing 
(Amoore, 2016), focusing on the ways in which technologies used for targeting and profiling 
work with the unknown, operating on probabilities and risk in constantly changing conditions 
rather than seeking complete oversight and certainty (Amoore, 2013, 2014). Seaver 
discusses the problem of ‘knowing algorithms’, given that their deployment, behaviour and 
effects are highly contingent and contextual, changing depending on the changing profile of a 
given user, for example (Seaver, 2014). Each of these question the idea that there is a single 
privileged vantage point that might reveal the full implications of an algorithm, protocol or 
system. Instead, everything potentially matters, and what matters more concretely depends 
on what or who is of interest, on where the cut is drawn. While there are important differences 
between systems deploying algorithms that are explicitly contingent on and operate through 
changing data, and the Bitcoin core client protocol and algorithms, which are deterministic, 
these insights are helpful for addressing the problem of assuming complete insight revealed 
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through a protocological analysis. Where Seaver and Amoore point to the ways in which the 
implications of algorithms are largely determined through and change along the data that they 
interact with, in ways that are less concerned with predicting known futures and more with 
opening up potentials (see also Amoore, 2013; Amoore and Raley, 2017), the Bitcoin protocol 
and its effects as a network system are also emergent in that they interact with and are 
deployed across differing and ever-changing contexts. Describing and analysing only a 
Bitcoin sensibility and its particular form of determinacy is to ignore the significance of its 
effects in, amongst and in relation to that which has not been determined, or is indeed 
determined by other sensibilities. This occurs in two distinct ways, namely the insensible that 
was not sensed as mattering from the perspective of those designing cryptographic systems, 
and the insensible ways in which a given system might matter. A political analysis focusing 
solely on a Bitcoin sensibility and materiality in and of itself is not enough, then. But also, and 
importantly, to exclaim that something has been excluded, such as the centralising 
tendencies of mining, is not enough either. It would merely suggest taking into account that 
which has been excluded, which in turn is to render it sensible to a deterministic 
protocological sensibility. A critique of a Bitcoin sensibility on the basis of it failing to 
successfully determine a given context or condition provokes either an expansion of the 
sensibility to include and reconfigure this missing element, or its productive exclusion from the 
realm of what matters; it is pushed into the realm of ‘mushy humans’. Instead of a description 
and subsequent assessment of a Bitcoin sensibility on such terms, then, my aim is to 
articulate a philosophical position in relation to the Bitcoin protocol that resolves the question 
of limits to the deterministic relations of cryptography by instead acknowledging the 
insensible, that which has not yet entered into a given sensibility – and possibly never will. 
This creates a space for cryptographic proofs to actually be considered to ‘work’ within certain 
contexts, but also to direct awareness to the limits of this mode of determinacy such that it 
becomes necessary to state whom and for what it ‘works’ and how it relates to other 
sensibilities.  
4.2  Algorithmic animism 
 
One of the best descriptions of Web3: Consider Web 3.0 to be an executable Magna 
Carta - the foundation of the freedom of the individual against the arbitrary authority of 
the despot. @juanbenet  quoting @gavofyork  at #web3summi t . Couldn’t agree more. 
 
– Jutta Steiner CEO of Parity, Tweet from the 2018 Web3 Summit60 
                                                       
60 See https://twitter.com/jutta_steiner/status/1054336890718031874 
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In late 2013, a new project called Ethereum was proposed; this was to become the second 
largest cryptocurrency network and one of the first to articulate ‘blockchain’ as a protocol level 
innovation independently of and exceeding application-specific uses as a transaction system. 
Ethereum was launched as a project to generalise the Bitcoin blockchain and make it Turing-
complete. Instead of only witnessing, verifying and registering transaction messages, the 
particular arrangement of cryptographic proofs, decentralised networks and economic 
incentives that had been invented with Bitcoin would be reconfigured to witness any kind of 
data, including code, as well as incentivise its execution in a decentralised network. The idea 
was no less than to transform the way the internet operates, suggesting a ‘Web 3.0’, realising 
an ambition that many technologists of the internet have been concerned with, namely to 
‘redecentralise’ the internet such that it would not longer be dominated and run by a select 
few companies, but instead would be facilitated and run by a network of peers. Addressing 
the protocol layer, this arrangement would be an ‘executable Magna Carta’ as suggested by 
Ethereum co-founder Wood (quoted above in a tweet by Steiner, founder of Ethereum 
company Parity, and ex security chief of the platform) and would be so in the sense that it 
would define a networked space that would operate on rules that were immediately executed, 
because these would be written in code, an executable language. Such a network would 
thereby be secured from ‘the arbitrary authority of the despot’ because it would be realised 
through a decentralised architecture and secured through cryptography. Code, 
decentralisation, cryptographic proofs and economic incentives would form and secure a 
network space that would be beyond the control of authorities. Authority in the meantime had 
taken on a broader meaning, derived from network security models, to include any potential 
aspect of the system that implied trust, and would therefore rely on a potentially corrupt/ible 
human. The project became a promise of a protocol layer with applications that would be 
beyond the control of any human, including the founders themselves. Such an apparatus 
promised an ‘incorruptibility of judgement, often difficult to find’ that ‘comes naturally from a 
disinterested algorithmic interpreter’ [sic] (Wood, 2014a, p. 1). This laid the groundwork for a 
determining agency beyond the control of humans, that I approach and discuss here as an 
algorithmic animism. I do so not to point towards some form of computational superstition but 
in order to work through how that which is beyond control is made sense of, more specifically 
in the ways that the concept of autonomy is reconfigured in and through suggested Ethereum 
applications.  
This section and the second half of this chapter are structured as follows: I first describe the 
Ethereum architecture and the ways in which it generalises concepts in Bitcoin to make them 
operational in a platform intended to run any kind of application, currency or protocol.61 I focus 
in particular on how economic concepts are operationalised for computational purposes, 
                                                       
61 Indeed, the Ethereum platform not only signified the generalisation of blockchain but also a move to platformise 
protocol development, discussed further in chapter 5. 
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drawing economic dynamics deep into the security model and operations of the platform. I 
then discuss how the understanding of trust and trustlessness in the security model of 
decentralised networks lays the ground for specific understandings of autonomy and control, 
shifting these to the non-human and non-human modes of determination, which I discuss in 
relation to two main applications envisioned for Ethereum, namely Smart Contracts and 
Decentralised Autonomous Organisations (DAO). The conjuring of agencies beyond human 
control provoke responses that might reclaim and reassert human control and therefore also 
responsibility. Instead, in the final section, I look to animist readings to sidestep the need for 
control as a basis of responsibility (and with it, ethics and politics). Such animism can and 
does to some degree amongst the Ethereum community suggest the necessity of a non-
human agency operating at scale and along a mathematical logic beyond human reasoning. I 
draw on the idea of the insensible and Barad’s multiple forms of determinacy and the 
indeterminate as a means to counter the necessary expansion of an algorithmic determining 
agency, without reverting to assumptions of the possibility of full knowledge and complete 
control by humans. 
4.2.1  The Ethereum architecture 
 
Ethereum is a project, which attempts to build the generalised technology; technology on 
which all transaction-based state machine concepts may be built. 
– Wood, 2014a, p. 1  
In this short quote from an early Ethereum technical paper, developer and co-founder Wood 
articulates the computing paradigm that the project seeks to realise; namely, to operationalise 
transactions as a means to change the ‘state’ in a decentralised network. Much how mining 
rewards in Bitcoin pays miners to change the state of the records of transactions in the 
network, in Ethereum transactions would fuel a state change expressing any kind of ‘machine 
concept’ (Wood, 2014a). I will explain this in more detail below, but first, in order to get an 
overview, the following table shows some of the main technical differences between Bitcoin 
and Ethereum and the ways in which Ethereum seeks to expand on and generalise the 
Bitcoin system. (The table compares general differences in the architectures of the Bitcoin 
and Ethereum based on their whitepapers). 
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Table 3: comparison of Bitcoin and Ethereum architectures. 
In Ethereum, the blockchain is used not only to manage transactions of the cryptocurrency 
‘ether’ but also for storing data and code for applications and contracts that are run across the 
network of full nodes. These two purposes correspond with two different forms of accounts; 
the first called external accounts that are similar to Bitcoin accounts and controlled through 
Bitcoin Ethereum 
Bitcoin 
A cryptocurrency used as 
speculative asset, store of value, 
payment token and reward for 
mining and payment of transaction 
fees. 
Ether A cryptocurrency used as speculative asset, store of value and payment 
token. 
Gas 
Ether is referred to as ‘gas’ when 
used internally in the Ethereum 
Virtual Machine to pay the gas price 
of executing a given computation.  
Account 
(address) 
An account has an address that is 
associated with a number of bitcoin 
on the blockchain. The account is 
accessed and controlled by a human 
using a cryptographic keypair. 
External 
account 
Has an address and a ‘nonce’ and 
are similar to Bitcoin accounts in that 
they are controlled by a person with a 
cryptographic keypair and can hold 
an amount of Ether.  
Contract 
account 
Has an address, a ‘nonce’, contract 
code and stores data used by the 
contract. It’s held on the blockchain 
(across all full nodes) and can be 
changed by paying the gas price to 
execute the code. Once written, it is 
controlled by its contract code and 
executes when prompted to by 
anyone in the network.  
Transaction 
A person can send bitcoin to another 
person’s bitcoin address by 
accessing their account using a 
private key and signing a hash 
with the next owner’s public key. 
Transaction Similar to bitcoin transactions, a person can send ether to another 
person’s account.  
Message Accounts can send ‘call’ messages to 
contract accounts to execute code.  
Mining Verifies transactions and determines money supply through the rewards 
paid to miners.  
Mining Verifies and executes transactions and contract code and determines 
money supply.  
Blocks Contain verified transactions. Blocks 
Contain verified transactions, as well 
as the ‘state’ of the Ethereum Virtual 
Machine, meaning any changes to 
contracts and new ones that have 
been created. 
Transaction 
fees 
Transactions include fees paid to 
miners for verifying them. When the 
total amounts of bitcoin (21mil) are 
created, this will ensure continued 
‘incentives’ for miners. 
Gas price 
A gas price must be included for each 
computational step required in order 
to execute a contract or transaction 
and is paid to miners for running the 
code.  
Rewards 
Miners receive a reward of a number 
of newly create bitcoin when they 
successfully mine a block. The 
mining reward started at btc50 per 
block and is halved every so often 
until a final cap of 21 million bitcoin 
is in circulation. 
Rewards 
Miners receive a reward of eth3 of 
newly created ether (as of writing), 
and 0.625-2.625 for miners who 
successfully mined but whose blocks 
were not included in the consensus 
chain. A cap on ether supply is set at 
18 million new ether per year. 
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a set of cryptographic keys managed directly by a human owner; and the second, contract 
accounts, that comprise contract code, which, once written and deployed on the blockchain 
operates independently and is run when prompted to, either by other contract accounts or 
other people’s external accounts. External accounts can make ether transactions with each 
other or send messages to contract accounts to run code. Contract accounts can also send 
messages to other contract accounts to run other bits of code independently of external 
accounts, meaning independently of a human-controlled account, by, for example, releasing 
funds when some criteria are met. Contract accounts have several elements not included in 
accounts as conceived in Bitcoin, most notably the contract code and storage that holds any 
data related to the contract. The code held in contract accounts is referred to as Smart 
Contracts and are considered ‘self-executing’ as they are stored in a network beyond the 
control of any individual, and run when prompted to by any external account or even a 
different, non-human controlled contract account. Contract accounts ‘live’ on the blockchain – 
i.e. across the network of full nodes. Any activation of the contract code that requires a 
change in a contract’s stored data entails what is called ‘state transition’, executed by miners 
mining a block and verified by all full nodes. This means that all Smart Contracts and bits of 
code are witnessed and run by all nodes in the network, making for a very inefficient 
computer. This is a brief overview of Ethereum. Below I go into more detail exploring how 
transactions are used to execute code; how this large decentralised computer, although 
hugely inefficient in terms of speed and resources, addresses ‘trust’ and therefore suggests 
an unusual set of possible uses. 
Transaction-based computation  
In a paper outlining the Ethereum technical architecture, co-founder Gavin Wood re-describes 
Bitcoin as a ‘transaction-based state machine’ (Wood, 2014a). The idea was that instead of 
tracking the exchange of value tokens, the blockchain could be conceived as representing the 
‘state’ of the network, and proof-of-work would be the algorithm that determines changes to 
that state; a subtle shift in perspective that foregrounds the blockchain, as representing the 
global state of any data in the network, while reconceiving transactions as the instrument 
for governing changes to the global state. The shift in attention from Bitcoin to the blockchain 
that was taking place more broadly at the time was met with scepticism in parts of the Bitcoin 
community, in part because side-lining Bitcoin in this way was seen as a move to make 
cryptocurrencies less threatening to regulators and financial institutions, but also because for 
those with an intimate understanding of the role of mining for securing the blockchain, there 
simply was no ‘blockchain’ without Bitcoin. The currency was an integral part of the 
consensus and security model. This was not lost on the Ethereum team, and the currency 
aspect continues to play a central role in its architecture, as reflected explicitly in a statement 
by the inventor of Ethereum Vitalik Buterin in an early presentation: ‘in order to have a 
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decentralised data-base, you need to have security, and in order to have security you need to 
have incentives, and you need to have a currency.’62 Value tokens were considered integral 
to the operation of the network because they would be an incentive to run it, keep it secure 
and contribute to its upkeep. This is a significant difference and change to previous 
generations of decentralised technologies, and rests on the idea of currency and value tokens 
as universal incentives. As it turned out, value tokens would not only incentivise security but 
also attacks on the network.  
Ethereum aims at being a ‘generalised technology’ (Wood, 2014a), but it is a generalisation 
founded on a set of very specific ideas from Bitcoin. In Ethereum, price mechanisms and 
monetary incentives are intended to help governing behaviour towards activities beneficial for 
the system, while preventing attacks by making these very expensive, an expansion of the 
idea of Bitcoin mining in which miners receive new coins and/or collect transaction fees once 
they have mined a block. This incentive-based form of network governance is similar to 
Bitcoin, however the architecture of Ethereum deepens and expands this model of incentive-
based network consensus. Protocol design began to incorporate ideas from game theory to 
psychology and economics to help design protocols that would enable certain behaviours 
while making others undesirable or impossible – an ongoing modelling of how people might 
‘game the system’ and how that might be prevented.  
The step-by-step process of a transaction, as defined in the Ethereum whitepaper, looks like 
this: 
1. Check if the transaction is well-formed (i.e. has the right number of 
values), the signature is valid, and the nonce matches the nonce in 
the sender's account. If not, return an error. 
 
2. Calculate the transaction fee as STARTGAS * GASPRICE, and determine 
the sending address from the signature. Subtract the fee from the 
sender's account balance and increment the sender's nonce. If there is 
not enough balance to spend, return an error. 
 
3. Initialise GAS = STARTGAS, and take off a certain quantity of gas per 
byte to pay for the bytes in the transaction. 
 
4. Transfer the transaction value from the sender's account to the 
receiving account. If the receiving account does not yet exist, create 
it. If the receiving account is a contract, run the contract's code 
either to completion or until the execution runs out of gas. 
 
                                                       
62 Vitalik Buterin, 1:49 https://youtu.be/l9dpjN3Mwps 
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5. If the value transfer failed because the sender did not have enough 
money, or the code execution ran out of gas, revert all state changes 
except the payment of the fees, and add the fees to the miner's 
account. 
 
6. Otherwise, refund the fees for all remaining gas to the sender, and 
send the fees paid for gas consumed to the miner. 
– Ethereum whitepaper63 
The Ethereum cryptocurrency, ether, doubles as gas to incentivise computation and prevent 
certain attacks, and transactions double as messages to call a change to the stored data in 
contract accounts. In this sense, transactions are used to ‘fuel’ computation in the Ethereum 
blockchain. In order to facilitate the use of ether as fuel to run computations, the design of the 
Ethereum currency differentiates from the Bitcoin deflationary model (with the absolute cap of 
21 million Bitcoin), instead steadily increasing ether in circulation. ‘We view Bitcoin to be kind 
of like gold, and Ethereum to be more like oil in terms of the economics and how we have 
designed the system’ (Hoskinson, ex-Ethereum developer).64 If an increasing amount of 
computation is to be run on the platform, it requires there to be an increasing amount of ether 
to ‘fuel’ these. One of the curious aspects of the Ethereum architecture is the concept of ‘gas 
price’. The motivation for introducing a gas price was that in order to make the Ethereum 
platform Turing-complete (and thus a generalised platform), there were certain computational 
functions that had to be made possible, including loops.65 Loops, as the name suggest, can 
be written to run infinitely, and can thereby be used to delay or prevent other transactions and 
computation from running by busying miners with infinite loop computations. As a security 
measure against infinite loops, or for that sake any kind of DDoS attack, the concept of gas 
price was introduced, in which each byte has a price that needs to be pre-paid in order to be 
mined and validated, by including a given amount of ether (gas) in the transaction.66 (On a 
more conceptual level, the gas price might therefore be understood as a limit to the Turing-
completeness of the platform). Price mechanisms are used as a way to put limits on the use 
of resources in the network – a concept of using cost for securing decentralised networks that 
can be traced back to Cynthia Dwork and Moni Naor’s 1992 paper suggesting price as a 
means to combat junk mail (Dwork and Naor, 1992), via Back’s Hashcash and proof-of-work 
in Bitcoin. The implications of this were to become very complex as market dynamics were 
integrated deep into protocol designs and inspire a field of research that has been given the 
name ‘cryptoeconomics’ (see 5.2.2). 
                                                       
63 See https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper [accessed 16.11.2016] 
64 See https://youtu.be/hdAnyC45ZbU  
65 In fact, all functions in the Ethereum Virtual Machine effectively run as loops and only stop when they have run out 
of gas.  
66 Gas price is also understood as a mechanism to discourage computational waste and encourage efficient coding.  
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To recap, then, how transactions, computation, state change and the blockchain operate in 
Ethereum: each new block in the Ethereum blockchain represents a state transit ion, i.e. a 
transition from one state of accounts to another. It is mined in a similar way to Bitcoin, using 
the proof-of-work algorithm (with plans to change to what is called proof-of-stake, 
discussed further below). Any computation that changes data associated with accounts 
implies a state transition in the blockchain and costs gas, which is paid to the miner. In other 
words, transactions can either be transactions of ether from one external account to another, 
or ether as ‘gas’ that sparks some contract code, changing its stored data implying a state 
transition in the overall network to be included in the next block to be mined on the blockchain 
and verified by full nodes. A contract account’s code might also be composed, in the Solidity 
language of ‘constants’, which is essentially computation that does not involve any 
changes to the data of a contract (and can therefore be run without the need for mining).67 A 
‘promise’ on the other hand implies computations where there is a change in the data. State 
transitions to any given contract are verified and executed across all full nodes that have 
validated that contract account:  
the process of executing contract code is part of the definition of 
the state transition function, which is part of the block 
validation algorithm, so if a transaction is added into block B the 
code execution spawned by that transaction will be executed by all 
nodes, now and in the future, that download and validate block B. 
– Ethereum whitepaper68  
In order to understand the particular reasoning and attraction of a network where each node 
runs the same computation, essentially operating as a large inefficient network, I need to 
explain the Ethereum Virtual Machine.69 
Ethereum Virtual Machine 
The Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) is how computation is executed in a decentralised 
manner across the network of miners and full nodes. Miners compete to mine blocks 
containing the state transition along with transactions. Full nodes, in a similar manner as in 
Bitcoin, verify blocks, which also entails computing the state transition to check if the results 
submitted by the miner are correct. The miners compete in running a given piece of code, 
                                                       
67 From the blogpost: https://medium.com/zeppelin-blog/the-hitchhikers-guide-to-smart-contracts-in-ethereum-
848f08001f05. 
68 See https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper#blockchain-and-mining 
69 It is worth mentioning here that, similarly to Bitcoin, the concept of ‘each node’ running the computation should be 
qualified, as the network has emergent tendencies and nodes begin to specialise. New techniques, for example 
what’s known as ‘sharding’ are also worked on in order to allow networks to split the workload so to speak, but 
without compromising on the security intentions of decentralisation – namely that no aspect of the network is in 
control. 
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incentivised by receiving transaction fees and gas price, paid to the first miner to execute a 
given computation. Because many miners might be competing to compute the same code, 
which is then computed again and verified by full nodes, the EVM could be understood as a 
hugely inefficient decentralised computer. However, its purpose is not to aggregate computing 
power and create a large supercomputer, but rather to ensure ‘trust’ in a given computation, 
understood in the sense of not relying on a trusted intermediary, but conducting the 
computation again to verify it. It is an unfamiliar mode of thinking about a computer system, 
where efficiency and speed are the usual metrics, but unpacking the histories and motivations 
for this architecture in notions of trust, decentralisation and network security research gives a 
better understanding of the motivation for such a system in which the EVM serves a very 
particular function as a layer that facilitates and secures a particular kind of trust. 
The use of the EVM and the relationship between trust and computation was illustrated to me 
in the following example by a mathematician and Ethereum enthusiast participating in the 
Bitcoin Summer School in Corfu 31st of May 2016: say you wanted to find out the voting 
results in an election. Such a computation, if run on the EVM, would be hugely expensive in 
terms of gas price as you would have to pay for the EVM to run as many computations as 
votes, +1 for each candidate, for each vote cast. Instead of this expensive and inefficient 
method, the question could be written as a Smart Contract promising a reward for the results. 
The computation could then be run by anyone ‘off-chain’ on a person’s local computer, who 
would then submit their results to the Ethereum blockchain. In the case that different people 
submit different results, the EVM can run the computation to determine who submitted the 
correct answer first (who would be rewarded) and punish those who submitted the wrong 
answer, making it expensive for anyone to submit false results. In this sense, the EVM can be 
used as a type of arbiter of last resort, a threat that is only invoked in case of conflicting 
results, or to put it differently, a crisis of trust.70 The intention is that other miners have the 
economic incentive to run the computation locally themselves and check if this is in fact the 
correct answer because they can reap the reward if it is incorrect, and on the other hand 
anyone submitting a false result runs the risk of paying for the full computation by the EVM. 
The applications of Smart Contracts and the use of the EVM are therefore of a particular kind 
addressing, specifically, questions of trust and truth in the form of calculability, insurance and 
rewards. In the following I go into a few more of the intended uses of Ethereum and how a 
particular network security understanding and concern for ‘trust’ would lay the ground for 
contracts and organisations that are intended to be beyond human control and determinacy. 
                                                       
70 Note that whoever submits the computation to be solved might want to submit their own answer to the computation, 
to avoid zero answers and therefore having to pay for the EVM to compute all the computation loops. 
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4.2.2  Non-human determinacy  
This is the difference between me and Mark Zuckerberg. I live in a world where I presume that I 
could be a potential adversary to the system. 
– Vitalik Buterin, interviewed by Hans Ulrich Obrist, 201871  
As Buterin describes in the quote above, the core of the proposition of the Ethereum platform 
was the idea of ‘trustlessness’ that the system is secure and runs autonomously, even from 
the inventor himself. With Ethereum, the blockchain was no longer envisioned as the 
architecture for a new type of currency but ‘generalised’ to be able to run any type of 
computation. The importance of Bitcoin had shifted to represent the possibility of an 
apparatus that would organise a decentralised network without the need to resort to authority. 
The idea of authority tends to refer to some powerful corporate, financial or state entity that 
looks to control the networks for censorship, sanctions, surveillance and control. But in 
decentralised systems design, authority takes on a slightly different and expanded meaning, 
namely referring to any potential aspect of the system that the system as a whole is 
dependent on. This, from a security perspective, makes sense, because if there is any part of 
the system that it as a whole depends on, this can, in turn, be a target for such external 
authority. It, in the meantime, gave rise to a particular idea of trust and trustlessness that 
centred on the corruptibility of human judgment in general. No aspect of the system should be 
fully trusted and no human relied upon. This connected ideas of censorship-resistance and 
anti-authoritarian efforts with the idea of the necessity for a system beyond the control of 
humans. In the meantime, such ways of thinking about and designing ‘trust’ (see the EVM 
example above) in protocol and application design were highly unusual in terms of more 
general applications, without very clear use-cases. In order to give some sense of what this 
new platform might be used for, inventor of Ethereum, Vitalik Buterin, in his launch 
presentation, outlined three potential areas of experimentation and development: 
decentralised applications (dApps), Smart Contracts (originally articulated by Szabo, 1997) 
and Distributed Autonomous Organisations (DAO).72 Here I discuss some of these 
applications and their motivations. 
Unstoppable applications and Smart Contracts 
On the landing page of the Ethereum platform, the tagline was ‘build unstoppable 
applications’ (see fig. 4 below). By ‘unstoppable applications’, what is meant is that the 
decentralised application is hosted and run on a network and can therefore not be controlled 
or shut down by any single actor or authority. The idea of decentralised applications (dApps) 
                                                       
71 See https://tankmagazine.com/issue-74/features/vitalik-buterin/  
72 See https://youtu.be/l9dpjN3Mwps  
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is to ‘disintermediate’ the running of online applications such that they are not run from any 
single server but instead are run across the network. The idea followed that this had the 
potential to disrupt existing platform services, like Facebook, AirBnB or Uber, and make it 
possible to instead operate and remunerate such services in a decentralised manner. The 
understanding of and reasoning for this particular kind of disruption are discussed in-depth in 
Chapter 5, while here I discuss how such ideas are sought to be realised in protocol designs. 
 
Figure 4. ‘Build unstoppable applications.’ Screenshot of Ethereum landing page, August 2017. 
The expansion of the remit of blockchain in Bitcoin from currency systems to any potential 
application on the basis of decentralisation suggested the possibility of resolving the role of 
authority in other affairs, and Ethereum sought to address, in particular, law and governance. 
The programming language of the platform is described as ‘contract-oriented language’ and 
code run on the platform is generally understood and referred to as contracts being executed, 
an explicit reference to and further instantiation of the notion that ‘code is law’ (Lessig, 1999). 
In order to run a decentralised Uber, for example, there would need to be a way to specify 
and enforce terms of use without resorting to an ‘intermediating authority’. Smart Contracts 
would be the solution: the contracts are written in code and therefore immediately executing 
without the need for external enforcement after the fact, and the contract code is held in the 
network and therefore cannot be tampered with or be modified after the fact. The ‘Smart’ in a 
Smart Contracs refers to the notion that the contract is self-executing, and it is so on the basis 
of that it executes on the decentralised network whenever it is prompted to, by either a 
person, or another contract account, sending it ‘gas’. Once written and deployed, it executes 
exactly as written, regardless of human intent or attempted control, including that of the 
original author. The ‘contracts’ aspect of Smart Contracts is essentially a re-conceptualisation 
of computational code. It is a conceptualisation that has significant effect in that calling bits of 
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code ‘contracts’ immediately directs attention and efforts towards the development of 
particular types of functionality in which relationships are primarily understood and encoded 
as contractual and transactional.73 The Ethereum Smart Contract coding language is called 
Solidity, an example of which looks like this:74  
pragma solidity ^0.4.0; 
contract Counter { 
 int private count = 0; 
 function incrementCounter() public { 
  count += 1; 
 } 
 function decrementCounter() public { 
  count -= 1; 
 } 
 function getCount() public constant returns (int) { 
  return count; 
 } 
} 
 – Gerald Nash, counter Smart Contract75  
The contract code here specifies the type of contract, namely a counter, and that the 
counter contract has three functions: incrementCounter that increments by 1; 
decrementCounter that subtracts 1; and getCount which returns the total count at any 
given time. On its own this is not the most useful contract (and as mentioned in the example 
describing the EVM above, it is not either the most effective way of counting in the network 
given that each increment needs to be paid for). However, it gives a sense of the kinds of 
contract building blocks and the accessibility of the Solidity syntax. It is relatively easy to write 
and deploy contracts and there are well-documented guides and introductions that non-
developers can also follow. The more difficult aspect is understanding what particular use-
cases might benefit from being run in a decentralised manner and through such notions of 
trust, contracts and transactions; how to achieve an aim in the most efficient way given that 
each computation has a gas price; to understand the relations between clusters of Smart 
Contracts, their implications beyond those contractual relations; and to ensure that these are 
actually secure. Once deployed on the Ethereum blockchain it is near impossible to reverse 
or change what has been written. This is a core feature of the platform, part of what makes 
dApps ‘unstoppable’, Smart Contracts ‘self-executing’ and, as explained below, Decentralised 
                                                       
73 This is part of a broader effort in coding communities to develop languages that are closer to human languages to 
encourage more engagement and literacy in how things are developed. So in addition to Solidity, Ethereum is also 
using a ‘natural specification format’ to clarify what is triggered by different aspects of Smart Contracts. See 
https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Ethereum-Natural-Specification-Format  
74 See https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/develop/  
75 From https://gist.github.com/aunyks/22be27444d6a9a91d2305c2ea2e2f7e8  
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Autonomous Organisations ‘autonomous’. As it turned out, not being able to modify contracts 
can have severe implications (explored at length in Chapter 6) and be tricky for many uses, 
requiring other layers of more editable elements (discussed in Chapter 5). 
The idea of Smart Contracts predates Ethereum and Bitcoin. Their initial articulation is 
assigned to Nick Szabo and a blogpost he wrote in 1997, The Idea of Smart Contracts.76 
Szabo also outlined a dedicated Smart Contracts language in 2002 that ‘models the dynamics 
of contract performance – when and under what conditions obligations should be performed.’ 
Contract-oriented languages tend to prioritise clarity such that people can understand the 
contractual relations and what conditions might trigger which aspects of the contract. But 
contract-oriented languages, and the obligations and conditions that are envisioned, tend to 
prioritise a certain type of contractual relations, often related to securing property and 
determining access. Already in the initial conceptualisation of Smart Contracts in 1997, Szabo 
uses the example of a lock to demonstrate the potential uses and a set of contractual 
relations determining payment conditions for a car:  
we've gone from a crude security system to a reified contract:  
(1) A lock to selectively let in the owner and exclude third 
parties; 
(2) A back door to let in the creditor;  
(3a) Creditor back door switched on only upon non-payment for a 
certain period of time; and  
(3b) The final electronic payment permanently switches off the 
back door.  
 
– Szabo, 1997 
It is not a coincidence that many examples of practical uses of Smart Contracts, and in fact 
the very first Ethereum-based company, Slock.it, focused on connecting physical locks to the 
platform to use Smart Contract to determine criteria of access.77 Cryptography is a technology 
for determining access; initially, access to messages with the aim of securing and verifying 
these and ensuring privacy of communications. With Bitcoin, messages implied transactions, 
and cryptography became primarily a means to secure property. If indeed Ethereum was to 
facilitate decentralised versions of AirBnB, Uber and so on, then there would need to be some 
way of extending code as law to physical space. Founded by three previous Ethereum 
developers, the company Slock.it produces blockchain-based applications for managing 
things to ‘Rent, sell or share anything – without middlemen.’ (Slock.it, 2016) The company 
combines developments in the Internet-of-Things with Ethereum Smart Contracts in order to 
                                                       
76 See 
http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOTwinterschool2006/szabo.best.vw
h.net/idea.html  
77 https://slock.it/  
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realise the promises of Smart Contracts beyond a purely digital realm. In order for the claims 
of Smart Contracts to hold true as self-executing in relation to physical relations and property 
required some further effort and elaboration, combining ‘smart property’ with Ethereum Smart 
Contracts, so that, for example, a lock determining access to a physical space or thing might 
be unlocked through an ether transfer from one account to the other.78 In order for Ethereum 
to realise the promise of trustlessness, to be a platform without authority, it would need to be 
beyond the control of humans who might otherwise be corruptible and therefore require some 
mediation. This notion runs through the envisioned uses and application of the platform such 
that dApps and Smart Contracts would also run beyond anyone’s control, determined and 
executed in a decentralised manner through code. Such an ‘disinterested algorithmic 
interpreter’ (Wood, 2014a, p. 1) would also have to be able to operate in the physical realm in 
order for many applications to make sense, and would therefore require the expansion into 
locks and physical objects, in the meantime giving rise to the idea of things that own 
themselves. Otherwise the execution and enforcement of Smart Contracts would once again 
depend on external, human-based authorities. What I have described here is the way that the 
idea of trustless systems, once generalised, demanded an expansion of such non-human, 
algorithmic modes of determinacy in order to remain consistent with the vision of resolving the 
need for authority through a generalised, ‘transaction-based state machine’ (Wood, 2014a). 
The idea of ‘trustlessness’ had in this sense, through its generalisation, laid the ground for the 
need for such things as Smart Contracts and unstoppable applications that would operate 
autonomously from humans. This, in the meantime, also necessitated expansions of such 
algorithmic modes of determining relationships and access to physical objects and an 
increasing number of relationships in order to hold true. This also inspired the idea of entire 
organisations and corporations formed on the same basis of ‘trustlessness’. 
Decentralised Autonomous Organisations (DAO) 
Historically, corporations have only been able to act through people (or through corporate 
entities that were themselves ultimately controlled by people). This presents two simple 
and fundamental problems. Whatever a private contract or public law require: (1) people 
do not always follow the rules and (2) people do not always agree what the rules actually 
require.  
…While bad behaviour may make a corporation or its management civilly or criminally 
liable, punishment can come as little comfort to an investor who has already lost their 
money. 
– DAO whitepaper, Christoph Jentzsch, 2016  
                                                       
78 See http://szabo.best.vwh.net/formalize.html and Szabo, 1997 for early definitions of Smart Contracts. 
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This brief quote from a whitepaper by Ethereum developer and co-founder Christoph 
Jenztsch neatly captures the problems that an Ethereum DAO contract is supposed to solve, 
namely rules (Smart Contracts) that execute as written, independently of any person’s 
individual will or control (solving the ‘problem’ of people not following or disagreeing with the 
interpretation of rules), and the splitDAO function, allowing investors to take their funds with 
them to a new DAO if they disagree with the direction taken – solutions and interpretations of 
problems that were to turn out hugely problematic when put into practice. Here I briefly 
explain how a DAO is intended to function, a further attempt at operationalising ideas of 
‘autonomous’ as meaning beyond human control, which also lays the technical ground for 
understanding how things went wrong in the first ever explicit attempt at a DAO (see 6.2.2). 
A Decentralised Autonomous Organisation (DAO) is made up of a cluster of Smart Contracts. 
DAOs are meant to run according to a set of pre-written functions, rules and operations, 
independently of which humans or interests might otherwise interpret or try and change it. 
While there exists varying perspectives of what a DAO might or should be, with some 
suggesting that Bitcoin itself is already a DAO, the most comprehensive definition and 
practical instantiation to date is presented in the Ethereum DAO contract code 
(https://github.com/slockit/DAO), based on a whitepaper by Slock.it co-founder Christoph 
Jentzsch, (Jentzsch, 2016). Another extension of the notion that Bitcoin presented a 
decentralised resolution of authority, the focus here was on governance and the possibility of 
incorruptible governing protocol by ensuring that the governance rules could not be tampered 
with.79 The idea is that organisational governance can be fully automated and the motivation 
for this is to solve the issue that Jentzsch lays out in the quote above – ‘people do not always 
follow the rules’ and ‘people do not always agree what the rules actually require’ (2016). This 
reasoning, in which disobedience and varied interpretation are understood as a problem to be 
solved through concise and automated code, has since The DAO whitepaper been widely 
problematised through experiences of implementations as well as research (cf. Levy, 2017) 
reminding the community that vagueness is a very useful feature of law and organisational 
management, allowing for these to function in the face of contingencies and unforeseen 
events.  
The meanings of the words ‘decentralised’, ‘autonomous’ and ‘organisations’, while conjuring 
all sorts of political and ethical positions, are in fact actualised in quite specific ways in the 
architecture. It is important therefore to unpack what aspects of the architecture these 
concepts relate to and describe. ‘Decentralisation’ refers to the fact that the organisational 
rules are deployed and enforced on the Ethereum blockchain and run by the EVM, meaning a 
network of ‘disinterested’ nodes that run the computation associated with the DAO on the 
                                                       
79 This tendency was to inspire statements such as Vinay Gupta’s ‘state in a box’, see http://guptaoption.com/4.SIAB-
ISA.php and projects such as Bitnation, see https://tse.bitnation.co/.  
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basis of financial reward. This is quite different from, say, decentralisation in the sense of 
people organising amongst themselves to take decisions in as a group rather than by one 
person. The notion of an organisation being ‘autonomous’ refers to the idea that the cluster of 
Smart Contracts sit on the decentralised network and executes as written without any person 
being able to modify it. It essentially means autonomy from the interpretation and control by 
any single human. Again, a very different understanding of autonomy than the idea of, say, 
political autonomy in which a group take control over and determine their own political 
processes and spaces. This is complicated by the fact that Ethereum does to some extent 
also address ambitions of political autonomy, being able to assemble and determine, as a 
group, one’s own rules and processes by making the writing of rules accessible, their 
deployment forceful and secure. However, the idea of ‘organisation’ is also quite specific, 
determined on the basis of particular interactions and relations that do not resonate with many 
other forms of groups and associations: in DAOs, people engage with the organisation as 
either a token holder, which is very similar to a shareholder; as a contractor, which means 
you perform work that is commissioned by the DAO; or as the DAO curator, which has the 
responsibility to maintain the list of addresses that can receive ether from the DAO (as 
contractors, for example, or as returns on investment for token holders).  
The main contract is called ‘DAO’. It defines the inner workings of The DAO and it derives the 
member variables and functions from ’Token’ and ’TokenCreation’. Token defines the inner 
workings of The DAO Token and Token-Creation defines how The DAO token is created by 
fuelling The DAO with ether.  
– Jentzsch, 2016, p. 3 
Tokens were initially intended as one of the building blocks of DAOs. Tokens in blockchain 
and cryptocurrency projects more generally have come to be understood primarily as 
speculative assets and a means to raise funds to start a new project (see ‘Initial Coin 
Offerings’). But these were always also intended as a governance mechanism, inspired by 
their use for incentivising network contribution in Bitcoin mining, and representing both voting 
rights and a stake in decisions. The relationship between tokens, value, stakes and behaviour 
form a field that has been given the name cryptoeconomics (see 5.2.2). The focus is how the 
design and engineering of tokens in protocols might produce different security properties and 
is used for the development of new consensus algorithms. A DAO, as outlined in the 
whitepaper, was to operate as follows: first there is a DAO ‘creation phase’ in which anyone 
can purchase a token in the DAO by sending ether to the DAO contract account. Tokens 
represent a type of stake or share in The DAO, granting both voting rights as well as share in 
potential profits made by any work done for the DAO by contractors. A DAO cannot do 
much on the Ethereum Virtual Machine without ether and so the creation phase provides the 
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DAO account with funds to execute contracts. The ether is held in the DAO contract account, 
with the idea that the contract account on the blockchain guarantees the security of the funds 
independently of any special interest as it is governed purely by the contract account held in 
the decentralised network and therefore beyond the control of any one person. Token holders 
can freely trade their tokens on the Ethereum blockchain. Because the DAO itself cannot 
‘build a product, write code or develop hardware’, it needs to hire humans to do so.80 A 
person or group can submit a proposal to the DAO to become a ‘contractor’  and perform a 
task or piece of work. Contractors can be fired or replaced at any time by the DAO token 
holders through a voting process.81  
The ambition of a generalised system beyond control keeps coming up against problems of 
how to interface with various non-algorithmically-determined conditions. Human meddling as 
well as new institutional forms keep creeping back in, and in the designs of Decentralised 
Autonomous Organisations this becomes painfully visible with the role of what has been 
named curators.82 In order to secure the DAO from attacks by, for example, contractors 
submitting arbitrary proposals, the position of a ‘curator’ has been defined. The curator alone 
decides who can receive funds from the DAO by maintaining a whitelist of approved 
accounts. (It is worth repeating here that this description is based on the 2016 whitepaper by 
Jentszch and so should not be read as the current state of DAO development.) The curator 
comes close to being an authority, deciding which addresses can or cannot be paid to. This is 
resolved in two ways: the curator can be replaced following a two-step voting process in the 
DAO, and the voting process allows for the minority to potentially ‘split’ if unhappy with the 
result of the vote, taking their own ether stakes with them in a new DAO. The splitDAO 
function is an important aspect of the design, which was to have all sorts of ramifications, and 
is symptomatic of how differences more generally tends to be dealt with, both of which are 
discussed at length in Chapter 6. It also draws on another emphasis in the type of anti-
authoritarianism in blockchain, namely voluntary involvement, whereby people contribute as 
and where they want to but also have the freedom to leave.83 Decision-making is distributed 
and enforced by the contract code across a number of tokens and token holders, so that ‘(1) 
participants maintain direct real-time control of contributed funds and (2) governance rules are 
formalised, automated and enforced using software.’ The ether funds of the DAO are in this 
sense under the control of token holders, but they are not able to modify the operations of the 
DAO as this is enshrined in what is advertised as immutable contract code on the blockchain. 
Another unresolved interface in terms of trustless architectures and algorithmic determinacy 
comes up in the use of Smart Contracts. In order for, say, a Smart Contract to release funds 
                                                       
80 See https://www.ethereum.org/dao  
81 For a full description of how a DAO might operate, see: https://medium.com/@BlockByBlock/the-decentralised-
autonomous-organization-dao-5e80cfe8c993#.zbcei3c0m and https://daohub.org  
82 See https://daohub.org/curator.html  
83 So-called ‘voluntarysm’ is one of the main aspects of a particular branch of US-based anarcho-capitalism 
subscribed to by amongst others one of the more famous Bitcoin entrepreneurs Roger Ver. 
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when certain conditions are met, this requires input of some sort. The sources of such 
external input are called Oracles and can be either a human or things like APIs and other 
external data feeds; a frequently mentioned example is the use of the BBC weather data feed 
for an insurance Smart Contract.84 This example points to the limits of claims of trustlessness 
and disintermediation. In this case, even if the Ethereum blockchain could be considered 
entirely trustless, trust is nevertheless placed in the BBC weather data feed, entailing, indeed, 
again a reliance on a trusted third-party authority. Even if cryptographic proofs, the blockchain 
and cryptoeconomic systems might be considered entirely trustless then, the more such 
systems seek to incorporate into algorithmic modes of determinacy, the more surface is 
opened up to interface with all kinds of human and non-human sensibilities.  
4.2.3  Non-human aff init ies 
References to imperfect, unpredictable, potentially corrupt ‘mushy humans’ resonate from 
Bitcoin throughout aspects of Ethereum, as a project to realise a general platform whereby no 
human would be trusted or able to control it. It gave rise to a very particular notion of 
autonomy of the system, expanded through Smart Contracts to ideas of the DAO. Such 
ambitions are made to matter by for example making contract accounts on the Ethereum 
network able to ‘call’ functions in other contract accounts without the need for human 
prompting. As clusters of Smart Contracts and DAOs expand and interact with each other, 
systems of automated processes might set in motion in ways that can potentially develop way 
beyond immediate oversight and understanding of humans, and in ways that, in theory, would 
be unstoppable. These ambitions also provoked speculation about what might happen when 
cryptographically unbreakable, self-executing blockchain systems might be wielded by a 
future artificial intelligence. From the very beginning of Ethereum there was therefore a giddy 
self-conscious excitement about possibly creating an unstoppable algorithmic authority, 
questioning whether the platform represented a ‘freenet or Skynet’ (Filippi, 2014).85 So far, 
actual implementations have turned out to be more mundane, looking towards efficiency 
gains of automating aspects of contracts and payments, and not quite able to fully sever the 
ties to the mush the insensible and indeterminate. Yet there are tendencies in the community 
that actively strive towards such a realisation of a system with its own agency. The rationale 
is in part that such an agency might provide a form of governance, legal and economic 
substrate that would be more rational and objective than any human or human-based system 
might. This disinterested algorithmic substrate would facilitate all manner of rules, currencies, 
organisations, differences and projects, and in this sense be beyond the political, because it 
would be able to facilitate any kind of systems design. At other times, such perspectives of 
                                                       
84 New companies are springing up to serve this market of feeding dApps with data, amongst others Oraclize 
http://www.oraclize.it.  
85 Skynet refers to the AI group mind in the Terminator films that gained self-awareness and decided to eliminate 
humanity after concluding that humans will inevitably want to shut it down.  
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algorithmic mediator take more sinister forms, arguing for why an agency constructed through 
mathematics and markets represents a necessary and inevitable evolutionary stage and the 
possible extinction of human beings as a result.86  
Here, in particular, I want to draw in the cut of the insensible in order to disentangle and 
suggest a different ground for debate. When faced with such notions of the necessity of an 
algorithmic determining agency it is tempting to react by reasserting human responsibility, 
control and oversight. Yusoff, in her discussion of the insensible and the extinction of forms of 
life that are beyond sensibility, raises the question of the possibility of a response and 
responsibility towards that which has not been sensed, has not made itself matter to a 
specific sensibility. I want to argue that such a perspective might be valid and helpful for 
understanding not only forms of biological or mineral life beyond sensibilities, but also 
algorithmic agencies. To further expand on this, I will draw in what is perhaps an unusual take 
on ideas of AI and autonomous systems, namely animism. I want to suggest that 
anthropological studies of animism might provide some helpful ways of construing non-human 
aliveness in techno-scientific fields too. Studies of animism intersect in interesting ways with 
new materialism debates about how the material world ‘matters’ in ways that exceed 
assumptions of mute objects for the manipulation of humans. These imply that the ‘aliveness’ 
and forms of autonomy that are ascribed to such systems do not have to be fully adopted as 
inevitable (nor even necessarily important) but neither dismissed as speculative fantasy (and 
thereby assuming full control and agency with humans). Anthropological accounts of animism 
have since the ‘90s sought to re-describe animist practices in an attempt is to understand 
how ‘aliveness’ might be understood in specific ways and make sense within particular 
practices and contexts (Bird-David, 1999; Ingold, 2000, 2011). The emphasis is placed on 
relations and agency understood as exerting a particular force, mattering by literally making a 
material difference to a people or person. The specifics matter; this storm, this tree, this rock 
is related to as a being, because these have exerted some force putting them into relation 
with a person or a group. There is a relationship of some kind, whether malicious or not, and it 
therefore matters. This also means that what matters does not rely on some general 
description (not all storms, trees or rocks matter or are ‘alive’), but is contextual (importantly 
for networked technologies, contextual here should not assume ‘locality’ necessarily).  
Reading the form of autonomy implied in the ambition of Ethereum Smart Contracts and 
DAOs through these ideas is helpful in several ways. Firstly, it avoids the necessity to counter 
the idea of autonomous systems by insisting on human control and complete knowledge. 
Human control and complete overview of algorithmic systems are strenuous claims. Large 
                                                       
86 I met such perspectives from individuals at meet-ups and developers’ conferences in conversation. In some ways it 
is the logical extension of the idea of ‘mushy humans’, some going so far as to say that if some person was not able 
to effectively engage with blockchain systems and markets, they were of an inferior genetic strand that should 
probably die out.  
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network systems, and the operations of algorithms, indeed comprise elements that are 
beyond the immediate control, oversight and comprehension (Seaver, 2014; Amoore, 2015; 
Burrell, 2015). (And that therefore imply already existing practices of working with that which 
is beyond modelling and certainty). Secondly, the insensible and an animist understanding of 
relational aliveness also suggests that the affinities and relationships that are formed do not 
necessarily follow human versus machine narratives that tend to dominate imaginations for 
how autonomous systems might play out. To close off this chapter, then, I would like to 
expand a bit more on this second point and explain how recognising such affinities that cut 
across assumed lines between humans and ‘the rest’, along with the concept of the 
insensible, help to counter deterministic reasoning about the most appropriate agency of 
control, whether human or machinic.  
The promise of an algorithmic, neutral determining sensibility that can be known, with 
mathematical certainty, to have certain properties, is simultaneously a promise of radical 
uncertainty, a machine necessarily beyond control, out of control. Operating beyond control 
suggests a particular ‘aliveness’ of an algorithmic determining agency, which then at the 
same time becomes necessary for the project of establishing a generalised, trustless 
platform. The two justify each other: a determining agency founded on indisputable proof 
cannot be controlled by any other agency or it would necessarily be tainted. In the 
engineering of a deterministic system, there is an awareness of aspects of the system, in 
particular how it plays out in practice that cannot be fully predicted or controlled. This is also 
the exact moment at which this aspect of being out of control conjures a certain ‘aliveness’ 
from this thing that is being built, a force that begins to shape aspects of the world that is not 
under direct command. This is all fine and well, and importantly, there are corrections; tuning, 
maintenance and changes that take place in the engineering of systems and protocols such 
that they begin to align more with the desired intentions and sensibilities. In fact, such tuning, 
corrections and maintenance reveal much of the desired intentions of such systems in ways 
that do point towards responsibility. But there is another problem, namely the necessity for the 
deterministic properties of such systems to be presented as universally mattering. The 
particular autonomy that is often articulated in Ethereum and Bitcoin is one that assumes 
universality on the basis of neutral mathematical determinacy. The autonomy and agency of 
Smart Contracts and DAOs might be considered real enough, in that aspects of these are 
indeed being built and might very well determine some things and act as a force in some 
people’s lives. And yet, drawing on a perspective of aliveness from animism, such claims of 
aliveness do not allow for universal demands that this thing matters. From an animist 
perspective, and indeed from a radical Baradian interpretation, what matters depends on the 
sensibility that makes it matter, so to speak. And such sensibilities are not singular and 
universal, but rather multiple and, as Yusoff points out, also insensible (2013a). Drawing in 
Barad, blockchain might be considered one mode of determinacy amongst many in an 
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ongoing relationship with a field of indeterminate potential. This particular mode of 
determinacy matters significantly to some, but in no way has to be made to matter for others. 
The argument I am making then, is primarily a philosophical basis for the particularity of any 
algorithmic determining agency, as a prerequisite for assessing its particular qualities and 
assigning a rather limited role for such. 
 
4.3  Conclusions 
I titled this chapter A politics for the insensible in order to, on the one hand, point towards the 
importance of that which is not sensed as mattering by and in the development of a given 
determining apparatus, whether based on cryptographic proofs or otherwise. By suggesting a 
politics for the insensible, I want to make matter the haunting awareness that there is a limit to 
any given sensibility, whether constructed out of cryptographic proofs or algorithms trawling 
through and evolving in vast datascapes or otherwise, such that insensible aspects and 
beings might never make themselves matter to particular sensibilities. If the insensible is 
taken seriously, the unknown does not justify necessary expansion of a form of reasoning 
operating at larger scales, but instead becomes a reason for humility and limits. Such 
spaciousness, an ‘affirmative action for the formless’ (Yusoff, 2013a, p. 224), allows for 
affinities that cross human, machinic and otherwise non-human in ways that to some degree 
are already taking place but tend to be overlooked in attempts at making universal claims. 
Yusoff argues, in the context of her work on the anthropocene that ‘human’ as a category is 
historically fraught, and that indeed humans have been treated as resources to be extracted. 
This suggests that affinities and categories of ‘human’, ‘nature’ and ‘machine’ cross each 
other when it comes to questions and struggles over what matters. On the other hand, it 
suggests a more conscious articulation of those affinities, instead of assuming at each turn 
that ‘humanity’ as a whole is ever fully mobilised on one side or the other (for humans, against 
the machine or for the machine, against humans). Instead, with the help of Barad and Yusoff, 
I suggest a differentiation between, on the one hand, forms of blockchain assemblages that 
conjure the necessity of a singular organising principle and, on the other, those that 
acknowledge the limits to modes of determinacy – allowing a spaciousness for other forms of 
determinacy, for that which has not yet been sensed as mattering, and indeed the insensible 
that might never make itself matter.  
In this chapter, I have described the Bitcoin protocol and the way in which it operationalises 
cryptographic proofs, decentralisation and economic incentives in order to suggest a method 
for determining consensus across a computational network. I have discussed how such a 
cryptographic mode of determinacy is proposed to resolve issues of ‘trust’, by replacing 
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human determinacy with that of a trustless consensus algorithm based on cryptographic proof 
– which, in the meantime, construes humans as necessarily subjective and untrustworthy, 
and cryptographic proofs as objective, the foundation for a trustless system. A Baradian 
approach does not necessitate one or the other to be the most neutral or objective and so 
instead of entering into a debate about whether human or cryptographic modes of 
determinacy are most appropriate in absolute terms, I describe and discuss necessary limits 
of a cryptographic mode of determinacy and the ways in which it construes other forms of 
determinacy as not mattering. I then describe and discuss the way the Bitcoin architecture, 
when deployed, has emergent dynamics whereby some of the claims of decentralisation and 
trustlessness come under strain, requiring maintenance and correction, once again pointing to 
the inseparability a ‘pure’ system from ‘mushy humans’.  
In the second half of the chapter I described the Ethereum protocol and intentions to make 
the Bitcoin architecture Turing-complete; a generalised platform for any computation. By 
extending the Bitcoin architecture, the Ethereum platform also extends ideas of non-human 
determinacy, which also brings with it a particular understanding of autonomy, namely as 
aspects of the system that would be beyond human control. Decentralisation and 
trustlessness is operationalised in order to achieve a form of autonomous execution of code 
in what are called Smart Contracts, and as autonomous organisational forms in Decentralised 
Autonomous Organisations. I discuss this suggested autonomy through ideas from 
anthropological studies of animism as a way to contextualise ‘aliveness’ and autonomy. I do 
this in order to suggest that instead of countering such ideas of autonomy by placing control 
and oversight back in the hands of humans, which to some degree cannot be taken for 
granted given both the emergent dynamics of network systems and algorithmic execution, 
that aliveness might be considered relational in these circumstances too. This means that a 
given networked system or algorithm might indeed be considered ‘alive’ and that there are 
indeed affinities between such systems and some humans, but that this is an expression of 
what matters for this particular community of people. It is a way in which to make such 
relationships specific, such that they can be discussed in their actual limited form, rather than 
assumed to have larger relevance as an abstract question of human versus algorithmic 
determinacy. With these architectures, protocols and forms of determinacy in mind, in the 
next chapter I trace these particular understandings of the concepts of decentralisation, trust 
and autonomy back to pre-Bitcoin histories of network technology in order to articulate the 
specific sensibility they are an expression of.  
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5  Blockchain sensibil i t ies 
In this chapter, I trace through events, experiences and histories of decentralised network 
technologies in order to describe what has given rise to a blockchain sensibility – sensibilities 
that indeed hold a blockchain assemblage together as a recognisable field. By sensibility, I 
refer to a general understanding, assumption and feeling for what matters in the assemblage, 
the tacit understandings of what is good or not, desirable or not. (The most obvious example 
of which is that ‘decentralisation’ is good and ‘centralisation’ is bad). The way I employ this 
notion of the sensible draws on Rancière’s theories of the political as a ‘redistribution of the 
sensible’ (2010, pp.27-44) and Barad’s onto-epistemology, whereby sensibilities, what is 
considered to matter and how it matters, in turn become part of a process of materialising 
new things (2007). The onto-epistemological cut that I draw, using this understanding of the 
sensible, is one that is concerned with the ‘disruption’ to existing sensibilities proposed by 
Bitcoin, Ethereum and blockchain and what came to matter for these assemblages in the 
process. Blockchain technology is described as a disruptive technology. But the question is 
what exactly makes blockchain ‘disruptive’. Legal scholar Herian argues that blockchain 
should not be considered disruptive because projects have been brought in and play out well 
within the rules of existing capitalism (Herian, 2016). While I do not exactly argue against 
Herian’s assessment, in the following I look to draw out and expand on what might be missing 
from this assessment: the diversity of already existing political and economic possibilities. I do 
this through a reworking of Gibson-Graham’s notions of diverse economies (Gibson-Graham, 
2008). Gibson-Graham propose a shift in attention, from a mode of analysis concerned 
primarily with capitalist advancement to instead give space and importance to already existing 
non-capitalist economic practices and the ways in which this diversity might be supported and 
expanded. Only if one addresses the world as entirely comprised and determined through 
capitalist relations does ‘disruption’ pertain only to projects explicitly articulated as anti-
capitalist. In the attempt to draw out a blockchain sensibility, then, I make use of the notion of 
diverse economies firstly to open up a history and description that does not centre on 
questions of capitalism, but instead take seriously the ways in which blockchain has attracted 
people with a very diverse range of political and economic ideas. My main aim is to explain 
this, which, as it turns out, also effectively explains the ways in which capitalist tendencies, 
financial instruments and indeed technologies of state and legal institutions themselves are 
replicated in and through blockchain technologies in ways that simultaneously seek to disrupt 
these. In short, what matters to the blockchain assemblage is not exactly capitalism or anti-
capitalism as such, but rather questions of decentralisation and centralisation that intersect 
with capitalism in certain ways, but are nevertheless operationalised through lived experience 
and an affinity with network computation.  
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The diverse economies approach is also helpful for opening up a sensibility within the 
blockchain assemblage, shifting the sensibility from the assumption of internal systems 
coherence to focus instead on the dependencies and relationships with other economic 
spaces. There is a tendency, from both within blockchain communities and more generally, to 
address blockchain projects and protocols in a hermetic manner, assuming that these can be 
assessed on their own terms. In the meantime, the significance of blockchain projects are 
always in relation to existing systems, not only because, just as everything else, they play out 
‘in the world’, but more importantly because their very designs involve already existing 
economic systems. The field of cryptoeconomics is the most glaring example, whereby 
economic dynamics are incorporated into protocol designs in very direct ways, exchange 
rates being the most immediate. Exchange rates, for example, are rarely addressed as an 
explicit and deliberate condition of a protocol design, and are instead treated as an 
unfortunate side effect. A diverse economies approach suggests a shift in attention from 
assessing blockchain projects and protocols as hermetic systems, to instead focus on the 
interrelationships with other economic spaces and dynamics – not as a side effect, but as a 
lasting condition. This also counters ideas of blockchain systems presenting a wholesale 
replacement of existing systems, and instead acknowledging that, at best, they might present 
possibilities for some radical reconfiguration and, at worst, simply another layer of complexity 
to the already complex interrelationships of financial, political and digital systems.  
The chapter is structured as follows: I first trace the particular understandings of one of the 
primary concepts in blockchain, namely decentralisation, through to earlier histories of 
decentralised network technology. By doing this I am able to articulate the more precise and 
particular understandings of decentralisation in operation in blockchain, namely as a strategy 
and a set of experiences of circumventing authorities through specific network architectures in 
the ‘90s and ‘00s. I then describe how these network strategies resonated more broadly with 
the launch of Bitcoin in the context of the financial crisis and the Wikileaks banking blockade, 
arguing that these contexts gave a new and broader meaning to this particular 
operationalisation of the concept of decentralisation. I argue that the sensibility of blockchain, 
in terms of what matters in the assemblage, the tacitly agreed-upon priorities, values and 
opinions whereby decentralisation is ‘good’, centralisation is ‘bad’ and so on, is primarily 
affiliated with network computation and such strategies for circumventing authority than any 
political or economic ideas. This, in turn, also brings with it a particular understanding of 
associated concepts of authority, trust, control and autonomy. I then describe more explicitly 
some of the main concepts in a blockchain political sensibility and the particular meaning and 
understandings associated with these. These concepts are not argued to be exhaustive, but 
rather present commonly used terms that cut across the field and many of the political 
differences within it. These are then discussed as they play out in and through two major 
events that suggested a broader appeal and relevance of Bitcoin, namely the 2008/2009 
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financial crisis and the Wikileaks banking blockade. In the second half of the chapter I discuss 
the generalisation of this sensibility in the launch of Ethereum. I discuss two main 
consequences of such a generalisation, namely its platformisation, and tokenisation of 
protocols, drawing out the ways in which these seek to be disruptive. The aim of this chapter 
then is to ‘stay with the trouble’ (Haraway, 2016) and attempt to articulate the precise nature 
of the emerging politics in and around blockchain technology with an aim of opening up new 
possibilities rather than arriving at a final assessment of its politics. The question the chapter 
seeks to address is what matters to blockchain communities, more specifically the Bitcoin and 
Ethereum case studies, and the events and contexts through which these came to matter.  
 
5.1  Why decentralisation? 
Decentralisation is arguably the main concept that informs a blockchain sensibility. In this 
section I begin by drawing out the motivations for decentralised architectures by tracing these 
through to pre-Bitcoin histories of peer-to-peer technology in the 1990s. These histories are 
helpful for articulating a more precise understanding of other key concepts used in the 
blockchain field, such as trust, openness and so on and their particular operationalisation in 
blockchain assemblages. Decentralisation was at the time a particular strategy employed for 
systems to be resilient to shutdown by authorities. With the launch of Bitcoin in the context of 
the financial crisis, I argue that decentralisation became generalised from particular strategy 
to a political proposition in its own right. The specific understanding of decentralisation in 
Bitcoin has been widely discussed and critiqued for its libertarian and right-wing references 
(Golumbia, 2016; Greenfield, 2017). Drawing on Gibson-Graham’s notion of diverse 
economies opens up an appreciation of the more diverse interests, economic ideas and 
involvement in Bitcoin and the political possibilities that come with these.  
I argue that the understanding and operationalisation of decentralisation is both broader and 
more specific than many critics of the politics of Bitcoin allow for: broader in the sense of 
appealing to a diverse political and economic spectrum and more specific in its particular 
affiliation to computational networks more so than political or economic ideology. I discuss the 
attraction of Bitcoin from several different monetary and economic perspectives as these were 
playing out in the financial crisis, arguing that the accommodation of such different political-
economic perspectives is in part due to a political sensibility affiliated primarily with ideas 
emerging from peer-to-peer networks. I then discuss another major event that lent geo-
political justification to Bitcoin, namely the Wikileaks financial embargo, and conclude that 
both of these events continue to shape the political sensibilities as well as imagined use-
cases of blockchain projects to this date. Finally, I describe several of the key concepts 
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making out blockchain political sensibilities, suggesting a distinction between principles, 
properties and intended effects as a way to offer more clarity around these concepts and how 
they relate to technical architectures.  
5.1.1  Disruption: networks vs. authorit ies 
In a paper titled Systematising Decentralisation and Privacy: Lessons from 15 Years of 
Research and Deployments by a number of computer and information security scientists 
(Troncoso et al., 2017), Bitcoin is analysed alongside, in particular, file-sharing system 
BitTorrent and anonymous relay network Tor as part of such longer history of decentralised 
systems. The paper assesses the application of decentralisation in systems, systematically 
reviewing different technologies since a 2001-edited volume titled Peer-to-Peer – The Power 
of Disruptive Technologies (Oram, 2001) which marked one of the first coherent overviews, 
narrative and reflections on decentralised systems at the time by many of the people building 
and maintaining these. Decentralisation, when traced through this particular history of peer-to-
peer systems, is understood primarily and initially a strategy for circumvention, censorship-
resistance and systemic resilience. The paper gives an important insight into the particular 
sensibilities around decentralisation as operationalised in and for peer-to-peer networks that 
resonate with and clarifies what otherwise might be considered curious lines of reasoning in 
subsequent projects like Ethereum – such as the necessity of systems beyond human control. 
Much of this history tends to be overlooked and is rarely explicitly discussed by both critics as 
well as proponents of blockchain systems, but are key to understanding the particular ideas 
and operationalisation of decentralisation in blockchain. 
From their systematic review of decentralised systems design since 2001, Troncoso, 
Isaakidis, Danezis and Halpin define decentralisation as a subset of distributed systems that 
has the particular characteristic of having multiple or preferably no ‘authorities’ (Troncoso 
et.al. 2017). Distributed systems are resilient by having no single point of failure, meaning 
they can withstand unexpected faults, breakdowns or accidents, but the motivations for 
decentralised systems go further and are concerned with questions of censorship-resistance 
and transparency, considered to be features that are distinct to systems with ‘no authority’. 
Importantly, the concept of authority as understood in and for decentralised network systems 
is any aspect of the system that would provide someone/something full control and oversight 
of the network. The paper therefore argues for analysing any given protocol’s ‘authority 
topology’ in addition to network and infrastructure topologies. This distinction between 
‘distributed’ and ‘decentralised’ is a way to differentiate between internet platforms and 
infrastructures such as Amazon, Facebook and Google, which employ distributed 
architectures but with particular commercial and governance structures that can determine 
the development of the platforms, and that governments would be able to pressure into for 
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example handing over specific information. Decentralised systems are in contrast intended to 
be out of the reach of any such authorities. The appeal and importance of such systems’ 
designs can be explained more clearly through further examples of the intentions of pre-
Bitcoin decentralised systems. 
Since the late ‘80s and ‘90s there had been a string of other attempts at creating online cash, 
including DigiCash, founded by cryptographer David Chaum (Chaum, 1998), b-money, bitgold 
and E-Gold.87 88 89 The early histories of these projects are, in many ways, prequels to Bitcoin, 
initiated on the basis of a concern for third party involvement in digital payments and looking 
to develop payment systems that would be untraceable by banks and governments. Chaum in 
particular was concerned with questions of privacy in online payments, keenly aware that 
commerce on the internet was likely to expand rapidly, and that this would bring with it a 
number of privacy problems. Douglas Jackson, the entrepreneur who founded E-Gold, was 
more concerned with critique of central bank issuance of money and providing a platform for 
non-state controlled and borderless transactions. DigiCash eventually went bankrupt and E-
Gold was shut down in 2009 when, the founder was arrested by the FBI and was charged 
with money laundering and conspiracy, seemingly despite attempts at cooperating with the 
law.90  
These experience and a growing politics of anti-authoritarian politics applied more generally 
amongst communities adopting peer-to-peer strategies. Peer-to-peer file-sharing networks 
were frustrating music, film and other intellectual property-based industries but also facing 
severe legal cases; information leaks by amorphous hacker/hacktivist groups were 
undermining corporate and government control of information (Coleman, 2009, 2014) and 
decentralised networks of servers and websites were facilitating independent news outlets, 
challenging monopolies of news and knowledge.91 92 One of the lessons that was gathered 
from these experiences was to not provide any single point of failure – whether server or 
person – that a government or any other authority or attacker might target in order to take 
down the whole system. Similarly, when the music sharing platform Napster was shut down 
on the basis of copyright infringement, BitTorrent became the decentralised answer, a file-
sharing system that would enable people to share bits of files from many different sources in 
ways that were difficult to trace and therefore difficult to prosecute (Oram, 2001; Troncoso et 
al., 2017). Decentralisation was rapidly becoming a strategy that was very much part of 
                                                       
87 See http://www.weidai.com/bmoney.txt  
88 See https://unenumerated.blogspot.com/2005/12/bit-gold.html  
89 See for example https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-11-29/e-gold-founder-launches-new-gold-backed-
currency  
90 See https://www.wired.com/2009/06/e-gold/  
91 cf. Napster, The Piratebay, the story of Aaron Swartz; (Terranova, 2004) Libraryoftheworld; Terranova, 2010. 
92 These groups included the Indymedia network using the Internet to take independent control of information, but 
which since has transforming into the plethora of blogs and self-publishing platforms and news distribution sites, and 
eventually into what we call social media today. 
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‘network culture’ more generally (Terranova, 2004; Coleman, 2009, 2014), a pragmatic 
systems architecture and organisational principle used for circumventing legal and political 
authorities. 
The concept of authority and decentralisation began to be understood in terms that were 
specific to these experiences. Decentralisation implied systems in which no single element 
would be trusted; it implied ‘disintermediating’ third parties or anyone/anything that might be 
an authority or targeted by one. An ‘authority’ in the meantime would be any aspect of the 
system that would make it vulnerable to shutdown, so ‘decentralisation’ implied a system that 
is censorship-resistant and resilient to shutdown by having multiple or no authorities, such 
that the system would not be vulnerable to any single authority. Arrests and harsh sentencing 
solidified a more general anti-authoritarian politics, while the ability to keep systems running 
regardless lent a political fascination and affiliation with decentralised systems as able to 
withstand attacks by government and corporate actors (Coleman, 2009, 2014). Decentralised 
architectures proved effective as a means to protect the systems themselves from authorities, 
but in the meantime, those using it would still be arrested, prosecuted or face other kinds of 
consequences. This pre-history is very effective for understanding the particular meanings of 
concepts used in the blockchain space, and the experiences informing the particular 
sensibilities at play. It is also very helpful for explaining some of the main issues with 
blockchain, namely its peculiar characteristic of drawing interest and attention on the basis of 
its architecture itself, rather than its immediate usefulness (what Golumbia interprets as an 
excess of ideology (Golumbia, 2015)); a tendency to affiliate primarily with the interests and 
conditions of the systems design assuming these to extend to those using it; and the strange 
quirks that come from generalising the idea of trust and trustlessness from network security to 
a political proposition in its own right (see Chapter 4). In the following, I attempt to more 
explicitly articulate key concepts and their meaning within a blockchain context – a blockchain 
sensibility, so to speak.  
5.1.2  What came to matter 
Many of the words and concepts that form a blockchain sensibility can be traced to very 
specific experiences, reasoning and histories in network computation. Most of the concepts 
are, however, also broad enough to refer to and open up more general social and political 
imaginaries. This has effectively attracted a broad spectrum of people, discussed further 
below, but has also caused significant confusion. For example, ‘decentralisation’ can refer to 
a network type, but equally to what might be the assumed social and political effects of these. 
It is further complicated by the fact that decentralisation is not a stable condition. It can be 
contended to state for example that Bitcoin is decentralised, but it is nevertheless intended to 
be to such a degree that decentralisation operates as the main principle in the assemblage, 
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and is corrected for and addressed when not satisfied (cf. Meiklejohn, 2018). Whether strictly 
true or not in terms of the state of the network, decentralisation might operate effectively in a 
social sense, such that, for example, miners might hesitate to exert their rather centralised 
hashing power for fear of backlash (see 6.1.2). While the intention, as discussed in Chapter 4, 
has been to eliminate vague human interpretations by encoding conditions into immediately 
executing protocols that cannot be controlled, these principles and concepts nevertheless 
continue to operate, informing ongoing decision-making in the space and forming the 
rationale for different legitimacy claims (see Chapter 6).  
Here, I attempt to clarify some of these confusions around the scope, claims, aims and 
ambitions of blockchain by doing three things: describing some of the main principles and 
concepts that form blockchain sensibilities; describing their particular meaning and 
operationalisation in terms of decentralised network protocols; and suggesting a distinction 
between general principles, particular desired properties and the hoped-for effects of Bitcoin 
and blockchain systems. These are in no way exhaustive, and the method for which I have 
arrived at the listed principles, properties and effects is far from structured or comprehensive. 
Instead, they are summations made on the basis of my involvement with the blockchain 
industry between the years 2014 and 2019 and should instead be read as navigational tools 
for the rest of the chapter, which will discuss some of the complexities and problems that 
come up when such a sensibility is generalised from a particular set of strategies in earlier 
histories of peer-to-peer structures to a generalised proposition (as well as the next chapter in 
which some of these sensibilities were severely challenged). What I here call blockchain 
‘principles’ entail assumptions about what kind of systems and architectures will have certain 
properties and achieve different effects. These can be considered ‘first principles’ in the sense 
of that they are often used as indisputable, as a common understanding of generally desirable 
conditions in and of themselves. They are principles for which there is a vague albeit general 
consensus, and tend to form the fundamental reasoning and purpose of blockchain systems 
and that hold together the blockchain assemblage.  
Decentralisation 
Decentralisation is the main principle in blockchain and cryptocurrency efforts. While 
distributed systems imply that there is no single point of failure, the intention for 
decentralisation is to go further and ensure resilience against shutdown by 
authorities, censorship, influence or manipulation. The principle, defined in terms of 
resilience towards authority, also raises issues about whether not only the network, 
but also the developers who write the protocols, the distribution of bitcoin tokens in 
the network, hardware provisions etc. needs to be decentralised in order to satisfy the 
aims (Bonneau et al., 2015; Srinivasan, 2017; Azouvi, Maller and Meiklejohn, 2018). 
Decentralisation tends to be understood through ideas of network topology and 
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assuming social effects will follow, but these ideas are increasingly adopting social 
and political sensibility of decentralisation in response to internal crises in the 
communities (see Chapter 6). 
 
Openness 
In order to not have any ‘authorities’ in a decentralised system, strictly speaking the 
systems reference client code has to be open source, so that it can be peer-reviewed 
and checked. If not, the persons who have written the code would effectively have to 
be trusted; no one would be able to check whether the system operates as stated, 
whether there are security issues or otherwise. Bitcoin and other decentralised 
systems like BitTorrent take openness further, also implying that anyone can take 
part in running the client and participating as a peer. They are designed so that 
anyone can join or leave as and when they want. ‘In a decentralised system, no one 
entity can act to censor transactions or prevent individuals from joining the network 
(as is possible with traditional institutions...’ (Azouvi, Maller and Meiklejohn, 2018, p. 
1). This form of openness has technical, social and political economic implications 
because if anyone can join then it also needs to be assumed that anyone might be an 
adversary and look to attack the system. This implies a ‘trustless’ security model that 
has gone on to also become a form of social, political economic approach to any 
manner of systems designs that also configures ideas of neutrality in particular ways. 
 
Trust/trustlessness 
Decentralised and open systems imply a certain level of trustlessness. Trust in the 
context of network computation refers specifically to a security threshold, namely 
which percentage of a network have to be trusted and are assumed to be ‘honest’ for 
any given system. The ideal is to reduce the amount of trust needed as much as 
possible, approaching complete trustlessness and security. Bitcoin and many other 
blockchain protocols consider 51% attacks, whereby if anyone controls 51% of the 
network, they would be able to determine which transactions are verified and 
compromising the neutrality of the network. This conception of trust, while effective in 
systems design and security modelling, meets severe contradictions when the 
systems are actually deployed, and the levels of trust required for their use and 
deployment (Vidan and Lehdonvirta, 2018) 
 
Immutability 
The Bitcoin blockchain would have to be immutable in order for it to be secure. 
Otherwise, anyone could change the record of accounts, rendering the system 
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useless. Immutability would secure that consensus on the state of the network, 
arrived at through the proof-of-work consensus protocol, and could not be arbitrarily 
modified. This idea of immutability was extended in Ethereum to the blockchain more 
generally and the idea of immutable code – code that would run exactly as written, 
that no one could change and that therefore would run and function ‘autonomously’ 
beyond the control of any human. Immutability was a main principle in blockchain 
systems until it became severely challenged after a series of hacks in 2016 and 2017 
(see Chapter 6).  
 
To appreciate the specificity of these principles, it can be helpful to compare them with what 
such notions might refer to in other contexts. For example, social and political understandings 
of decentralisation might aim at bringing control and decision-making closer to those who are 
affected by a given decision, while in the case of aspects of blockchain decentralisation, the 
systems are designed specifically so that they are beyond the control of any given person, 
whether or not they affect them. Equally, social and political understandings of trust might 
consider more trust to be a good thing, while for anyone looking to model and develop secure 
network systems, any trust required in the network represents a potential attack vector and a 
weakness. Because of this, the kind of openness that is implied is of a particular nature, 
where, in terms of social life, one might associate openness with a trustful relationship to 
others. In decentralised systems, openness is based on precisely calculated security 
threshold, implying and assuming that anyone might be an adversary. This concern of first 
and foremost with security and the security properties of different design principles, when 
generalised, tend towards securitising and militarising of how relationships are modelled and 
determined more generally. They are intended to withstand attacks from any potential source. 
The provenance of these concepts in network security concerns were to go on to affect the 
ways in which neutrality is understood in relation to political difference (expanded on in 
section 5.2.1).  
These principles are, in turn, associated with particular properties that are generally 
considered desirable in blockchain systems. Such properties are specific to a given systems 
design and can be achieved, but are not necessarily guaranteed, by following certain design 
principles. The ones described here are some of the more general properties that different 
blockchain projects try and ensure for people using them. Again, these are not exhaustive in 
any way, but are intended to give an overview of the types of concerns that blockchain 
systems designs tend to take into account, which also gives a sense of what matters in 
blockchain assemblages in terms of use-cases and needs. They are therefore often seen as 
the reasons for what are called forks of existing projects (see 6.2.1) or the development of 
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entirely new projects, cryptographic or mathematical tools that suggest new and better ways 
of achieving such properties.  
 
Privacy 
Privacy is one of the most prevalent properties and concerns in early decentralised 
systems designs and in Bitcoin. It is a politicised field of computer engineering that 
tends to be the focus of activists’ development efforts in the realm of information 
security (cf. Rogaway, 2015). It is a property of systems designs that became the 
focus and reasoning of what is called Cypherpunk, a political movement and 
subculture that seeks to use cryptography as a counter measure against authority. 
Cypherpunk is, in many ways, the political and cultural backdrop to Bitcoin. From very 
early on in the development of the internet, a network of engineers and developers 
were concerned with the ways in which the system would fundamentally alter power 
relations between governments and citizens. Privacy was considered a crucial point 
and the focus of two manifestos that came out of Cypherpunk movements: a 
Cypherpunk manifesto by computer programmer and founder of the Cypherpunk 
mailing list Eric Hughes, stating for example, ‘Privacy is necessary for an open 
society in the electronic age’, ‘Privacy is the power to selectively reveal oneself to the 
world’ and ‘We the Cypherpunks are dedicated to building anonymous systems. We 
are defending our privacy with cryptography, with anonymous mail forwarding 
systems, with digital signatures, and with electronic money.93’94 Another contributor to 
the Cypherpunk mailing list, Timothy C. May wrote the crypto-anarchist manifesto that 
begins with ‘A spectre is haunting the modern world, the spectre of crypto anarchy. 
Computer technology is on the verge of providing the ability for individuals and groups 
to communicate and interact with each other in a totally anonymous manner.’95 These 
concerns predicted what has since become more a prevalent understanding of the 
internet as having become a mass surveillance infrastructure. On a more technical 
level, the intention is that peer-to-peer technologies intersect with privacy properties 
by eliminating third party intermediation that would otherwise have full oversight of 
behaviour and data. In some peer-to-peer designs, however, third party 
intermediation is replaced with a different kind of decentralised intermediation in the 
shape of the protocol itself. And so in Bitcoin, in order to have a peer-to-peer payment 
system, instead of a third party holding a record of transactions, the whole network 
holds it, making all transactions fully public. In order to preserve privacy in such a 
                                                       
93 See archive here: http://mailing-list-archive.cryptoanarchy.wiki/  
94 See https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/manifesto.html  
95 See https://activism.net/cypherpunk/crypto-anarchy.html  
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radically transparent system, the accounts themselves remain anonymous. Privacy is 
a desired property of decentralised systems, but its design is never absolute, instead 
entailing decisions around selective revealing and concealing of relevant information 
and very careful modelling of potential systems weaknesses.  
Anonymity 
Anonymity is closely related to privacy, but slight different in terms of systems design. 
A given user or node might be anonymous but still engage in open and non-private 
communication. This is also a major aspect of Cypherpunk and network culture with a 
fascination and use of pseudonyms and ‘nyms’ conveying the possibility of multiple 
identities and the ability to selectively reveal or conceal oneself. Bitcoin was initially 
understood to be anonymous, and infamously became the means of payment for the 
‘Darknet’ and online black markets (cf. Pagliery, 2015). The anonymity and 
subsequent disappearance of Bitcoin inventor(s) Satoshi Nakamoto was in the 
meantime also a symbol of the disappearance of authority. The author of the system 
receded into the shadows, the ‘nym’ had served its purpose and instead of coherent 
fixed identities, the only fixed thing was the blockchain itself. All else would be fluid, 
multiple, and could exist ‘in the dark’, shielded from the prying eyes of authorities. 
This intention easily and quickly flips into its opposite. Research and testing has 
shown several different ways that anonymity can be compromised (Meiklejohn et al., 
2013). A given transaction can be traced all the way to an exchange and de-
anonymised at this point. Anonymity nevertheless matters to blockchain ‘sensibilities’ 
and so there are continuously new techniques and protocols being developed to 
improve both anonymity and privacy features (cf. Narayanan and Möser, 2017) – for 
example, coin mixers that ‘mix’ transactions so that they cannot be traced directly to 
specific owners. Mix nets and advanced cryptography, called zero-knowledge proofs, 
have also been added to the arsenal for the development of different cryptocurrencies 
with much stronger anonymity, like Z-Cash, Monero and more recently Nym, which 
have been developed specifically for anonymity purposes (Blum, Feldman and Micali, 
1988; Dwork, Naor and Sahai, 2004; Saberhagen, 2013; Ben-sasson et al., 2014).96 
97 98 Techniques like Attribute Based Credentials (ABC) selectively reveal only the 
minimum necessary information in order to cryptographically prove something about 
oneself and gain access to a system; it is a network of ‘nyms’ to engage freely rather 
than of coherent identities to be targeted. In response to those aspects of blockchain 
that tend towards complete determinacy, fixed identities and defined property, the 
fluid interactions of anonymous systems remains one of the more explicitly politically 
                                                       
96 See https://z.cash/  
97 See https://www.getmonero.org/  
98 See https://nymtech.net/  
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aware aspects of blockchain projects and development. These are two differing 
tendencies in the field of blockchain that tend to either prioritise formalising and 
having blockchain systems adopted within existing legal, commercial and economic 
frameworks, or continuing its trajectory as primarily an anti-authoritarian tool. 
Transparency 
Transparency is, to some degree, ensured through principles of openness and 
trustlessness: the code of decentralised systems is open and transparent and can be 
reviewed, as can transaction data and the state of the Bitcoin network overall. 
However, there is a tension between the principles of transparency and 
privacy/anonymity that remains unresolved. In the Cypherpunk subculture the general 
ideal of transparency for the powerful and privacy for the powerless (Hughes, 1993; 
Assange et al., 2012) was adopted, but this distinction between powerful and 
powerless beyond references to governments and corporations becomes less clear 
as when decentralisation becomes a generalised idea. In relation to specific and well 
understood authorities, the formula makes sense, but in terms of the Bitcoin network 
as a proposition in its own right, it remains unresolved because there are as of yet no 
agreed-upon methods to name ‘the powerful’ from ‘powerless’ in what are supposed 
to be decentralised systems. For example, are people with large holdings of bitcoin 
the ‘powerful’ and should they therefore have some form of transparency and 
accountability structures put in place? For those looking to establish accountability 
methods for the emerging ‘authorities’ amongst and within blockchain systems, I 
would like to suggest that although politically and ethically unresolved, the aim of 
systems having transparency properties can be leveraged. Indeed, the culture of anti-
authoritarianism and leaking can provide a context for developing more refined 
accountability structures. 
Capacity (scalability, speed, throughput) 
Less explicitly ideological but an important property for most blockchain systems has 
been the question of sufficient capacity, including scale, understood in terms of 
volume, speed and the throughput that a network can manage. Chapter 6 discusses 
how a seemingly neutral technical issue such as capacity, scale and speed of a 
system can become hugely politicised and debated. Capacity of the network can 
serve different purposes and be mediated in different ways. (Bitcoin itself came out of 
network engineering research that sought to use price mechanisms to throttle 
networks in order to reduce spam and waste of network resources (Dwork and Naor, 
1992; Back, 2002)). Capacity at different layers and for different purposes is therefore 
a fine-grained design question that tends to benefit certain types of uses over others, 
rather than being an absolute measure. It is nevertheless an important property in 
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protocol designs and the basis for many forks and new protocols looking to improve 
on Bitcoin. Capacity is addressed, for example, on the basis of being able to compete 
with existing digital payment systems, but also from a network security standpoint of 
achieving large enough networks for decentralisation to function effectively as a 
security property.  
Autonomy 
There is an underlying tension in blockchain systems designs between questions of 
autonomy as ‘automation’ and systems beyond control, or in the sense of self-
determination and indeed bringing more control back to people using a given system. 
The provenance of early peer-to-peer strategies of decentralisation brought with it a 
very particular understanding of autonomy. Early peer-to-peer systems were built with 
the intention of making their shutdown impossible by ensuring that the network was 
not controlled by any single node, server or person, but instead run in a decentralised 
manner. Such ambitions understand the construction of a system that is autonomous 
from control to be the basis of a form of political autonomy for those that use it. As 
these ideas became generalised, this evolved into a particular understanding of the 
system itself as autonomous from human control more generally, with the aim of 
ensuring that various functions would execute automatically and regardless of human 
will or influence (see Chapter 4). Autonomy came to mean a form of automation in 
systems design rather than necessarily self-determination in the political sense, while 
the concept still maintained the social and political insinuations of empowerment in 
relation to authority.  
These principles and properties are intended to serve particular purposes and to have certain 
effects. I consider such effects to be hopes and claims about what blockchain systems do, but 
that again should not be understood as guaranteed by the technical architecture alone.  
Disintermediation 
Disintermediation refers to the idea of getting rid of any ‘trusted third party’. This 
might be in terms of the network, to disintermediate and establish a peer-to-peer 
network such that there are no intermediating servers, or commercial or institutional 
service providers more generally. Peer-to-peer systems are, technically speaking, 
characterised by peers in the network communicating directly with each other. 
Contrasted with a server-to-client model, where servers hold and serve content to 
various clients, in peer-to-peer networks there is no such distinction. The concept 
also tends to be understood in a more broad sense of cutting out the middleman 
(Filippi, 2013), at times as a critique of rentier behaviour where intermediaries are 
understood as unnecessary and adding extra cost (Nakamoto, 2008), at other times 
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referring to the security concerns from earlier years of decentralisation networks, 
whereby an intermediary might distort, manipulate or block flows of information, either 
of their own volition or due to pressure from external authorities. As discussed in 
more refined technical detail by Troncoso et al., 2017, peer-to-peer systems can 
evolve into ‘super-node’ types, where peers with more capacity become the main 
relay nodes. And so in Bitcoin, there has been significant specialisation in the network 
over time (see 4.1.3 and 6.1.2) that arguably begins to resemble new forms of 
intermediation.  
(Net) neutrality 
One of the main intentions of decentralised architectures is that they provide a neutral 
network that does not ‘care’ who, or for what, it is used. Because the infrastructure is 
run by multiple nodes, even if one node is run by a person, company or organisation 
that might disagree with a given use, they will be unable to stop it because the 
message will be relayed and transaction will be processed by other nodes. Net 
neutrality became politicised as a legal and technical term through a case between 
the decentralised file-sharing system BitTorrent and major US internet service 
provider (ISP) Comcast. The company had been throttling network traffic when users 
of their services attempted to share whole files with each other (Svensson, 2007; 
Daniel, 2008; Smith, 2010).99 A court ruling went in favour of BitTorrent and the 
concept of net neutrality: that a network should treat users equally regardless of their 
uses. The notion is also used as an argument for network service providers to not be 
liable for potential illegal uses of their services. This idea of neutrality is at times 
conflated with ideas of technological neutrality more generally, whereby a given 
technical system is thought to be neutral in terms of its effects in contrast with human-
based institutions, for example when Bitcoin developer Corallo states: ‘if you have a 
system that is much more decentralised and technology-based it is much easier to 
build something where you can’t necessarily apply the same pressure without going 
all the way to making something completely illegal. You can’t block these things.’ The 
necessary and inevitable differences of contexts, people and places, however, means 
that any given system will effect people in very different ways, and such an approach 
to ideas of power, networks and neutrality were to be complicated in disputes 
internally in Bitcoin and Ethereum not long after.100  
Freedom  
                                                       
99 Net neutrality is also a cultural rallying call for open network infrastructures and peer-to-peer economies, see for 
example this album on Napster: https://us.napster.com/artist/various-artists/album/rock-the-net-musicians-for-
network-neutrality/track/red  
100 See Bitcoin developer, Matt Corallo, interviewed by iamsatoshi, Tomer Kantor, Apr 2015 
https://youtu.be/0ve8hqfeM0E 
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Economic and political freedom is one of the major intended effects of Bitcoin and 
blockchain systems more generally. Bitcoin critic Golumbia picks up on the frequent 
mention of ‘liberty’ versus the ‘tyranny’ of governments and state violence as 
indication of right-wing ideology at work in Bitcoin (Golumbia, 2016). These intersect 
easily with right-wing and cyberlibertarian ideas, but also with ambitions of disrupting 
monopolies of international monetary and payment systems more generally. Bitcoin 
and cryptocurrencies contributed to an awareness of and debates around 
dependencies and geo-political dynamics in money systems. The imagined use-
cases of Bitcoin and many cryptocurrency systems are therefore to circumvent 
financial blockades, sanctions and other legal controls to value flows. So while, for 
example, the short-serving Greek finance minister Varoufakis criticised the economic 
ideas and gold standard implied in Bitcoin, he nevertheless also suggested the 
possibility of a cryptocurrency that would alleviate liquidity problems in Greece due to 
the problem of public debt in the context of the financial crisis (Varoufakis, 2014). The 
ability to control money supply and circulation is considered an important aspect of 
being independent from ‘authorities’ and establishing autonomy in the sense of self-
determination – and is indeed one of the intended effects of Bitcoin and many of the 
cryptocurrencies, alt-coins and social currency projects that it gave rise to.  
Cost efficiency 
In theory, because a decentralised peer-to-peer system should facilitate transactions 
without any intermediary, it should be more cost effective than existing payment 
services and infrastructures. This is one of the main arguments in the Bitcoin 
whitepaper for disintermediation. Bitcoin was therefore envisioned as a potential 
remittance infrastructure where people could freely send money circumventing both 
government and corporate intermediation. One of the intended effects of Bitcoin and 
many blockchain systems are therefore to outcompete existing systems by being 
more cost-efficient. Cost efficiency is in no way guaranteed by decentralised network 
design but is a more complex economic question that also relates to how the 
infrastructure is intended to sustain itself, who should get paid, for what, and how 
much can be charged from those using the system (see 5.2.2). 
The political sensibilities of and in Bitcoin and blockchain assemblages are still very much in 
formation. The affiliation tends to be primarily to computational concepts, while political and 
economic ideas are often drawn on in an experimental manner as and when they speak to 
such network concerns. My attempt with the above has been to articulate some of these 
particular sensibilities. The common ground, and what tends to matter in blockchain, draws on 
ideas, experiences and approaches from network computation in relation to ‘authority’. They 
are grounded neither in a critique nor in a total support of existing capitalist systems. In 
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addition, as Golumbia and others point out, there tends to be a critique of the state and 
government regulation, but indeed also corporate authority, monopolies and state-backed 
violence more generally that intersect with political interests beyond US right-wing libertarian 
context looking towards disrupting network monopolies. This is not trivial but suggests a form 
of disruption, which will be explored further in the second half of the chapter. First, however, I 
will trace through how these ideas and concepts became popularised beyond the immediate 
Cypherpunk, hacker and network cultures and took on a broader meaning. 
5.1.3  From disruption to redistr ibuting the sensible 
The main concerns of decentralised peer-to-peer systems has been to eliminate the 
possibility of control by authorities and prevent any single point of failure in such a way to 
ensure that the system is reliable, resilient and can survive attacks by what engineers have 
called ‘formidable adversaries’ (Troncoso et al., 2017), referring to governments, legal 
systems, secret services or corporate adversaries. This particular strategy was to eventually 
become a generalised proposition for getting rid of human intermediaries overall as these 
might in turn be corrupted (as discussed more below as well as in Chapter 4); it turned from 
an intention to defeat ‘formidable adversaries’ to assuming any kind of adversary. This, I 
argue, is in part due to the timing of Bitcoin, published and built in the midst of the financial 
crisis, and its testing against such formidable adversaries in the Wikileaks banking blockade. I 
here discuss both of these events.  
Financial and political crises 
The Bitcoin whitepaper was published and circulated on ‘The Cryptography Mailing List’ in 
October 2008 and the first Bitcoin transaction took place on the 3rd of January 2009, famously 
including a headline from that day’s Times newspaper: ‘The Times 03/Jan/2009 Chancellor 
on brink of second bailout for banks’ (Champagne, 2014).101 102 103 This has been interpreted 
as both a ‘timestamp’, proving the date of the transaction, and also as a means to position the 
purpose of Bitcoin as a critique of the existing banking system and the political handling of the 
financial crisis. Only a year later, another major event — the Wikileaks financial embargo — 
put the idea of Bitcoin and decentralised networks as a strategy against authority to a 
practical and very public test. The attention for and interest in Bitcoin has been traced to the 
timing in relation to the financial crisis, the Wikileaks case shortly after and an early article in 
Forbes that described a rapid increase in the value of bitcoin against the dollar (Roio, 2013). 
These events have become part of an established narrative of the history of Bitcoin and 
                                                       
101 See https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/chancellor-alistair-darling-on-brink-of-second-bailout-for-banks-
n9l382mn62h  
102 See https://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/msg09959.html  
103 See 
https://www.blockchain.com/btc/block/000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f  
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blockchain (Roio, 2013; Champagne, 2014). It is nevertheless worth describing them once 
again, focusing on how these events attracted people with several different understandings of 
finance, monetary theory and economics to Bitcoin, and the ways in which ‘decentralisation’ 
accommodates for these, drawing forth a sensibility along different lines.  
Bitcoin’s launch just as the financial crisis erupted attracted people with differing critiques of 
the political handing of the crisis and the financial and economic systems that gave rise to it. 
For theorist and blockchain critic Golumbia, the timing of the financial crisis would attract 
people to Bitcoin who, regardless of its usefulness as digital money, would find in and through 
the protocol a decidedly right-wing economic explanation for why things had gone wrong. 
‘Bitcoin absolutely does something, yet it does not do what many of its advocates claim it 
does. Bitcoin is a technology whose social and political functions far outstrip its technical 
ones’ (Golumbia, 2015, p. 119). He traces the provenance of aspects of the Bitcoin protocol, 
in particular analogies to gold mining, and fixed money supply in right-wing economic ideas 
and central bank conspiracy thinking from the US in particular (Golumbia, 2015, p. 123). In 
these theories, tyrannical governments control the printing of money and use this power to 
steal from ordinary people by causing inflation. The algorithmically-determined money 
creation and fixed money supply in Bitcoin would be an effective antidote to central bank 
tyranny, quantitative easing and corrupt bailouts.  
Several other authors have read a commodity theory of money in Bitcoin gold analogies, also 
often associated with aspects of right-wing economics (Scott, 2014, 2018; Varoufakis, 2014; 
Golumbia, 2015). Yet it is telling that in the list of references at the end of the Bitcoin 
whitepaper, there is not a single reference to monetary or economic theories (Nakamoto, 
2008, p. 9). Instead, the references are to cryptographic and computer engineering work. 
Grounding the project in computation rather than political or economic affiliations meant that 
Bitcoin attracted people with varying ideas and understandings of money, finance and 
economics, but generally with a sense that the existing system was not working. The 
relatively undefined monetary approach and the context of the financial crisis has indeed 
allowed the project to become a strong vehicle for political and economic conspiracy theory 
explanations from the right wing, as noted in particular by Golumbia and Greenfield 
(Golumbia, 2016; Greenfield, 2017). It is important to acknowledge such ideological workings 
of Bitcoin, but without an appreciation of the specific history and affiliation to peer-to-peer 
computation, many of the political ideas that inform decisions and hold together the 
blockchain community will be missed.  
Money creation in Bitcoin takes place through what is called bitcoin mining (explained and 
discussed in detail in 4.1.1). The Bitcoin whitepaper states: ‘The steady addition of a constant 
of amount of new coins is analogous to gold miners expending resources to add gold to 
 132 
circulation. In our case, it is CPU time and electricity that is expended.’ (Nakamoto, 2008, p. 
4) This explicit gold analogy suggests an affiliation with or assumption of commodity theories 
of money: that the value of a bitcoin token is derived from the effort that is needed to create it 
(or, more precisely, the burning of energy while repeatedly running hashing algorithms). The 
economic ideas contained in the gold analogy sound convincing from a peer-to-peer 
perspective; money that has an intrinsic value is, in a sense, disintermediated money 
because it seems like it does not require an authority to back up and enforce its value. The 
understanding of those that, knowingly or unknowingly, subscribe to commodity theories of 
money is that the current value setting is determined through central bank authorities, and 
that instead of relying on authorities to establish and enforce the value of money should be 
derived directly from some intrinsic nature of the material itself, in most cases gold (Scott, 
2014). Commodity theories of money relate to a longer lineage of thinking that takes markets 
and trade as natural rather than state enforced, and money as the most effective means to 
facilitate such activities. The assumption is that such intrinsic value ensures stability whereby 
the value is derived from the quality of the thing itself rather than enforced and determined by 
a government and central bank. Golumbia’s work is aimed primarily at drawing out the 
contradictions of these ideas, pointing to the volatility of the price of gold as well as Bitcoin in 
the absence of any policy or regulation, and counters that the role of central banks and 
interest rate policies exactly serves to ensure stability; in other words, that grounding an 
economics and monetary approach on a notion of natural state of value, determined through 
the scarcity of a precious metal, is to ignore the evidence of the effects of such monetary and 
economic thinking that contradict the very hopes and claims. But Bitcoin did not exclusively 
appeal to the US right wing or those subscribing to right-wing political economy, and the 
Bitcoin architecture also points to a different set of monetary ideas and possibilities, one of 
which is an understanding of money as expressing relationships rather than an intrinsic value, 
namely credit theories of money (Innes, 1914).  
In Bitcoin there are no self-contained ‘coins’ as such. Instead the system functions as a 
ledger of transactions and balances of accounts. It is frequently thought of as a decentralised 
ledger, has even given rise to so-called DLT (Walport, 2016), distributed ledger technology, a 
decentralised ledger of credits, debts (and witnesses, so-called triple entry accounting, (Grigg, 
2005, see 4.1.1). Credit theories of money define money as credit notes that can be 
redeemed for some good or service. Whether expressed through tokens or ledgers, these are 
simply ways of making visible and registering relationships of credit and debt. The financial 
crisis had also spurred a different critique of money creation that focused on debt 
relationships and fractional reserve banking. Central banks generally do not ‘print’ money 
directly, but regulate money supply through interest rates. Fractional reserve banking allows 
private banks to lend amounts backed only by a fraction of the total lending. This in effect 
means that money creation takes place through by private banks issuing debt, and central 
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banks regulate by setting interest rates. This formed much of the critique of the existing 
financial and banking system from the political left so to speak, and here too, Bitcoin was an 
attractive prospect, in particular as a technology that promised the possibility of 
programmable money. Alternative and complementary currencies have been around for a 
long time, but Bitcoin introduced the possibility of deploying, securing and running alternative 
currencies at scale, and program more complex interoperability between these, allowing for 
experimentation with all kinds of economic and monetary ideas. There is therefore an 
important part of the history of Bitcoin, colloquially known as the time of the ‘alt-coins’, where 
the invention of Bitcoin spurred playful experimentation with lots of different economic and 
monetary ideas, often quite specific to different subcultures, and often driven by curiosity and 
humour.104 This was a vision of decentralisation as multiple monetary ecosystems at different 
scales, with a focus on diversity and interoperability (cf. Bauwens, 2014; Prieto and Duran, 
2015; Roio and Sachy, 2015; Pazaitis, Kostakis and Bauwens, 2017; Haiven, 2018; Scott, 
2018). 
The possibility of disrupting existing monetary, economic and financial systems with self-
issued and programmable money along with the scope for economic experimentation 
attracted a more motley bunch of people to Bitcoin, cryptocurrencies and blockchain than is 
often appreciated. In the process, economic and political ideas were drawn on, sporadically 
relating to different aspects of the Bitcoin architecture and its history in decentralised network 
technology. Decentralisation was a strategy used to circumvent pressures or control by 
authorities and prevent forced shutdown. ‘Authority’ in turn came to also mean any node 
internally in the network that would need to be trusted in order for the system to work as 
intended. If any aspect of the system would have to be fully trusted then this could become a 
target for governments or corporations looking to close down the system. For network security 
reasons, the ideal was to approach trustlessness. With the financial crisis the question of trust 
took on a broader meaning, and indeed the ideal use-case continues to be resilience towards 
untrustworthy authorities in conditions of economic tensions, from Greece (cf. Varoufakis, 
2014; Richards, 2015), to India (cf. Higgins, 2017) and Venezuela (cf. Bambrough, 2018; 
Chandler, 2018; Crypterium, 2018; Voge, 2018) –  in ways that have also been critiqued as a 
form of technology-driven colonialism (Scott, 2016). In the financial crisis, economic and 
political authorities showed themselves to be untrustworthy, a context that lent a much 
broader political-economic dimension to the concept of trust and many other concepts in 
decentralised network computation. An architecture that promised ‘trustlessness’ went from 
being a particular notion in network computation to an enticing narrative for political, economic 
and social systems more broadly. 
                                                       
104 See https://dogecoin.com/ for one of the more long-standing alt-coins with a dedicated following. Some years later, 
when conflicts broke out as to the development pathways of Bitcoin, the term alt-coin started to be used in a 
derogatory manner. Different versions of the Bitcoin protocol were being created, some of which were called alt-coins 
as a way to state that they were not the ‘real’ Bitcoin. 
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Wikileaks banking blockade 
So for example if you have PayPal; it is very easy to apply pressure on PayPal to make 
significant business decisions, for example to block Wikileaks, without necessarily applying a 
law and going straight to PayPal and say we are going to sue you, right? Whereas if you have 
a system like Bitcoin or if you have a system that is much more decentralised and technology-
based it is much easier to build something where you can’t necessarily apply the same 
pressure without going all the way to making something completely illegal. You can’t block 
these things. 
– Bitcoin developer, Matt Corallo, Apr 2015105  
In 2010, the ability of decentralised systems to withstand attacks and be censorship-resistant 
was put to a very public test. The whistle-blower website Wikileaks faced an unofficial banking 
blockade, meaning they could no longer receive donations. What emerged out of the 
Wikileaks situation was a political justification for Bitcoin as a peer-to-peer money system in 
relation to existing political and economic systems. For many, what was revealed in this 
moment was more than repression of Wikileaks; it showed that the financial system, and 
indeed the internet itself as it had developed, were far from a free and neutral global 
infrastructure, and that the US had a very real ‘kill switch to any organisation anywhere in the 
world’ through their control of the handful of companies that facilitated nearly all of global 
value flows.106 And so the events attracted the attention of many for whom infrastructures and 
networks are supposed to be neutral and facilitate free exchange of value and information 
and who were outraged at their control and manipulation for geo-political purposes. 
The founder of Wikileaks, Julian Assange, was involved in the Cypherpunk movement, a 
political subculture that came about in relation to concerns of privacy and transparency in the 
face of power. Cypherpunk grew out of parts of peer-to-peer culture and the capacity of 
cryptography to modulate questions of privacy and transparency in such ways as to be 
unbreakable by even the most powerful actors (Hughes, 1993; Assange et al., 2012). The 
vision was to enforce transparency on the activities of the powerful, through whistleblowing 
and otherwise, while protecting the privacy of the powerless through for example private key 
encryption technologies. The work of the whistle-blower website in exposing government 
corruption and violence, and involvement of Assange with Cypherpunk movement, resonated 
with the intentions of Bitcoin as a means to establish a network of value flows beyond the 
control of authorities. So when Wikileaks came up against a banking blockade, a perfect use-
case for Bitcoin started to emerge. The first mention of potentially helping the organisation 
                                                       
105 See https://youtu.be/0ve8hqfeM0E 
106 Quote from Rick Falkvinge, founder of the Pirate Party in Sweden, in an interview in the documentary Ulterior 
States https://youtu.be/yQGQXy0RIIo?t=11m42s  
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was posted on bitcointalk, the main forum for the Bitcoin community in 2010 when the project 
was still very small and mostly unknown:  
 
Hey, 
I wanted to send a letter to Wikileaks about Bitcoin since unfortunately they've had 
several incidents where their funds have been seized in the past. 
  
Anyone know where to send a message to them? 
 
– genjix, November 10 2010, 12:49:16 PM107  
While for some in the Bitcoin community this was an exciting opportunity to test the security 
and capacity of the project and support an ally, for others, this would attract attention too early 
and potentially destroy the project, and so a longer discussion ensued on the forum.108 But 
the news began to circulate about the latest leaks, the US military war logs by US army 
soldier Manning with evidence of the killing of civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan, including very 
explicit video recordings of drone strikes. Shortly after, with no court order, Paypal, closely 
followed by most major international money transfer companies, blocked donations to the 
organisation.109  
Paypal just blocked them, and they're trying to get other US banks do the same. This 
would be a great moment to open bitcoin donations. 
 
– wumpus, December 04, 2010, 08:47:59 AM110  
There were strong disagreements in early discussions on the Bitcointalk forum about 
whether Bitcoin should publicly support Wikileaks, and thereby become an explicit strategy 
for circumventing authority, or aim for everyday adoption for regular payments. In particular, 
there was hesitation about how such a politicised act might affect Bitcoin companies and 
exchanges. Bitcoin, as a proposal for a peer-to-peer money system, had brought together a 
wide-ranging set of people attracted to the capacity that peer-to-peer networks have in 
circumventing controls of money systems. But there were diverging opinions as to what extent 
the purpose was to circumvent and resist political control of such a contentious and high 
profile kind as in the Wikileaks case, or whether the project would be better off operating and 
expanding in more mundane contexts: ‘I say, we MUST get Bitcoin accepted at Starbucks 
                                                       
107 See https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1735.msg21271#msg21271  
108 See the full chat log archived here: http://archive.li/Gvonb  
109 See for example https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonmatonis/2012/08/20/wikileaks-bypasses-financial-blockade-with-
bitcoin/#4bb337b77202 and http://www.coindesk.com/assange-bitcoin-wikileaks-helped-keep-alive/ and 
https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/5ai3x1/fact_wikileaks_the_whistleblowing_website_turned/  
110 See https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1735.msg26737#msg26737 
 136 
and the local grocery store.... BEFORE it gets accepted at Wikileaks.’ Some were worried 
that political association with the organisation would kill the project from its infancy: 
‘Currently all intelligence services are working to smash wikileaks. I would not want to 
suddenly posthumously come into Al-Qaeda.’111 Others argued that this was the moment to 
prove the efficacy and necessity of a system like Bitcoin: 'PayPal just blocked them, and 
they're trying to get other US banks do the same. This would be a great moment to open 
bitcoin donations' and 'bring it on. Let's encourage Wikileaks to use bitcoins and I'm willing 
to face any risk or fallout from that act.' The inventor/s Satoshi Nakamoto disagreed: 'No, 
don't 'bring it on'. The project needs to grow gradually so the software can be strengthened 
along the way. I make this appeal to WikiLeaks not to try to use Bitcoin. Bitcoin is a small beta 
community in its infancy. You would not stand to get more than pocket change, and the heat 
you would bring would likely destroy us at this stage.’ A few days later, on the 10th of 
December, an article was published on the PCWorld website suggesting the Wikileaks 
situation was giving rise to renewed efforts of blocking censorship through peer-to-peer 
networks, and discussing and introducing Bitcoin as the latest in that field. This public 
connection, between Wikileaks and Bitcoin had this response from Nakamoto:  
It would have been nice to get this attention in any other context. WikiLeaks has kicked the 
hornet's nest, and the swarm is headed towards us. 
– satoshi, December 11, 2010, 11:39:16 PM112 
After this post Satoshi Nakamoto largely disappeared from forums and discussions. 
(According to Wikileaks founder Assange, the two of them had agreed that it was too early to 
use Bitcoin, and so it was not until six months later on 14th of June 2011 that Wikileaks 
created and published an address to receive donations.)113 114 In some ways these types of 
disagreements continue to this day, between those seeking to develop Bitcoin as a legitimate 
and broadly accepted means of payment, and those who understand the project as primarily 
a strategy against authorities, whether for very specific geo-political purposes or as a general 
attitude and a means to maintain a network beyond the reach of authorities. The voice of the 
absent authority of Satoshi Nakamoto has often been conjured to support development 
pathways towards everyday payment systems (see, for example, Bitcoin Cash), but the open 
decentralised characteristic of the project does not easily conform to authorities, whether the 
authority in question is the supposed inventors or not. 
                                                       
111 See bitcoinex https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1735.msg25360#msg25360 
112 See https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=2216.msg29280#msg29280 
113 https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/5ai3x1/fact_wikileaks_the_whistleblowing_website_turned/ and 
https://www.coindesk.com/assange-bitcoin-wikileaks-helped-keep-alive.  
114 See https://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2011/06/14/wikileaks-asks-for-anonymous-bitcoin-
donations/#4f21fee54f73 and https://www.blocktrail.com/BTC/address/1HB5XMLmzFVj8ALj6mfBsbifRoD4miY36v 
and https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=15480644 and https://www.wired.com/2010/12/paypal-wikileaks/ 
Wikileaks donations page: https://shop.wikileaks.org/donate 
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The Wikileaks case has been described as a determining moment for Bitcoin (cf. Roio, 2013; 
Grigg, 2016), going from an obscure experiment to emerging and proving itself, practically, as 
a global value-network capable of evading and circumventing controls by authorities. Such a 
possibility embodied the ideal of a global platform for the circulation of value that would be 
neutral because it was technologically beyond the reach of authorities, thereby contributing to 
the possibility of political contestation. It was not just that Bitcoin provided an alternative 
means of value transfer – its very architecture, the fact that it was decentralised and could 
therefore not be shut down by anyone, came to represent a solution to centralised power. 
This, in turn, was related to another notion that had come out of peer-to-peer forming part of a 
blockchain sensibility, namely net neutrality. In the earlier history of legal cases around 
breach of copyright taking place in file-sharing networks, the argument was that those 
providing infrastructure should not and could not be prosecuted for breach of copyright taking 
place on these networks. They were providing an infrastructure that was accessible to 
anyone, but could not be held accountable for what took place on it. Internet providers, in 
contrast, were perceived by peer-to-peer communities as threatening net neutrality, by 
blocking or throttling different kinds of content, on the basis of legal pressure by IP holders as 
well as political or religiously motivated forms of censorship – related to debates around free 
speech that are alive to this date. Through the Wikileaks case, the control of global flows of 
value became in many peer-to-peer communities linked to free speech, and ideas of freedom 
more generally. ‘It is much more about how can people exchange different forms of value as 
free speech’, said early Bitcoin entrepreneur Elizabeth Starks.115 These ideas of net neutrality, 
through the Wikileaks case, became justified at a geo-political scale, related to US control of 
international value transfer networks. To this date, a commonly mentioned and pursued use-
case of Bitcoin is for circumvention of financial embargoes and control and the establishment 
of net neutrality in the sphere of international value transfers, including examples like Iran, 
Kurdistan, Ecuador, but also Russia and Chinese interests in the relationship between the 
control of network infrastructures and geo-politics.  
The intention with the first half of this chapter has been to give some context and 
understanding for how the particular operationalisation of concepts in peer-to-peer 
computation and network political cultures would come to resonate with broader political 
events in such a manner as to take on meaning beyond their immediate strategic applications 
to become a sensibility and proposition in its own right. While certain operationalisation of 
ideas of decentralisation indeed relate to US right-wing economic and monetary ideas, there 
are histories and reasons for why Bitcoin did not exclusively attract the political right and 
instead presents a broader political scope than that, based on ideas that are derived from 
network computation and the capacities of these to be used as a means to circumvent 
                                                       
115 Elizabeth Starks, Interviewed by Tomer Kantor iamsatoshi, April 3rd, 2015, https://youtu.be/B3K5aVvqt7U 
[accessed 16.11.2018] 
 138 
authorities. There are considerable political differences and differing economic ideas 
circulating in and amongst blockchain projects and yet there is also an assemblage, a 
common sensibility that holds the community together despite the differing economic, social 
and political backgrounds.  
The attraction of Bitcoin and decentralised technologies was the possibility of circumventing 
authorities. However, since the invention of Bitcoin and the increasing attention of blockchain, 
a critical body of literature has appeared, raising concerns about the ways in which blockchain 
systems might instead lead to increasing authoritarian control (Scott, 2014; Herian, 2016; 
Käll, 2018; Manski and Manski, 2018). How did this transformation take place, and what kind 
of authorities are emerging in and through blockchain? In the following section, and with the 
invention and launch of Ethereum, I discuss how what I have described as blockchain 
‘sensibilities’ became generalised in much more explicit ways. The provenance of early peer-
to-peer understandings and operationalisation of decentralisation and a particular form of 
network anti-authoritarianism would have significant and in some ways contradictory effects 
on the social, political and economic purpose and imagined use-cases of blockchain 
technology more generally. 
 
5.2  Decentralisation generalised 
Ethereum marked a shift from decentralised systems that were application-specific to 
generalised protocols and platforms. The project sought to take the Bitcoin architecture and 
make it Turing-complete, meaning able to run any kind of computation. Instead of a 
decentralised system for verifying and storing transactions, Ethereum would be a 
decentralised system for storing and running any piece of code. This chapter has so far 
traced concepts and ideas that form a blockchain sensibility through a pre-Bitcoin history in 
order to understand its provenance as a strategy for circumventing authority and in the 
thinking and reasoning of network security under conditions of decentralisation. In the 
following, I argue that the Ethereum blockchain project makes explicit two major changes to 
previous generations of decentralised network projects since Bitcoin, namely the 
generalisation of these concepts and ideas, from particular strategies in the face of 
‘formidable adversaries’ into general platforms resulting in systems designs in and for 
themselves, and the incorporation of economic dynamics into protocol design through 
tokenisation, opening up a new field of cryptoeconomics and shifting the political economic 
assumptions in network culture. The ideas informing this understanding of decentralisation 
form a particular sensibility that does suggest a kind of ‘disruption’, but does not follow along 
the lines of explicit critiques of capitalism, nor necessarily ‘the state’ in the case of Ethereum, 
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but rather ideas of decentralisation, trust, authority and autonomy as articulated above. And 
so many aspects of market and state techniques are indeed reproduced and in some ways 
strengthened and extended through Ethereum, while it nevertheless poses challenges to 
existing state, financial and commercial business models. The extent to which such a 
disruption and sensibility has been articulated clearly and is enough of a priority to enable a 
‘redistribution of the sensible’ remains to be seen and is still very much up for negotiation.  
In the second half of this chapter then, I here discuss the ways in which decentralised 
protocol design was first ‘platformised’ in Ethereum. As a platform Ethereum was intended as 
a disruption to existing platform monopolies, but could be argued to present an emerging kind 
of platform monopoly in its own right – this time on a protocol rather than application layer. As 
such, and with the incorporation of market dynamics into several aspects of the protocol, the 
project could easily be read as another frontier of platform capitalism (Langley and Leyshon, 
2016; Scholz, 2016). This contradiction is resolved from the perspective of Ethereum through 
notions of zero-trust systems, namely that the platform should not be perceived as another 
trusted intermediary exactly because it is trustless. This notion in the meantime point towards 
significant governance questions on the protocol level. If the platform is intended to be neutral 
with no trusted intermediation, then how the code is written and run, who gets to decide on 
changes to the protocol and how become the main site of differentation (discussed in detail in 
chapter 6). Here, I draw on a diverse economies approach (Gibson-Graham, 2008), this time 
not necessarily to look for diverse economic dynamics but rather to shift the attention to the 
multiple possibilities at play in relationships with existing systems. I argue that much of the 
meaning of Ethereum, and indeed most blockchain systems, comes from their articulation in 
terms of such relations. I argue that the project of generalising the principles of the Bitcoin 
protocol removed these from their articulation and meaning in relation to specific authorities, 
and in the process lost much of their reasoning. ‘Decentralisation’ became a vague idea in 
and for itself but without much clear definition or purpose, systems and protocols being 
addressed as hermetic systems on the basis of whether or not they fulfilled abstract notions 
of decentralisation rather than a particular purpose in relation to the context of their use.  
I argue that bringing into play some of the initial motivations for decentralisation clarifies the 
particular disruptive potential of the technology – for example, the potential to platformise the 
design of decentralised systems that would make advanced cryptography more accessible. 
This ambition is indeed one of the main ones in the Ethereum project, namely to radically 
transform the underlying internet protocol such that existing surveillance-based business 
models are made technically and economically unfeasible. From this point of view, the 
incorporation of economic dynamics into protocol designs might be read less as a 
straightforward advancement of capitalist market logics, and more as a politicised project to 
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outcompete current internet business models by attempting to make surveillance-resistant 
protocols economically viable and attractive.  
The generalisation of Bitcoin systems design principles also brought with it a second major 
change to decentralised protocols, namely tokenisation. Tokens suggest the possibility of a 
system that pays for itself by incorporating an internal economy. I discuss this hope of a 
systems design that pays for itself, again drawing on Gibson-Graham (2018), but this time to 
suggest a shift in attention when looking internally in the protocol designs to address 
relationships with existing economic dynamics. I analyse the tokenisation of protocol designs, 
discussing first the emerging field of cryptoeconomics, suggesting that here too, the 
relationships with existing economic spaces is what matters the most – incorporating a token 
into a protocol does not make that protocol economically autonomous; rather, it draws in all 
manner of economic dynamics into the protocol itself, starting from exchange rates. Finally, I 
discuss the ways in which tokenisation has shifted the political economic assumptions in 
network culture, from one founded on openness and a critique of in particular intellectual 
property, to one of multiplying propertied relationships and their immediate enforcement. 
While this is no accident, given that cryptography indeed is a technology for determining 
access, I argue that it is not an inevitable outcome. By drawing on the earlier histories of 
decentralised systems designs, a blockchain sensibility does lend itself to more critical ideas 
of property and access, but that such an agenda would require consistent theoretical and 
practical effort. 
5.2.1  Platformising decentral isation 
In the first formal public presentation at the 2014 North American Bitcoin Conference in 
Miami, Florida the then 20-year-old founder of Ethereum, Vitalik Buterin, reframed the core 
contribution of Bitcoin from a peer-to-peer currency to a ‘global trust-free decentralised 
database’.116 Bitcoin had spurred a whole variety of monetary experimentation in new ‘alt-
coin’ cryptocurrency projects, but it had also brought ideas of how this architecture might 
support long-standing ambitions towards decentralisation in other aspects of the architecture 
of the internet, including for example website domain name registration.117 In the launch of 
Ethereum, these developments were narrated into a more explicit history. Until then, Bitcoin 
had been a proposition for decentralised digital money. The Ethereum whitepaper articulates 
a lineage, tracing the development of ‘trustlessness’ from pre-Bitcoin experiments with online 
currencies (Chaum, 1998; Back, 2002; Grigg, 2014), through Bitcoin to Ethereum.118 119 
                                                       
116 See the full presentation here: https://youtu.be/l9dpjN3Mwps Buterin initially announced the project on 
Bitcointalk.org (https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=428589.0) in 2013 just a few months before formally presenting 
it in Miami. 
117 See https://www.namecoin.org/  
118 See https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper, accessed 29th May 2017 
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Bitcoin had shown how decentralised consensus could be organised in a ‘trustless’ manner, 
and the Ethereum project would build on that advancement in order to generalise 
decentralisation. The particular understanding of decentralisation that is sought to be 
generalised is completely in coherence with its history as network design strategy, with the 
associated network security ideas of trustlessness. In the first public presentation of 
Ethereum, Buterin thereby articulated what was to become a common explainer in efforts to 
make Bitcoin palatable beyond the reputation as a means of payment for illegal activities; 
namely that the ground-breaking contribution of Bitcoin was not so much decentralised money 
but the decentralised database and consensus process – in other words, the ‘blockchain’, and 
the proof-of-work consensus protocol. Ethereum was to expand the capability of this design 
into a ‘featureless layer’ on top of which any type of application might be built (Ethereum, 
2014; Szabo, 2014; Wood, 2014a; Buterin, 2015) what people were starting to describe as 
‘next generation’ blockchain to signify the shift from application specific designs to 
generalised protocols. 
In Buterin’s first presentation he suggested three potential uses of the Ethereum project’s 
generalised protocol, namely so-called Smart Contracts, Decentralised Autonomous 
Organisations, and Web 3.0. The reasoning and motivation for these can be traced directly 
from the political sensibilities of early decentralised technologies, into a more generalised 
form. Previous generations of decentralised projects therefore explain much of the thinking 
behind and reasons why these particular applications are considered desirable. Firstly, Smart 
Contracts are essentially bits of code that are deployed on the blockchain, stored and run 
across a decentralised network. Running code in this manner is hugely ineffective in terms of 
speed and resources, but the primary aim is that the code is held and run in a decentralised 
manner that cannot be shut down or stopped by any authority. In other words, just as the file-
sharing network BitTorrent had been developed in order to make it impossible to shut down 
by authorities, Smart Contracts are equally deployed with the intention to make it impossible 
for any authority to stop them. They are ‘Smart’ because their execution is somewhat 
automated by economically incentivising others in a network to run them, and that the network 
is decentralised enough for it to be beyond control or shutdown by any single person or 
authority (see 4.2.1). This anti-authoritarian motivation and pre-history is glossed over by the 
generalising the problem of trust from specific institutions and governments to anything that 
could possibly be understood as currently operating in a centralised manner. Smart Contracts 
were not marketed as a technology to circumvent authority, but as being beyond the control of 
potentially anyone, and addressing a more general question of trust and trustlessness. They 
came to represent the possibility of automating aspects of contract law and business 
management rather than a direct challenge to specific authorities.  
                                                                                                                                                              
119 As well as forks of Bitcoin like Litecoin and additional functionality on top of the protocol, like Namecoin, Coloured 
Coins and Metacoins. 
 142 
Similarly, in what are called Decentralised Autonomous Organisations (DAO) – clusters of 
Smart Contracts that comprise an organisational form – here too the intention is for a DAO to 
run autonomously from any authority. Again, it is important to note the very particular 
understanding of authority and indeed autonomy operationalised here: the idea is that a DAO 
is ‘autonomous’ because it operates purely on the basis of the code it comprises rather than 
any human interpretation, and exists beyond the capacity for shutdown by any authority 
because it is on a decentralised network that is resilient to authorities. (Both claims were to be 
severely reconsidered in 2016 and 2017; see Chapter 6). Authority, in turn, was at the time 
understood as any person, organisation, or otherwise, that would be in a position to control or 
shut down a DAO; in other words, any human being. If a particular human would be able to 
shut down or modify a DAO, this would mean that person would have to be trusted and this 
would be a security weakness: the person might be corrupt, or a malicious government or 
corporation might take advantage of and pressure this person, which in turn could lead to 
censorship and all manner of tyranny. In order to prevent any such security weakness a DAO 
needs to operate beyond the capacity of any human to stop it or shut it down. By generalising 
trustlessness, the ability of any human to influence a given code or system would potentially 
be treated as a security threat (see 4.2 for a discussion of DAOs). The third use-case 
suggested for Ethereum was that the platform would make possible a Web 3.0, a 
redecentralisation of the internet such that the infrastructure would no longer be dominated 
and in the hands of a few monopoly companies and the associated government pressures. 
This use-case is discussed further below, in relation to events that were to become the 
political justification of Ethereum, namely the ways in which existing internet infrastructures 
were sustained by mass surveillance as revealed in a leak by former CIA employee Edward 
Snowden. The Snowden revelations, on the one hand, form a political and technical 
reasoning for ‘zero-trust’ systems and the need to generalise these to the internet more 
broadly, but they are also an important reminder of the particular remit of decentralised 
systems towards specific purposes rather than a generalisation of their particular 
understandings of decentralisation in and for itself. Here, I discuss the platformisation and 
disruptive potential of the blockchain sensibility.  
Neutrality and ‘zero-trust’ interaction systems  
As we move into the future, we find increasing need for a zero-trust interaction system. 
Even pre-Snowden, we had realised that entrusting our information to arbitrary entities on 
the internet was fraught with danger. However, post-Snowden the argument plainly falls 
in the hand of those who believe that large organisations and governments routinely 
attempt to stretch and overstep their authority. 
– Gavin Wood, 2014b, Ethereum 
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The Internet enabled Google, Facebook, Amazon, Apple to connect the world under their 
third-party custody. Blockchains can enable connecting the world under the custody of 
the participants. 
– Jon Choi, 2017, Ethereum120  
If the financial crisis and the Wikileaks banking blockade broadened the appeal and meaning 
of the political sensibilities in Bitcoin, the political reference for Ethereum was the 2013 leak 
by former CIA employee Edward Snowden, giving evidence of mass surveillance by the 
National Security Agency of the United States and international surveillance collaborations, 
working with large telecoms companies and search engines such as Google and Yahoo. 
These events had pointed to the ways in which the internet, with its existing architecture, had 
become a tool for mass surveillance and geo-political control. Buterin, as well as co-founders 
Wood (2014b) and Steiner (2018) positioned Ethereum as enabling what a broader coalition 
of technologists were aiming for, namely a Web 3.0 to redecentralise the web.121 The 
ambition of Web 3.0 is to create internet protocols that would eliminate third parties, 
‘authorities’ that might be pressured and compromised by governments or corporations and 
make possible a decentralised peer-to-peer Internet. In the above quotes, two visions for how 
such efforts might look can be gleaned: an ‘increasing need for a zero-trust system’ and that 
‘blockchains can enable connecting the world – under the custody of the participants.’ If 
decentralisation could be cryptographically and mathematically guaranteed and secured, then 
the problem of authority would be solved. By generalising this design for any and all 
applications, decentralised ‘zero-trust’ protocols – protocols that would not require trust in any 
third party – could be platformised and the problem of ‘authority’ solved for any type of 
application, protocol or system.  
Ethereum has, from the start, been positioned as a significant disruption to existing internet 
architectures, suggesting a technology-based internet governance beyond the control of any 
authority based on the idea and ambition of a neutral system. However, by developing a 
generalised platform, Ethereum also generalised the ‘problem of trust’. Similarly to 
‘decentralisation’ this generalisation of the idea of trustless systems has caused confusion, 
conflating the network security concept with a more general social condition of trustlessness, 
lending trust instead towards notions of an algorithmic neutral mediation. This conflation of 
trustless systems designs with socio-political notions of trustlessness nevertheless proves 
productive for the Ethereum project in several ways. Most notably by addressing issues of 
platform monopolies, as well as the enforcement of law through the question of trust and 
network security de-politicises the proposition and turns the debate into a question of network 
security.  
                                                       
120 See 10:52 https://youtu.be/6iEpqbACLbY  
121 See for example https://web3summit.com/ and https://web3.foundation/ and http://www.decentralisedweb.net/  
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A ‘zero-trust’ system entails a system where no single aspect needs to be trusted. It is 
therefore considered beyond the control of anyone and also neutral. The foundation of a 
philosophy of decentralisation coming out of trustless systems means that many questions 
that might be considered social, political, philosophical are framed as security questions or 
pushed to other layers that do not concern the neutral protocol. Making the issue one of 
centralisation versus decentralisation means that any critique of existing platform businesses, 
whether from a capitalist or anti-capitalist, whether to do with capitalism or rentier behaviour 
or security issues, can be incorporated with decentralisation offered as the general solution. 
This understanding of zero-trust systems in the meantime allows for a curious contradiction 
whereby protocols can aim towards monopoly status, to become the protocol on top of which 
all other protocols, applications or token systems are built, while still maintaining an ethos of 
decentralisation and anti-monopoly and anti-authoritarianism. Because the given system is 
supposedly beyond the control of even those who built it, it is not considered an 
intermediation, but a neutral protocol substrate.  
There are some interesting contradictions between the ambition of becoming a generalised 
technology-based solution beyond control and the suggestion of an internet ‘under the 
custody of the participants’, or to put it differently, ‘disintermediating’ (one of the most 
commonly stated aims of blockchain systems) while aiming to become the sole medium 
through which this would take place. Ethereum was positioned as an explicit disruption to and 
critique of platform businesses like Uber and AirBnB (Valenzuela, 2016), disintermediating the 
digital economy of intermediaries. However, the platform economy itself can be traced to pre-
blockchain efforts and excitement over the possibilities of peer-to-peer architectures that in 
turn led to new forms of intermediation and platform businesses (Scholz, 2016). The hopes 
for peer-to-peer technologies were that these would allow people to share knowledge and 
resources directly with one another. But instead of direct communication between people, 
what emerged were new platform businesses that facilitated such connections, becoming 
types of monopolies in their own right, and this led to the emergence of the so-called ‘platform 
economy’ or ‘platform capitalism’ (cf. Langley and Leyshon, 2016). A description of emerging 
platform economics offered by van Dijck (2013) defines platforms as establishing multi-sided 
markets, giving rise to new business models and financial products that curate connectivity. 
New platform business models would seek ‘rapid upscaling and extracting revenues from 
circulations and associated data trails’ (Langley & Leyshon, 2016, p. 2) in order to, following 
O’Dwyer, (2015), become monopolised rentiers of network data circulations. Platform 
businesses, instead of empowering individuals, largely created an ‘on-demand service 
economy’ where human labour could be plugged in as and when needed, with companies 
evading existing labour and tax regulations in the process (Scholz, 2016). 
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In each of the above mentioned senses, Ethereum is indeed a new kind of platform 
intermediation, but this time on a protocol layer (Buterin compared Ethereum to TCP/IP, the 
protocol of the internet); many blockchain projects seek ‘rapid upscaling’ to become the 
generalised platform on which all other tokens, contracts or protocols will be built, essentially 
seeking a form of monopoly status. They also facilitate connections and establish new multi-
sided markets, providing the conditions for decentralised markets at the data layer (and not 
only between people but also between things with ambitions for Smart Contracts in IoT 
economies); these are paid for through fees that, seen in a different light, might also be 
considered network rent. Indeed, the general gist of Smart Contracts and their clustering into 
Decentralised Autonomous Organisations is exactly to approach human labour as something 
to be plugged in as and when necessary. Finally, in keeping with the history of 
decentralisation as a strategy of circumvention, blockchain projects are often unapologetically 
positioned as vehicles for circumventing regulation and taxation. There are two ways in which 
Ethereum proposes a disruption and difference from existing forms of platform intermediation: 
firstly through the idea of trustlessness, such that the platform would be beyond the control of 
even those who build and maintain it (that points to major questions of governance and 
protocol governance, the topic of Chapter 6), and secondly by making existing platform 
business models technically and economically unfeasible by addressing centralisation in 
terms of data ownership, storage and management, and reorienting the economic activities 
around these. 
 
Figure 5. First Ethereum DevCon, Gibson Hall, City of London, 2015 (authors image). 
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The existing digital economy has been articulated as ‘surveillance capitalism’ (Zuboff, 2015) 
to describe the ways in which Google, Facebook, Amazon and others rely on mass data-
harvesting for their business models. The Ethereum project does not suggest a disruption of 
nor is critical of capitalism as such, and the emergence of ‘platform capitalism’ is not an 
explicit concern of most people involved. The very first developer’s conference of Ethereum 
was held at Gibson Hall in the City of London financial district, and the intention of the 
particular kind of ‘disruption’ marketed by Ethereum was amongst other things to outcompete 
existing financial services by platformising finance (quickly leading to the emergence of the 
so-called FinTech industry as the financial industry embraced the ‘disruption’, hired 
blockchain developers and started ‘sandboxing’ financial applications of blockchain). But to 
dismiss Ethereum as ‘business as usual’ would be to misunderstand, and miss out on, the 
particular forms of disruption proposed in this new generation of decentralised technology on 
the basis of a blockchain sensibility that I have been articulating throughout this chapter. 
Concerns for central control of various aspects of infrastructure, data and economy do open 
up important political differentiation and new sensibilities. In what might seem a perversion of 
Gibson-Graham’s diverse economies, there is nevertheless diversity in and amongst capitalist 
modes of accumulation that can pose significant disruption in ways that are not entirely 
predictable, in particular because in this case the ideas that inform them are founded in 
network computation over and above any particular business model. 
The difference between blockchain systems and existing surveillance-based internet 
infrastructure models is repeatedly articulated as one between ‘centralisation’ and 
‘decentralisation’, but with a very specific operationalisation of these terms in mind. The 
distinction is neatly captured in this quote from an interview with Buterin, founder of 
Ethereum: ‘This is the difference between people like me and Mark Zuckerberg. I live in a 
world where I presume that I could be a potential adversary to the system.’122 What Buterin is 
saying is that the Ethereum platform is built in such a way as to be beyond the control of any 
authority, including himself (a claim that could be contested, see 6.2). Claims of neutrality and 
zero-trust systems aside, there are two important differences to surveillance capitalist 
business model or platform capitalism. Firstly, for the system to be resilient towards for 
example Buterin as adversary, the data itself would need to be beyond his control, in this 
sense held in a decentralised manner. Secondly, the writing, running and maintenance of the 
system, namely protocol governance, would also need to be decentralised. Both of these 
areas present potentially significant differences and challenges to infrastructure business 
models based on data extraction. While there is nothing guaranteed in terms of control of data 
or things like privacy in the Ethereum platform itself, nevertheless a platform where data is 
held in a decentralised manner changes certain underlying dynamics in potentially radical 
                                                       
122 Buterin, interviewed by Obrist, 2018 https://tankmagazine.com/issue-74/features/vitalik-buterin/ 
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ways. A decentralised platform that would not economically depend on data extraction and 
that simplifies some aspects of advanced cryptography would indeed open up possibilities for 
a significantly different type of protocol level infrastructure both in terms of businessmodel, 
technical architecture and questions of privacy.  
It is important to still keep track of the provenance of this conception of decentralisation as it 
points to some important details in what matters to those building Ethereum protocols. 
Decentralisation was a strategy for ensuring that a system would be resilient to authorities. In 
the meantime, the primary concern here is computational, and has to do with the survival of 
the system itself while very few promises that can be made for those using the systems in 
terms of protection from authorities, empowerment or risk more generally. This is a common 
misconception, as there is a tendency to conflate the interest of the system with the interests 
of society or people more generally. A trustless system does not mean trustless for those 
using it. Because any internal component of the system might be adversarial, the nature of 
the system is radically different from other systems. The system itself is open, meaning when 
determining the security of the system, it is for the system itself, but not necessarily for those 
involved. In the meantime, the effects of platformising decentralised architectures mean that 
advanced cryptography and some aspects of decentralised data storage can be made more 
accessible. An ideal outcome of platformising the engineering of decentralised protocols then 
would be to make accessible the design of privacy-aware platforms that would force a 
renewed consideration for what kinds of economic dynamics should and could fund internet 
infrastructures.  
The hope: a system that pays for itself 
A major attraction of Bitcoin, and the idea of incorporating tokens into a decentralised system 
more generally, was the idea of a system that pays for itself. Decentralised infrastructures had 
largely been run voluntarily or with ad-hoc funding in ways that were difficult to scale. The 
possibility of a system that pays for its own upkeep by incorporating an internal economy was 
therefore an attractive prospect. Major internet companies like Google, Amazon and 
Facebook had developed business models that were able to offer services for free by turning 
service users into the product. People’s attention and behaviour would be captured, profiled, 
targeted and sold for advertisement. From there, it was a short jump for such profile and 
targeting techniques to be repurposed for security and military systems (Amoore, 2007, 2014) 
and led to what has been called surveillance capitalism (Zuboff, 2015). Rewarding miners to 
run the Bitcoin network and verify transactions opened up a broader idea that designing 
economic incentives and token economies into the systems could make the infrastructure 
economically self-sustaining such that it would not be dependent on service providers and 
surveillance-based business models.  
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Decentralised infrastructures that are run by communities with specific interests can be driven 
and motivated by a common vision and funded through external communities of support. The 
question of trust is largely understood to crop up at larger scales. For decentralised systems 
that aim at global scales and for general purposes there is an issue and question of 
motivation and accounting when running systems for the benefit of other strangers. The 
reasoning of tokenisation is that if decentralised protocols are to be generalised and operated 
across networks of people and organisations that do not know or trust one-another, these 
would need some other form of more universal motivation to contribute and a means through 
which to account for such contributions. The Bitcoin incentive structure proposed a solution to 
the issue by introducing a ‘universal’ incentive through a token economy. An infrastructure 
that would not rely on data extraction, but incorporate an internal economy such that people 
instead could contribute to and use the infrastructure on a peer-to-peer basis, was an 
attractive prospect. For part of the peer-to-peer community, then, the vision was to radically 
transform the internet ecosystem into economically sustainable infrastructures and alleviate 
voluntary work on the basis of ideals. The hope was a system that would pay for its own 
upkeep, thereby technically and economically disrupting existing internet infrastructure 
models at scale, and thereby making a blockchain sensibility economically viable. Token 
economies have in the meantime indeed created new communities that also rely on levels of 
trust (see in particular Chapter 6), and claims of universality and neutrality should be qualified 
and understood as some of the main promises and claims made in these communities. 
Creating a token is not the same as an economy. And so the hope of creating a system that 
pays for itself does face significant economic questions. Ethereum and blockchain systems 
had been addressed largely as hermetic systems, and deployed with the assumption of 
wholesale replacement of existing systems. This meant that the ongoing interrelationships 
with already existing diversity of economic contexts was given only cursory attention in terms 
of deployment rather than protocol design. But the economic sustainability and power of 
Ethereum or Bitcoin or any given token-based platform is dependent on exchange rates and 
the full range of events and actions that might affect these, which in turn therefore also affects 
the level of remuneration of a miner or node, and the cost of running a Smart Contract or an 
application. This detail and consequence of incorporating economic dynamics into protocol 
design was sidelined for the first many years of blockchain development as an unfortunate 
side effect rather than an integral aspect of how the system plays out. The motherboards, 
computers, cables and energy being used in sustaining the Bitcoin network were still 
purchased using dollars, yen, pounds and euros etc., not to mention all the other resources 
and basic needs of people engaging in and developing the system. The price of bitcoin 
against these fiat currencies mattered and still matters significantly for the ambition of 
developing systems that are autonomous from existing economic spaces.  
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Between 2014 and 2018 the price of bitcoin fluctuated wildly with an overall tendency of 
substantial increase in value against the dollar. Towards the end of 2017 the price shot up 
reaching at one point $20,000 per bitcoin, with Ethereum and many other cryptocurrency 
projects following the trend. The wild fluctuations attracted news stories of Bitcoin as a Ponzi 
scheme and of people getting rich fast or losing a hard drive with all their bitcoin and other 
dramatic life changing sums of money either made or lost by individuals around the world. 
Whether positive or negative, the news stories seemed to attract more and more people to 
cryptocurrencies. 
 
Figure 6. Chart of the market capitalisation and exchange rates of bitcoin to US dollars between June 
2016 and December 2018, from https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/bitcoin/ 
An emerging culture of DIY speculators and cryptocurrency trading experts developed and for 
some time it seemed as if the main use-case for cryptocurrencies was not exactly 
decentralised applications but to facilitate and make available financial speculation and 
currency trading to a much broader segment of society by operating in an unregulated field 
with few barriers to entry.123 124 Bitcoin had gone from an alternative to the financial system to 
spurring a decentralised and unregulated version of it. Such speculative behaviour is often 
criticised and the token economies understood as scams. It is worth acknowledging that the 
period of speculation functioned as a large fundraising drive and was experienced as 
empowering (see @coin_artist tweet below). For some, here was a potential to ‘democratise 
finance’, and a community that was accumulating attention, wealth and power at a very fast 
                                                       
123 See for example https://twitter.com/Crypto_God  
124 Apart from familiarity with the system – for which a substantial amount of effort went towards making knowledge of 
these new complex systems more accessible and readily available. 
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pace, while for others, this was a period rife with scams and Ponzi schemes.125 The tweets 
below are examples of the kinds circulating at the time, and both point towards Bitcoin 
experienced as an empowering technology, and yet both also entail an unsaid dependency 
on the exchange rate at the time – for @coin_artist in the way that her bitcoin made her 
suddenly very wealthy, and for Kevin Pham by moving wealth from the Venezuelan peso to 
bitcoin as a means to avoid the rapid inflation that was happening in the country at the time. 
Both tweets took place as bitcoin had been rapidly increasing in value in relation to the dollar. 
   
Figure 7. Screenshots of tweets by Bitcoiners, taken on 24.12.2017. 
Incorporating tokens into the protocol in some senses seemed to be working; the Bitcoin 
community was seemingly gaining economic independence and the 
blockchain/cryptocurrency ecosystem was rapidly expanding. For many who bought 
cryptocurrencies at the time, the volatility of the exchange rates provided an opportunity and 
were indeed a positive feature rather than a negative. Along with the increasing attention and 
fascination with blockchain technology and the news stories about the market spikes, a 
plethora of new cryptocurrencies started to be launched. Two problems faced by anyone 
wanting to launch a new decentralised cryptocurrency are firstly, you have to have enough 
capital and capacity to actually develop the architecture, and secondly you have to establish a 
decentralised network of miners and nodes to secure and run the new currency. And so, 
                                                       
125 See https://www.robinhoodcoop.org/#what. 
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arguably one of the most widespread applications of Ethereum to date has been for so-called 
Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) whereby new cryptocurrencies can ‘bootstrap’ the Ethereum 
blockchain to launch their own projects. Because the Ethereum platform requires tokens as a 
means to run a DAO, these were designed such that they can be deployed easily through 
what is called an ERC20 Smart Contract. By creating a token on the Ethereum platform, new 
cryptocurrency projects could sell those tokens in the expectation that they would be worth 
something down the line when the tech would be built, essentially raising the capital for it 
before almost any code has been written. Ethereum became the platform to bootstrap money 
creation. The easy creation of new tokens with the Ethereum ERC20 contract, and the 
broader attention that cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology was getting at the time due 
to the volatility of exchange rates. meant that a plethora of new currencies and projects were 
being launched and marketed, many of which were outright scams, causing a regulatory 
backlash against ICOs. 
At the same time, it was also becoming clear that the increase in price and the speculative 
behaviours ran counter to the intended uses of the systems. Volatility makes it hard to use 
Bitcoin as money to pay for goods rather than as an investment, and makes it difficult to run 
applications on Ethereum. A response began to emerge where Bitcoin ‘the currency’ was 
separated out from Bitcoin ‘the technology’, a distinction that was mirrored in other blockchain 
projects looking to distance themselves from a potential impending crash in exchange rates.  
it is important not to confuse the two: Bitcoin the technology, vs. bitcoin the network, vs. 
bitcoin the protocol vs. bitcoin the currency. So you know as far as I am concerned, 
bitcoin the currency is interesting, it pulls in the media attention and at the current price it 
is fuelling adoption, but it is almost entirely irrelevant to the much more important topic of 
Bitcoin the invention of a technology that fundamentally disrupts the status quo in a 
couple of very important industries and also as a technology cannot be uninvented.  
– Antonopoulos, A. in video interview with Kantor, T. December 2013, private archive footage 
In this quote from an interview with Bitcoin entrepreneur Antonopoulos the distinction between 
‘the technology’ and ‘the currency’ insinuates not only a distinction between the bitcoin 
currency and blockchain as a technology more generally, but also an understanding of 
blockchain as something more long-lasting with a more sturdy and significant impact than the 
unpredictable and fluctuating price of the currency. Bitcoin developers and supporters that 
wanted to distance themselves, and the project, from the unpredictable consequences of the 
wild speculation and fluctuations taking place as well as accusations of Bitcoin being a Ponzi 
scheme sought to distinguish the underlying technology from the performance as a currency. 
But this distinction is not so straightforward, and there are several reasons why the 
speculative tendencies and volatility of Bitcoin cannot be dismissed as a fictitious, fickle by-
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product of the more ‘real’ technological contribution. Firstly, as Bitcoin entrepreneur and 
author Antonopoulos also mentions in the interview that the rapid increase in value on the 
currency markets had the very real effect of driving adoption by attracting attention and media 
stories – a form of profit-driven crowd-funding that works in a trustless manner such that you 
don’t need to believe in the technology, or support its vision in order to buy into it in the hopes 
of making a lot of money and thereby supporting it materially. Secondly, as mentioned above, 
it acted as a major fundraising exercise for development of the entire blockchain industry, and 
thirdly, the tokens form an important aspect of the protocol itself, giving rise to the field of 
cryptoeconomics, which in fact is exactly based on the inseparable relationship between 
economic concepts and the technology. But finally and more significantly perhaps, the 
architecture itself has an economic design that is likely to have impact on the volatility of the 
price. To fully distinguish the technology from the currency would deny and sever further 
research into the relationship between exchange rate fluctuations and the design and 
engineering of ‘the technology’. The protocol design, after all, encodes a set of economic 
ideas, including about where value comes from, no less, and so is likely to have an effect on 
the ways in which plays out in currency markets. More careful economic designs are only 
recently being addressed more explicitly, through efforts towards so-called stable-coins 
(Blockchain, 2018) that are, for example, tethered to other government-backed currencies in 
an attempt to ensure stability. In this sense, token-based platforms are beginning to look less 
like decentralised initiatives that allow a certain autonomy from existing systems, and more 
like another layer that interacts with existing systems in complex ways that require more 
careful attention both in terms of analysis and design. 
Incorporating a token and token economy into decentralised protocol designs opens up new 
fundraising and economic possibilities that are still being experimented with, but it does not in 
any straightforward way make the infrastructure more economically self-sustaining. Although 
a deeper political and economic analysis of these economic dynamics is beyond the 
immediate scope of this thesis, it is worth giving a brief overview of what they look like: firstly, 
mining rewards double as a money creation and distribution mechanism, but depend on 
exchange rates in relation to, for example, energy costs for their profitability; secondly, fees 
for verifying blocks have become another area of research and development of economic 
incentives; third, cryptocurrency exchanges, trading platforms and apps are where people 
who are not necessarily a peer or a node can purchase tokens, and are also a main site of 
regulation; and finally Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) have operated as something between 
crowd-funding and unregulated securities issuance, and became for a few years the main 
economic model through which new blockchain and cryptocurrency projects would launch. 
Each of these face issues that are being addressed in the cryptocurrency and blockchain 
industry. Mining is incredibly wasteful in terms of energy, and has a tendency towards 
centralisation. In response, new consensus mechanisms (see for example proof-of-stake or 
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non-consensus-based systems) as well as hardware designs seek to rectify these two main 
issues. Fees entail pricing issues, whether these should be dynamic or not and an issue 
around willingness to pay in the context of the ingrained habits of free online services. One of 
the arguments for peer-to-peer payment systems was that costs would be minimised by 
eliminating third-party intermediation – a promise that current fee structures are disappointing. 
Exchanges have had some major fraud cases, and have become sites of, for example, KYC 
and AML regulation or alternatively are becoming decentralised themselves as a means to 
circumvent regulation. ICOs in turn became one of the main areas of fraud and have been 
banned in multiple countries. These token-enabled economic mechanisms have turned out to 
be hugely problematic in the long term, and the fluctuating exchange rates severely impede 
the aims of token economies as enabling financial sustainability of decentralised 
infrastructures. But when considered over time, they have nevertheless played a significant 
role in raising interest, funds and attention for a broader agenda of decentralisation. The 
question is whether there is enough clarity around what decentralisation is supposed to 
achieve, politically, socially and technically, for it to continue to matter when exchange rates 
drop and complications arise.  
If decentralised, token-based infrastructures were to contribute to an economic and political 
disruption of existing surveillance-based internet business models, there would need to be 
more deliberate consideration and design for the diversity of economic interdependence with 
existing systems. The future shape and conditions of internet provision and governance could 
potentially be disrupted by decentralisation and might very well be determined by new 
economic ideas and business models. Token systems are a potentially powerful accounting 
method for distributing and remunerating the cost of running a decentralised infrastructure, 
but there is significant work still to be done in order for token systems to make sense in terms 
of establishing some level of autonomy economically and financially, of establishing what their 
appropriate uses are and when they simply add unnecessary complexity, scarcity and 
volatility, in particular in relation to the interfacing economies of fiat currencies, resources, raw 
materials and efforts that sustain a given infrastructure. Such agendas would benefit from 
shift of focus away from internal coherence of proposed systems towards their dependencies 
and a deliberate articulation of the kinds of relationships they are intended to enable.  
My argument is that what matters for those involved in Ethereum development is not primarily 
any particular political or economic ideas or ideology, but instead should be understood as a 
particular sensibility coming out of the history and experiences of network computation. The 
sensibility has come out of network computer systems and the idea of decentralisation as a 
neutral substrate because it eliminates the possibility for control by any single set of interests. 
This sensibility does have political and economic effects, but these are not straight forward or 
easily mapped out. Such a technical proposition for tackling the dominance of major platform 
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businesses in the meantime is attractive for both those critical of platform capitalist business 
models and those who seek a new competitive angle to ‘disrupt the disruptors’, looking for 
platforms that might provide a more profitable environment for new applications and services. 
The broad appeal of the potential of ‘decentralisation’ has therefore been a powerful attractor 
to the agenda and proposition of Ethereum and blockchain. The particular anti-authoritarian 
understanding of decentralisation does, in the meantime, open up some important political 
possibilities. The focus on authority, censorship-resistance and privacy in earlier 
decentralised systems extend in important ways that disrupt established models of digital 
network governance and economics; a critique of authority at the basis of decentralised 
designs implies that protocols remain open source and open to some degree, that privacy 
concerns are prioritised and also that data, protocols and infrastructure are governed in ways 
that are transparent and at least to some extent decentralised (see 5.1.3 and 6.3). Such 
conditions go a fair way to ensuring that protocols do not become the same model of 
monopoly platform businesses, but instead either have to significantly innovate in terms of 
economic sustainability and/or draw on non-profit, potentially commons approaches. These 
developments are in no way guaranteed, however, and decentralised platforms might very 
well also become substrates for centralisation of wealth and power while placing huge 
barriers to for example accountability and oversight. Platformising decentralisation might not 
disrupt capitalism as such, but it does imply a sensibility that could pose a significant 
challenge to existing Internet business models by decentralising the control of data. The 
question of what kinds of business models such architectures would make possible, and what 
indeed would be desirable has, as of yet, not been answered. 
5.2.2  Tokenised decentral isation 
The incorporation of financial incentives into the Bitcoin security model turned out to be 
hugely generative and with Ethereum sparked a ‘tokenisation’ of decentralised protocols, 
which conversely opened these up for economic dynamics and unforeseen complications. 
Tokenisation, on the one hand, presented an opportunity to articulate decentralised 
information and communication systems that might be sustained by new kinds of business 
models, thereby posing both a technical and economic challenge to existing surveillance-
based infrastructures of the internet (Zuboff, 2015). On the other hand, it presented two major 
challenges: tokenisation also introduced new kinds of complexity deep into protocol designs 
in ways that exceed purely technical concerns, opening these up for all the complexities of 
economics and finance – and on a more fundamental level, token creation brought with it the 
tools for engineering scarcity in the otherwise infinitely replicable digital space. The latter in 
the meantime also caused a change in the economic ideas and assumptions of peer-to-peer 
decentralised technologies in which property and defining access conditions became a main 
focus. Where Bitcoin had been an application-specific proposal for a payment system, 
 155 
Ethereum generalised tokens into a form of ‘fuel’, a substrate for running any kind of 
decentralised application, cryptocurrency, platform or organisation. Economic concepts 
entered into the toolbox of decentralised systems engineers, opening up new areas of 
computational research. Here I discuss these two implications of tokenisation as a further 
extension of a blockchain sensibility, namely the complexities in field of cryptoeconomics and 
a shift in political economic sensibility within the development of decentralised systems before 
concluding the chapter. 
The complexity: cryptoeconomics 
I think of cryptoeconomics as a methodology for building systems that try to guarantee certain kinds 
of information security properties. 
– Vitalik Buterin, Ethereum126  
The reason we are talking about incentivisation is that this ethos that seems so amazing wont work 
unless the cryptoeconomics incentivisation piece works, right. The idea is not good enough unless 
everybody says actually that is a good deal for me and we want to tune the system so that 
everyone will think that it is a good deal to participate and at the end of the day the overall group is 
better off.  
– Jon Choi, in December 2017 presentation on Cryptoeceonomics and Casper127  
The incorporation of tokens and economic incentives as an integral part of the Bitcoin protocol 
design gave rise to what is called cryptoeconomics. Expanding on the concept of Bitcoin 
mining rewards and their security function – making it more profitable to contribute to the 
network than attack it – this budding interdisciplinary field is concerned specifically with 
designing incentives in such a way to ensure the secure running of decentralised systems. As 
Choi explains above, the main idea is to align the economic interests of an individual 
node/contributor with that of the system, drawing on and operationalising concepts from 
economics, game theory, cryptography and mathematics (such as probability). The 
incorporation of economic concepts into security modelling and decentralised protocol design 
is becoming an area of research and development in its own right across computer sciences 
departments and in the fields of information security and cryptography (Buterin, 2014; Garay, 
Kiayias and Leonardos, 2015; Kiayias, 2015; Bano et al., 2017; Choi, 2017; Ethereum 
Foundation, 2017), beginning from the seemingly simple solution in Bitcoin, incentivising 
contribution in the network by rewarding bitcoin miners, incentive design and the ambition of 
aligning the behaviour of individuals with that of the system quickly becomes very complex.  
                                                       
126 See https://youtu.be/pKqdjaH1dRo 1:46 - 1:56 
127 See https://youtu.be/6iEpqbACLbY 11:19 
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Figure 8. ‘Miners just follow the money, and they will definitely not attack the source of their 
income’. Tweet by DigiEconomist 14 Oct 2017. 
This tweet is typical of the ways in which game theory is drawn on in order to assess what 
kinds of behaviours might happen in the system given certain conditions. The argument is 
that although bitcoin mining has become centralised, if miners were to take advantage of this, 
they would face a backlash from those expecting Bitcoin to be decentralised, who would then 
leave the network in favour of a different cryptocurrency, resulting in fewer transactions and a 
lower bitcoin value. Incentives are here mobilised in order to guarantee a (commercial) 
concern for the legitimacy of one’s actions in a game theoretical speculation on the behaviour 
of miners. In other words, the security model in cryptoeconomic designs attempt to take into 
account various kinds of incentives or disincentives for behaving in certain ways.  
Cryptoeconomics is a field concerned with the design of systems whereby certain behaviours 
are made desirable through rewards, undesirable through punishments or impossible through 
code and cryptography. It is, in a sense, a complex endeavour of shaping a landscape of 
possible and desirable actions, indeed an attempt at a form of protocological control rather 
than disciplinary control (see 4.1 and Galloway, 2004). Ethereum and blockchain more 
generally are intended to be net neutral, meaning the infrastructure is open for anyone to use 
and participate in. The protocol is, in this sense, understood to be politically neutral, instead 
providing a substrate for any kind of protocol, currency or governance system to be built. This 
means that cryptoeconomics and incentive design tend to be discussed and addressed purely 
as security questions – how to prevent or discourage ‘malicious’ behaviour and encourage 
‘honest’ behaviour. Security concerns are considered neutral concerns, pertaining primarily to 
the survival, benefit and coherence of the system itself. But in open, decentralised protocols, 
the question of what is beneficial or not, what might be considered ‘malicious’ or ‘honest’ 
behaviour can be contentious, and the question of who gets to decide this even more so. For 
example, it’s up for debate whether a given action might be considered an ‘attack’ on the 
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system, or simply another understanding of how the system should work, and even more 
importantly, where the limits to such considerations might lie – and at what point 
cryptoeconomic designs begin to resemble attempts at large scale behavioural engineering. 
This raises the question of protocol governance; who gets to write the rules of the system and 
who gets to design the landscape (see Chapter 6).  
A second complication in the field of cryptoeconomics is the implication of incorporating the 
full range of economic dynamics into the protocol design and security model. The concept in 
Bitcoin was to incentivise mining in the network, such that this task would be more attractive 
and profitable than attacking the network. But this seemingly simple idea quickly becomes 
quite complex in attempts at measuring or assessing. Even calculating the profitability of 
mining involves a number of more or less understood variables: the cost in terms of energy 
consumption and hardware which needs to be weighed against the potential for reward in 
terms of the likelihood of computing the nonce for a block, which gets further complicated by 
the competition with other miners and the addition of mining pools, ASICS and so on. 
Calculators have been cobbled together in order to be able to determine the profitability of 
mining.128 That covers just the economic complexity of just one actor, namely the miner – 
which in turn needs to be understood in relation to the broader economic dynamics such as 
exchange rates, concentration of wealth amongst so-called ‘whales’ potentially manipulating 
the markets, the overall money supply and so on in order to achieve an understanding of the 
full security implications. In such conditions, it becomes very complex to model with any 
accuracy whether and when it is more profitable to contribute to the system than attack it, 
raising the question of what economic incentives really do in decentralised protocols and 
might contribute to in the long run. 
Once there is economic value in the network, generalising the incentive to contribute, it 
conversely also generalises the incentives to attack the system and has become an intensive 
area of modelling, testing, research and development, in order to anticipate attacks. In 
Ethereum, research is focused in particular on the security issues of shifting from the Bitcoin 
proof-of-work consensus algorithm to what is called proof-of-stake. Proof-of-stake employs 
the idea of placing an economic ‘stake’, and the threat of losing that stake, to secure the 
intentions of nodes in the network instead of mining. The Ethereum project has (as of 2019) 
two different pathways for moving from a proof-of-work to a proof-of-stake consensus 
algorithm, one that is developing an interim step in which a proof-of-stake layer will be added 
on top of the existing proof-of-work-based network, and another that would be a direct 
transition to proof-of-stake. The change is far from simple, as the individual behaviours in 
relation to new economic conditions need to be carefully modelled, and the effects of these on 
                                                       
128 See for example https://www.cryptocompare.com/mining/calculator/btc and 
https://www.coinwarz.com/calculators/bitcoin-mining-calculator  
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the overall system need to be assessed and calculated to arrive at any idea of the security 
properties or potential attack vectors involved. Researchers and developers working on this 
transition fully acknowledge that significant assumptions have to be made and that the 
system tends to get very complex, evident here in Ethereum developer Floersch’s explanation 
of the new protocol called the ‘Casper’ version of proof-of-stake:  
We have this complex behaviour emerging from really simple economic rules, right, and this 
actually not specific to Casper by any means, this is any protocol that we are messing around 
with economics we are going to have people spending their lives trying to break it, there is 
crazy stuff happening, so we need better tools for evaluating these economic incentives. If we 
don’t’ actually have the right methodologies for coming up with these kind of attacks that we 
might face we are not going to be able to properly defend our protocol. 
– Karl Floersch on Casper and proof-of-stake, 2017129  
Economic incentives, then, both increase the incentives for attack and vastly expands the 
potential attack surface. (This contradiction, whereby economic incentives are supposed to 
solve security problems but in the meantime significantly increase the attack surface is 
resolved somewhat in a similar manner as control, discussed in the second half of chapter 4, 
through the idea of complex behaviour and emergence). What Floersch means by people 
‘spending their lives trying to break it’ is that when there is economics involved and money is 
at risk, the system is likely to have a lot of attacks. Indeed, as he also states, the field quickly 
becomes very complex. To give an example of this, in the proposed Casper (what became 
known as Casper FFG, (Buterin and Griffith, 2017), the idea is that the proof-of-stake layer 
will have a ‘checkpoint’ every 50 blocks with the underlying proof-of-work blockchain. At this 
checkpoint, validators put ether into a Smart Contract, verifying a given state in the network. If 
there are two conflicting states at the checkpoint, a third of deposits will be slashed as a 
punishment for the delay in finalising a state in the network. This is one of the so-called 
‘slashing conditions’ that outline what behaviours are not permitted and therefore would result 
in funds being destroyed. In the case of conflicting states, the economic penalty increases the 
longer it takes to finalise a state, and conversely, when a state is arrived at, validators receive 
a reward. It is worth considering a few of the economic and behavioural calculations that 
would need to happen in order to understand the potential outcomes of this system: whether 
the loss of a third of funds is enough of a deterrent to prevent attacks; whether the 
punishment is too much so that it deters ‘honest nodes’ from wanting to be validators; 
whether conflicting states will occur frequently, causing so many funds to be slashed that it 
affects the overall money supply; whether money supply affects the value of the token on 
exchanges; to what extent this affects the uses of the system for applications built on top of it; 
                                                       
129 See https://youtu.be/ycF0WFHY5kc 12:18 
 159 
whether creating deliberately conflicting states at a checkpoint will be used as a potential 
attack; whether attackers are willing to burn funds to do so, draining the economy and 
preventing finalised states; whether ‘honest’ nodes would pledge a willingness to burn a 
similar amount in a public contract to continue securing the network regardless; whether 
people using the system would be satisfied with such an assurance; whether other options, 
like redistributing the funds to honest nodes rather than slashing (and burning) it is viable and 
economically possible.  
This seemingly simple idea – to use the economic self-interest of actors in the network to 
ensure that it is more lucrative for them to contribute rather than attack the system – very 
quickly becomes quite complex as the tokens that are used as incentives enter into further 
economic dynamics. It is a field with plenty of new ideas of how to apply economic concepts 
to computational security, but with systemic ramifications that are not very well understood 
yet. Navigating economic decisions in protocol design have so far been considered primarily 
for network security questions and incentives as a form of behavioural engineering for 
security purposes. This helps to delineate some core priorities and primary concerns in 
design considerations that might otherwise be hard to contain. And yet the impact of these 
decisions cannot be simply isolated network security concerns; a cryptoeconomic design 
decision is simultaneously an economic, monetary and financial decision that will also affect 
the price of running Smart Contracts and dApps (decentralised applications), and therefore 
immediately impacts and shapes the potential business models that might come out of these 
designs. These complexities are no less than the grappling and expansion of a blockchain 
sensibility, operationalising other fields and dynamics in the process.  
The change: from pirates to police 
Finally, I would like to suggest another, rarely commented on consequence of tokenisation, 
namely a shift in the economic aims and ideas prevalent in blockchain notions of 
decentraliation. Early generations of decentralised technologies from the late ‘80s through to 
the early ‘00s employed decentralisation as a strategy to make a given system resilient 
against potential legal persecution. In peer-to-peer network culture at the time, a critique of 
intellectual property circulated based on the idea of digital copies as next to zero cost and 
infinite, and therefore naturally abundant (cf. Arvanitakis and Fredriksson 2016). File-sharing 
communities resisted digital rights management technologies as an artificial imposition of 
scarcity on information, knowledge and digital goods, epitomised in the slogan ‘information 
wants to be free’. The infinite replicability of ‘the digital’ formed the intellectual justification for 
file-sharing and digital piracy. Networks were spaces of free flows of abundant knowledge and 
information, entailing multiple pathways that would circumvent any attempt at blockage or 
control. Because code, information and knowledge have no inherent scarcity, there had been 
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an underlying critique of, in particular, intellectual property rights and any attempt at forcing 
scarcity on abundant resources. Bitcoin marked a significant shift in this history of peer-to-
peer network politics, a shift to an economic position that could be said to be the exact 
inverse – concerned with the expansion of what might be deemed property, building some of 
the most fine-grained IP management systems aimed at immediate and ‘unmediated’ policing 
of property rights (see for example Mattereum and Slock.it).130 131 Through Bitcoin, 
cryptography went from being a tool to ensure privacy to determining ownership more 
broadly. For the purposes of establishing a peer-to-peer payment system, this was necessary 
in order to prevent infinite replication of token records, thereby rendering the payment system 
meaningless. But in the meantime it has had major implications across several different 
scales and has significantly changed the very culture and assumptions of peer-to-peer in 
ways that have not been sufficiently acknowledged and understood. When Ethereum 
platformised and generalised aspects of the Bitcoin protocol, the ability to determine 
ownership and access control was an engrained logic and set of use-cases. Smart Contracts 
could become the means for fine-grained control of access to uniquely defined digital objects, 
determined in a ledger. The proposition of replacing aspects of payment systems, contracts, 
identity registration and legal enforcement with a decentralised version of these has drawn 
those who might previously have been critical of the very techniques of such state and 
economic institutions into their reinforcement in and through digital technologies (Käll, 2018; 
Manski and Manski, 2018).  
There are nevertheless important legacies from earlier generations of peer-to-peer with an 
affinity to open sharing of especially knowledge: educational material and code tends to be 
open and shared widely, and there is a culture of leaking if relevant information is being 
withheld. So while Ethereum and blockchain assemblages are rarely critical of questions of 
private and intellectual property rights or capitalism more broadly, these sensibilities and their 
encoding in protocols and architectures pose some complications for what are called 
surveillance-based business models (Zuboff, 2015). Herein lies the potential for disruption 
that can in part be traced back to the political sensibilities of earlier decentralised systems. 
For example, most major blockchains are fully public, what has since been called 
‘unpermissioned blockchains’, meaning one does not need special credentials or permissions 
to take part in the network and browse the data. This poses a problem for many types of 
business that would rather keep most of their operations and agreements relatively private.  
Such approaches to decentralisation and openness are justified through network security 
issues and privacy concerns rather than a consideration of the socio-political effects of 
different property regimes. In the meantime, so-called permissioned layers have been added 
                                                       
130 See https://mattereum.com/  
131 See https://slock.it/  
 161 
so that new types of privacy arrangements can be established (cf. Didil, 2017). These layers 
add the potential for fine-grained management of privacy and transparency that would be 
better suited to existing business needs. In order to facilitate research and development for 
how Ethereum might be useful for businesses and industry, the Enterprise Ethereum Alliance 
was formed, with nearly 500 companies and institutions as members, ranging from tech 
companies like Microsoft, to Antibiotic research UK, Credit Suisse to the Government of 
Andhra Pradesh in South India, Singapore University of Social Sciences, Santander, BP, 
Shell, American Family Insurance and many more, including blockchain start-ups and 
Consensys.132 The Alliance is also a non-profit, but is set up to support research and 
development of Ethereum-based applications specifically for industry, including exploring 
permissioned uses of the otherwise unpermissioned Ethereum chain. While the Foundation 
applauded the formation of the alliance, it retained independence from it.133 134  
Neither privacy and transparency, nor new, open business models are therefore guaranteed 
by the protocols. New layers are developed on top of such systems that can exacerbate or 
ameliorate issues of data and privacy as well as issues around Intellectual Property, 
ownership and access. There is an implicit arrangement of commons, public and private 
economies, but also some significant areas of negotiation over appropriate economic and 
property regimes currently taking place. And so much of the political-economic potential and 
outcome of decentralised systems is very much up for negotiation. But it is a negotiation and 
developing sensibility that prioritises security in decentralised network computation, as these 
are considered to be a neutral starting point.  
The ability of cryptographic tools to determine access conditions maps well to existing 
understandings of property and allows for very fine-grained determination of property 
relations, and so has a momentum of its own. The political sensibilities and affiliation of the 
current generation of decentralisation movement are grounded in decentralised networks 
rather than particular economic and politically informed ideas. And so, just as with capitalism 
more generally, there is not an explicit critique of state technologies either beyond notions of 
centralised control. Instead, the determination and enforcement of property and identity are let 
lose as tools for anyone to use, determine and define in ever more fine-grained manners; 
many technologies, concepts and frameworks from what might otherwise be understood as 
centralised entities to be deployed in new decentralised ways as the political, economic and 
legal is addressed from the perspective of the decentralised computational network rather 
than the other way around. Notions like security, property, sovereignty and so on are not 
scrutinised per se, but instead are sought to be decentralised such that these are no longer 
                                                       
132 See https://entethalliance.org/  
133 See https://entethalliance.org/ footer stating independence between the Alliance and the Foundation. 
134 See https://cointelegraph.com/news/ethereum-alliance-formed-by-microsoft-intel-ubs-secures-support-of-eth-
foundation 
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determined and enforced by a state, but by potentially anyone. The effects of decentralising 
existing economic and financial technologies cannot be easily predicted, because they do 
open up tools of digital security and enforcement that was previously out of reach. But this 
has entailed a shift from a culture of pirates circumventing authorities, to policing and 
enforcement of property and through designing automated algorithmic authorities. 
 
5.3  Conclusion 
What holds a blockchain assemblage together, the common sensibility across the field, is not 
concerned or unified by neither the disruption of, nor propagation, of right wing capitalist 
ideas. Yet there are aspects to the ways in which such a sensibility does present a 
redistribution of the sensible, through which new things come to matter that have the potential 
to disrupt existing digital economies and business models, challenging existing sensibilities. 
In this chapter I have traced through and described a blockchain sensibility. Drawing on 
Rancière’s notion of disruption and redistribution of the sensible and Barad’s articulation of an 
onto-epistemological making into matter what matters, the sensibility I have traced comprises 
the assumptions and ideas of what matters in the assemblage. I employed Gibson-Graham’s 
notion of diverse economies (2008), initially when approaching the blockchain assemblage 
and analysing it through the history of decentralised architectures. This enabled me to shift 
the focus from concerns and questions of capitalism to a broader as well as more specific 
interrogation such that other matters might come to light. I drew on the idea of diverse 
economies once again when approaching questions of tokenisation from within a blockchain 
assemblage, such that relations to already existing economic spaces in, for example, 
exchange rates are addressed rather than sidelined as not mattering. I acknowledge that this 
might be considered somewhat of a misappropriation of Gibson-Graham’s intentions and 
agenda, as, arguably, my analysis stays within the bounds of established and formal 
economics rather than discussing the diversity of for example social currency projects in 
blockchain nor, for example, their feminist approach of highlighting dependencies on 
externalities, materials extraction or unpaid labour. This has largely been because the aim of 
this chapter has primarily been to articulate a sensibility of the blockchain assemblage and to 
do this in order to point towards the edges of what matters in such a sensibility. The aim, in 
other words, has not been to argue for more inclusion of things otherwise not perceived as 
mattering (whether exchange rates, unpaid labour, materials extraction and so on), but 
instead to make visible the particular nature of this kind of sensibility, that, in turn, would allow 
for other sensibilities to sit alongside and shift the focus of attention and analysis to their 
relations. In short, the aim is not inclusion (inclusion and externalities are a condition of 
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assumptions of a singular sensibility) instead to articulate as specific what otherwise tends to 
be described as general – in the case of blockchain, computation and markets. 
To conclude, what holds the assemblage together is not primarily particular economic, nor 
political affiliations, but an affiliation with decentralisation as articulated in and through 
network computation. It is an understanding and operationalisation of decentralisation that 
stems from earlier peer-to-peer histories of developing decentralised architectures in order to 
circumvent authorities. The history of peer-to-peer and cryptography in the Cypherpunk 
movement in particular in the US and UK had entailed severe legal and personal 
consequences for those involved (Coleman, 2009, 2014), in which inordinately harsh 
sentences had been passed on digital and information activists.135 These experiences 
solidified the understanding of central government as violent and coercive and the law as 
acting in favor of big business interests while also enforcing the idea of the need for peer-to-
peer networks to resist these. The purposes in early decentralised design were particular, 
practical and usually well understood by the communities building, sustaining and using a 
given system, namely to make systems that would be resilient to targeting by authorities. I 
have argued that the context of the financial crisis and the specific Wikileaks case gave 
Bitcoin and decentralisation a more general appeal as a disruption to existing economic and 
political institutions and processes. Along with Bitcoin, an emphasis from Cypherpunk culture 
also emerged and became a more broad tendency, namely the importance given to 
technology-based solutions to problems of power, not only as a tool for resisting particular 
governments and agendas but as a general proposition in and of itself. Technological 
networks would be independent of not just government control but also the control of 
potentially corrupt human beings more generally, and would provide a (net) neutral substrate 
for decentralised communities to form. 
I have drawn on this pre-Bitcoin history of decentralisation in order to explain the very specific 
ideas and justifications for blockchain. I have argued that in the years since the invention of 
Bitcoin and in particular through Ethereum, two major shifts happened in the development of 
such decentralised architectures, namely their generalisation into platforms and their 
tokenisation, both of which have had major effects as decentralisation changed from a 
strategy to a general sensibility. I argue that an overlooked detail in these experiences is very 
important for understanding what was to become a generalised blockchain sensibility, namely 
an affiliation with the system over and above what happens to those using it. Decentralisation 
had been effective for ensuring the survival of the system in the face of authorities, but not 
necessarily the individuals running nodes or using the network who might very well be 
arrested, scammed or targeted in other ways. This, I argue, is a legacy from early 
                                                       
135 See for example the story of Aaron Schwartz (Schwartz, 2013) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/13/technology/aaron-swartz-internet-activist-dies-at-26.html  
 164 
decentralised systems design that was generalised with the Ethereum project of making the 
Bitcoin architecture Turing-complete. It is an approach to systems design that has had a 
major effect on the use-cases and sensibility of blockchain projects ever since, and can be 
seen in the particular understandings of trust, authority, control and autonomy. The system 
design itself is considered trustless, while for those using it, it indeed requires a lot of trust; 
the system should be decentralised so that it is beyond control by any authority, but authority, 
in a generalised system, is anyone who might control the system, therefore the system itself 
needs to be built such that it is beyond the control of anyone. Autonomy, therefore, is 
autonomy of the network system, ensuring it is beyond control – a generalised autonomy, 
rather than self-determination and more control for a particular community. The generalisation 
of an operationalisation of decentralisation from earlier peer-to-peer strategy, where 
conditions and truths are determined primarily for the system, has caused confusion, 
conflating systems designs with social and political effects, but also been very effective in 
attracting support, interest and efforts across political spectrums.  
Ethereum also generalised tokens as a means for coordinating and operating decentralised 
computation. In what I have discussed as ‘tokenisation’ I traced how Ethereum turned the 
specific application of Bitcoin as a payment infrastructure into a platform fuelling any potential 
computation rather than just transactions. Instead of discussing the merits of this approach 
from a critique of capitalism, I draw out and discuss the particular form of disruption that this 
was intended to initiate, namely as a system that would pay for itself and therefore undermine 
the existing business models currently sustaining the internet. I draw again on Gibson-
Graham, however, to point towards the ways in which otherwise sidelined issues of other 
economic spaces continue to matter and complicate such hopes for economic autonomy, with 
the explicit example of dependence on exchange rates. I argue that this is not only a 
dependency but, also, by being incorporated into the protocol, complicates the design and 
modelling in the emerging field of cryptoeconomics. Finally, I discuss a broader shift that the 
generalisation of tokens has brought about, namely a shift in the culture of peer-to-peer from 
an understanding of digital networks as fluid spaces of abundance towards ever more fine-
grained determination and enforcement of property. In a sense, the tendency has been 
towards decentralising techniques of both state and markets in ways that are more 
complicated than simply replicating these. In the next chapter, I describe two major events in 
Bitcoin and Ethereum that challenged and caused a reassessment of how a blockchain 
sensibility might best be materialised, putting into question the appropriate role and limitations 
of algorithmic means for organising consensus. 
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6  Dissensible matters 
In this chapter I propose the concept of the dissensible to describe a persistence of 
incompatible sensibilities and to look at the ways in which dissensus and incompatibility are 
negotiated in Bitcoin and Ethereum. The Bitcoin consensus algorithm had inspired a whole 
new field of engineering decentralised protocols based on the idea of algorithmic means for 
organising consensus in decentralised networks. Bitcoin and Ethereum were intended to be 
‘trustless’ – neutral protocol substrates, algorithmic rules, on top of which all manner of 
differences or any form of political or economic systems might be designed and play out. 
Such consensus algorithms determine a form of consensus for the network, but as it turned 
out, the sites of disagreement, differences and dissensus, the question of the political, shifted 
to protocols themselves, their design and maintenance. In the previous two chapters, I have 
described the concepts and ideas that are operationalised in blockchain, and the histories and 
experiences that gave rise to these specific understandings of concepts of decentralisation, 
trust, autonomy and neutrality. The political in relation to the technical might be understood as 
the construction, materialisation and automation of particular social, cultural and political 
concerns (Daston and Galison, 1992; Latour, 1992; Feenberg, 1999; Star, 1999; Paul N. 
Edwards, 2003). But the proposition of blockchain distinguishes itself from other technologies 
in that it seeks to intervene into the very processes of political determination; not only as an 
expression and materialisation of, but also as a proposition for, different agencies through 
which to negotiate the political, suggesting the involvement of algorithmic determination in 
governance, the very process of negotiating and settling differences. If blockchain protocols 
suggest a new resolution to the political, determining how decisions are made, then in the 
words of Kreutler, ‘Who is responsible for making the decision on how to make decisions?’ 
(2018). This question became pertinent in and for blockchain assemblages over the course of 
major conflicts about protocol changes in both Bitcoin and Ethereum. In Bitcoin, a long-
standing question around scalability, known as the Bitcoin scaling conflict, culminated in the 
network ‘forking’ in August 2017, splitting into two different cryptocurrencies. In addition, after 
what became known as The DAO hack, the Ethereum Foundation decided to fork the 
blockchain in 2016 in what some saw as a betrayal of the claim of immutability and 
autonomous code raising questions around governance of the Ethereum protocol. 
Challenges to the assumed consensus in the network turned what were otherwise perceived 
as purely technical issues into politicised debates and raised questions of what holds 
blockchain assemblages together and how they come apart when differences and 
incompatibility turns out to be unresolvable. By tracing dissensus and incompatibility the limits 
to algorithmically-determined consensus in open decentralised networks present themselves: 
open, decentralised networks can be designed in many different ways and these differences 
are not only a matter of what ‘works’ best technically but also for who or what it works, who 
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benefits most from a given change to the architecture and who gets to determine and enforce 
such changes. In Bitcoin and Ethereum, the concept of ‘decentralisation’ was mobilised and 
operationalised alongside cryptography in order to determine and enforce consensus without 
resorting to authorities, and yet, decentralisation is in itself articulated and materialised in and 
through different mediums (networks, assemblies, chats or otherwise) and can be encoded in 
different ways. I discuss decentralisation as the ‘fix’ to this very question of ‘who is 
responsible’ in relation to literature on the political, most notably Rancière’s discussions of the 
political as the moment of dissensus ‘as the presence of two worlds in one’ (Rancière, 2010, 
p. 37) and Mouffe’s ontological starting point of ‘failed unicity’ (Mouffe, 2012, p. 29), both 
acknowledging the ongoing possibility of incompatibility, difference and disagreement. 
Drawing on these notions, I critique the idea of decentralisation as a ‘fix’ to the political in any 
final manner, describing the political instead as ongoing potential for things to be different. 
The dissensible, drawing on Barad, is the onto-epistemological potential for incompatible 
differences to emerge and come to matter.  
The chapter is structured as follows: I first describe the way the Bitcoin protocol is governed in 
and through a version control platform commonly used for hosting and collaborating on code 
projects, namely GitHub. I then describe the Bitcoin scaling conflict and the ways in which the 
roles and actions of GitHub as well as the emergence of more specialised roles in the Bitcoin 
network became foregrounded as governance mechanisms and rearticulated as such. The 
conflict politicised what were otherwise considered neutral technical questions about capacity 
and scale, these suggesting different development pathways and visions for the project 
drawing on different ideas of decentralisation. The Bitcoin scaling conflict resulted in a ‘fork’, 
which was to become one of the main mechanisms through which to resolve incompatible 
differences. In the second half of the chapter then, I first describe ‘forking’ as a dissensus 
mechanism, and then discuss the differences and implications of project forks, code forks, 
chain forks, hard or soft forks. I then discuss a major conflict in the Ethereum assemblage, 
namely The DAO hack, which was to fundamentally challenge the idea of autonomous, 
neutral code beyond the control of humans that had informed much of the proposition of the 
platform. The hack forced a reassessment of understandings of non-human determinacy and 
opened up for a rearticulation of these in which ‘the social’ would have a place. In the years 
since these two major conflicts, governance has become one of the major areas of focus in 
blockchain projects more broadly. In response, some tendencies in the field address the 
problem of governance as something to be solved once again through forms of code and 
algorithmic determinacy in what has come to be known as ‘on-chain governance’, while in 
other projects the problem is addressed through attempts drawing up the right combination of 
human and algorithmic determinacy with the at coding entirely new forms of societies. I would 
like to suggest that instead of these variations on complete solutions to governance and the 
political, which both assume a blank slate or complete replacement, a far more interesting 
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approach would be had by focusing on what a particular network-form of governance might 
do in relation to other already existing geo-political governance institutions – in other words, 
tracing the project once again back to its roots as a means for circumventing authority, less as 
a complete solution and replacement, and more as a new kind of space that might sit along 
side existing institutions and processes for political determination. This also raises the 
question of what more precisely it is that blockchain and decentralised governance methods 
can do that is different from existing institutional forms and methods of addressing the 
dissensible. 
 
6.1  Bitcoin and the matter of dissensible decentralisation 
Bitcoin Core is an open source project, which maintains and releases Bitcoin client software 
called “Bitcoin Core”. 
It is a direct descendant of the original Bitcoin software client released by Satoshi Nakamoto 
after he published the famous Bitcoin whitepaper. 
Bitcoin Core consists of both “full-node” software for fully validating the blockchain as well as a 
bitcoin wallet. The project also currently maintains related software such as the cryptography 
library libsecp256k1 and others located at GitHub. 
Anyone can contribute to Bitcoin Core. 
– Bitcoin Core website136  
 
The quote above, from the Bitcoin Core project webpage, is a very careful description that no 
longer takes for granted that the people, client and repository of Bitcoin Core is necessarily 
‘Bitcoin’, although for all intents and purposes it is, in the sense that the project maintains the 
reference cl ient that most of the network is running.137 This understanding, that Bitcoin 
Core is not in any easy or straightforward way ‘Bitcoin’, but instead is a specific project in and 
amongst other potential versions of Bitcoin, has been one of the consequences of the scaling 
conflict, a major unresolved dispute over a technical decision that would have longer term 
ramifications for the development pathway of the project.138 The Bitcoin scaling conflict made 
evident that the consensus protocol does not in itself resolve problems of dissensus and does 
                                                       
136 See https://bitcoincore.org/en/about/ [accessed 27.11.2017]   
137 See also https://bitcoin.org/en/about-us#owntxt4-title describing how ‘Bitcoin.org is not Bitcoin's official website. 
Just like nobody owns the email technology, nobody owns the Bitcoin network. As such, nobody can speak with 
authority in the name of Bitcoin.’ 
138 As of 2018, still very much an open dispute.  
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not solve problems of power and the political in any final manner. A dissensibility forced 
debates about who or what determines the outcome of such incompatible positions. The 
maintenance of the Bitcoin protocol came to matter and it became necessary to articulate the 
governance of the protocol itself. These new articulations in turn would have to contend and 
comply with the main sensibilities of decentralisation, openness and consensus which in turn 
led to new understandings of open source protocol development processes as important 
governance methods.  
This section first describes the distinct types of actors and modes of governance that 
emerged in and through the conflict as mattering politically. It is important to know a little bit 
how protocols are managed, updated, deployed and executed in open, decentralised systems 
in order to understand the ways in which these roles became politicised in the process of the 
scaling conflict. I then outline the story of the conflict itself, highlighting the ways in which it 
challenged and forced a rearticulation of claims of decentralisation and trustlessness in 
relation to the specific interests and concerns of the actors involved. Finally, I discuss the 
case in terms of how the political is once again sought to be resolved through a measure of 
decentralisation to not only the protocol but also governance layers. The section concludes 
with three main points raised by analysing Bitcoin protocol governance through the 
persistence of the dissensible: that ‘decentralisation’ can be operationalised and encoded in 
many different ways; that mediums of governance therefore are always necessarily particular 
and therefore matter politically; that any governance ‘solution’ is therefore necessarily 
particular rather than a final solution to the political. These points mean that a given 
architecture scrutinised not only for the extent to which they live up to a given measure of 
decentralisation, but more precisely the extent to which they live up to an assumed effect of 
decentralisation.  
6.1.1  Governing open protocols 
The Bitcoin protocol and algorithms are run across thousands of computers that reference 
and are updated from a specific repository on GitHub also called the reference cl ient.139 
This reference client comprises the consensus rules of Bitcoin, meaning the rules that nodes 
in the network agree make up ‘Bitcoin.’ Until the scaling conflict, the processes and actors 
involved in maintaining, deploying and running the reference client were not considered to 
matter significantly in terms of the political aims of the project. ‘Bitcoin’ as a decentralised 
peer-to-peer project tended to be thought of through node/vector diagrams, nodes 
communicating directly and of relatively equal size – but as it turned out, not all nodes are the 
same. Specialised actors emerged with different kinds of interests, informed by conditions 
external to the protocol itself, for example exchange rates, the cost of electricity in a given 
                                                       
139 See https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/ 
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country and so on. When the conflict intensified, these were held up for scrutiny in terms of 
the main principle of decentralisation, and in the security terms of trustlessness. Here, I briefly 
describe the different types of roles and activities involved in making changes to, deploying 
and running Bitcoin clients.  
GitHub is the platform through which the Bitcoin reference client is managed. It is a distributed 
versioning and collaboration platform based on git version control systems used for many 
open source development projects. The platform determines a set of relationships and 
credentials to the repositories and content, much of which has filtered into and become a 
major part of how blockchain protocol governance is discussed and takes place. Code is held 
in repositories, of which a person, or limited group of people, are ‘owners’ and can decide 
on the permissions of other contributors. In Bitcoin Core there are three people, called 
project maintainers (as of early 2018 Wladimir J. van der Laan, Marco Falke and Jonas 
Schnelli), who have what is called commit access, meaning they can determine what 
contributions by any of the hundreds of contributors are committed (integrated) into Bitcoin 
reference client code (or that of other related projects in the Bitcoin repository).140 There are 
several different ways this takes place – pull requests, merges etc.– which I explain below.141  
 
Figure 9. Screenshot of the first six in a long list of contributors to the Bitcoin reference client on GitHub 
from the creation of the repository in 2009 until January 16th 2019. 
                                                       
140 See https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/projects  
141 See https://help.github.com/articles/github-glossary/  
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The primary purpose of GitHub is to facilitate the management of contributions to code in 
such a way that these can happen openly and freely by anyone while still keeping the integrity 
of a given codebase (the screenshot above is of a page in the Bitcoin GitHub repository, 
listing contributors and their contribution statistics). Anyone wishing to contribute to Bitcoin 
can fork some part of the Bitcoin repository, meaning duplicating some of the code into a 
different repository to work on their own changes, experiments, patches or additions. They 
can then submit what is called a pul l  request with the given contribution. After a peer-review 
process, developers can choose to merge and commit or reject it. If rejected, the person 
submitting the pull request can choose to develop their own fork of the code in a new 
repository, meaning that they control and essentially have a version of the (Bitcoin) code that 
includes their amendment (see code forking, more on forks in section 3.2). This also means 
that, at least in theory although practically unlikely, Bitcoin could change hands in terms of 
reference client maintainers if there was consensus in the network that developments taking 
place in a new repository better reflect the aims of the project (for that to happen would 
require coordination of a large number of actors across remote geographical locations, as will 
become evident). The GitHub platform also keeps track of who has done which commits and 
when, giving an overview of contributions and transparency of who has been responsible for 
what aspect of the code.142 
The process for contributing to the Bitcoin repository was further formalised by developer 
Amir Taaki in 2011, specifying the Bitcoin Improvement Protocol (BIP) through a first BIP0001 
as a way to create some oversight and accountability in code governance, motivated by a 
concern regarding informal hierarchies that were emerging. The purpose of BIPs and the 
general code governance model in Bitcoin is meant to be managing maintenance and 
patches in the most efficient manner. Many of these discussions take place on the 
developers’ mailing list with regards to why a given proposal might be suitable or not. 
However, those whose contributions and suggestions are rejected are not always in 
agreement, and there is disgruntlement about the development process being determined by 
informal dynamics between trusted insiders. Jo Freeman’s seminal feminist text The Tyranny 
of Structurelessness was referenced in forums and debates in particular during the Bitcoin 
scaling conflict (described in more detail below) to raise awareness of informal hierarchies in 
what might otherwise be considered decentralised, horizontal conditions.143 The BIP process 
was partially modelled on the Python Improvement Process.144 To submit a BIP, one is first 
encouraged to discuss the idea in more informal channels and forums of the community, to 
                                                       
142 See https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/graphs/contributors  
143 See for example 
https://www.reddit.com/r/Buttcoin/comments/2bmbmi/the_tyranny_of_structurelessness_and_why/  
144 See BIP101, the proposal for how to suggest changes to the protocol 
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0001.mediawiki. This process is not unique to Bitcoin but an evolution 
of processes developed in open source more generally, and in this case specifically inspired by the process used in 
Python, PEP-0001 
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understand whether the idea has been suggested before or is indeed relevant before 
developing it further; then to email the proposal to the Bitcoin developers’ mailing list, an open 
email list, as well as the BIP editor (Dashjr as of 2018).145 146 The suggestion might already 
at have been rejected before reaching status as a BIP. The BIP editor ensures that the BIP 
follows the formatting requirements and has the required information before it is assigned a 
number. The author (or ‘champion’ of the BIP) then submits it as a pul l  request to the BIP 
section of the repository at https://github.com/bitcoin/bips. It is then reviewed further by peers 
and merged by the BIP editor when ready.  
It might seem as if developers with commit access have substantial powers to determine the 
direction of a protocol. However, because the code is open and reviewed by a community of 
developers, and a given client needs to be accepted by nodes and run across thousands of 
computers rather than a central server, contributors and nodes in the network have to be 
convinced to change over to the new protocol as and when major changes are made (cf. 
Wirdum 2016c). This happens in several ways, but the most powerful to date has been by 
convincing miners to adopt changes. Miners validate transactions and add blocks to the 
blockchain, so they can essentially decide to stop validating transactions that are made using 
a previous version of the protocol, and push for adoption of the new version (or the other way 
around, refusing the modified protocol). This decision can be relatively harmless, in the case 
of so-called soft forks (discussed further in section 6.2.1 below), as these types of changes 
and patches do not break compatibility between versions. But the case of a hard fork, in 
which the new version is incompatible with previous versions, the Bitcoin blockchain splits 
and miners play a significant part in determining which of the forks ‘win’ by mining on the 
branch that they agree with.147 Although miners are in this way able to determine the outcome 
of protocol changes (a particularly problematic possibility given the centralisation of mining, 
discussed in 4.1.3), they are however not the only type of nodes that ensure that transactions 
comply with the consensus. 
Full  nodes are peers in the Bitcoin network that store the full Bitcoin blockchain and run a 
full Bitcoin client.148 They participate by witnessing and relaying messages, checking that the 
consensus rules, i.e. Bitcoin reference client is complied with. If a transaction is not in the 
correct format, or attempts something that is not permitted by the reference client, it is 
rejected by the full nodes and will not be added to the memory pool of transactions to be 
mined and verified. In this sense, full nodes can also organise and mobilise in support or 
                                                       
145 https://bitcoin.org/en/development website (accessed 27.02.2018) recommends irc.freenode.net #bitcoin-core-
dev. Web interface: https://webchat.freenode.net/?channels=bitcoin-core-dev Logs: http://bitcoinstats.com/irc/bitcoin-
core-dev/logs/2018/02  
146 See full archive: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev 
147 Miners can also ‘signal’ their support for a given protocol change, as in the case of BIP141, by hashing a little 
message into their blocks (in this case bit1, and in the case of BIP). See Wirdum, 2017 
https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/bip-91-has-activated-heres-what-means-and-what-it-does-not/  
148 Also called full nodes, as they store the entire blockchain and check that the protocol is complied with.  
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refusal of a given change to the protocol. Full nodes emerged as a potential actor and 
decision-maker role in terms of protocol governance when the scaling conflict seemed to have 
reached a deadlock. Through a campaign for a ‘user activated soft fork’ (BIP 148) in 2016 
organised largely through the #UASF hashtag on Twitter, people were encouraged to set up 
full nodes adopting a protocol change that would resolve the conflict through a compromise 
that would prevent the network from splitting (see segregated witness below). Full nodes can, 
in this way, participate in determining and implementing protocol changes, but are different 
from miners in the sense that they are not rewarded for their contribution in the network. This 
difference to some extent also shapes the characteristics and interests of the two types of 
nodes: mining is increasingly done by mining pools, companies that have begun to resemble 
commercial service providers, whereas full nodes tend to be run by people looking to 
contribute on the basis of concerns for the ethos, overall development and governance of the 
project. 
At the height of the Bitcoin scaling conflict in 2016, the BIP process was updated and 
expanded by Bitcoin developer Luke Dashjr, likely in response to accusations and 
disgruntlement of centralised tendencies in protocol governance, in order to ‘make the 
selection criteria more objective.’149 Notably, the updated BIP process also included a new 
articulation of Bitcoin protocol governance that would justify these processes in relation to the 
principle of decentralisation understood in its market form: 
For Bitcoin to function as a currency, it must be accepted as payment. Bitcoins have no value if 
you cannot acquire anything in exchange for them. If everyone accepting such payments 
requires a particular set of consensus rules, "bitcoins" are de facto defined by that set of rules - 
this is already the case today. If those consensus rules are expected to broaden (as with a 
hard-fork), those merchants need to accept payments made under the new set of rules, or they 
will reject "bitcoins" as invalid. Holders are relevant to the degree in that they choose the 
merchants they wish to spend their bitcoins with, and could also as a whole decide to sell 
under one set of consensus rules or the other, thus flooding the market with bitcoins and 
crashing the price. 
– BIP 0002, Dashjr150  
The argument was that coin ‘holders’ could wield power and determine protocol decisions 
through, for example, crashing the price, as mentioned above. Including such economic 
dynamics in the new BIP process description can be understood as a rearticulation of the 
Bitcoin governance, defending its decentralised nature: the argument was that neither 
developers with commit access, miners, nor full nodes fully determine the direction of the 
                                                       
149 See https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0002.mediawiki  
150 See https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0002.mediawiki [accessed 08.10.2018] 
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project, because the project would have no value and these roles would be meaningless if 
there were no people doing transactions or merchants accepting Bitcoin. This argument was 
used in order to justify and meet the criteria of decentralisation by involving an idea of ‘the 
economy’ as part of a governance process – and so coin holders and merchants entered into 
a description of the balances of power and decentralised governance of the system. This 
remains to a large degree a claim, as the understanding of coin holders and merchants as 
distinct, organised and coordinated governance actors that are able to answer back to 
developers and miners has so far not been significant. This form of capacity – to signal 
disagreement on the direction of the protocol by changing to a different currency – is also 
likely limited by network effects. If a network is large enough, it can be near impossible for an 
individual to leave given that most activities are taking place through that network. 
Cryptocurrency exchanges had, in the meantime, emerged as powerful entities, serving as 
gateways for new users to access and purchase cryptocurrencies. Decisions about whether 
to list a currency or not could make a big difference for the success and survival of that 
currency. These have the potential to play a significant role in putting pressure for a given 
technical change to take place. Exchanges were therefore also an obvious site of legislation 
(specifically KYC, Know Your Customer, and AML, Anti Money Laundering), which in turn 
also affected decisions about which currencies to list. But most significantly in terms of 
protocol governance, exchanges’ handling of forks, whereby a given currency would split into 
several versions, also came into question. In open decentralised systems, setting the criteria 
for what currency is considered worth supporting or not was politicised. The emergence of 
decentralised exchanges took place in and around these years, in response to such questions 
of governance, whereby an exchange would have the power to determine the validity of a 
currency, as well as in response to legislation and the concomitant compromise on the 
principle of anonymity and perceived potential of censorship and control by authorities. 
With this brief run-through of the diversity of actors and how code maintenance, updates and 
changes happen in Bitcoin I intend to explain the ways that notions of decentralisation, 
openness and trustlessness that hold together the Bitcoin assemblage form a sensibility, and 
are attempted to be realised not only in the protocol but also in its governance. In the 
following section, I describe a major conflict in Bitcoin that was to test many of these code 
governance processes and raise the issue of how to deal with incompatible differences. The 
Bitcoin consensus algorithm had, for some, solved the age-old problem of consensus without 
authority, the final sentence of the Bitcoin whitepaper reading: ‘Any needed rules and 
incentives can be enforced with this consensus mechanism’ (Nakamoto 2008, p. 8). But as it 
turned out, the consensus mechanism itself was not beyond dispute, despite being made up 
of cryptographic proofs in a ‘trustless’ architecture. I discuss the re-emergence of the political, 
the dissensible, in the sense of negotiating incompatibility in Bitcoin, and the ways in which 
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these are resolved while still in reference to the primary principle of ‘decentralisation’. The 
Bitcoin scaling conflict raised the issue of dissensus, politicising what were otherwise 
perceived as technical questions, where the political disputes of ‘mushy humans’ (see 
Chapter 4) was supposed to have been resolved through a neutral consensus algorithm. 
6.1.2  The Bitcoin scal ing confl ict 
The Bitcoin scaling conflict can be summarised as being about how to technically 
accommodate for a growing number of transactions. The reference client stipulates a data 
limit of 1MB per block that had been put in place early in the history of Bitcoin to safeguard 
against micro payments being used as DDoS attack – spamming the network with many small 
transactions.151 As the network and number of transactions grew, most notably two Bitcoin 
developers, Mike Hearn and Gavin Andresen, began to publicly express concern that blocks 
on the blockchain were ‘filling up’ in the sense that the increasing numbers of transactions 
meant blocks were nearing the 1MB blocksize hard limit (Andresen, 2015; Hearn, 2015, 2016; 
IamSatoshi, 2015; Vavilov, 2016). The worry was that this would cause delays in transaction 
verification and inhibit any scaling of the network in terms of capacity and numbers of 
transactions. In June 2015 Andresen put forward a so-called Bitcoin Improvement Proposal, 
BIP101, proposing to increase the data limit of the blocks on the blockchain at a steady rate, 
starting with an increase to 8MB, which became known as Bitcoin Classic. These ideas were 
further developed with Hearn into the Bitcoin XT client to replace the existing Bitcoin client, 
sparking divisions and outrage across large parts of the community. The outrage was largely 
because XT would force a hard fork of the Bitcoin protocol, meaning the changes it proposed 
would be incompatible with the existing reference client, and would potentially split the 
network.152 XT and Classic were understood as not only a change to blocksize but also a 
commitment to a very specific development pathway for Bitcoin that a large number of Bitcoin 
developers and users disagreed with.  
The position against increasing blocksize was largely that the governance and running of the 
protocol layer should remain decentralised, and that in order to scale the network, faster and 
possibly more centralised solutions and applications could be built on top (BitFury Group, 
2015; Vavilov, 2016; Wirdum, 2016b). The argument was that larger blocksizes would make 
the load of participating as a full node in the network heavier, and potentially centralise who is 
able to run Bitcoin in terms of witnessing transactions and ensuring that the consensus rules 
were complied with; that larger blocks would result in fewer people able to run nodes. There 
                                                       
151 DDOS attacks mean denial of service attacks and are usually done by overloading a system – in this case 
overloading the network with transactions by flooding it with micropayments. See 
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1347.msg15366#msg15366  
152 See Bitcoin Core statement on hardforks and softforks and compatibility in relation to the scaling conflict: 
https://bitcoincore.org/en/2016/01/07/statement/ See also http://nodecounter.com/#all_nodes for a graph of how 
many nodes are running which protocol.  
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were already concerns that the centralisation of mining was concentrating power in a few 
hands (see image below) and full nodes had emerged as a potential counter balance to this. 
The dispute came to be debated as a question of trade-off between throughput (where larger 
blocksizes would facilitate more transactions) and decentralisation at the protocol layer (which 
might be compromised by a larger blocksize solution to the problem of throughput) (cf. 
Wirdum 2016b).  
 
Figure 10. Screenshot of tweet by Jameson Lopp at the Scaling bitcoin conference in December 2015, 
demonstrating the centralisation of bitcoin mining.153  
In order to develop proposals further and attempt to find common solutions, a major 
conference, the Scaling Bitcoin workshop, was held in Hong Kong in December 2015 
gathering engineers, developers, academics and stakeholders and during which several 
alternative solutions to larger blocksizes were presented.154 What came to be known as the 
Bitcoin Core fraction and a company called Blockstream took the position that the Bitcoin 
blockchain was more suited as a decentralised settlement layer. New technical proposals 
would accommodate other layers of development that would facilitate faster transactions, 
including sidechains (Back et al., 2014), a lightning network (Poon and Dryja, 2015) and 
segregated witness (Wuille, 2015). The dispute was developing from a technical issue into a 
question of the future shape and purpose of the project, referencing different understandings 
of ‘decentralisation’, namely whether to compete directly with existing global payment 
                                                       
153 See https://twitter.com/lopp/status/673398201307664384 
154 See https://hongkong2015.scalingbitcoin.org/  
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infrastructures as ‘cash’, or evolve as a new form of infrastructure altogether, potentially as a 
form of global settlement layer or asset class, prioritising decentralisation on a protocol layer 
(Wirdum, 2016b).  
In the midst of the scaling conflict in the summer of 2016, an Australian businessman, Craig 
Wright, came forward to the media and general public claiming to be Satoshi Nakamoto, the 
inventor of Bitcoin, and staged a series of ‘proof sessions’ broadcast by the BBC, The 
Economist and GQ. Wright had already held ‘private proof sessions’ with Bitcoin Classic 
developer Gavin Andresen and one of the founding directors of the Bitcoin Foundation, Jon 
Matonis, who subsequently both published blogposts in support of Wright.155 Both of these 
individuals also supported increasing the Bitcoin blocksize. The Bitcoin community scrutinised 
and immediately rejected the proofs as fake and demanded he sign a block or a message 
with a cryptographic key used in some of the earliest blocks on the Bitcoin blockchain.156 For 
a community that had formed around the idea of a trustless system, Wright would have to 
provide evidence in the only way acceptable as secure to this community – through a valid 
cryptographic signature. But Wright refused ‘to jump through further hoops.’ This comment on 
ycombinator expresses the general feeling:  
Why would Satoshi go about proving his existence and identity in such a convoluted matter? 
Simply signing the genesis with a message and posting it pretty much anywhere (bitcointalk, 
/r/bitcoin, here) for people to verify is all it takes. Not a rambling blot posts full of screenshots 
and some back-alley interview. This is exactly the kind of 'slight of hand' that a conman utilises, 
not a cryptographer of Satoshi's caliber. 
– Forum thread on ycombinator157  
As soon as it became clear that the proofs were fake, it was announced that developer Gavin 
Andresen had had his commit access revoked, stating concerns that the security of his 
account and/or his opinions had been hacked and that he was too close to Matonis and the 
Bitcoin Foundation who were perceived as cooperating closely with US regulatory 
authorities.158 Gavin Andresen was the developer who had initially suggested an increase in 
                                                       
155 See Matonis (2016): http://themonetaryfuture.blogspot.co.uk/2016/05/how-i-met-satoshi.html and Andresen (2016: 
http://gavinandresen.ninja/satoshi; here Andresen states that Wright signed a message with the private key from 
block 1 of the Bitcoin blockchain, see 
https://np.reddit.com/r/btc/comments/4hfyyo/gavin_can_you_please_detail_all_parts_of_the/d2plygg/ 
156 See http://blog.erratasec.com/2016/05/satoshi-how-craig-wrights-deception.html#.WpgiEILLjMW , 
https://dankaminsky.com/2016/05/03/the-cryptographically-provable-con-man/ illustrating how Wright faked his 
proofs.  
157 See https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11609611  
158 Commit access is the ability to implement protocol changes that only a handful of developers have. Changes to 
the protocol take two different forms – as either a soft fork that can run despite some nodes still running the old 
protocol or as a hard fork, which is backwards incompatible. 
https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/4hl7i2/gavins_commit_access_unlikely_to_be_restored/ 
https://www.reddit.com/r/btc/comments/3wl6sa/can_someone_do_finitely_tell_me_who_exactly_are/  
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/tree/master/doc  
 177 
blocksize and was one of only two people, the other being the developer Jeff Garzik, that at 
the time had commit access to the Bitcoin repository. Satoshi Nakamoto themselves had 
handed Andresen the keys when they left the project and disappeared in 2010, and so 
discussions circulated about why Andresen (and indeed Matonis of the Bitcoin Foundation) 
would support the claims of Wright.159 Because of the timing, in the midst of the scaling 
conflict, many pointed towards the significance that Wright’s claims to being Nakamoto would 
have in shaping the outcomes of the conflict:  
acqq on May 2, 2016 [-]  
> what other reasons could there be for his support? 
The most obvious reason is simpler: Wright and those who accept his claims are "big-
blockians": 
"Matonis, Andresen and Wright are all big-blockians. Having the esteemed creator 
Satoshi on their side would help their argument, and it is entirely plausible that there 
are several large organisations who would benefit from having more control over the 
regulation of Bitcoin." 
The same fact is also alluded to in the OP Economist article: 
"It pays, too, to bear in mind that Mr Wright’s outing will most likely be of benefit to 
those in the current bitcoin civil war who want to expand the blocksize quickly, whose 
number include Mr Matonis and Mr Andresen. Mr Wright says that if he could reinvent 
bitcoin, he would program in a steady increase of the blocksize." 
Add to that that there's this conference in NY today where Andresen repeats his 
claims: https://vid.me/FhZu 
 – Forum thread on ycombinator160  
The conflict continued and became increasingly tense, and in January 2016 Mike Hearn 
publicly left the Bitcoin project (Hearn, 2016). As discussed above, Bitcoin developers can 
write code, put forward BIPs and argue their positions but do not finally determine the 
outcome of the conflict as they rely on miners and full nodes to run any protocol changes, and 
not long after Hearn’s departure over the course of the spring of 2016 it was clear that Bitcoin 
XT had been largely rejected by the network. The dispute continued with personal 
accusations, conferences, formal and informal meetings and speculation about the power and 
interests at stake (Morgan, 2017), while new technical solutions were being worked on by the 
Core developers. Segregated witness, a technical compromise that had also been presented 
at the 2015 Hong Kong Bitcoin Scaling conference, gained attention over the following two 
                                                       
159 See Andresen’s statement of intentions regarding the maintenance of the Bitcoin reference client after taking over 
from Satoshi, 2010 https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=2367.0&all=  
160 See https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11609611  
 178 
years resulting in a ‘soft fork’ with parts of the network running what was called SegWit 
version of the Bitcoin client. The solution proposed to allow transaction data and signatures to 
be treated separately. The idea was that this would make nodes accepting 1MB blocks able 
to validate more transactions by not including signatures, while those nodes accepting and 
able to compute larger blocks could also do so, essentially allowing small and large blocks 
without requiring a hard fork (van Wirdum, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). In the meantime, another 
version of the protocol, Bitcoin Cash, was launched and mobilised support for a hard fork to 
increase blocksizes. The name was intended to explicitly reference Nakamoto’s whitepaper 
for Bitcoin as ‘electronic cash’, and claimed to be closer to that vision by being able to 
manage more transactions and looking to compete with other online payment systems.161 The 
conflict had been going on for some time and a group of users launched a campaign to push 
for SegWit as a compromise and resolution to avoid hard forks under the Twitter hashtag 
#UASF.162 On the 1st of August 2017, those advocating a larger blocksize (including Craig 
Wright, ex-Bitcoin developer Gavin Andresen, Jihan Wu behind one of the largest mining 
hardware companies, and vocal Bitcoin libertarians Roger Ver and John McAfee) successfully 
hard forked Bitcoin Cash.163 164  
 
Figure 11. Announcement on the nodecounter.com website illustrating some of the accusations swirling 
around the Bitcoin community in relation to the scaling conflict. 
                                                       
161 See for example https://www.bitcoin.com/info/bitcoin-cash-is-bitcoin  
162 See https://transactionfee.info/charts/payments/segwit  
163 GitHub repository: https://github.com/bitcoincashjs/bitcoincashjs  
164 See for example https://blog.sfox.com/the-bitcoin-cash-people-platforms-wallets-and-miners-you-need-to-know-
afa53aaa3c66 for an overview.  
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Through these events, the roles and powers of different kinds of actors were being argued 
and discussed, and a governance model was being articulated attempting to explain who was 
or was not in control of Bitcoin (Wirdum, 2016a, 2016b). The scaling conflict and the inability 
for any fraction to fully ‘win’ was for some proof of the security properties of decentralisation. 
In the words of Bitcoin miner Guo, ‘people like Bitcoin because it is out of control’ 
(HackerGold, 2016), referring to the fact that no single interest group has been able to take it 
over and control the protocol, despite what has been interpreted as several attempts to do so. 
The dismissal of large block solutions, Hearn’s earlier departure, Andresen’s commit access 
revocation and the dismissal of Craig Wright as the inventor of Bitcoin were celebrated by 
some as demonstrating the network’s resilience against individual interests and takeover 
attempts. For others, however, it was a frustrating inability for the network to move forward as 
well as evidence of the ultimate control by a company called Blockstream based on the fact 
that several of the Core developers worked with this company (see, for example, the image 
above). The #UASF by full nodes had in turn been an attempt to resolve the clashing interests 
of the different camps, but the Cash fork occurred nevertheless, an incompatible 
differentiation from what then became known as Bitcoin Core resulting in two different and 
incompatible versions of Bitcoin. 
The governance of the Bitcoin protocol had emerged out of open source software 
development processes for writing, reviewing and deploying code in an open decentralised 
manner. Relationships and processes outside of the protocol itself were not perceived to 
matter for the integrity of the technical maintenance. This radically changed in the scaling 
conflict. ‘Decentralisation’ was the inviolable principle and measure of legitimacy for everyone 
involved, but it turned out that the core principle and aim of ‘decentralisation’ could be 
interpreted in very different ways; that there were potential trade-offs with other principles and 
aims; that not all ‘nodes’ in a network were equal or had similar interests at stake; that they 
would benefit differently from different solutions; and that what takes place outside of the 
protocol also potentially matters and cannot be not fully determined through protocological 
consensus rules. The different kinds of contributors, nodes, exchanges, and affiliations with 
particular companies, commercial interests and political ideas came to matter and were drawn 
into considerations and measures of the aim and principle of decentralisation. 
6.1.3  Decentral isation pol i t ic ised  
Decentralisation can mean many things to many people and had, from the years 2014 
onwards, become a sweeping marketing slogan for the growing blockchain industry more 
generally. The Bitcoin scaling conflict raised questions around the exact definition and 
properties of decentralisation in relation to questions of authority and control. Parts of the 
engineering and developer community sought to establish more precise definitions such that 
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these could be assessed and measured, maintaining some scientific as well as political 
integrity of the systems (Srinivasan, 2017; Troncoso et al., 2017; Azouvi, Maller and 
Meiklejohn, 2018; Gencer et al., 2018; Vorick, 2018). Clear definitions and measurements 
were necessary in order to assess the state of decentralisation in and for these systems, and 
indeed to measure whether or not decentralisation was having the intended effects – 
questions which became particularly important in this period of conflict for the project overall.  
As discussed in Chapter 5, decentralisation is operationalised in particular ways for a 
computer network system, namely in order to solve the problem of authority by making a 
network that is impossible for any single actor to dominate. But in the scaling conflict new 
things came to matter for such a condition of ‘decentralisation’ to be met. The questions of 
decentralisation and authority were expanded from the state of the network itself and had to 
be considered in and for the communities writing and maintaining a given protocol, from 
contributions, comments and discussions on the code base to mining and mining hardware 
(Srinivasan, 2017; Troncoso et al., 2017; Azouvi, Maller and Meiklejohn, 2018; Gencer et al., 
2018; Vorick, 2018). Such studies and attempts at measuring decentralisation are met with 
the problem of where to draw the limits around what matters and can be determined in and 
through a description of decentralised governance. For example, measuring ‘decentralisation’ 
in the writing of protocols might be done through an analysis of GitHub commits, comments 
and contributions to the repository (Azouvi, Maller and Meiklejohn, 2018) but this (as the 
authors themselves point out) does not say much about discussions across other forums and 
the level of involvement, transparency and engagement at conferences or elsewhere, which 
equally might affect what gets written and committed to the protocol. The adoption of such 
changes might in turn be affected by investment in a given piece of mining hardware and the 
economic interests of the companies involved (Vorick, 2018). The scaling conflict raised the 
question of what should be considered to matter in the aim of achieving ‘decentralisation’. 
Modelling and constructing deterministic conditions with certain desired properties are the 
important tasks of computer engineering and information security disciplines. But the scaling 
conflict shifted attention from the deterministic relationships in the protocol to the writing, 
adoption and deployment of the protocol and to all the potential conditions that might affect 
these – in effect raising a very fundamental question of the limits of what should be 
considered to matter in the engineering of open, decentralised systems. This question of the 
limits of the design space is beginning to be understood as one of the particular security and 
engineering design challenges posed by decentralised open systems (Bonneau et al., 2015; 
Troncoso et al., 2017). The limits to deterministic conditions might be established in and for a 
given protocol, but such limits cannot be easily taken for granted in open, decentralised 
systems and remain an unresolved question in the design and philosophies of such systems. 
It raises fundamental questions about what aspects of the aims of decentralisation, and its 
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associated principles, can and should be taken care of through a determinate protocol; and 
how does the determinate protocol relate to other sensibilities and modes of determinacy, 
such as the interests of diverse actors in the network (but potentially also extended to other 
things that might come to matter like geographical, legal and political contexts – for example 
how these potentially contribute to the concentration of bitcoin mining in China).  
An issue with addressing decentralisation as defined and measured only in terms of security 
is the reduction of the political to a security question. For some, the scaling conflict was a 
stress test of decentralisation as a security property and systems design resistant to 
authorities – a test which it passed by resisting the imposition of larger blocksizes, DDoS 
attacks and takeover attempts by a fake Satoshi Nakamoto. For others, the opposite was the 
case, and Bitcoin had been taken over by default through clever prevention of blocksize 
increase by Core developers. But the attraction of decentralised systems, and the motivation 
for its measure, was not only driven by the notion of authority as a security question, but also 
around questions of power, and empowerment, freedom, participation and involvement. 
Decentralisation had been considered an aim in and of itself, with the supposed effects of 
decentralised architectures remaining vague except for on the question of censorship. This 
vagueness as to the supposed properties and effects of decentralisation, as discussed in 
Chapter 5, had been hugely powerful because it allowed people to attach their own 
expectations of effects onto such decentralised architectures without much scrutiny. The 
scaling conflict and assessments of decentralisation in and for the processes that the protocol 
depended on raised the question of what is the definition and meaning of decentralisation 
beyond the security concerns of the network itself. Other expectations of the effects of 
decentralisation became important. For example, the issue of authority might be resolved in 
the network, but does not necessarily address an issue of power more generally; a network 
without authority can be used very effectively for the concentration of wealth or mining power, 
for example. And so you can have a decentralised platform and even a decentralised 
governance structure that nevertheless can be easily manipulated for other purposes that 
might contradict with other expected effects of decentralisation such as decentralised power, 
autonomy and so on. The scaling conflict raised these questions not only in terms of concerns 
about how centralisation of economic interests might affect the security assumptions of 
decentralised networks, but also in terms of how decentralisation, as a principle and aim, 
might relate to and in certain designs imply trade-offs with other principles and properties. The 
most explicit of such trade-offs was expressed in terms of transaction throughput versus 
protocol decentralisation.  
The aim of a given blockchain protocol is to establish determinate conditions and outcomes 
with particular security properties. As an open, decentralised system, the dissensible raised 
the question of the limits of such modes of determinacy as other sensibilities make 
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themselves matter in ways that in turn also affect the defined deterministic conditions. Efforts 
towards defining the supposed properties and measuring the effects of decentralisation are a 
step forward, where before, decentralisation has been very much considered an aim in and of 
itself. Such critical assessments are essential for a more grounded assessment of the 
principle and supposed effects of decentralisation in Bitcoin and blockchain. However, the 
social and political effects of decentralised architectures remain hugely under-defined and 
under-examined. There is an important difference and tension between decentralisation as 
conceptualised in and for network protocols and decentralisation as an ethical, political, social 
or economic aim or principle that such a protocol might or might not support. Focusing only on 
one mode of (algorithmic) determinacy in a decentralised, open system is to ignore the ways 
in which other modes might significantly alter the effects, as would become even more 
evident over the course of 2016, when in the midst of the Bitcoin scaling conflict Ethereum 
found itself in its own governance crisis.  
 
6.2  Ethereum and forking as a dissensus mechanism 
The Bitcoin scaling conflict brought to light questions of protocol governance. As it turned out, 
the political could not be fixed in any final manner, even through the consensus mechanisms 
of a truth machine. This became even more evident in the Ethereum DAO exploit. Ethereum 
had learned from and replicated aspects of the Bitcoin protocol governance model, for 
example BIPs, in Ethereum called EIPs, and understandings of the market as part of 
decentralised protocol governance. Nevertheless, at the height of the Bitcoin conflict in 2016 
Ethereum faced its own governance crisis, foregrounding another of the main promises of 
blockchain as a fix for the political, namely immutability. The immutability of blockchain was 
important in order for a system to be considered ‘trustless’ and for the claims of Ethereum as 
a system operating outside of the control of humans: if the blockchain could be reverted or 
changed, it implied an authority with such powers, which in turn also potentially undermined 
the principle of decentralisation, as that authority would need to be trusted. As it turned out, 
immutability, just as decentralisation, could be determined and enacted in different ways 
drawing on different modes of determinacy. Protocol governance came to matter for 
blockchain communities, becoming a major topic of discussions and blog posts and articles 
(Caffyn, 2015; Hagelstrom, 2016; Wirdum, 2016c; Buterin, 2017; Zamfir, 2018), opening up a 
negotiation over what might be best determined through a consensus algorithm, when and 
how ‘the social’ might be necessary. In the second half of this chapter, I describe a major 
conflict in Ethereum, namely The DAO exploit, and the ways in which these events forced a 
rearticulation of ideas of immutable code, governance and determinacy. But first I will 
describe how ‘forking’ of code repositories emerged as a dissensus mechanism in developer 
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communities.165 Forking was, in the Bitcoin conflict, perceived as a negative, as it would split 
the network, thereby weakening its security properties (by reducing hashrate amongst other 
things). Through the conflict and more notably in the Ethereum DAO hack, forking began to 
be reconsidered as part of an accepted repertoire of managing difference and dissensus in 
ways that correspond to the general sensibility of blockchain, namely an expanded 
understanding of decentralisation as the possibility for diverse networks, openness and 
freedom to join or leave a network and repurpose code.  
6.2.1  Forking as dissensus  mechanism 
The concept of forking comes out of the open source software community as a way to 
manage distributed contribution and versioning while ensuring project coherence. Open 
source software management functions, such as hard and soft forks, pull requests and so on, 
have through disagreements and conflicts in the blockchain assemblage been politicised and 
have become understood as governance mechanisms for decentralised protocols without 
resorting to authorities. Forking in particular has, since the Bitcoin scaling conflict and 
Ethereum DAO exploit, become a significant aspect of protocol governance. There are 
several different types of forking with different implications in terms of protocol governance:  
Code forks 
Code forks came about as a version control mechanism in the coding workflow primarily 
with the introduction of git and GitHub. Code forks take place all the time and are 
intended to be temporary, such that a given patch or improvement can be worked on 
independently and without clogging up or messing with the existing code. The intention is 
that the patch or improvement will then be merged once it is ready (through a pull request 
if the author does not have commit access by the project maintainers).  
Project fork 
Project forks are forks of a given GitHub or git repository with the intention of developing a 
new project, one that is not necessarily antagonistic but simply builds on what has 
already been developed. It is a fundamental part of open source culture in which the 
ability to use what has already been developed (whether code or knowledge more 
generally) is understood as anyone’s right and as a core resource and benefit to 
everybody because it allows for innovation and development. Plenty of forks were taking 
place early on in Bitcoin in a creative burst of what are called alt-coins, testing out other 
designs, consensus protocols and economic or monetary ideas. These forks were not 
                                                       
165 Forking as dissensus mechanism was a term I articulated with RIAT as part of the Fork-Politics in Post-
Consensus Cryptoeconomics at Transmediale, February 2018: https://2018.transmediale.de/content/fork-politics-in-
post-consensus-cryptoeconomics  
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necessarily intended to change or replace Bitcoin as such, but were part of a broader field 
of experimentation in a period of cryptocurrency development that was characterised by 
playfulness and curiosity rather than competition. Later forks of Bitcoin, however, have 
been on the basis of technical disagreements and the relationship between Bitcoin and 
alt-coins/other blockchain-based projects have become increasingly competitive.  
Chain forks 
Chain forks are particular to blockchain protocols. Changes to a reference client can force 
a chain fork and happen when different parts of the network start running different clients. 
Peers in the network (full nodes and miners) ‘witness’ transactions that comply with the 
reference client that they are running. If there is disagreement on the client and the rules 
it stipulates for transactions, different peers might start to run different versions of the 
client and nodes might not witness and transmit the transactions they ‘disagree’ with. In 
turn, miners might not mine blocks containing transactions that do not comply with what 
they consider to be the consensus, meaning the chain might split and miners might start 
mining on different chains. 
Soft and hard (chain) forks 
There are two types of code and chain forks: hard and soft. Soft forks are changes to a 
client that are still compatible with an existing protocol and therefore do not necessitate a 
chain fork. A hard fork entails a fork in the blockchain, meaning nodes need to decide 
what client they want to run and miners have to decide what chain they want to mine on.  
Hard forks were initially not very well received in the blockchain community, partially because 
they split the network and in the process weaken security; if the network running a given client 
is smaller, it might be easier for someone to control a large enough part of the network for 
what is called a 51% attack, namely to be able to dominate the blockchain by controlling most 
of the mining power. The proof-of-work consensus algorithm organises an emerging 
consensus that depends on it being impossible for any single node to mine blocks faster than 
the rest of the network. If the network is small enough, however, it becomes easier for a node 
or set of nodes to do so, thereby dominating the mining of blocks, and essentially controlling 
which transactions are verified or not. More recent research, however, has shown that hard 
forks of both Bitcoin and Ethereum have not significantly split the respective networks; 
instead, the forks have generally drawn in new contributors (Azouvi, Maller and Meiklejohn, 
2018), with new constituencies formed around and mobilised by new visions for Bitcoin and 
Ethereum.  
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The idea of forking expanded on the notion of the digital as making possible a different kind of 
politics whereby rules and realities are complied with in a voluntary manner and new rules, 
new realities, relations, currencies and constituencies might be created as and when needed. 
Such notions of forking tend to exclude the ways in which such rules and constituencies 
depend on much more arduous contexts and relations that nevertheless remain the same 
regardless of which new client is run (see Chapter 5). Through Ethereum’s own governance 
crisis, new articulations of forking began to form as a dissensus mechanism, and these were 
perceived as a powerful tool for forcing a ‘vote’ on protocol changes by forcing the network to 
chose which client to run, drawing human decision-making back into the system but without 
resorting to authorities. For others, however, forking also represented a betrayal of the 
promise of immutable code and non-algorithmic determination, representing the return of 
authorities. 
6.2.2  The Ethereum DAO exploit  
Ethereum was a project to generalise the Bitcoin blockchain such that instead of only 
transactions, the blockchain would also hold bits of code and execute any type of 
computation. These bits of code were articulated as Smart Contracts – contracts that would 
execute as written, and beyond the control of any person or institution once they had been 
deployed because the contracts would be held in a decentralised manner and executed on 
the basis of financial incentives. A cluster of such Smart Contracts was then envisioned to 
form a Decentralised Autonomous Organisation (DAO), an organisation that would operate on 
and through a decentralised network, beyond the control of humans, beholden only to its 
contract code. The first explicit instance of a DAO was developed and launched by the 
Ethereum-based Internet-of-Things company Slock.it in the spring of 2016.166 Its purpose was 
to act as a fund to invest in Ethereum-based start-ups, motivated by a desire to expand the 
decentralised model to the actual funding of new projects rather than be reliant on venture 
capital funding and traditional business models. The creators of The DAO promised an 
entirely new organisational model that would be governed only and explicitly through its 
contract code (Tual, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c) independent from any legislation or human 
intervention. This was emphasised and enshrined in a document where it was made explicit 
that any statements of intent, publications or promotional material would have no implications 
in the running of The DAO. The contract code, and only the contract code, would count in its 
governance:  
The terms of The DAO Creation are set forth in the smart contract code existing on the Ethereum 
blockchain at 0xbb9bc244d798123fde783fcc1c72d3bb8c189413. Nothing in this explanation of 
terms or in any other document or communication may modify or add any additional obligations or 
                                                       
166 See https://daohub.org/  
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guarantees beyond those set forth in The DAO’s code. Any and all explanatory terms or 
descriptions are merely offered for educational purposes and do not supercede or modify the 
express terms of The DAO’s code set forth on the blockchain; to the extent you believe there to be 
any conflict or discrepancy between the descriptions offered here and the functionality of The 
DAO’s code at 0xbb9bc244d798123fde783fcc1c72d3bb8c189413, The DAO’s code controls 
and sets forth al l  terms of The DAO Creation. 
– Terms set out on The DAO website, 2016167 
On the back of the attention surrounding Smart Contracts and Ethereum as a whole, The 
DAO received near $22 million worth of ether in the first week of token sales, much more than 
was anticipated.168 169 Over the next months the value of The DAO soared to over $100mil. 
The intention was that start-ups would submit proposals for new Ethereum-based projects 
and applications, which The DAO would then fund after a round of voting by token holders. 
Slock.it themselves submitted a proposal 1, in which they suggested an Ethereum ‘network of 
things’ sharing platform (Slock.it, 2016) in which The DAO would receive a percentage of any 
revenue generated in the platform, providing a return on investment to token holders.170 There 
was no time for more proposals to be submitted, however, because on the morning of the 17th 
of June 2016 the funds in The DAO contract account started to drop substantially; an amount 
of 258 ether tokens were being repeatedly sent to a new DAO address rapidly emptying The 
DAO of funds totalling approximately $60 million worth of ether.171 The hack turned out to be a 
combination of functionality in the code, in which the splitDAO function that automatically 
releases a token holder’s initial investment, the very function that is supposed to protect token 
holders from attacks by allowing them to withdraw their funds in case they, for example, 
disagree with curator, was being looped, sending funds to a new childDAO.172 As news 
began to spread, the value of ether crashed. Because the amount of investment siphoned off 
to the new DAO represented a large market share of the ether currency, it became a problem 
not only for the Slock.it start-up but for the Ethereum platform as a whole, forcing 
interventions and statements by Ethereum core developers (Buterin, 2016b). In some frantic 
hours in which exchanges were asked to shut down all trade in ether to prevent the hacker 
from withdrawing the tokens and exchanging them to fiat currency, thoughts of ‘rolling back’ 
                                                       
167 See https://web.archive.org/web/20160501124801/https://daohub.org/explainer.html (accessed June 29th 2016) 
This quote was circulated across forums, articles and blog posts commenting on the exploit, the likely or best 
response and rights of investors, etc. See also a supposed letter from the hacker/exploiter 
https://pastebin.com/CcGUBgDG  
168 See https://blog.slock.it/the-inexorable-rise-of-the-dao-2b6e739b2615#.f1gaowogr  
169 Ethereum developer Vlad Zamfir stated in conversation that the amount of investment in The DAO far exceeded 
anyone’s expectations, and probably exacerbated the security risk. 
170 The principle of disintermediation seems to have given way to a more traditional corporate network ‘rentier’ model, 
the innovation instead being in the ease at which ownership and stakes can be traded, and the management of funds 
by cryptographically enforced agreements.  
171 The address showing all the transactions can be browsed here: 
https://etherchain.org/account/0x304a554a310c7e546dfe434669c62820b7d83490#txreceived  
172 http://hackingdistributed.com/2016/06/18/analysis-of-the-dao-exploit/  
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the blockchain were floated. Ethereum founder Buterin issued a statement suggesting a soft 
fork, which was dismissed on the basis of further security issues.173 Founder of the company 
Slock.it Tual pushed for a hard fork in which the split would be reversed and all funds would 
be returned to token holders.174 The idea of a rollback or a fork was met with furious response 
by exchanges and parts of the community. The comment below was symptomatic in many 
discussion forums following the fork proposals: 
The "too big to fail" approach is what the crypto-world set out to solve in the first place, now one of 
the chief projects is flat out admitting that "too big to fail" is an ok policy.  
– User “Ledgers” on reddit discussion175 
The very purpose of Ethereum, a platform promising unstoppable decentralised applications 
and Decentralised Autonomous Organisations, was being betrayed. Code that was supposed 
to be beyond the reach of control and thereby beyond any potential political disputes or 
censorship turned out to not be so easily extracted from human concerns. A leaked chat 
between some of the Ethereum core developers and cryptocurrency exchanges in the early 
hours of the exploit show the resistance to a rollback as a serious violation of the 
‘immutability’ of the blockchain and Smart Contracts.176 The DAO had, after all, been 
advertised as being governed only and exclusively by the contract code – which in this 
instance indeed allowed for calling the split function in a loop. A rollback of the blockchain 
(restarting the network from a block before the exploit had taken place) through a decision by 
the core developers was seen as undermining the promise of immutability and the whole 
purpose of trustless system:  
[4:59:49 AM] QIU Liang: YUNBI Exchange think ROLLBACK IS EVIL 
[5:00:01 AM] Mike Li: We don’t agree rollback 
[5:00:35 AM] Craig Sellars: You can't claim immutability and then change the ledger. 
[5:01:05 AM] Mike Li: Rollback will be unfair for all ETH traders on Yunbi 
[5:01:14 AM] Philip G. Potter: even a serious discussion about a rollback by eth overlords IS EVIL 
– Chat-log between Ethereum developers and exchanges, June 18th 2016177 
                                                       
173 https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/06/17/critical-update-re-dao-vulnerability/  
174 https://blog.slock.it/a-fork-in-the-road-c3c267b9ff31#.1ubf6r5x0  
175https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/4oj7ql/personal_statement_regarding_the_fork/  
176 See also https://medium.com/swarmfund/daos-hacks-and-the-law-eb6a33808e3e that assumed the exploit would 
have to be honoured.  
177 See http://dpaste.com/1SH9EQA.txt and also https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1139044.msg15261584 and 
responses here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11921900 and https://medium.com/@iconomi.net/ethereum-
thedao-it-is-about-what-you-believe-in-2116d1f4ce88  
 188 
Eventually, a hard fork was developed by the Ethereum Foundation in order to recover 
investors’ funds. The hard fork would move the hacker’s funds from the childDAO into a new 
contract account with only one functionality, namely to allow token holders to withdraw their 
original investments of ether. Because such a fork would rollback on a function that was in 
fact permitted in the contract code, there was another round of strong negative reactions in 
online discussions, seeing a fork as a fundamental breach of the stated intent of The DAO in 
the first place. The blockchain and Ethereum contracts were supposed to be immutable, 
beyond interference by any human, and the main promise of The DAO was that it is entirely 
governed by its contract code. The ‘hack’, it was argued, was in fact permitted according to 
The DAO contract code and so should not be considered a hack but an ‘exploit’ of existing 
functionality. Not long after, a letter was published addressed to The DAO and Ethereum 
communities claiming to be from the person behind the hack: 
I have carefully examined the code of The DAO and decided to participate after finding the 
feature where splitting is rewarded with additional ether. I have made use of this feature and 
have rightfully claimed 3,641,694 ether, and would like to thank The DAO for this reward. It is 
my understanding that The DAO code contains this feature to promote decentralisation and 
encourage the creation of "child DAOs". 
I am disappointed by those who are characterising the use of this intentional feature as "theft". I 
am making use of this explicitly coded feature as per the smart contract terms and my law firm 
has advised me that my action is fully compliant with United States criminal and tort law. For 
reference please review the terms of The DAO. 
– ‘An open letter to The DAO and Ethereum community’178  
While there were doubts as to whether or not this letter genuinely came from The DAO 
hacker, the points raised in it were circulated and became a focus of debate. The DAO exploit 
and following hard fork pushed the community into a flurry of discussions and proclamations 
on the relationship between technology and the social world in a search for coherent 
explanations and justifications for or against the hard fork. In the week leading up to the hard 
fork, a ‘crypto-decentralist manifesto’ was published reminding the Ethereum Foundation, 
core developers and Slock.it of earlier claims of decentralisation founded on principles of 
openness, immutability and neutrality.179 
The hard fork was announced to take place at block 1920,000, estimated for the 21st of July 
2016. The day would prove whether or not there was ‘consensus’ for the fork, meaning 
                                                       
178 See https://pastebin.com/CcGUBgDG Also, there was some discussion whether the letter was indeed from the 
hackers or not, but also general agreement that it hardly mattered because the discussions sparked by it were 
relevant more broadly, see https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11927891  
179 https://medium.com/@bit_novosti/a-crypto-decentralist-manifesto-6ba1fa0b9ede  
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whether miners would adopt the changes and begin mining on the new chain. The 
http://fork.ethstats.net/ website was set up to monitor which blockchain miners were mining on 
and relatively quickly it became clear that there was broad adoption. The hard fork by the 
Ethereum Foundation was successful but only a few days after, headlines appeared about 
Ethereum Classic – an initiative to keep mining on the original Ethereum blockchain, a chain 
and version of events in which the exploit was not reverted.180 After one of the main 
exchanges (Poloniex) declared that they would facilitate trade in Ethereum Classic tokens the 
value went up and miners began to declare their interest.181 The statement on the Ethereum 
Classic GitHub site states the motivations behind the continued mining explicitly: 
We believe in decentralised, censorship-resistant, permissionless blockchains. We believe in the 
original vision of Ethereum as a world computer you can't shut down, running irreversible smart 
contracts. We believe in a strong separation of concerns, where system forks are only possible in 
order to correct actual platform bugs, not to bail out failed contracts and special interests. We 
believe in censorship-resistant platform that can be actually trusted - by anyone. 
– Ethereum Classic GitHub repository, 2016182  
Ethereum Classic and the old chain of events proved successful and is, as of writing, still 
actively mined on and used – meaning there are now two versions of Ethereum, two versions 
of history: one where the exploit was reverted, never happened and investors still have their 
ether, and one where it did happen and investors lost their ether to the childDAO. For the rest 
of the network using Ethereum, a chain fork essentially means a duplication of accounts, 
meaning those who held their own keys to their ether wallets gained an equivalent of ether 
classic tokens.  
Soon after, Ethereum Classic publicly gained the support of previous Ethereum founder 
Charles Hoskinson (Rivlin, 2016) who had left the Ethereum Foundation in 2014 due to 
disagreements over the governance of Ethereum. Hoskinson had, since departing from the 
Ethereum Foundation, launched the company IOHK (Input Output Hong Kong)183 and a new 
Smart Contract platform called Cardano, with a cryptocurrency called ADA coin.184  They 
raised investment specifically in Japan, with promise to launch their blockchain in early 2017, 
but still have not built or launched their blockchain, and according to a blogpost from 
Ethereum Classic stopped communication with investors (Ethereum Classic, 2017). This 
raised questions about why the coin had only been marketed in Japan, whether this was to 
prevent scrutiny from the rest of the cryptocurrency community, and brought accusations that 
                                                       
180 http://www.coindesk.com/ethereum-hard-fork-creates-competing-currencies-support-ethereum-classic-rises/  
181 https://poloniex.com/exchange#btc_etc  
182 See https://ethereumclassic.github.io/  
183 See https://iohk.io/  
184 See https://www.cardano.org/en/home/  
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the project was a scam.185 A blogpost in May 2017 suggested that Hoskinson’s involvement in 
Ethereum Classic looked suspiciously like an attempted takeover of their protocol 
governance, having shifted attention from Cardano Smart Contract platform after the 
promised date of the ADA coin launch had passed (Classic, 2017). As of writing, Hoskinson is 
still promoting Cardano and ADA coin as a ‘third generation blockchain’ but IOHK have not 
yet launched their blockchain.186  
Such disputes, rumours and scams had at this point become rife in cryptocurrency 
communities, as the hype of the technology had reached a peak and investments were easy 
to come by. The difference and contradiction between the claims of blockchain systems as 
trustless and beyond corruptibility and the number of fake projects and unfulfilled promises 
became glaring as governance crises rippled throughout most projects, followed by legal 
clampdowns, in particular in relation to Initial Coin Offerings. In a sense, two contradictory 
governance descriptions coexist: on the one hand, the claim that decentralised systems exist 
beyond both corruptibility of humans and the reach of existing regulatory authorities, and on 
the other, the reality that most blockchain projects do incorporate as companies and 
foundations in order to be able to operate legitimately, for example in order to have their 
tokens listed on the large exchanges, and have in many cases have relied on existing legal 
frameworks. The intersection of the two conditions are rarely explicitly mapped out, dealt with 
and designed for in discussions of decentralised governance, possibly because of a belief 
that the decentralised models will eventually ‘escape’ the bind of existing legal frameworks 
once built and fully functional. Regardless, this actual intersection and strategic navigating 
between existing legal frameworks and processes, and the governance thinking and theories 
coming out of the blockchain space in relation to open decentralised governance structures, 
would benefit from further research, in particular in relation and comparison to research done 
around attempts to regulate, tax and hold accountable large transnational technology, to see 
where and how blockchain companies and foundations seek to differentiate or not in relation 
to these. The particulars of blockchain protocol governance are worth outlining, as has been 
the ambition above, but they do not address some important areas, such as the ways in 
which protocol governance and attempts at decentralise these intersect and are affected by 
legal incorporation as companies and foundations, and the associated governance methods 
and processes entailed, in turn affect, intersect with and contradict these decentralised 
aspects. To state it more explicitly, liability cases and the pressures of existing legal 
frameworks mean that specific names need to be on documents, and people and assets are 
at stake, in turn also determining a service relationship with users or customers – all of which 
are not entirely compatible with ideas of open, decentralised and autonomous systems.  
                                                       
185 See https://twitter.com/AceOfWallStreet/status/841743375346851842 and 
https://twitter.com/CollinCrypto/status/841770372764733442 for Hoskinson’s comments in the Ethereum Classic 
Slack channel about the tweet.  
186 See https://ethereumworldnews.com/charles-hoskinson-cardano-trillion-dollar/  
 191 
So far I have recounted how the DAO exploit forced a reassessment of some of the main 
promises of the Ethereum platform, namely to be a platform for code, contracts and 
organisational form that would be beyond reach of any authority, determined by and running 
solely according to the stated contract code. As it turned out, the political could not be fixed in 
any final manner, code was not simply neutral and the blockchain was not immutable. In the 
following section I discuss some of the ways in which these events caused a rearticulation of 
the remit of blockchain and the Ethereum platform in particular, explicitly integrating ‘the 
social’ into processes for determining consensus at a protocol governance layer. 
6.2.3  Integrating social consensus 
The Ethereum DAO exploit severely challenged the idea of developing systems that would 
operate beyond the control of humans and in a realm of mathematical, predictable and 
transparent execution. Instead, the execution of code turned out to be less than predictable 
and certain. These events diffracted the principle of immutability with new articulations, on the 
one hand arguing ‘only social consensus trumps code’ (see tweet below) and on the other 
that the Ethereum social contract had been breached in the fork (see above, and Rivlin 2016). 
Decentralised systems now began to include some notion of human and social determination 
through an ‘implicit’ social contract amongst the community (Zamfir, 2016).  
 
Figure 12. d11e9 retweets Ethereum developer Vlad Zamfir’s celebration of the hardfork, July 2016.  
Discussions around social or technical determination have since evolved into questions of on-
or off-chain governance (Ehrsam, 2017; Zamfir, 2017; Buterin, 2018; Kreutler, 2018) in efforts 
to solve the political through new technical means or refuting such efforts by acknowledging 
the political. The changing attitudes towards some of the main design and political principles 
are captured in the table below. 
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 Ethereum pre-exploit  Ethereum hard fork Ethereum Classic 
Immutabil i ty Blockchain is immutable. The blockchain is 
immutable but can be 
changed through 
community consensus. 
Blockchain must remain 
immutable. 
Decentral isation Ethereum is a project to 
take decentralisation to 
the next level and counter 
the centralising 
tendencies of Bitcoin.  
The hard fork would not 
have happened if there 
was no consensus to 
implement it, therefore 
decentralisation has not 
been compromised.  
The hard fork 
represented some 
people’s interests over 
others and therefore 
compromises some 
aspects of 
decentralisation. 
Community Anyone in the Ethereum 
ecosystem. (Seems to 
only be a word that is 
mobilised when some 
form of legitimacy is 
called upon ‘what the 
community has 
expressed’, ‘what the 
community wants’ ‘the 
community wins again’). 
Loosely consists of 
users, miners, 
businesses, blockchain 
media, commentators, 
developers, and the 
foundation, but no 
precise understanding of 
who the community is or 
how power dynamics 
operate in this space.  
The community is what 
mobilises against 
centralising tendencies. 
Authority Authority is guaranteed 
distributed by the 
immutability of the code. 
‘The community’, clients 
and social consensus 
have the ultimate 
authority. 
The authenticity of the 
code must remain the 
only authority. If not, 
otherwise the system is 
biased. 
Governance The community is self-
governed through market 
incentives and secure 
immutable code.  
Hard forks are just 
another governance 
mechanism for the 
community.  
The system is self-
governing through 
immutable code founded 
on decentralisation, 
openness and neutrality. 
Calculation 
(and 
indeterminacy) 
By incorporating rewards 
and punishment all 
behaviour can be 
calculated, accounted for 
and managed in a 
decentralised manner.  
When the unpredictable 
happens, the community 
will decide what is the 
most just want of 
calculating. (Ethereum 
still a project of 
expanding the realm of 
calculation.) 
While all events might 
not be calculable, the 
rules must remain the 
same for everyone and 
should not be changed, 
even and especially if 
that means someone 
loses out as that would 
favour special interests 
over neutrality.  
Neutral i ty Code is neutral as 
opposed to vague human 
language. 
The community has 
values, which should be 
respected and enforced 
through consensus. 
Distinction between 
‘bugs’ that should be 
fixed, and special 
interests, which should 
never affect the code.  
Table 4: changing attitudes to principles in Ethereum over the DAO exploit. 
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Discussions and debates on reddit, Twitter and elsewhere about The DAO exploit were at 
times vitriolic and very tense. But although there were harsh words written about the different 
implementations, forking is an integral and accepted practice and so there was also quickly 
an acceptance of the Ethereum Classic project, and efforts from developers on all sides 
moved on to focus on the potential security issues of having two chains. A comment by 
Smithgift in October 2016 expresses worry about future incompatibility between the two 
chains. They describe a ‘metaethereal’ world, expressing a continued desire for 
interoperability between chains and ensuring it is usable as a platform down the line for 
applications that want to function across chains: 
…In any case, the existence of two incompatible replay protection systems will hardly cause 
them to fail in their intended function. It's just a kind of balkanisation of code that, IMHO, would 
be harmful for a future cross-chain metaetheral world. I'm not saying that doing our own system 
would be wrong, but that there's a non-zero cost to having different systems. 
– Discussion on the Ethereum Classic GitHub repository187  
Such concerns for a higher level of interoperability shows the extent to which forking at this 
point had become an acceptable way to express dissensus and exercise freedom to 
determine one’s own protocol while still considering a common project at a ‘meta’ level. In the 
case of the Ethereum DAO hard fork, in particular developer Vlad Zamfir, who had been 
involved in the writing of the Ethereum fork, engaged in a rearticulation of hard forks as 
important and useful tools for decentralised governance as it allows for ‘social consensus’ to 
intervene and decide and prevent potential negative uses of a system (see Fig. 14 above and 
Zamfir 2016).188  For one of the people behind The DAO, Stephan Tual, not only that, but that 
‘Hard forks are the most democratic means of consensus on earth today. They are the 
ultimate referendum mechanism’ (Tual, 2016d). This was a significant shift in the discourse 
surrounding governance that previously had been addressed as a problem to be removed 
from human interference and resolved through algorithmic means (see 4.2.1). The role of ‘the 
social’ and the ability for actors to organise outside of the system in order to mobilise 
consensus started to be integrated into the ideas of how governance in these new 
decentralised systems operate.  
Acknowledging the social, however, does not entail organising it. Zamfir and much of the 
blockchain community remain anti-institutional and are not keen on formalising social 
consensus processes. Institutions are understood as too rigid, oppressive and ‘easy to game’ 
                                                       
187 See https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/155  
188 In Zamfir’s opinion the whole DAO project had been rushed through. He had co-written a moratorium 
(http://hackingdistributed.com/2016/05/27/dao-call-for-moratorium/) after finding many issues that could be ‘gamed’ in 
the code but not much had been done to correct these. In his opinion the hack was a lesson on the importance of 
getting the code right in smart contracts and the role of social consensus more broadly.  
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as opposed to decentralised computational systems that are secure and have transparent 
rules that people can engage with or disengage from as and when and to the extent that they 
want to. The idea is that ‘split’ functions and hard forks are safeguards against the systems 
becoming oppressive; if you disagree with the direction of a project, simply fork the chain (or 
indeed split The DAO).189 However, both the Bitcoin scaling conflict and the Ethereum DAO 
exploit show that in order to successfully fork, a network requires significant capacity beyond 
the protocol changes themselves, which looks a lot like lobbying, campaigning and other 
practices from what might be considered traditional politics, in order to get enough people and 
machines to form a functioning network. Peer-to-peer networks also imply network effects that 
can make it significantly difficult for some actors to fork in any effective manner. The 
involvement of ‘the social’ in determining aspects of the protocol in this sense was and still to 
a large degree remains under-examined, outside of immediate engagement with the protocol 
itself. For example, miners and core developers are much more coordinated and have much 
more established methods of communication than the loose network of end-users, the 
multiple actors running clients and using the platforms. Governance is instead addressed 
primarily in direct relation to the protocols and platforms. The project to develop protocols, 
applications and apparatuses that are independent from any specific human, that anyone 
could join, leave, contribute to or fork continues across disagreements.  
The Ethereum project, as a project to generalise the consensus algorithm of Bitcoin, had 
turned the Bitcoin solution to double-spending into a generalised solution to governance (see 
Chapter 5). In the process, the political had been turned into a security concern, which has 
been addressed and solved as a systems engineering problem, such that undesirable 
behaviour would be eliminated through the right combinations of incentives and cryptography. 
‘Malicious behaviour’ would thereby be made either impossible or undesirable enough that it 
would not occur. The DAO exploit, however, forced the question of who gets to determine 
what is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in the first place, whether what happened with The DAO was a hack to 
be corrected for or an exploit to be applauded. In her analysis of the post-political in the 
context of European liberalism, political theorist Mouffe argues that dissensus of the kind that 
threatens the foundations of liberal ideas and institutions is marginalised to such an extent 
that it is no longer considered a legitimate political position, but a moral one of ‘right’ and 
‘wrong’, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ (Mouffe, 2005). In and through the scaling conflict and The DAO 
hack, two different responses seem to emerge. In some cases, the political in the sense of 
dissensus with the very conditions of governance protocols is turned into a security question. 
The manner of dealing with ‘malicious’ versus ‘honest’ behaviour is one way in which 
                                                       
189 Forking, as an approach and method emerging out of open source software development, also relates to ideas of 
meritocracy in which people with the skills and abilities to improve on something should be able to freely do so. Some 
of these ideas have a more explicitly ideological articulation in a US anarcho-capitalist tendency called voluntarysm 
that amongst others Bitcoin and libertarian Roger Ver subscribes to. It is a market-based form of anarchism that 
however is strongly anti-corporate as it is against monopolies and any state involvement. Corporations are seen to 
collaborate with the state to oppress people’s freedoms.  
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dissensus is shifted from a political question (with the open debates around what should or 
should not be considered malicious behaviour) to a security question (malicious behaviour 
should be made impossible). The other response was one that indeed recognised the political 
as a right to difference and differentiation. This was largely resolved through the notion of 
forking such that difference could be recognised and accommodated for. Continued 
interoperability between different forks then emerged as the next task, with new projects 
seeking ever more ‘meta’ layers in order to facilitate such interoperability. In the case of the 
Ethereum DAO exploit, the opposite occurred, and what had up until then been treated as 
self-evidently good or bad, malicious or honest behaviour in the network became politicised. 
The Ethereum DAO exploit and subsequent fork had brought ‘the social’ into focus as a 
potentially valid process for determining changes to the protocol. The promise of immutable 
code and systems beyond the control of humans was shown to be a promise and project 
rather than an inevitable state of things emerging out of the nature of cryptography and 
decentralised networks. The fork was, at essence, about this very question, the extent to 
which social determination should be allowed in relation to the protocol. The Ethereum 
foundation and developers had made a decision on what was in the best interest for 
investors, the community and the project, which was accepted and enacted by a large part of 
the network running Ethereum; in the meantime Ethereum Classic sought to maintain the 
initial promise of immutable code and refused intervention from anything outside of the 
existing rules of the code gathering a constituency around this understanding.  
Such questions, of who or what should determine the protocol, were expanded to include 
protocol governance and discussions continued in the form of on-chain or off-chain 
governance processes. Off-chain governance, argued for by amongst others Zamfir, to some 
extent acknowledges the political as an ongoing negotiation, describing an ‘ever-changing 
social contract’ (Ehrsam, 2017; Zamfir, 2017) (while the ways in which such an ever-changing 
social contract is articulated and negotiated remains under-explored). The argument for an 
expansion of algorithmic determinacy was, curiously, also argued for exactly on the basis of 
accommodating different sensibilities. The author(s) of the crypto-decentralist manifesto 
discussed the question of different sensibilities in relation to the social, but the social was 
here challenged in terms of the extent to which ‘social’ sensibilities understood as human 
could accommodate for the non-human sensibilities of artificial agents including these as part 
of a ‘wider set of constituencies’ that blockchain systems would serve: 
I believe that “blockchain tech” is in fact a social technology. Community consensus is an 
integral part of “blockchain tech” same as cryptography, network protocols and consensus 
layer. However, I feel that focusing on “human participants” is shortsighted since blockchain 
systems will come to serve a much wider set of constituencies, including artificial agents that 
may not necessarily share our sensibilities. Serving as a dependable, predictable and 
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frictionless mechanism for economic and social cooperation between entities of all sorts. So, 
basic blockchain characteristics and rules of the game should be simple and understandable 
for everyone. Not dependant on social instincts and judgements of intelligent primates. It won’t 
be fair to other participants, which therefore won’t participate. So neither human nor 
“refrigerator judgement” should be necessary as part of the system. 
– Bit Novosti, July 2016190 
The conclusion drawn from acknowledging the diversity of sensibilities was that ‘neither 
human nor ‘refrigerator judgement’ should be necessary as part of the system’. Differences in 
sensibilities were sought overcome, once again, through the pursuit of a neutral substrate of 
‘dependable, predictable and frictionless mechanisms’ that could take place between 
supposedly any human or artificial agent. Such approaches have given rise to the idea of on-
chain governance, whereby blockchain mechanisms would also be brought in to determine 
protocol governance.  
Given the ontological effects of the sensing apparatus, inclusion into a given sensibility can 
have effects of eliminating and excluding other sensibilities as mattering. Already existing 
difference might not register on a given sensing apparatus. This is, in fact, the very purpose of 
a deterministic system like blockchain: to ensure that differences are settled and determined 
in a ‘frictionless’ manner. In the case of blockchain applications, this might be the relations, 
transactions or otherwise that do not take place via the protocol – or, in the example of the 
economic apparatus of price mechanisms, this would be all the ‘stuff’ that does not enter into 
market relations. The ways in which determinate systems engage with other sensibilities and 
other modes of determinacy is foregrounded as mattering here and through The DAO exploit. 
The acknowledgement and recognition of the necessary particularity of a given mode and 
medium of governance, and its ontological effects, should be cause for hesitation in terms of 
immediate inclusion of any new sensibility that makes itself felt, and for efforts to be made in 
understanding such effects while also looking at other possible sensibilities – for example the 
beginnings of an acknowledgement of ‘the social’ as a mode of determination in relation to 
blockchain governance.  
The DAO exploit and subsequent negotiations over the involvement of ‘the social’ are nothing 
less than the negotiation over which sensibilities are appropriate for determining different 
aspects and processes around the legal, economic and social intra-actions, their limits and 
how these sensibilities and modes of determinacy relate to one another. The political 
signification of that relational space is hugely under-studied in the development of new 
blockchain applications, most likely because of the particular practices of engineering and 
                                                       
190 See https://medium.com/@bit_novosti/i-believe-that-blockchain-tech-is-in-fact-a-social-technology-6d409fa6e97e  
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information security, examining and developing determinate conditions. There are, however, 
developments in this relational space, and from the information security field itself (Zurko and 
Simon, 1996; Rogaway, 2015). Broadening the information security and privacy design 
considerations from the systems themselves to focus on the interactions with users, there is 
an acknowledgment that information security cannot be addressed in a meaningful way 
without taking into account the way security plays out in practice. In terms of design strategy, 
what this means is that the concern cannot only be the construction of determinate conditions 
meeting specific security requirements and design principles (decentralisation, immutability, 
etc.) in and of themselves. The concern has to be what is determined in and through the 
relation between the constructed determinate conditions of a blockchain protocol and the 
ways it meets the otherwise determined (socially or culturally, as discussed above), as well as 
the indeterminate, potentials for incompatible differentiation to emerge. 
Consensus protocols and also protocol governance (as dissensus protocols), whether off-
chain or on-chain, do not ‘fix’ the political in any final manner, but are particular forms and 
mediums for managing dissensus and the dissensible. These forms and mediums matter 
politically (and, in turn, can be contested). Fixed notions of mediation, whether based on the 
certainty of universal values, mathematical laws, price mechanisms, largest voting numbers, 
or fairest institution, when understood as universal, flatten the registers of what matters and 
how things come to matter (Yusoff, 2013a). The lessons here are therefore threefold: the 
political cannot be fixed in any final manner; the particular mediums through which to 
negotiate and settle differences matter in and of themselves and can therefore be contested; 
there are many potential sensibilities and these therefore demand attention to the 
relationships between these and a certain spaciousness to be determined through other 
sensing apparatuses in the Baradian onto-epistemological sense (Barad, 2007, pp. 132–186). 
 
6.3  Conclusions 
In response to the scaling conflict, attention shifted from the protocol itself to its governance, 
measuring and applying the principle of decentralisation at this layer. Addressing the 
dissensible as a governance problem tempts further efforts towards resolving and fixing the 
political with more decentralisation, to ensure that no single authority will dominate. In this 
sense it seems to present a problem of infinite regression, seeking to measure and apply a 
decentralisation ‘fix’ at ever-deeper layers as and when dissensus emerges. Any attempt at 
measuring decentralisation necessarily requires a clear definition of what is being measured. 
Drawing in Barad and Rancière, such definition and subsequent measuring in turn determines 
the characteristics of a necessarily particular instance of ‘decentralisation’ in an onto-
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epistemological manner, to the exclusion of other potential materialisations of the notion. This 
particular instantiation of decentralised systems in turn might be contested if and when 
different and potentially incompatible articulations of decentralisation are made to matter.  
This can be explained by discussing some more implications of and expanding on the 
definitions of the political that have been built through the previous two chapters, namely as a 
disruption to what is sensed as mattering by a given apparatus. Blockchain technologies 
sought to disrupt existing methods of resolving differences, namely legal and political 
processes, looking to shift the sensibility around who or what should be able to intermediate 
to include (or in the case of maximalists, solely comprise of) algorithmic processes. This in 
itself then becomes a new sensibility, a new sensing apparatus, and a potential site for 
dissensus, a different sensibility to emerge. Through this understanding, then, the political is 
never fixed or resolved; it is simply reconfigured into different forms and mediums – and these 
new forms and mediums might in themselves become politically contested. This inability to 
finally ‘fix’ the political does not mean that establishing new governance mechanisms, new 
ways of doing politics, is futile or meaningless. On the contrary, and returning to Barad and 
the ontological effects of apparatuses, such new mediums matter, literally. The apparatus, 
through which the management of difference takes place, matters, in the sense that it will 
always be particular. They make a material difference in ways that should be ethically and 
political scrutinised and never assumed as universal or final.  
Decentralised technologies in a sense represent one particular resolution to the political 
materialised in and through collaborations with non-human phenomena to form new 
apparatuses of governance. These might have desirable or undesirable effects, and should 
each be analysed accordingly. Some actors will be more able than others to navigate 
particular methods (the legal system, or a code repository, BIP process, forking, etc.), while 
others might in turn seek to disrupt this method and establish different mediums for navigating 
and resolving differences. Any description, encoding or understanding of what is sensible will 
always entail acknowledged or unacknowledged exclusions of other positions, perspectives 
and sensibilities, and thereby will also entail the possibility that these will make themselves 
felt, and disrupt a given sensibility. But the particulars of the mediums for resolving 
differences and incompatibility matter, exactly because they are never neutral and never 
universal and therefore have particular material effects. To make this clearer, instead of 
understanding blockchain and blockchain governance as a wholesale replacement of existing 
political, legal and governance institutions, and therefore having to address any potential 
issue to do with decentralisation and power, it would be more fruitful to assess blockchain 
governance in terms of a much more contextualised understanding of what the technology 
might be able to do. Referring back to discussions in 5.1, this might be, for example, as a 
network space that operates beyond control of existing political and financial authorities, in 
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the context of geo-political stakes in internet protocols. In other words, I want to suggest a 
contextualised discussion on the political purpose of blockchain protocols in relation to current 
systems, and what might be the appropriate governance mechanisms for these. 
In this chapter I have therefore distinguished between governance and the political. Where 
blockchain protocols are intended to replace authorities through a decentralised network that 
mediates and organises consensus, dissensus might arise as to the actual development of 
the protocols themselves. These disagreements also brought out different interpretations of 
core principles and claims of blockchain, forcing new articulations of these principles that 
would include ‘the social’ in their realisation. Stopping short of the political, however, the issue 
of dissensus has been largely either addressed through notions of encoding new ‘on-chain’ 
governance processes, or by seeking determination in an under-defined realm of the ‘social’. 
On-chain governance processes open up an issue of infinite regression whereby the question 
of how to resolve dissensus is met with a decentralisation fix at ever higher or deeper layers. 
It is helpful to instead distinguish between governance, as particular modes of managing 
difference, and the political as an ongoing potential for dissensus and something new to make 
itself matter. I discuss three consequences of this distinction in relation to blockchain 
governance. Firstly, the political is not something to be solved in any final manner and that 
any claim to do so entails repression or ignorance towards difference. Secondly, specific 
instances and mediums of resolving the political nevertheless matter (in fact matter more); as 
became evident through the conflicts, the very protocols for resolving and mediating 
difference also became an area of disagreement and differentiation, not only of opinion but 
also of determination. The mediums have ontological effects, which also demand recognition 
of multiple modes of determination (including ‘the social’ and countless others). Thirdly, the 
recognition of different forms of mediation, determined through other sensibilities of what 
matters (such as the social), points attention towards how these are related to. Rather than 
solving a given problem of difference internally in a deterministic protocol, the relationship 
between a given protocol  and other sensibilities can start to be considered and be placed in 
the foreground in terms of design and engineering.  
The acknowledgement that there are many things, relations and situations that cannot be 
determined and fixed through the protocol has begun to open up a space for acknowledging 
and analysing what happens outside and around blockchain systems and protocols. The 
political goes directly against the idea that it is possible to finally fix questions of power, both 
in the sense of fixing a problem, and fixing as determining a fixed, dependable and provable 
condition, exactly because what matters can never be finally known or fully modelled but 
instead should be considered as an ongoing and at times contested field of (indeterminate) 
potential. Consensus protocols and also protocol governance (as dissensus protocols), 
whether off-chain or on-chain do not ‘fix’ the political in any final manner, but are particular 
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forms and mediums for managing the political. These forms and mediums matter politically 
(and, in turn, can be contested). Fixed notions of mediation, whether based on the certainty of 
some universal values, mathematical laws, price mechanisms, largest voting numbers or 
fairest institution, when understood as universal, flatten the registers of what matters and how 
things come to matter (Yusoff, 2013a).  
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7  Conclusion: reassembling the trust 
machine 
 
With this thesis I have sought to answer the question of what matters politically in blockchain. 
When I began my research, it quickly became clear that the technology was attracting 
attention and efforts from a wide variety of contexts, geographies, political/economic 
tendencies and industries. The motivation for, and intention of, asking this question was to 
understand this broad attraction, to seek out which aspects of blockchain might determine its 
political effects, to analyse its possible implications and how these implications might be 
made differently. The thesis overall then is intended to contribute to a growing body of critical 
literature on blockchain technology. Situating blockchain in debates on the politics and ethics 
of algorithmic mediation, digital platforms and platform economics and questions of 
governance and political theory in the context of planetary scale computation the thesis is an 
assessment of its potential implications and claims made of it and in turn contributing to 
related literature. As the research progressed, I have increasingly taken the position of critical 
insider in the field, collaborating with developers and computer scientists, with an aim of also 
contributing to technical and industry debates, highlighting issues in blockchain protocol and 
governance design. The main aim of this thesis has therefore increasingly become not only to 
assess, but also to actively situate the technology such that its potential, limitations and scope 
can be more precisely understood and deliberately shaped in a considered manner. With this 
thesis, in other words, I have sought to interrogate as well as take part in articulating the 
political possibilities of blockchain technology. Having disassembled and reassembled the 
‘trust machine’ in different ways throughout this thesis, my answer to my overall question then 
is that in an open, decentralised system many things potentially matter when assessing its 
political implications. What matters more precisely is the site of negotiation, differentiation and 
dissensus – context and negotiations that are often dismissed (as ‘mushy humans’, irrelevant 
speculative behaviour, imperfect communication and so on). A thread throughout the thesis, 
then, has been to challenge generalised claims made of ‘decentralisation’ ‘trustlessness’ and 
‘consensus’ and ground these in the specificity of their enactment through this technology, 
pointing to their precise enactments and limitations, the dependencies, and relationships with 
other systems and sensibilities.  
In order to answer the question of how to understand the political in relation to blockchain, I 
have drawn three ‘cuts’ through the field: first, appropriating Kathryn Yusoff’s notion of the 
insensible as a way to point to the limitations and particularity of understandings in the 
blockchain assemblage of what matters (Yusoff, 2013a), both in algorithms themselves and in 
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what is intended to be determined through these; second, by tracing and articulating the 
disruption and sensibility of the blockchain assemblage (Rancière, 2006), distinct from 
political histories and cultures of decentralised network technology, so that I could describe 
the specific understanding and operationalisation of otherwise broad and universalised 
concepts; and, finally, by proposing the dissensible as a way to describe the ongoing 
possibility of differing, incompatible sensibilities as the re-emergence of the political and the 
particular ways in which such dissensibility is negotiated and resolved.  
The nature of these ‘cuts’ has pushed me to draw from a wide and perhaps unusual variety of 
theoretical sources and debates – from technical papers on cryptography to animism and 
economics. I have relied heavily on the thinker Karen Barad’s work on determinacy and 
indeterminacy (Barad, 2007) as well as Rancière’s work on the political as a disruption to the 
‘sensible’ (Rancière, 2006, 2010), in order to draw a theoretical thread through these 
disparate sources. Barad’s work enabled me to address the deterministic promises in 
blockchain from a unique perspective, whereby the deterministic qualities of the technologies 
employed in blockchain can be fully acknowledged while also pointing to the exact 
boundaries. Rancière, in the meantime, enabled me to relate such an approach immediately 
to questions of the political, the clashes and negotiations of differing sensibilities, differing 
understandings of what matters and what should be made to matter. As Barad points out, 
humans are not the only agencies that determine things (Barad, 2007, p. 338), but, in 
response to technological determinism in blockchain, neither are the apparatuses that 
humans build. Such technological determinism is not unique to blockchain. What is unique 
and important, though, is that blockchain is suggested as a technology intended to be both 
decentralised and not determined by any specific authority and deterministic, determined 
solely through its code and architecture. This raises important and unusual questions about 
the exact limits of such different sites of demining things in a decentralised system: through 
decentralised input, the deterministic apparatus itself, the developers and engineers who 
designed it, the miners and nodes that run it and so on (the very conundrum explored in 
Chapter 6 on the dissensible). This implies an open question as to the limits of what can or 
should be determined in the architecture, limits of what matters in the security model, limits of 
who or what can be involved, and how. Blockchain, because of intentions to eliminate 
‘authority’, replacing this with a ‘trust machine’ operated through multiple different devices 
with multiple different versions of the protocol and client, does pose some challenge to 
defining and analysing a distinct ‘thing’. Indeed, the very definition of the ‘thing’ itself becomes 
politicised as a question.  
With this chapter then, I conclude the thesis by first rearticulating the main insights and 
contributions of the three ‘cuts’ I have drawn here, pointing to the implications that these 
suggest for the literature (sections 7.1 and 7.2 and 7.3). I then discuss this question of limits 
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that emerged through the thesis and what it implies in terms of relationships to an ‘outside’ of 
those limits – diverse economies, different sensibilities and so on (section 7.4). I end the 
chapter, and this thesis, by discussing the limits and scope of my work, suggesting areas for 
further research (section 7.5).  
 
 
7.1  Determinacy, trust and autonomy 
In this section, I describe and discuss the main findings from my first ‘cut’ on what matters 
politically in blockchain, in which I make the insensible come to matter in relation to protocols 
and technical architectures. In this cut, I first described the Bitcoin and Ethereum 
architectures, discussing these descriptions, purpose and reasoning. By doing so I was able 
to explain how cryptographic proofs lend a very particular meaning to the concepts of trust, 
autonomy and decentralisation in blockchain. The ability to cryptographically prove things is 
operationalised in the Bitcoin architecture to organise a form of computational consensus in a 
decentralised network, namely the proof-of-work consensus algorithm. Describing this 
algorithm I articulate the precise form of ‘consensus’ that is assembled, which is on the basis 
of disinterested, economically-motivated settlement on events intended to be beyond the 
capacity for any single human to repeatedly determine.191 Understanding this algorithm 
enables a discussion of how cryptography is used in the consensus algorithm with the 
intention and idea of eliminating the need for ‘trust’. If events, ownership and access can be 
cryptographically-determined and secured – and cryptography is mathematically-determined 
– then there is no longer the need to trust any institution or person’s claim. Instead, the truth 
of events is determined mathematically, no longer requiring external authority or mediation. A 
main contribution of this chapter is to disassemble this consensus algorithm, emphasising the 
particularity of this arrangement in order to clarify and make specific otherwise universal 
claims of having solved the problem of trust and consensus.  
This particular method of determining consensus, because it is based on cryptographic proofs 
rather than trust, is also understood to be an objective method for arriving at and enforcing 
consensus about events. This has led to an understanding of Bitcoin as the invention of 
‘trustless’ consensus, a ‘truth machine’ implying the elimination of the need for any ‘trusted’ 
means for organising consensus and truth of events across any context – from financial to 
political and legal. I describe how this specific understanding of trust comes from the context 
of network security engineering for decentralised networks; in order for a decentralised 
                                                       
191 The ‘disinterest’ of actors involved in the network is constructed through scale, distance and economic incentives. 
This construction can be argued as in fact a high level of ‘intermediation’ in order to construct human engagement as 
disinterested, and to ensure that there is no direct interest in the results (verified transactions), other than to produce 
them.  
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network to be secure, the network as a whole cannot be dependent on (trust) any single 
aspect of the system, otherwise that particular aspect can become an attack vector to destroy 
the network. As I argue in Chapter 5, this perspective comes from a politicised pre-Bitcoin 
history, and I suggest that the context of the financial crisis and the Wikileaks financial 
embargo lent a broader meaning and appeal to the possibility of trustless systems, referring 
to untrustworthy government and financial institutions. I argue that through Bitcoin, the remit 
of conceptions and operationalisation of ‘decentralisation’ and ‘trust’, specific and particular to 
decentralised information networks, are expanded to include all manner of interactions, 
systems, contexts and institutions. Bitcoin came to represent a general possibility of 
eliminating the need to trust in any authority to determine and enforce consensus at scale. 
Developing this more precise understanding of ideas of trust and decentralisation as 
understood in Bitcoin enabled me to describe the Ethereum protocol and project, as an 
explicit project to generalise the Bitcoin architecture and with it, these particular conceptions 
of trust and decentralisation. The Bitcoin proof-of-work algorithm is seen as a more neutral 
and objective mediation and enforcement of consensus because it is considered ‘trustless’, 
while humans, human judgment are necessarily subjective. The generalisation of this idea of 
trustlessness, and the particular aim of developing a system without attack vectors, came to 
imply a system beyond the control of humans in general. By tracing through the concerns in 
network engineering and the particular contexts and rationale of trust and decentralisation, I 
was therefore able to explain the reasoning of the use of Ethereum for decentralised 
applications, Smart Contracts and organisations (DAO) beyond human control, namely that it 
is a logical extension of the need for systems that cannot be shut down by any authority. This 
reasoning for systems beyond human control in the meantime also informs the specific 
understanding in Ethereum of decentralised systems enabling a form of ‘autonomy’ of the 
system itself. I discuss the ways that this understanding of autonomy sits in tension with 
interpretations of decentralisation as enabling a form of autonomy that, on the contrary, 
implies being more in control of systems and conditions that might affect people. In Ethereum, 
the deterministic qualities of cryptographic proofs and trustlessness, when generalised, 
become a promise of an autonomous agency of determinacy, an agency that determines 
transactions, data and relationships in a manner that is beyond control. In other words, the 
entirely controllable deterministic process of cryptographic hashing gives rise to the possibility 
of and reasoning for designing systems beyond human control.  
I draw on the theoretical work of Karen Barad to rethink these promises and the practices of 
determinate systems, which allows for acknowledging things that might be determined 
through the use of cryptographic hashing without therefore having to cede all authority to it. In 
the Baradian agential realism (Barad, 2007, pp. 132–185), neither scientific apparatuses nor 
human beings are the only determining ‘agencies’. Determinate effects happen through all 
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manner of what she calls intra-actions at a quantum level, unfolding determinate, material 
conditions from a field of indeterminate potential in an ongoing manner. This means that 
cryptography, and importantly also accounts of cryptography, can indeed determine things in 
particular and different ways, but in no way does it therefore necessitate that it be the best, 
most objective or most appropriate means to determine transactions, truth of events or 
otherwise. Instead, this must be assessed in relation to a variety of other conditions, 
contingencies and effects.  
I tie these observations and arguments to the question of the pre-condition of the political by 
drawing in Yusoff’s articulation of the insensible as that which might not be sensed, but is 
nevertheless understood to matter (Yusoff, 2013a). Not only are there other agencies that 
determine matters, these might also never come into direct relation and be sensed as 
mattering. To put it differently, there is a sense that neither humans nor the apparatuses (or 
any other probes and prostheses that humans might build) fully sense all that matters (the 
extinction of lifeforms that we have never known is the question that Yusoff discusses). The 
importance of this, philosophically, is that there are effects, lives, sensibilities and things that 
happen that we do not immediately sense and relate to, and that therefore are not sensed as 
mattering by any attempt at creating a generalised sensibility. It is a consideration that is 
important for addressing the kind of ‘autonomy’ that the Ethereum project seeks to achieve, 
and the idea of algorithmic network agencies that operate beyond the control of humans (and 
also potentially beyond an immediate relation to human concerns). Yusoff notes, in her work 
on the Anthropocene, ‘These mappings of planetary material infrastructures have an affective 
economy that place some subjects in and some outside of agency’, and points towards the 
ways that some humans are treated as resources to be extracted (Yusoff, 2013b, 2017). This 
suggests that ‘humans’ are not all necessarily on the same side in relation to ‘nature’; instead, 
there are affiliations (and alliances) across human/non-human distinctions, although these 
might be read as temporary moments of political contestation, before eventually being 
included in a ‘universal’ sensibility of what matters encoded in law or treaties or otherwise (for 
example the amazon, an animal facing extinction etc.) – an understanding of aliveness, 
affinities and relationships that is nicely captured in Ellen Ullman’s autobiographical novel 
Close to the Machine (Ullman, 2013) describing programmers’ affinities to the systems they 
build over and above a concern for those who use them.  
Drawing in Yusoff’s work on the insensible (2013b), I argue to resituate ‘autonomy’ as 
operationalized in Ethereum as a question of affinities that cross distinctions between humans 
and non-humans rather than suggesting a universal condition. The insensible suggests a 
position in relation to the possibility of autonomous elements in Ethereum (autonomous in the 
sense of beyond human control) that does not necessitate reasserting claims of complete 
human oversight and control. In my discussion of blockchain consensus mechanisms and the 
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kinds of autonomy that is conjured in the design of trustless systems, I aim to contribute to 
debates on the possibility of an ethics and politics in relation to algorithmic, network systems 
that defy immediate or complete oversight – notions of opacity, challenges of fully ‘knowing’ 
algorithms and their ever-changing emergent behaviours in relation to input challenges ideas 
of complete knowledge as the basis of responsibility, and as the basis of an ethics and a 
politics.  
Situating Ethereum and blockchain amongst and in relation to other determining agencies, as 
a question of affinities rather than distinct categories, means that the human versus machine 
dilemma can be sidestepped, as can awkward questions of aliveness, which I have attempted 
to address through ideas drawing on animism (see 4.2) and contemporary new materialism 
debates (2.2.2 and 4.2.2). Instead, affinities are drawn up such that the question of whether a 
given Smart Contract or DAO is indeed autonomous or not (or whether AI or a coming 
singularity is ‘alive’ or not), is not a matter of absolute definition, but of relation to the 
particular phenomenon. This points to a question of affinities and relationships rather than 
absolutes, such that some humans might be ‘closer to the machine’ enabling a certain 
communication, relation, control or otherwise in a given assemblage, while other aspects 
operate indeed beyond the control of other humans – a radical relativity which is nevertheless 
precise and which suggests the presence of the insensible in all manner of contexts, that, if 
taken seriously, demands an extraordinary spaciousness and indeed trust, but that in the 
meantime avoids the need to replace human or institutional authority with yet another, 
algorithmic form of authority. In this chapter, then, I described the protocols and architectures 
as a question of the precondition for the political, seeking its resolution in technological 
determinacy. I argued to re-open the question of a precondition of the political through, on the 
one hand acknowledging multiple agencies of determinacy, but also by asserting a certain 
humility required in the face of the insensible, a haunting awareness that what matters might 
not be immediately sensible. 
 
7.2  Decentralisation and authority 
In this section, I describe and discuss the main findings from my second ‘cut’ on what matters 
politically in blockchain by articulating a particular blockchain sensibility. By understanding 
what matters, is desirable or undesirable for a blockchain sensibility, a clearer understanding 
can also be had as to the ways blockchain might be disruptive. By using the term ‘sensibility’ I 
have drawn on Rancière’s concept that describes a common sense of what is good or bad, 
desirable or undesirable that cuts across differences and disagreements to comprise a 
recognisable blockchain assemblage. A key insight gained from this cut is in response to a 
body of critical literature on blockchain, suggesting that a blockchain sensibility is not primarily 
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affiliated to right-wing politics, but rather to decentralised network computation. That is not to 
say that the presence of the right wing and a right-leaning political economy is not significant 
in the space and ties in to the technology in important ways (Nakamoto, Bridle and Brekke, 
2019, p. 62), but instead that there is another sensibility that crosses these differences, and 
that forms a common sense in the community despite these, which also points to important 
political possibilities that otherwise would be missed. Gibson-Graham’s notion of diverse 
economies (Gibson-Graham, 2008) allowed me to treat the field firstly as both containing an 
internal diversity of approaches, such that I would hesitate to associate Bitcoin, Ethereum and 
blockchain within an exclusively capitalist or right-wing politics. By taking seriously the 
diversity of people, opinions and ideas that ‘blockchain’ was attracting I was able to trace 
through a particular form of disruption and sensibility that is not primarily concerned with 
capitalism, but rather computation; with decentralised networks as a strategy to circumvent 
authorities. Notions of diverse economies also allowed me to focus on the many ways that 
protocols and projects are already dependent on and sit within existing economic dynamics 
and offer a critique of the ways in which these otherwise tend to be positioned and analysed 
as wholesale replacement of existing systems. The most evident example of this is the 
relationship between cryptocurrency exchange rates and protocol security properties – often 
treated as separate concerns, but that are highly interdependent. Such a perspective 
foregrounds the dependencies of already existing diversity of fields, which in turn also opens 
up a focus on articulating these relationships as an important site of political and technical 
meaning, otherwise often dismissed as not mattering. 
In an effort to draw out a blockchain sensibility, then, I traced a pre-Bitcoin history of 
decentralised network technology and the reasons that decentralisation came to form a 
specific form of anti-authoritarian strategy: as a means to make it impossible for an authority 
to shut down or control a network. The main insights from such histories of technical 
architectures were that the political sensibility of blockchain is grounded in such political 
histories of network computation more so than political-economic ideologies, and that political 
economic ideas are instead operationalised in the architectures in order to achieve specific 
network security properties and behaviours (which were to form the basis of a new 
interdisciplinary field of cryptoeconomics). More specifically, economic incentives are used in 
order to achieve security properties in the network: making ‘attacks’ expensive while 
rewarding contribution to the network. It is worth noting that the design of ‘incentives’ lends a 
certain promise whereby the architecture is understood to be able to determine behaviours at 
scale in a continuous, immanent manner. The deterministic promises of blockchain protocols 
are significant in themselves by encouraging such ideas of behavioural engineering – that 
‘blockchain’ can be used to configure societies and used for ‘the good’, if only coded correctly, 
incentivising certain behaviours over others. Such temptations of large-scale behavioural 
engineering also have an attraction that cuts across political ideas and leanings. I would like 
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to argue that such tendencies represent a form of reconstruction of authority, justified through 
mathematical determinism. Importantly, tracing through these histories also gave more 
contextual understanding of key concepts and ideas that form a blockchain sensibility that I 
explicitly describe in the chapter as commonly desired principles, properties and effects in the 
assemblage.  
Situating Bitcoin, Ethereum and blockchain more generally in such a politicised history of 
decentralised networks enabled me to articulate two major changes in the development of 
decentralised technologies in blockchain, namely ‘platformisation’ and ‘tokenisation’. A key 
insight that I articulate here is the importance of these two developments for debates about 
platform economics and platform capitalism (Langley and Leyshon, 2016; Scholz, 2016; 
Pasquale, 2017; Srnicek, 2017). My analysis points towards a nuanced take on the field, 
suggesting blockchain does not necessarily represent business as usual and yet another 
instance of platform capitalism. I argue that there is a disruptive proposition not merely based 
on competition but rather on a different vision for internet and network technologies. With this 
I therefore aim to re-open some political space in debates on platform economics and 
blockchain, by drawing in a pre-history of decentralised technologies, such that 
‘platformisation’ can become a project of making privacy-aware protocol design more easily 
available, and ‘tokenisation’ as an opening to debate what kinds of economic and governance 
models might best sustain global network infrastructures.  
Ethereum was placed in this longer historical trajectory, and I discussed some of the issues 
that came about in attempts to platformise ‘decentralisation’ by making the Bitcoin 
architecture Turing-complete. I discussed the curious condition of Ethereum as a project to 
become the general platform, aiming for what can very well be considered a monopoly 
position as such, being both protocol and platform. And yet ‘blockchain’ is positioned as a 
‘disintermediating’ technology aimed at disrupting monopolies. I sought to explain the ways in 
which the project, more specifically Ethereum inventor Vitalik Buterin, is able to differentiate 
the Ethereum platform from other forms of platform intermediation that it seeks to disrupt. This 
is largely through the idea of ‘trustlessness’, that the Ethereum protocol and platform is 
beyond the control of anyone, including the inventor himself. Decentralisation as entailing 
trustlessness and these conditions as being the main differentiation from other platforms 
shows a great deal about what matters to a blockchain sensibility. The argument for 
trustlessness also works to position the Ethereum protocol itself as a form of neutral substrate 
through which any protocol, currency or system can be designed, deployed and enforced. I 
argue that this construction of neutrality is based on the very ideas of non-human trustless 
autonomous systems that I disassemble in Chapter 4. It also places the onus of such claims 
of disintermediation and disruption heavily on questions of protocol governance as became 
clear and discussed in Chapter 6.  
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My analysis of pre-Bitcoin history in the meantime points to other important development 
pathways, highlighting hopes for blockchain as an infrastructure that might circumvent 
censorship, sanctions and other forms of geo-political control of network flows. This history is 
one that is critical of specific authorities and forms of control, and that understands 
decentralisation as a strategy rather than an aim in and of itself. It is a vision that is reflected 
in ambitions for Ethereum (and blockchain more broadly) to facilitate a ‘Web 3.0’ to 
‘redecentralise’ the Internet such that it is no longer dominated by a select few companies, 
such as Google, Amazon and Facebook. The aim of such a use of blockchain is to disrupt 
existing business models of the Internet that rely on large-scale data gathering and 
monopolies both technically and economically. The disruption proposed in blockchain here is 
that by decentralising data storage and verification, data monopolies would be made 
technically impossible, and by incorporating economics into the protocol design, some level of 
economic independence might be achieved such that network infrastructures would no longer 
be dependent on extractive business models. There are nevertheless significant challenges to 
such a vision for blockchain, in terms of protocol governance as well as in the complexity of 
incorporating economic dynamics in the protocol in what I discuss as ‘tokenisation’ of 
decentralised technologies.  
I discussed tokenisation by focusing on two points; first, the complexity that protocols are 
opened up to when economic dynamics are incorporated in their function, issues that the field 
of ‘cryptoeconomics’ grapples with; and second, the shift in political economic assumptions in 
network culture that tokenisation brings about. In generalising the Bitcoin architecture, 
Ethereum platformised the capacity to create decentralised value tokens introduced in Bitcoin: 
new blockchain projects that did not have a sufficient network to run a decentralised currency 
could ‘bootstrap’ the Ethereum network to launch new tokens, using a simple Smart Contract. 
Furthermore, the Ethereum architecture also generalised the use and function of tokens, 
making these the ‘fuel’ of a decentralised computational network, running Smart Contracts 
and means for governing organisations (DAOs). The intention of internalising economic 
dynamics, as mentioned above, is to achieve network security properties by encouraging 
computational contribution to the network as well as the possibility of a certain economic 
autonomy for the protocols by creating an internal economy. However, a key insight and 
argument I make is that that by incorporating economic dynamics into the security model of 
the protocol, the protocol itself is opened up to all manner of economic dynamics and 
complexities which challenges any deterministic claims made of the security properties.  
A second observation of the consequences of tokenisation was the ways this significant new 
element in protocol design affects the political economic assumptions of network culture more 
generally, and the imagined use-cases of blockchain. Pre-Bitcoin network culture was largely 
defined by the idea of networks as facilitating flows, and as representing a form of abundance 
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through the near-zero cost of digital copies. This was a foundation for a certain critique of 
property, in particular intellectual property (cf. Terranova, 2004; Coleman, 2009; Söderberg 
and Daoud, 2012; Rifkin, 2014; Arvanitakis and Fredriksson, 2016). With the invention of 
decentralised digital tokens in Bitcoin and the generalisation of their use in Ethereum, the 
tools for designing digital scarcity were also decentralised, which, I argue, orientates ideas 
and use-cases towards ever more fine-grained determination of property and property rights 
and their enforcement – a subtle but significant shift in the political economic assumptions in 
decentralised network culture, and one that directs a blockchain sensibility towards particular 
kinds of use-cases and projects.  
 
7.3  Dissensus and indeterminacy 
In this section, I describe and discuss the main findings from my third and final ‘cut’ on what 
matters politically in blockchain, proposing the concept of the dissensible to describe the 
ongoing possibility of different sensibilities, their potential incompatibility, and the question of 
their resolution. When both Bitcoin and Ethereum faced crises around development 
pathways, this raised the issue of who is to determine decentralised systems in the first place. 
This turned the attention of the blockchain industry more generally towards protocol 
governance and the question of, ‘Who is responsible for making the decision on how to make 
decisions?’ (Kreutler, 2018). If Bitcoin, Ethereum and blockchain were indeed a form of 
disintermediation, whereby decentralised, trustless protocols would replace the need for 
authorities, then the protocols themselves would also need to be determined in a 
decentralised trustless manner. I have described these crises and debates as a re-
emergence of the political introducing the notion of the dissensible to point towards 
compatible sensibilities and their negotiation. I analyse them as a renegotiation of the 
purpose, aims and implications of blockchain consensus in response to the re-emergence of 
‘dissensus’ – that through these crises, the communities in and around Bitcoin and Ethereum 
and the blockchain industry grappled with ways to accommodate for dissensibilities, in a 
manner that nevertheless would be consistent with a blockchain sensibility, rearticulating 
decentralisation, trust and consensus in the process. I have done this by tracing through the 
conflicts, describing the ways in which open, collaborative coding processes of git and GitHub 
became foregrounded as governance mechanisms, and how the idea of ‘forking’ code, 
blockchains and projects become a means for resolving dissensus, what I describe as a 
‘dissensus mechanism’ in the field.  
I introduced the notion of the dissensible as a concept to describe differing sensibilities of 
what matters. I describe the Bitcoin scaling conflict therefore as entailing differing 
understandings of what matters in terms of increasing the capacity of the network, but also as 
an expansion of what matters in terms of Blockchain protocol design more generally – from 
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the protocol itself to include hidden and not-so-hidden power dynamics, mining hardware and 
centralisation of mining, company affiliations, currency holdings, and stakes in different 
outcomes, different priorities in terms of development pathways, and so on. One insight 
gained from this description was the way in which Bitcoin protocol governance was 
foregrounded as mattering for claims of decentralisation. Descriptions began to include 
economics in order to argue for ‘decentralisation’ at the level of protocol governance, arguing 
that not only developers and miners but also holders of bitcoin have a say in the direction of 
protocol development, as the value of the system is dependent on their use of the system. I 
suggest that this is a strenuous claim that nevertheless points to some of the ways that 
‘decentralisation’ remains a main concern and reason for the system, all of which came to 
matter in questions of who gets to determine ‘Bitcoin’ in the first place. It is a question of the 
limits of the design space in terms of protocol design concerned with and dependent on 
‘decentralisation’. A key insight here is that the claims and desired properties of 
‘decentralisation’ on a protocol level, namely that it be beyond the control of authorities, is 
nevertheless severely affected by centralisation elsewhere, for example in terms of mining 
hardware or currency holdings. This issue is addressed in several ways, one of which is to 
seek further decentralisation in these other areas, which begs the question of limits of what 
should be considered to matter, and be part of the ‘design space’ of the protocol, or what 
should be taken care of by other means. Indeed, an issue of limitations to how much 
blockchain can or should determining things (transactions, or consensus more generally) that 
I discuss in 7.4 below.  
The Bitcoin scaling conflict highlighted different understandings of the aim of Bitcoin that can 
be gleaned in discussions from even the early days; namely whether the purpose of a 
decentralised payment system is as a strategy to circumvent authorities and ‘formidable 
adversaries’, or whether the priority should be to compete with existing payment systems in 
terms of speed, seeking mainstream adoption and recognition from regulators. The two 
positions are not entirely mutually exclusive, but emphasise different approaches to 
authorities and regulation in particular, and in terms of priorities in the technical development 
that became increasingly incompatible.192 I describe how attempts at conjuring the original 
author(ity) played in to the conflict when Australian businessman Craig Wright claimed to be 
Satoshi Nakamoto, the inventor of Bitcoin, aligning with the development pathway promoted 
by Bitcoin Foundation members Jon Matonis and Gavin Andresen. This attempt was thwarted 
as Craig Wright failed to produce the only kind of evidence that might have been acceptable 
to a community formed around the possibility to eliminate authority through trustless 
                                                       
192 – a difference in vision for Bitcoin as a project, which could be summarised as legal recognition versus a ‘Darknet’. 
In this thesis I have avoided discussions of Bitcoin and the ‘Darknet’, however, because it opens up a series of new 
debates around the use of bitcoin for illegal activities, legislation and so on which, though related, are beyond the 
immediate scope of this thesis. 
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architectures and decentralisation, namely cryptographic proof. The incident brought to light 
the strongly anti-authoritarian tendencies in Bitcoin and blockchain sensibility. 
In my discussion of the Bitcoin scaling conflict I highlight how what might be perceived as 
purely technical decisions embody particular priorities and development pathways that can 
quickly become hugely politicised – and, conversely, how differences and disagreements are 
often construed as information security questions in the community. This serves to 
depoliticise decisions that might entail broader questions about who is best served by a given 
decision, instead framing the debates in the realm of security concerns that are considered 
neutral and beyond special interests. The question of whether to increase capacity by 
changing the protocol and increasing blocksizes or whether to increase capacity by enabling 
other layers, ‘lightning network’ and ‘sidechains’ and so on also became a question of 
different priorities in terms of a project of decentralisation – whether to compete with existing 
systems along existing terms such as speed and convenience, generally associated with an 
increase in blocksize, or whether to prioritise decentralisation at a protocol level representing 
an alternative to existing payment systems along questions of governance and 
decentralisation instead. These different positions were muddled by different affiliations with 
companies and interests in the outcomes, whereby, for example, the Bitcoin developers 
advocating to keep the current limit on blocksize on the basis of protocol level decentralisation 
tended to be working with the company Blockstream who, in the meantime, were developing 
alternative solutions for scaling and capacity. I then describe the eventual resolution through 
the Bitcoin Cash hard fork leading to two incompatible versions of Bitcoin.  
In my discussion of the Ethereum DAO hack I highlighted how the crisis, and fork that 
followed, challenged one of the main preconditions and promises of a disinterested, 
algorithmic mode of determinacy, namely immutability. Decentralisation, code and 
cryptography were supposed to ensure that the blockchain could not be controlled and would 
execute exactly as coded, which required that the code and the blockchain be immutable. The 
DAO hack and subsequent hard fork by the Ethereum Foundation demonstrated that what is 
written in immediately executing code might not play out as intended, that intentions indeed 
are important and that Smart Contract code, as well as the blockchain itself, can be corrected 
and controlled by human decisions; the question is simply by whom and under what 
conditions. I describe how the decision of the Ethereum Foundation to hard fork therefore 
caused major reconsideration of the purposes and intent of decentralised systems. Where the 
Ethereum project had distinguished itself as a platform beyond the control of anyone, 
including the Ethereum Foundation and Vitalik Buterin, the inventor himself, the hard fork for 
some represented a major disappointment of that promise. I discussed the role of ‘forking’ in 
resolving this issue in a way that would be consistent with ideas of decentralisation, namely 
as a dissensus mechanism. Those who were unhappy with the Ethereum Foundation fork 
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retained the previous version of the Ethereum blockchain as ‘Ethereum Classic’, such that 
there would be two versions of Ethereum entailing two visions for what matters in terms of the 
Ethereum blockchain platform, and indeed how dissensus should be resolved. For some, the 
solution was to expand the remit of an algorithmic mode of consensus, while for others the 
hack became a reason to address more carefully the relationship between blockchain 
systems and complex social processes, a ‘social contract’. A key insight of tracing through 
debates in and around The DAO hack, therefore, is that its resolution emphasised different 
understandings of decentralisation, trustlessness and control, one aiming to extend the form 
of determinacy suggested in the consensus algorithms to protocol governance itself, in what 
is called on-chain governance, and one that includes the possibility of ‘the social’ to determine 
aspects of how protocols should develop whereby forking operates as a form of vote. This 
latter perspective retains the claim of a system beyond control of authorities, now no longer 
conveying that authority to an algorithmic process, but instead understanding the system 
architecture to facilitate decentralised social determination – on the basis that protocol 
changes by developers rely on adoption by miners, full nodes and those using the systems.  
I draw on some of Mouffe’s analyses of liberal institutions whereby the understanding of these 
as ‘universal’ mediums through which politics might play out in the meantime depoliticises 
contestation of these, reconfiguring the political into a moral question (Mouffe, 2005, pp. 69–
89). Contestation that happens outside of what are understood as the legitimate forms 
established by liberal institutions are labelled as bad and immoral on the basis of being 
undemocratic. I compare this reconfiguration of the political to blockchain systems. 
Blockchain, as a different form of proposition for a neutral substrate on top of or through 
which difference might be negotiated brings with it its own ‘legitimate’ forms of contestation. 
No longer a moral question, in blockchain, the legitimate form that dissensus can take is as a 
network security question – whether a given action is a bug or a feature, an attack or exploit. 
Addressing all behavioural aspects as network security concerns allows the system to 
continue to be understood as neutral and universal, rather than entailing and enforcing certain 
understandings of what should or should not be allowed. Both the scaling conflict and The 
DAO hack in the meantime pointed to the limits of the idea of neutral, universal systems. The 
ability to fork the project reference client and blockchain largely represented the resolution to 
such issues in ways that would remain consistent with ideas of decentralisation and 
openness.  
The importance of protocol governance is not merely a practical issue of who gets to decide 
and on what basis, but rather addresses the very core of the argument of a decentralised, 
trustless technology. It is what differentiates blockchain from other forms of platform 
intermediation and is the basis of its claim as ‘disintermediating’. Addressing governance 
adequately, not as a final algorithmic resolution to authority in the abstract, but in concrete 
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terms for specific situations – for example, a Web 3.0 – might very well position the 
technology in interesting and powerful ways in relation to existing corporate or institutional 
‘authorities’. This raises the question of what kind of determinacy is the most appropriate for 
different kinds of spaces and concerns. The Bitcoin scaling conflict and DAO exploit were two 
events that raised the question of limits to the specific method of determining things 
represented in consensus algorithms and blockchain systems. I would like to argue that this 
does not necessitate nor validate the assumption of ‘human’ control, but instead that there is 
still much to understand about the limitations and possibilities of algorithmic mediation in and 
among other methods for determining things, processes and relationships.  
 
7.4  Limits, edges and relationships 
The question of limits, edges and relationships kept coming up as an unresolved question in 
the three ‘cuts’ that I have articulated in this thesis: firstly, the limits to what can and should be 
determined through an algorithmic sensibility, the edges of such a determinacy and its 
relationship to other determining agencies and systems and indeed its non-relation to the 
insensible; secondly, the importance of the already existing, yet mostly unacknowledged 
relationships with existing diversity of economic, monetary, legal and political systems, and 
therefore the edges and limitations of what different protocol designs can or should involve in 
those fields; and thirdly, the negotiation over the limits of what should or should not matter in 
an open, decentralised protocol and how such negotiations are governed and resolved. One 
of the main, and arguably cross-disciplinary, contributions of this thesis is to raise this 
question of limits and edges as an important question for decentralised open blockchain 
systems to address and articulate – pointing towards the need also to address and shape 
relationships to pre-existing systems and contexts more explicitly, whether enforcing these, 
disrupting them, being dependent upon them or otherwise. I therefore briefly address this 
underlying thread more explicitly, before concluding the overall thesis by suggesting further 
areas of research.  
The issue of limits, edges and relationships first comes up in the analysis and discussion of 
limits to ‘trustlessness’. Analysing the protocols of Bitcoin and Ethereum highlighted how 
claims made of these can indeed be read as true in some instances and for some purposes 
but not for others. Here, I was faced with the question of the exact limits to such claims that I 
discussed in 4.1.2 specifically in terms of trustlessness and 4.1.3 in terms of decentralisation. 
I analysed where they came to matter in terms of correction and enforcement; which precise 
aspects of a specific protocol design should be ‘trustless’ and ‘decentralised’ in order to 
achieve the desired properties and effects, instead of assuming, as much of the industry 
seemed want to, that general statements could be made about these. There was a tendency 
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to describe the condition of a system that simply was not true in terms of interactions with it. I 
found some explanation to this widespread tendency by tracing through politicised histories of 
decentralised networks. I drew on the example of file-sharing networks in particular, and 
found that there was a logic at play here whereby the file-sharing networks themselves, by 
being decentralised, were indeed used as a strategy to make these resilient to authorities’ 
attempts at shutting them down, but that this did not translate into such resilience for 
individuals who regardless would be arrested and prosecuted. What I read in this was a seed 
of what was to become a widespread tendency in blockchain to affiliate with a given system 
and the condition of a system over and above the individual engagement and uses of it; the 
grounds for what was expressed on the Bitcoin developers’ mailing list as the difference 
between the ‘perfect system’ and ‘mushy humans’. What became clear was that what might 
be considered true for the given system, for example ‘trustlessness’, is not necessarily true for 
those using it. I raise the issue of limits, edges and relationships in terms of the protocols, 
then, to argue for the need to make specific the claims and aims of open decentralised 
systems – for who exactly they are trustless and decentralised and what trustlessness and 
decentralisation is supposed to achieve more precisely. That is not to say that they need to be 
trustless and decentralised for each and every context, but rather to argue for some 
consideration of what might be the appropriate uses of ‘trustlessness’ and ‘decentralisation’ 
as technical and political strategies to achieve certain effects, rather than as aims in and of 
themselves.  
The question of limits, edges and relationships came up secondly when articulating and 
analysing the form of determinacy sought through the employment of cryptographic hashing 
and decentralisation. The configuration of these elements was based on an understanding of 
an objective system as a system beyond control. This form of ‘objectivity’, created by 
assembling such a ‘truth machine’, entailed that anything not determined through such 
trustless mechanisms might be dubious, and in the meantime entailed a demand for 
expansion of such a form of determinacy. This was evident in two examples; firstly, the 
question of Smart Contracts and the necessity of expanding their remit to physical objects 
such as locks and so on, in order for the immediately executing laws of code to be effective; 
and secondly, in responses to The DAO fork in Ethereum that demanded that the governance 
of protocols also be determined in and through such ‘truth machine’ mechanisms. Both of 
these examples pointed to the question of the limits to what can and should be determined by 
‘blockchain’ and to the unresolved issue of the relationship between such mechanisms and 
other forms of determinacy, or indeed, the indeterminate and insensible. In part, this could be 
articulated as an issue of infinite regression in a pursuit of a resolution to the issue of the 
dissensible: a consensus algorithm to determine consensus, which would require a 
consensus algorithm to determine consensus about the consensus algorithm, and so on – 
namely the problem that was raised and being grappled with in both the Bitcoin scaling 
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conflict and the Ethereum DAO exploit. But the question of infinite regression is a conceptual 
and hypothetical one. More urgent, real and important is the problem that by assuming the 
resolution of authority and the political in a ‘truth machine’, one delegitimises any other 
determining agency as well as the insensible, in essence recreating an algorithmic authority 
that determines things on the basis of, in the case of proof-of-work, competitive, and 
probabilistically decentralised hashing cycles. The question of limits, edges and relationships 
here is one of addressing more deliberately what might be appropriate uses of such a method 
for determining things and relationships and with what aims. By making such methods 
specific and limited to specific uses, it thereby also opens the possibility to address more 
deliberately how such methods in turn relate to other forms of determining things (whether 
existing legal systems, economic or monetary conditions or otherwise). In response to this 
question, I look to rescue some of the particular disruptive potentials of a blockchain 
sensibility – in particular, to foreground a main disruptive aim, namely Web 3.0 and the aim of 
making mass surveillance-based internet business models technically and economically 
unfeasible. Such an aim requires a specific application of blockchain, less as a solution to 
authority and the political in general, and more as a proposition for different kind of internet 
infrastructure and governance mechanisms. 
The need to incorporate and determine more and more things through a deterministic protocol 
in the meantime opens up such a protocol to all manner of dynamics raising the question of 
limits, edges and relationships in terms of what matters in the security models in the design of 
open decentralised network protocols. The remit of blockchain protocols are often discussed 
in a hermetic manner, a given protocol assessed on its own terms, and relationships to other 
systems largely limited to an articulation of attack vectors in dystopian or utopian speculation 
that assumes blockchain to completely replace existing systems. In the meantime, blockchain 
projects and protocols are built within the context of, in response to, and are dependent on 
existing socio-political and economic contexts, systems and dynamics. The relationships to 
such other spaces and dynamics matter significantly, although they tend to be excluded from 
discussion and analysis exactly because they do not correspond with claims of trustlessness. 
I discuss these edges and relationships more specifically in relation to, firstly, claims of 
decentralisation and disintermediation, and secondly in relation to exchange rates and the 
network security assumptions of the profitability of mining. During the Bitcoin scaling conflict, 
new things came to matter in terms of protocol design, namely their governance and the 
extent to which their governance could be argued to be decentralised, and therefore trustless. 
In response, there were efforts to measure levels of decentralisation in terms of protocol 
governance, including contributions to core clients, mining, mining hardware and so on – 
expanding the realm of what matters in terms of the security model itself. This raises the 
question of the edges of what matters, in terms of decentralisation and the security model of, 
in this case, proof-of-work, as the protocol is dependent on its maintenance, miners 
 217 
incentives, electricity costs, mining hardware, chip production and so on. All of which could 
potentially matter in terms of network security, if these were not determined and taken care of 
through other means and reasons. For example, the reason for why the rather centralised 
miners do not collude to cheat the Bitcoin network might have as much to do with questions of 
reputation, legitimacy and so on than the immediate value of their bitcoin holdings. Such 
complexities are the subject of the field of cryptoeconomics that looks to model and 
operationalise such assessments and behaviours through game theory and psychology. 
Here, also, is an issue with limits and the mostly unacknowledged forms of relationships to 
the fields and dynamics that are not incorporated into the protocol. This came up largely in 
curious attempts at dismissing the importance of exchange rates for blockchain protocols. 
The incorporation of tokens into decentralised protocols is argued to ensure certain security 
properties (making it expensive to attack and reward contributions). This was informed by 
hopes and ambitions for a certain economic autonomy to be gained by incorporating tokens. 
Creating a token is not the same as creating an economy, however. Instead, it draws in new 
forms of dependencies on monetary and economic dynamics beyond the protocol.  
Overall, then, what was highlighted was the importance of articulating such limits, edges and 
in particular the relationships that are formed, whether deliberately or inadvertently, in order 
for blockchain to regain a situated meaning and purpose. There is much to be disentangled 
and resolved her in terms of claims of ‘disintermediation’, and much that could be explored 
more deliberately in terms of relations to existing systems (economic, legal, geo-political and 
so on) and the effects on one another. In terms of a blockchain sensibility, the projects where 
relationships and purposes are indeed articulated the most clearly are those that relate to 
privacy, censorship and network control – the explicit and deliberate efforts to develop 
networks of communication and value transfer that cannot be shut down by specific state and 
financial authorities. Note that such projects do not have to imply an assumption of having 
resolved all issues of authority through ‘trustlessness and decentralisation’ in order to be 
achieved, but they do need to consider questions of governance of such means of authority-
resistant communication and value transfer in order to survive in the longer term. Instead of 
resolving the problem of consensus without authority in absolute abstract terms, then, it is 
enough to solve it for specific purposes, and in the process articulate a new form of network 
space and governance of such space that might indeed disrupt existing political and financial 
authorities.  
 
7.5  Scope and further research 
With this thesis I have sought to address foundational questions of the political in relation to a 
technology that seeks to ‘solve’ it in ways that would remain consistent with rigour and 
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practices in computer sciences, political and social sciences alike. The scope of this thesis 
has therefore been limited to this effort of shifting and clarifying some of the terms of the 
debates about blockchain technologies. This has meant that, while I have gone into detail in 
my analysis of certain key concepts, their provenance and operationalisation in technical 
efforts and events, there are questions that I have dealt with on very abstract basis, only 
hinting towards empirical material, the most glaring of which is a ‘user’ side to the protocols 
and applications. Just to mention a couple of examples: to understand the attraction of 
‘decentralisation’ more broadly beyond an immediate Cypherpunk and blockchain cultures; 
what specifically attracts application developers to develop on decentralised platforms rather 
than existing app stores (and what this says about ‘disruption’); the practical usability of 
decentralised payment infrastructures to actually circumvent sanctions or banking blockades. 
I conclude this chapter suggesting a few more possible areas of research and theoretical 
work from this thesis. 
In my discussion of blockchain protocols I argue that the cryptography, decentralisation and 
economic incentives that form a blockchain ‘truth machine’ cannot be considered ‘neutral’ and 
‘objective’ but rather enforce a very particular form of consensus, which matters. I argue 
therefore that the protocol itself is a form of intermediation. This implies that ‘mediation’ 
cannot not simply be addressed as an unnecessary barrier, or cost, that needs to be 
‘disintermediated’, but in fact matters qualitatively for how things come to matter and are 
resolved. This includes the protocol itself as a form of intermediation, that it changes things – 
the quality and type of relationships – rather than simply facilitating these. There are, 
therefore, significant philosophical, social, technical and political questions that would benefit 
from further research in terms of the qualitative effects different of forms of intermediation, in 
particular by addressing these as sensibilities rather than systems. This could be, for 
example, in terms of the question of ‘trust’ and ‘trustlessness’, whether and when ‘trustless’ 
systems indeed might enable trust, by cryptographically guaranteeing a certain neutral terrain 
given a specific context, or when and under what conditions it might do the opposite, 
producing trustlessness by militarizing relationships. Another might be on the question of 
autonomy and autonomous networks and how network technologies relate to experiences of 
control, being in control or being at risk.  
Another area of further research is opened by my discussion of blockchain sensibilities. I 
suggest that what holds a blockchain assemblage together is not an affiliation with particular 
extreme Right or capitalist economic ideas, but rather a politicised anti-authoritarian history of 
decentralised network infrastructures that tie in to and are attractive to different economic 
ideas. More specifically, I suggest that this opens up an appreciation of the ‘platformisation’ 
and ‘tokenisation’ of decentralised infrastructures as a possible disruption to existing internet 
platform economies. This has implications for, and suggests important further research in the 
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areas of infrastructure governance, digital finance, platform economics and platform 
capitalism, as an urgent task of shaping the stakes and possibilities in the fields. If indeed 
technical architectures that make centralised control of data impossible are ‘platformised’, 
disrupting the possibility of data monopolies, such an agenda would require significant 
theoretical and empirical work, not only from technical sciences, but also from social sciences 
that might build towards such agendas and assess whether and how such a possibility might 
be enacted. Furthermore, if indeed ‘tokenisation’ might enable if not ‘a system that pays for 
itself’ then at least a different set of economic dynamics through which to run global network 
infrastructures, such an agenda demands significant theoretical and empirical work to shape 
how such new digital economies might turn out. This could range from exploring the business 
models appearing in the space, and how they might look different to those enabled through 
‘surveillance-based’ platforms, to the remit for a commons-based approach to the forms of 
relationships assumed, enabled or ignored in cryptoeconomics, to give just one example. I 
argue that there is significant space within a blockchain sensibility for such agendas to be 
addressed from multiple different economic, political and indeed ethical perspectives.  
One of the main ways that ‘blockchain’ is considered different from major internet platforms 
such as Facebook, Google and Amazon is that it is ‘decentralised’ and ‘trustless’. While much 
can be and has been said about the limits of these claims (in this thesis as well as in a 
growing body of critical literature), in my discussion of the two major blockchain networks 
Bitcoin and Ethereum these proclaimed differences do come to matter, especially in questions 
of protocol governance. On a protocol level in blockchain there remains a certain sensibility 
about how code and data is handled that indeed can present a technical, economic and 
political disruption. But this also means that the governance of such protocols becomes a 
major issue in the writing of the code and would need to be addressed in ways that achieve 
the desired results of decentralisation and trustlessness – which, at present, are most 
strongly articulated for questions of privacy and censorship resilience but otherwise remain 
vaguely defined, assumed to be important in and of themselves. Blockchain is one of the few 
technical fields where governance questions are taken very seriously at a structural level and 
is part of engineering decisions. While governance is a big topic in blockchain debates, there 
is a significant lack of in-depth research, empirically and theoretically on the issue, which 
would benefit, in particular, from further research from social sciences and humanities. As an 
example, the question of accountability in particular is lacking, probably due to an assumption 
that if authority has been dealt with through decentralisation, questions of accountability are 
no longer pressing. There is scope for accountability to be addressed, both within a 
blockchain sensibility around the notion of transparency and also for more fundamental and 
philosophical ideas and research on the question in relation to decentralised infrastructural 
intermediation.  
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Finally, there is significant further theoretical work that could be pursued for a new materialist-
informed political theory. In this thesis, I have drawn heavily on work by Karen Barad (Barad, 
2007) and Jacques Rancière (Rancière, 2006, 2010) in order to articulate an approach to the 
political in relation to open, decentralised systems that also claim determinate properties. I 
have in the process suggested (and assumed significant compatibility between) Rancière’s 
notion of sensibility (Rancière, 2010, pp. 27–44) and Barad’s sensing and measuring 
apparatuses (Barad, 2007, pp. 132–185) – such that Rancière’s conceptualisation of the 
political as a redistribution of the sensible can be understood as part of an onto-
epistemological determining process, although of different kinds of scales and complexity 
than in Barad’s examples of specific scientific experiments. Sensibility as well as the political 
thereby become possible and happen through sensibilities, a sensing device, consensus 
mechanism and human perception alike, although in significantly different qualitative ways, 
with differing material outcomes. These qualitative differences become the main site of 
question, then, rather than a priori assuming a site for the political proper or scientific proper; 
objectivity and subjectivity. The insensible and dissensible can then be explored as 
challenges to any singular, linear or complete understanding of what matters and how the 
sensible becomes material. There is much to research further in such an articulation of these 
two theorists, in particular how materiality and temporality affect such developments, how 
different modes of determination in turn affect one another and the ways in which framing 
networks in terms of sensibilities relate to the more common approach of addressing these as 
systems and system diagrams. The insensible and the dissensible also suggest that rather 
than disruption, after which the political moment entails a ‘redistribution of the sensible’ and 
‘inclusion’ of ‘externalities’ into such a sensibility, ‘forking’ and the resulting questions of 
compatibility or incompatibility might suggest a new and different basis from which to explore 
and articulate the political. 
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Appendix: Empirical sources 
 
Table 1: interviews 
Interviews Date Topic 
Denis Jaromil Roio, Dyne 28.01.2016 The politics of the Bitcoin community and 
clarifying factions in the early days of the block 
size conflict. 
Vlad Zamfir, Ethereum 20.07.2016 Ethereum DAO hack, forking and governance 
in decentralized systems. 
Enric Duran, Faircoin 29.11.2015 Faircoin idea, history and project. 
Matthew Slater, currency activist 04.03.2016 Faircoin community decision-making 
processes, “internal” community versus 
“external” market-based exchange rates. 
Pikette, Aurea Social Faircoin 
welcome committee 
07.03.2016 The Aurea Social FairCoop centre, affiliated 
Faircoop projects and history. 
Sebas, Faircoin Girona local 
node 
11.03.2016 Girona Faircoin node, Faircoin governance 
structure and relationships to FaircCoop and 
other “Fair” projects. 
Ale, Faircoin Barcelona local 
node 
01.11.2016 Faircoin local nodes and organizational issues. 
 
I conducted only a limited number of interviews early on in my fieldwork. This was because it 
quickly became clear that there was substantial work to do in gathering and analysing already 
available online interviews and material before I would be able to develop meaningful 
questions beyond the existing information. And so my empirical focus for this PhD has been 
online community discussions, email lists, code repositories, statements and blogs of key 
figures. The majority of the empirical work consisted in studying the development and online 
discussions around the technical architectures of what was still a very new and emerging set 
of projects and communities. These are detailed below. 
 
 
Table 2: onl ine sources and empir ical material 
Source Reasoning Material 
GitHub 
A platform 
for 
managing 
and 
collaborating 
on code 
projects 
An important indicator of how 
alive a project might be was 
their respective GitHub 
repositories: how recently 
these had been modified, how 
many contributors and 
discussions there were.  
Bitcoin https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin  
Bitcoin cash 
https://github.com/bitcoincashorg/bitcoincash.org  
Ethereum https://github.com/ethereum  
Ethereum Classic https://github.com/ethereumclassic  
and https://github.com/ethereumproject 
Faircoin https://github.com/faircoin/faircoin  
Email l ists Changes to the Bitcoin 
protocol would be discussed 
on the Bitcoin developers’ 
mailing list. The discussion list 
is for broader Bitcoin related 
discussions and the SegWit 
list is for  
Bitcoin developers mailing list 
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/  
Bitcoin email list for discussions 
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-discuss/  
Bitcoin email list for segwit2x 
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-
segwit2x  
Medium 
publishing 
platform 
The blog platform Medium 
became a main site where 
projects and key individuals in 
the industry would articulate 
their reasons for pursuing 
various development pathways 
and explain the ideas behind 
their work.  
In particular but not limited to:  
Vitalik Buterin, founder of Ethereum 
https://medium.com/@VitalikButerin  
Vlad Zamfir, Ethereum developer, developer of DAO fork 
and proof-of-stake https://medium.com/@Vlad_Zamfir 
Stephan Tual, founder of Ethereum company Slock.it 
https://medium.com/@stephantual  
Valery Vavilov, CEO of Bitfury 
https://medium.com/@valeryvavilov 
Mike Hearn, ex-Bitcoin developer, 
https://medium.com/@OctSkyward   
Hackernoon https://medium.com/@hackernoon 
Twitter Twitter is another key site 
where many discussions, 
organizing and commentary in 
the cryptocurrency and 
blockchain community. It was 
In particular but not limited to: 
Peter Todd, Bitcoin developer, 
https://twitter.com/peterktodd; Gavin Andresen, Bitcoin 
developer https://twitter.com/gavinandresen; Jonas 
Schnelli, Bitcoin developer, 
a good place to get a sense of 
the main disputes and 
debates, and how much 
engagement there was with 
different projects. Where I 
have used quotes or explicitly 
drawn on statements on twitter 
these are referenced in the 
text. Discussions also provided 
a more general background 
context to my understanding of 
the blockchain community. 
Listing these key profiles here 
is intended to make visible the 
source of my understanding of 
the dynamics and discussions 
in the blockchain community 
such that my assessments and 
descriptions might be 
scrutinized and so that, in the 
eventuality of any important 
omissions, these might be can 
be highlighted. 
https://twitter.com/_jonasschnelli_; Matt Corallo, Bitcoin 
developer, https://twitter.com/TheBlueMatt; Jeff Garzik, 
Bitcoin developer https://twitter.com/jgarzik; Jon Matonis, 
Bitcoin Foundation, https://twitter.com/jonmatonis; Adam 
Back, from Bitcoin company Blockstream 
https://twitter.com/adam3us; Bitcoin company Blockstream, 
https://twitter.com/Blockstream; Bitcoin Core project, 
https://twitter.com/bitcoincoreorg; Amir Taaki, Bitcoin and 
darkwallet https://twitter.com/Narodism; Denis Jaromil 
Roio, Bitcoin and Dyne, https://twitter.com/jaromil; Andreas 
Antonopoulos, Bitcoin advocate, 
https://twitter.com/aantonop; BitNovosti, Bitcoin news for 
Russian speaking Bitcoin communities, 
https://twitter.com/bit_novosti; Contentious, self-proclaimed 
inventor of Bitcoin, Craig Wright, 
https://twitter.com/ProfFaustus; Jameson Lopp, Bitcoin 
node counter and prolific commentator 
https://twitter.com/lopp; Chandler Guo, Bitcoin miner and 
investor https://twitter.com/ChandlerGuo; Jihan Wu, 
Bitmain, Bitcoin mining hardware company 
https://twitter.com/JihanWu ; Roger Ver, Bitcoin advocate, 
https://twitter.com/rogerkver; Izabella Kaminska, Financial 
Times journalist and prominent critic of cryptocurrencies 
https://twitter.com/izakaminska; Stacy Herbert, broadcaster 
of the Keiser Report, early adopter and supporter of 
cryptocurrencies, https://twitter.com/stacyherbert; Max 
Keiser of the Keiser Report, early adopter and supporter of 
cryptocurrencies, https://twitter.com/maxkeiser; Aaron van 
Wirdum, cryptocurrency journalist, 
https://twitter.com/AaronvanW; Tuur Demeester, Bitcoin 
advocate, https://twitter.com/TuurDemeester; Jimmy Song, 
Bitcoin advocate and developer 
https://twitter.com/jimmysong; Elizabeth Stark, Bitcoin 
entrepreneur, https://twitter.com/starkness; Vitalik Buterin, 
founder of Ethereum, https://twitter.com/VitalikButerin; 
Joseph Lubin, co-founder Ethereum, founder of ConsenSys 
https://twitter.com/ethereumJoseph; Ethereum company 
ConsenSys, https://twitter.com/ConsenSys; Jutta Steiner, 
co-founder Ethereum, CEO of Parity Tech, 
https://twitter.com/jutta_steiner; Ethereum web 3.0 
company Parity Tech, https://twitter.com/ParityTech; Vlad 
Zamfir, Ethereum developer https://twitter.com/VladZamfir; 
Gavin Wood, co-founder Ethereum,  
https://twitter.com/gavofyork; Karl Floersch, Ethereum 
developer, https://twitter.com/karl_dot_tech; Nick Szabo, 
smart contracts inventor https://twitter.com/NickSzabo4; 
Jessi Baker, founder of Provenance, a company using 
Ethereum, https://twitter.com/jessibaker; Vinay Gupta, 
blockchain commentator, theorist and founder of 
Mattereum, https://twitter.com/leashless; Primavera De 
Filippi, blockchain artist and founder of COALA (Coalition of 
Automated Legal Applications, https://twitter.com/yaoeo; 
Gnosis, Ethereum prediction market company,  
https://twitter.com/gnosisPM; Kei Kreutler, blockchain 
organizer, artist and educator, 
https://twitter.com/keikreutler; Amy Castor, blockchain 
journalist, https://twitter.com/ahcastor; Rhian Lewis, 
blockchain developer and commentator 
https://twitter.com/rhian_is ; Ian Grigg, blockchain 
entrepreneur and https://twitter.com/iang_fc; Daniel 
Hassan, developer of Robin Hood and Dark Crystal, 
https://twitter.com/dan_mi_sun; Brett Scott, author on 
finance and blockchain critic 
https://twitter.com/Suitpossum; Enric Duran, Faircoin 
founder, https://twitter.com/EnricDuranG; FairCoop, 
https://twitter.com/Fair_Coop; Thomas Konig, Faircoin 
developer, https://twitter.com/thokon00; Elias Haase, 
founder of B9Lab, https://twitter.com/8bitpal; Jackson 
Palmer, blockchain educator, 
https://twitter.com/ummjackson; Hyperledger blockchain 
project, https://twitter.com/Hyperledger ; Holochain non-
blockchain consensus network, 
https://twitter.com/holochain ; Holo, non-blockchain 
cryptocurrency, https://twitter.com/H_O_L_O_. 
Discussion 
forums 
For Bitcoin in particular, 
discussion about development 
decisions, contentious 
individuals, explanations for 
people’s actions, community 
responses, possible infiltration 
and other rumors would take 
place on discussion forums. 
Bitcointalk, one of the very early Bitcoin discussion forums 
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?   
Reddit: https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/ 
and https://www.reddit.com/r/btc/ 
ycombinator https://news.ycombinator.com/news 
Blockchain 
industry 
Blockchain industry websites 
emerged and would explain 
Coindesk https://www.coindesk.com/  
news 
outlets  
new technical changes, 
reasoning behind as well as 
investment and so on. 
Bitcoin magazine https://bitcoinmagazine.com/  
In particular journalists Aaron van Wirdum, Amy Castor and 
Rachel Rose O’Leary. 
Telegram 
group chat 
application 
Most relevant discussions for 
Faircoin took place on the chat 
application Telegram, 
organized in “assemblies” for 
different aspects of the project.  
The Faircoin assemblies were all open to join. I did not 
participate much beyond introducing myself, instead simply 
observing conversation and comparing understandings and 
decisions with that of other blockchain communities. The 
assemblies that I followed were: “FairCoop”; “FC Circular 
economy”; “Faircoin economy strategy”; “Bank of the 
commons”; “multicurrency eco-system”; “FairCoin CVN 
operators”. 
Video 
archive 
Filmmaker Tomer Kantor 
made an early film about 
cryptocurrencies titled Ulterior 
States: 
http://www.iamsatoshi.com/. 
As part of making the film he 
conducted substantial 
interviews with key Bitcoin and 
cryptocurrency figures from 
very early in the development 
of the field, which he gave me 
access to. 
The interviews I drew on were in particular with:  
Peter Todd 
Elizabeth Stark 
Andreas Antonopoulos 
Matt Corallo 
Ian Grigg 
 
To ground the research further and get a better understanding of the people, industries and 
investors involved I attended local meet-ups and gatherings, initially in London.  
 
Table 3: events 
What event or place Why  
Coinscrum cryptocurrency and 
blockchain meet-ups 
https://www.meetup.com/coinscrum/  
The London Coinscrum meet-ups are a blockchain and 
cryptocurrency community meet-up in London, where new 
projects often present their ideas and progress. 
MIT Medialab and Berkman Centre for 
Internet and Society1 Blockchain 
Workshop at the Millenium Hotel in 
Mayfair, June 2015 
(documentation here: 
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC9L
mf5FfNkSmYMoxhQh5ktA/videos ) 
The third in a series of high profile workshops, previously 
hosted at Stanford and Berkman/MIT, the event covered 
potential implications for law, governance, architecture as 
well as finance. 
Ethereum DevCon 1, Gibson Hall, City of 
London November 2015 
https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/09/24/dev
con-is-back/ 
 
The first Ethereum developer’s conference. The DevCons 
take place every year in different cities across the world. An 
early introduction to the ideas, culture and communities 
taking part or interested in Ethereum. 
NESTA organized 2015 Future Fest Keynote speech by the founder of Ethereum Vitalik Buterin 
and respondent Primavera Di Filippi and an early 
introduction to the ideas and culture of Ethereum. 
Robin Hood London Office The Cooperative Hedge Fund, Robin Hood, ran early 
experiments with blockchain technology in its architecture 
and governance structure and held a series of “offices”, 
small seminars. These would gather blockchain people as 
well as those involved with alternative currency initiatives, 
academia and activism giving a sense of the more activist 
tendencies in the blockchain assemblage.   
 
 
 
                                                       
1 Also sponsored by Deutsche Bank, CERSA, CNRS, LSE, UCL, Oxford University and Cambridge University, SENG 
School of Engineering and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. 
